The final thesis deals with the Leniency programme, as one of the most important instrument of the Office for the Protection of Competition and the European Commission for detecting of cartel agreements. The aim of the thesis is to analyze regulation of the Leniency programme in the Czech Republic, from the practical point of view find out how participants of cartel agreements use the programme and whether it is effective from the view of the Office for the Protection of Competition. The thesis should also involve formation and development of the programme and how it is influenced by European law. The thesis is divided into 4 parts. The first part deals with cartel agreements. The second part focuses on cartel law enforcement which is divided in term of law regulation into public and private enforcement. The third part is the core of the theoretical part of the thesis, it presents in detail the regulation of the Leniency programme within the European Union and in the Czech Republic, there are problems of the program and their possible solutions outlined as well. The fourth part concerns the practical point of view of the Leniency programme, its harmonization among the member states of the European Union and its application in the Czech Republic in decisions of the Office for the Protection of Competition.

本篇論文主要係就我國競爭法規範為本，以國際合作之角度，從競爭法之制度規範及實務執行層面，探討寬恕政策應如何運用於各國執行競爭法規範，以有效偵測，進而防杜國際惡性卡特爾。論文架構可分為五個章節，茲分述如次： 第一章緒論在闡述本文研究的背景說明，確認打擊國際惡性卡特爾為國際競爭法合作最佳探討議題，進而提出本文之問題核心及研究動機、目的，並說明研究範圍及以比較法學及分析法學為本論文研究方法，藉以建立本文的架構與目標。 第二章為闡述國際惡性卡特爾之類型及特徵，並以比較各國立法例之方式，對應各主要國家競爭法所規範聯合行為之類型、豁免（例外許可或除外規定）及制裁方式，以瞭解惡性卡特爾於各國競爭法規範上定位；內容包括歸納及整理各國聯合行類型及制裁方式之立法例，藉以建立惡性卡特爾在國際競爭法規範上的實質內涵、規範特徵，作為本文論述的基礎架構；另深入探討國際惡性卡特爾如何開始、如何執行及運作暨何以規避法律，據以確認寬恕政策作為打擊國際惡性卡特爾之工具價值，以進一步探討於國際合作其間運用之可能性。 第三章係針對於競爭法規範制度內已採行寬恕政策有成效之法域：美國及歐盟為探討分析之對象。不僅就該等法域寬恕政策之內涵，加以詳盡說明，歸納其間之差異，並觀察該等施行實務執行經驗，以瞭解實務執行所面臨之障礙及其執行應用於打擊惡性卡特爾是否確具成效。 第四章從前開執行層面之觀察，探討其應用於國際惡性卡特爾之可行性；並以前開已採行及準備引進寬恕政策之我國為假想對象，進一步深入研析該等國家共同合作打擊國際惡性卡特爾之可行性。並針對縱向運用及橫向聯繫之不同合作模式，以進一步評估運用寬恕政策打擊國際惡性卡特爾之可行性，並一一檢測可能國際合作之途徑，以尋求可能之最佳合作管道及層次。 第五章為結論，主要歸結本文的研究成果，除就該等可行性之評估，歸納出最具高度可能性之最佳合作途徑，提供各國競爭法執法機關執法合作之建議，並對於正擬修法引進寬恕政策之我國競爭法主管機關言，予以取法外國立法例之修法建議，使國內修法趨勢得以兼顧競爭法國際合作觀點，不僅得以藉此有效防杜惡性卡特爾，更能有效拓展國際競爭法合作之空間及提昇國際競爭法合作之執行層次。 / The main idea of this thesis is to explain and study how the leniency policy is applied to fight hard-core cartel in one country and among nations. And the structure of the thesis includes five chapters. The thesis is based on the Fair Trade Law of R.O.C , comparing and analyzing the different regulations of hard-core cartel in the United States and the EU, to identify the characteristics of hard-core cartel and further explore the related issues of enforcement if leniency policy is applied to fight hard -core cartel. The thesis also explains the ways of international cooperation how leniency policy is applied to fight hard-core cartel in vertical application and horizontal connection. Finally the thesis submits that the best way of international cooperation in applying the leniency policy to hard-core cartel. In addition, the thesis also submits the suggestion for R.O.C. which plans to introduce the leniency policy in the Fair Trade Law of R.O.C to fight hard-core cartels.

"Mémoire présenté à la Faculté des études supérieures en vue de l'obtention du grade de Maîtrise en droit (L.L.M.)" / Une personne est injustement condamnée à l'emprisonnement. Elle est victime d'une erreur judiciaire. Plusieurs causes peuvent être à l'origine d'une telle injustice mais malheureusement il est difficile de le prouver. Le système de justice pénale au pays n'est pas à l'abri des condamnations injustifiées et plusieurs innocentes victimes en ont payé le prix. Or, comment une victime d'erreur judiciaire peut-elle prouver son innocence et ainsi recouvrer la liberté à laquelle elle a droit? Certes, l'aveu du coupable ou la découverte d'une nouvelle preuve peuvent servir de moyens de reconnaissance factuelle d'une condamnation injustifiée. Toutefois, certains obstacles procéduraux comme les délais d'appel, les règles d'admissibilité de la preuve nouvelle ou encore le mécanisme de correction des erreurs judiciaires prévu aux articles 696.1 et suivants du Code criminel peuvent compliquer le scénario. Avant le 4 juin 2002, cette dernière procédure était visée par l'article 690 du Code. Toutefois, suite à de nombreuses critiques ainsi qu'à une consultation publique orchestrée par le gouvernement canadien, des modifications législatives ont été apportées à cette procédure. Mais celles-ci sont-elles suffisantes? Nous pensons que certaines des modifications sont grandement appréciables. Cependant, la structure d'évaluation des dossiers et de recommandation des dossiers au ministre de la Justice mériterait la mise en place d'un comité formé d'avocats indépendants pour conseiller ce dernier. Cela est nécessaire afin de réduire à néant tout conflit d'intérêts potentiel de la part du Ministre et d'assurer la transparence du processus en cause. / A person is unjustly condemned to imprisonment. He or she is victim of a wrongful conviction. Many causes can lead to such an injustice but unfortunately, it is hard to prove. The country's criminal justice system makes no exception to wrongful verdicts of guilt and many innocent people have paid the priee. Thus, how can a person victim of a wrongful conviction prove his innocence and recover his rightful freedom? Of course, the confession of the true guilty person, the discovery of new evidence or a special inquiry commission are all ways of recognizing factually an unjust guilty verdict. However, certain procedural obstacles such as appeal delays, rules of admissibility of new evidence or even the procedure for correcting wrongful convictions provided under article 696.1 and following of the Criminal code, can complicate the scenario. Before June 4, 2002, the latter procedure was provided under article 690 of the Code. However, following great criticism as well as a public consultation orchestrated by the Canadian government, legislative modifications were brought to that procedure. Are the modifications made to the procedure sufficient? We believe that some of them are greatly appreciable. However, the evaluation and case recommendation structure to the Minister deserves the creation of a committee constituted by attorneys fully independent of the Minister able to advise him or her. This is necessary in order to fully reduce any potential conflicts of interest by the Minister and would ensure transparence of the process in question.

Die Arbeit untersucht das Problem der Marktmanipulation in komplexen Märkten aus kartell- und kapitalmarktrechtlicher Perspektive am Beispiel des deutschen Großhandelsmarktes für Strom (European Energy Exchange, EEX) mittels einer ökonomischen und rechtlichen Analyse. Es wird aufgezeigt, dass die Behörden bei der Anwendung des Manipulationstatbestandes auf mögliche Verstöße häufig vor Nachweisproblemen stehen, die im Ergebnis zu einer fehlenden Durchsetzung von Sanktionen trotz Tatbestandsmäßigkeit führen können. Dadurch kommt es zu Lücken in der Rechtsdurchsetzung, die den Abschreckungseffekt der Verbotstatbestände erheblich mindern. Zentrale These der Arbeit ist daher, dass das bestehende Sanktionensystem derart weiterentwickelt werden muss, dass es Rückwirkungen bereits auf die Tatbestandsebene entfaltet, die einen Verstoß gegen das Manipulationsverbot schon aus der ex-ante Perspektive unattraktiv machen. Im ersten Teil werden das Marktumfeld sowie der bestehende Rechtsrahmen untersucht und Manipulationsanreize für die Marktteilnehmer sowie das Fehlen effektiver Instrumente zur Rechtsdurchsetzung festgestellt. Die Sektoruntersuchungen der Europäischen Kommission sowie des Bundeskartellamtes bestätigen diesen Befund. Der zweite Teil setzt auf die positive Analyse auf und schlägt Regulierungsinstrumente zur Änderung des Anreizsystems vor. Dabei ist der Fokus anstelle stetig steigender Bußgelder auf Maßnahmen zur Steigerung der Entdeckungswahrscheinlichkeit zu legen. Es wird vorgeschlagen, das bestehende Kronzeugenprogramm auf Manipulationsfälle auszudehnen und mit einem Belohnungssystem für Whistleblower zu kombinieren, um vermehrt Verstöße aufzudecken und den Abschreckungseffekt der Manipulationstatbestände zu erhöhen. Begleitend ist eine effektive Koordinierung der Maßnahmen staatlicher und privater Durchsetzung des Kartellrechts geboten, um Durchsetzungsdefizite zu beseitigen. / The work examines the problem of market manipulation in complex markets from an antitrust and capital market law perspective, using the example of the German wholesale market for electricity (European Energy Exchange, EEX) and applying the methodology of the economic analysis of law. It is shown that authorities applying the ban of market manipulations on potential infringements regularly face problems of proving a breach of the law which may result in a lack of enforcement of sanctions. Considerable gaps in enforcement result that may reduce the deterrent effect of the prohibition significantly. The central thesis of this work is therefore, that an evolution of the existing system of sanctions is required such that it exerts repercussions on market participants´ reasoning that make an offence unattractive already from the ex-ante perspective. In the first section, the market conditions as well as the existing legal framework are examined. As a result of this analysis, incentives for manipulation of the market by market participants and the lack of effective instruments for law enforcement are found. The sector inquiries of both, the European Commission and the German Federal Cartel Office confirm this finding. The second section of the work builds upon the positive analysis and proposes regulatory instruments to change the incentive scheme in the market. The focus is placed on measures that increase the probability of detection and punishment instead of the dogma of consistently increasing fines. The central proposal extends the existing leniency program for cartels on manipulation cases and combines it with a reward system for whistleblowers. This approach proposes an increased probability of detection of market manipulations and thereby boosts the deterrent effect of antitrust law. Also, the effective coordination of public and private antitrust enforcement efforts is a necessary accompanying measure to remedy deficiencies of law enforcement.

Com as mudanças do mundo moderno surgiu uma justificada preocupação global com a crescente prática de delitos contra a ordem econômica e a dificuldade que as autoridades enfrentam para apurá-los. Para socorrê-las surge o acordo de leniência, instrumento de investigação altamente eficaz de ampla aplicação em nações estrangeiras. Mas não por isso, este instituto deve ser importado ao nosso ordenamento tal qual utilizado em terras alienígenas, ignorando-se os direitos do delator e em flagrante desrespeito aos princípios constitucionais. Diante dessa problemática, o presente trabalho tem por objetivo realizar uma análise crítica acerca deste acordo e dos reflexos que provoca no âmbito penal, a fim de serem detectadas as falhas e incongruências de seu procedimento, bem como os seus aspectos inconstitucionais e, com isso, contribuir para a sua adequação ao ordenamento jurídico e seu desenvolvimento como meio de investigação para o combate aos crimes contra a ordem econômica, sobretudo, a formação de cartel. Em vista disso, será feito um estudo inicial sobre a relação entre Direito e Economia, Direito Concorrencial, seus interesses e a necessidade de tutela, inclusive pela via penal, da concorrência pelo Estado. Posteriormente, passar-se-á à análise das condutas anticoncorrenciais e dos crimes contra a ordem econômica, constatando-se os empecilhos para a investigação de tais delitos. A partir deste exame, far-se-á uma apresentação do acordo de leniência, suas origens, sua regulamentação em outros países para, então, a par das preocupações éticas que o circundam, realizar uma apreciação crítica dos efeitos que provoca na esfera penal. Ao final, em concordância com a necessidade de se manter o instituto, o presente trabalho buscará sanar as deficiências da atual legislação sobre o tema e, inclusive, da recémaprovada Lei nº 12.529/2011 , propondo alterações que visam minimizar a discricionariedade, o subjetivismo e a insegurança jurídica que permeiam o acordo, de modo a adequá-lo aos ditames constitucionais e torná-lo mais atraente aos candidatos. / The modern world has undergone changes that justify the global concern with the increasing occurrence of criminal offenses against the economic order and with the difficulty the authorities face to ascertain them by investigation. Precisely to aid the authorities, looms the leniency agreement, a highly effective investigation instrument of broad use in foreign countries. In spite of that, this institute shall not be imported to our legal system as regularly applied abroad ignoring the rights of the delator and of flagrant disrespect to constitutional principles. Before this issue, the current paper has the objective to promote a critical analysis concerning the leniency agreement and the reflexes it triggers in the criminal field, in order to evidence the flaws and incompatibility of its procedure, as well as its unconstitutional aspects, by that, be able to contribute with its suitability to the criminal systemand to its development as a mean of investigation to fight crimes against the economic order, overall, the formation of cartel. Due to that, an initial study is proposed about the relation between Law and Economics, Competition Law, their interests and the need of tutelage containing the criminal manner and the competition by the State. Later, an analysis of anti-competitive conducts and of crimes against the economic order containing the impediments to the investigation of such criminal offenses. Resulting from this examination, there will be a presentation of the leniency agreement, its origins, regulations in other countries, so that, in addition to the ethical concerns that surround the agreement, be possible the fulfillment of critical appraisal to the effects it causes in the criminal field. Finally, in accordance to the need to support the institute, the current paper seeks to heal the gaps of the current legislation related to the theme including, the newly approved Law number 12.529/2011 proposing changes that aim at minimizing the discretion, subjectivism and juridical insecurity that permeates the agreement, in a way to adequate it to the constitutional precepts and make it become more engaging to the candidates.

Submitted by Filipe dos Santos (fsantos@pucsp.br) on 2017-01-10T11:28:25Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Ricardo Camarotta Abdo.pdf: 1138723 bytes, checksum: 4a33cab6fb873cc90f5c9f418ea5dd31 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-01-10T11:28:25Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Ricardo Camarotta Abdo.pdf: 1138723 bytes, checksum: 4a33cab6fb873cc90f5c9f418ea5dd31 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-12-05 / The present dissertation aims to analyze the institute of the leniency agreement, as established in the Law nº 12.846, of August 1, 2013, also known as the Brazilian Clean Company Law, and its framework as a contemporary measure of the public administration by consensus, not mandatory. For such purpose, we will initially analyze some basic concepts to establish assumptions for the development of this work. Later on, we will analyze the Clean Company Act Law as a whole. Finally, and doing so, we will focus on the analysis of the leniency agreement encompassing its main aspects and controversial issues linked to the institute / O objetivo desta dissertação é analisar o instituto do acordo de leniência, previsto pela Lei nº12.846, de 1º de agosto de 2013, também denominada de Lei Anticorrupção Brasileira, bem como o seu enquadramento como uma modalidade de atuação contemporânea da Administração Pública de forma consensual, não imperativa. Para tanto, analisaremos, inicialmente, noções fundamentais necessárias ao estabelecimento de premissas para o desenvolvimento deste trabalho. Posteriormente, será feita uma contextualização da Lei Anticorrupção e, por fim, adentraremos à análise do acordo de leniência, com foco em seus principais aspectos e questões polêmicas inerentes ao tema

Esta pesquisa tem como hipótese o fato de que a corrupção desponta como uma questão de significativo relevo no cenário político, social e econômico dos países, tendo profunda imbricação com o desenvolvimento e estrutura institucional das nações. Um dos aspectos da estrutura institucional implicados se refere justamente à arquitetura normativa, a qual deve se ver dotada de instrumentos básicos e eficazes para um adequado enfrentamento do problema. Nesse contexto é que a novel Lei Anticorrupção se apresenta como mais um diploma a complementar o microssistema brasileiro de combate à corrupção, incrementando instrumentos punitivos, consensuais e de mutação de culturas corporativas. A harmonização sancionatória e o alinhamento dos diferentes atores encarregados da persecução, nesse viés, se apresentam como os mais candentes desafios a serem superados pelos operadores do direito. Cuidou-se, pois, de se apresentar os novos instrumentos e hipóteses-tipo com as respectivas sugestões de harmonização sistêmica. / This research has as hypothesis the fact that corruption emerges as a matter of significant importance in the political, social and economic scenario of the countries, having deep imbrication with the development and institutional structure of the nations. One of the aspects of the institutional structure involved is precisely the normative architecture, which must be equipped with basic and effective instruments for an adequate confrontation of the problem. In this context, the novel Anticorruption Law presents itself as another diploma complementing the Brazilian anti-corruption micro-system, increasing punitive, consensual and mutating corporate culture. The sanctioning harmonization and the alignment of the different actors in charge of the persecution, in this bias, are presented as the most burning challenges to be overcome by the operators of the law. Therefore, the new instruments and standard hypotheses were presented with the respective suggestions for systemic harmonization.

Une personne est injustement condamnée à l'emprisonnement. Elle est victime d'une erreur judiciaire. Plusieurs causes peuvent être à l'origine d'une telle injustice mais malheureusement il est difficile de le prouver. Le système de justice pénale au pays n'est pas à l'abri des condamnations injustifiées et plusieurs innocentes victimes en ont payé le prix. Or, comment une victime d'erreur judiciaire peut-elle prouver son innocence et ainsi recouvrer la liberté à laquelle elle a droit? Certes, l'aveu du coupable ou la découverte d'une nouvelle preuve peuvent servir de moyens de reconnaissance factuelle d'une condamnation injustifiée. Toutefois, certains obstacles procéduraux comme les délais d'appel, les règles d'admissibilité de la preuve nouvelle ou encore le mécanisme de correction des erreurs judiciaires prévu aux articles 696.1 et suivants du Code criminel peuvent compliquer le scénario. Avant le 4 juin 2002, cette dernière procédure était visée par l'article 690 du Code. Toutefois, suite à de nombreuses critiques ainsi qu'à une consultation publique orchestrée par le gouvernement canadien, des modifications législatives ont été apportées à cette procédure. Mais celles-ci sont-elles suffisantes? Nous pensons que certaines des modifications sont grandement appréciables. Cependant, la structure d'évaluation des dossiers et de recommandation des dossiers au ministre de la Justice mériterait la mise en place d'un comité formé d'avocats indépendants pour conseiller ce dernier. Cela est nécessaire afin de réduire à néant tout conflit d'intérêts potentiel de la part du Ministre et d'assurer la transparence du processus en cause. / A person is unjustly condemned to imprisonment. He or she is victim of a wrongful conviction. Many causes can lead to such an injustice but unfortunately, it is hard to prove. The country's criminal justice system makes no exception to wrongful verdicts of guilt and many innocent people have paid the priee. Thus, how can a person victim of a wrongful conviction prove his innocence and recover his rightful freedom? Of course, the confession of the true guilty person, the discovery of new evidence or a special inquiry commission are all ways of recognizing factually an unjust guilty verdict. However, certain procedural obstacles such as appeal delays, rules of admissibility of new evidence or even the procedure for correcting wrongful convictions provided under article 696.1 and following of the Criminal code, can complicate the scenario. Before June 4, 2002, the latter procedure was provided under article 690 of the Code. However, following great criticism as well as a public consultation orchestrated by the Canadian government, legislative modifications were brought to that procedure. Are the modifications made to the procedure sufficient? We believe that some of them are greatly appreciable. However, the evaluation and case recommendation structure to the Minister deserves the creation of a committee constituted by attorneys fully independent of the Minister able to advise him or her. This is necessary in order to fully reduce any potential conflicts of interest by the Minister and would ensure transparence of the process in question. / "Mémoire présenté à la Faculté des études supérieures en vue de l'obtention du grade de Maîtrise en droit (L.L.M.)"

Doctor Legum - LLD / Competition law and its enforcement have become necessary tools in the face of trade liberalisation. Nowhere is this more evident than in the area of cross-border cartels. The global South is steadily becoming aware of this. With the advent of globalisation and trade liberalisation, individual economies have become intrinsically linked. Anti-competitive conduct in one territory may have an impact in another territory. Therefore, an effective regional competition law framework complements trade liberalisation, especially in light of the principal objective of the South-South regional economic communities: the deepening of regional integration, in order to realise economic development and alleviate poverty. Cartel practices, such as, market allocation cartels, are in direct contradiction to this primary objective. This is when enforcement collaborations in South-South regional economic communities becomes crucial. The regional legal instruments of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, the East African Community, the Southern African Customs Union and the Southern African Development Community make provision for enforcement collaborations among Member States. To facilitate collaboration, regional competition authorities have been created to investigate, among other things, cross-border cartels. Within these economic communities, there is a strong case for enforcement collaborations, as evidence shows that the majority of the firms engaging in cartels are the so-called Regional Multinational Corporations. They operate throughout the territories of Member States. Additionally, the international nature of cartels, such as, private international cartels and export cartels, provide an opportunity for South-South co-operation to be utilised. However, this co-operation has not been utilised to the fullest extent, especially with reference to cross-border cartel activities. This has been attributed to various factors, such as, institutional incapacities, resource austerity, the absence of common procedural rules, the lack of adequate investigatory tools, and political ineptitude. As a solution, this current study makes specific recommendations that are directed at enhancing the effectiveness of South-South collaborations pertaining to cross-border cartel activities.

Submitted by Morgana Silva (morgana_linhares@yahoo.com.br) on 2016-07-04T19:36:04Z No. of bitstreams: 1 arquivototal.pdf: 1182622 bytes, checksum: 2e5942b467ad9f97326d7ce6284d69d6 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-07-04T19:36:04Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 arquivototal.pdf: 1182622 bytes, checksum: 2e5942b467ad9f97326d7ce6284d69d6 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-04-20 / This paper aims to shed some light on the applicability of leniency agreement in the Brazilian System of Competition Defense. For this, it’s necessary a rescue on the development of the idea of freedom, and then get to free competition as principle underlying the Economic Order. The democratic state, established in the 1988 Constitution, is the contemporary stage of defense of legal, economic and social values which are intended to guarantee national development, and promote the construction of a free, fair and inclusive society. It will be seen that the mentioned Economic Policy correlates with the Criminal Policy idealized by the State. There will be a theoretical and historical establishment that takes account of the evolution of the discipline of Antitrust in Brazil. There will also find space in this paper for the illustration of the idea of Antitrust Sanctioning Law to see how the Government may, very effectively, investigate and punish officials based on their own standards, serving as a counterpoint to the Economic Criminal Law. This route of parallel paths between administrative and legal marks of Antitrust is clearly reflected in the Leniency Agreement institute. Thus, a conceptual frame about what will be the object spanned by the leniency agreement will be presented: cartels. Will fetch up the demonstration of various types of cartel, with special emphasis on bidding cartels. Finally, the work dissects the institute's Leniency Agreement itself, solidifying its legislative and conceptual basis, and presenting their rules. Through the combination of legal rules, will be shown the way to be observed when entering into an agreement. Based on this view, will be presented the Historical of Conducts of a Leniency Agreement in a bidding cartel. Also adds up the context of the Leniency Agreement in international models implemented in the United States and European Union. In addition, this paper will seek to give lights to the criteria for distinguishing between administrative predictions arising from decisions made by administrative courts, especially the Administrative Council for Economic Defense, and its possible implementation in criminal area, suggesting alternatives that may match in an harmonic way the application of the institute and the preservation of its effects. / O presente trabalho tem por objetivo lançar algumas luzes acerca da aplicabilidade do Acordo de Leniência no Sistema Brasileiro de Defesa da Concorrência. Para isso, vislumbrou-se como necessário um resgate acerca do desenvolvimento da ideia de liberdade, para então se chegar à livre concorrência como princípio inspirador da ordem econômica. O Estado Democrático de Direito, estabelecido na Carta de 1988, representa o estágio contemporâneo de defesa de valores jurídicos, econômicos e sociais que têm por finalidade garantir o desenvolvimento nacional, além de promover a construção de uma sociedade livre, justa e solidária. Será visto que a mencionada Política Econômica encontra correlação com a Política Criminal idealizada pelo Estado. Será feito um apurado teórico-histórico que dê conta da evolução do disciplinamento do Antitruste no Brasil. Também encontrará espaço no presente trabalho a ilustração da ideia de Direito Antitruste Sancionador, a fim de que se possa perceber como a Administração Pública pode, muito eficazmente, investigar e punir agentes com base em suas próprias normas, servindo de contraponto ao Direito Penal Econômico. Essa via de caminhos paralelos entre administrativização e judicialização do Antitruste encontra reflexo claro no instituto do Acordo de Leniência. Para tanto, será apresentado um panorama conceitual acerca do que venha a ser o objeto de combate abarcado pelo Acordo de Leniência: os cartéis. Buscar-se-á a demonstração dos diversos tipos de cartel, dando especial relevo aos cartéis em licitação. Por fim, o trabalho esmiúça o instituto do Acordo de Leniência em si, firmando sua base legislativa, conceitual e apresentando suas regras de procedibilidade. Por meio da combinação de disciplinamentos legais, será demonstrado o caminho a ser observado quando da celebração de um Acordo. A partir dessa visão, será feita a demonstração do Histórico de Condutas do Acordo de Leniência num cartel em licitação. Acrescenta-se também a contextualização dos modelos internacionais de Acordo de Leniência implementados nos Estados Unidos e União Europeia. Além disso, buscar-se-á dar relevo aos critérios de distinção existentes entre as previsões administrativas oriundas das decisões proferidas pelos órgãos da administração, especialmente o Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica e a sua possível implementação na seara penal, sugerindo alternativas que possam compatibilizar de forma harmônica a aplicação do instituto e a preservação dos seus efeitos.