Made available in DSpace on 2013-08-07T18:55:52Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 000385288-Texto+Completo-0.pdf: 1614445 bytes, checksum: b2ec545a66a5a2dff2ceff6ad5d81de6 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2006 / Opposing 20th century studies on humanitas do homo humanus, and specifically studies that represented an exercise of Philosophy - phenomenology in Heidegger, Sartre and Levinas - this work aims at discussing the possibility of Lightness. Having in view that the weight of existence in such studies - pari passu the sense of human – is expressed as a burden allied with finitude (Heidegger), excessive self-focus (Sartre), and infinite responsibility (Levinas), this work suggests that it is philosophically possible to incorporate humanity and lightness at once, without providing dionisiac or alienated descriptions of what man is. In short, this work deals with the fact that Human Lightness is bearable when the phenomenality of a generosity event is observed and the sense of human based on responsibility is penetrated, which since Levinas represents an anarchical disposition to Good that precedes being. It is a kingdom of Goodness and not a burden or weight on the shoulders of man. / Na contramão das pesquisas sobre a humanitas do homo humanus no século XX, principalmente a que se fez no exercício da filosofia como fenomenologia em Heidegger, Sartre e Levinas, ergo aqui a possibilidade da Leveza. Considerando que nestes se delineia, pari passu ao sentido do humano, um peso existencial expresso como o fardo da finitude (Heidegger), do excessivo centramento em si (Sartre) e da responsabilidade infinita (Levinas), sugiro a Tese de que é viável filosoficamente coadunar, a um só tempo, humanidade e leveza, sem que se decaia a um sentido dionisíaco ou alienado da descrição do que é o homem. Em síntese, transito aqui no fato de que é sustentável a Leveza do Humano, quando do olhar para a fenomenalidade do evento da generosidade e quando se adentra de vez no sentido do humano tecido a partir da responsabilidade, o que desde Levinas se delineia como disposição anárquica ao Bem anterior ao ser. Reino da Bondade que de nenhum modo é um fardo e um peso sobre os ombros do homem.

Made available in DSpace on 2013-08-07T18:56:03Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 000393794-Texto+Completo-0.pdf: 443062 bytes, checksum: 01d4e137f7847a9700cf32230afb5c28 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2007 / This work has as a main objective to highlight the importance of the alterity in the constitution of subjectivity. Also aiming to establish an approach between Freudian psychoanalysis and philosophy we will analyse some elements in the works of Emmanuel Levinas (1906-1995) that deal with this question and point how such question is also present, though less evidently, in the thought of Sigmund Freud (1856 -1939). Insofar providing this approach we will build a path that goes since the conception of the individuality of the self separated from the other, warranty of its singularity until the possibility of the encounter and the constitution of the self since its approach with alterity. We will point that in Freud as well as in Levinas works the notion of a narcissism that is paramount to a initial and constitutive integration of subjectivity must be broken in order not to configure a eternal return of the self to the same, in the indifference that forbids the recognition of the Other and the constitution of subjectivity is present. This theme will be treated in the first chapter of this thesis, entitled "The trauma of the encounter" and has as subtitles "The individuality: the self in its innocence" and "From the narcissism and towards the Other: the possibility of the encounter".The self in its innocence signs the self that ignores the other, that enjoys from the elements of the world, in a selfish fashion. It is referent to a personal interiority that limits the singularity and allows the building of a individual and unique life. However, such innocence at first understood as structuring, must be broken without the waiver of oneself singularity. This question will be approached in the following item,"From the narcissism and towards the Other". In this chapter we will see how, in Levinas thought, the possibility of understanding the exteriority beyond the nature of the Self and its particularity refers to the appearance of the thought and the desire. The moment of "departing the innocence" is the moment in which the self looses the safety of the intention to assimilate and possess the exteriority and the possibility of the encounter with the new is inaugurated, which incessantly appeals to the overflown and redimensioning of the self, which then allows the construction of subjectivity. In the Freudian theory as well in Levinasian thought we find the idea that through the effect of a traumatic event that is the announcement of something as strange and inconceivable, there is a demand for the self to take for itself the burden of such excess, which constitutes the paradox that, having received from the unpredictability and strangement of the different more than it can handle or understand, the self must leave itself to constitute its own subjectivity from the difference. The demand of taking responsibility for what is traumatic, inconceivable to the standards of the organization of the self is present in the theories of Freud and Levinas. The constitution of subjectivity is more than the recognition of the other, it depends of the other and for this reason, for Levinas, it implies in the unconditional and infinite responsibility for the other. The Self is the only one who may host the others, because is to the Self that the proximity of the other offers the vestige of the infinite. We thus speak of the constitution of the subjectivity since the alterity, an item in the second chapter that leads to the themes of discourse and hearing. Among the identity of the self and the alterity of the Other, there is a decompass of temporalities, a tear that invites to the turbulent and instigant news that is the Other. The event of the relation is made possible for what one can introduce in this interval, in an attempt to cross it: the discourse. With the discourse there is no unification nor reciprocity, and, at the same time, there is revelation. It is an adventure that may never perfectly host what the Other reveals, for each time new enigmas for the Other are opened, thus revealing the flowing of time. In Freudian psychoanalysis the discourse is also not understood in its linearity, but in its breaking, which allows new meanings always to be articulated. We then see that through the differences among the legacies of Freud and Levinas it is enlighten a common ground: the hearing is the hearing of the Other, strange and stranger that, as alterity, desarticulates the time of the identity for, in the articulation of another time, keeping the non-stoppable building of the self, as subjectivity. / O presente trabalho tem como objetivo principal ressaltar a importância da alteridade na constituição da subjetividade. Também com o propósito de estabelecer uma aproximação entre a psicanálise freudiana e a filosofia, analisaremos alguns elementos da obra de Emmanuel Levinas (1906 – 1995) que tratam desta questão e apontaremos como esta se revela também no pensamento de Sigmund Freud (1856 – 1939), embora de forma menos evidente. Para tanto, percorreremos um caminho com estes autores, desde a concepção da individualidade do eu separado do outro, garantia de sua singularidade; até a possibilidade do encontro e a constituição da subjetividade a partir da aproximação com a alteridade. Apontaremos que tanto na obra de Freud quanto na de Levinas está presente a idéia de que o narcisismo indispensável para uma integração inicial e constitutiva da individualidade precisa ser rompido para não configurar um eterno retorno do eu a si mesmo, na indiferença que impede o “reconhecimento” do Outro e a constituição da subjetividade. Trataremos deste tema no primeiro capítulo, que se intitula “O trauma do encontro” e aborda como subtítulos, “A individualidade: o eu em sua inocência” e “Do narcisismo ao outro: a possibilidade do encontro”. O eu em sua inocência assinala o eu que ignora o outro, que frui dos elementos do mundo, de forma egoísta. Refere-se a uma interioridade pessoal que demarca a singularidade e permite a construção da vida individual e única. No entanto, esta inocência mesmo que inicialmente estruturante, precisa ser rompida, sem que o eu abdique de sua singularidade. Esta questão é abordada no item seguinte, “Do narcisismo ao Outro”. Neste capítulo, vemos como, no pensamento de Levinas, a possibilidade de a exterioridade ser concebida como para além da natureza do Mesmo e de sua particularidade está referida ao surgimento do pensamento e do desejo. O momento de “saída da inocência” é o momento em que o eu perde a segurança da intenção de assimilar e possuir a exterioridade e se inaugura a possibilidade do encontro com o novo, com o que incessantemente apela para o transbordamento e redimensionamento do eu, possibilitando a construção da subjetividade. Tanto na teoria freudiana quanto no pensamento levinasiano, encontramos a idéia de que pelo efeito de um trauma decorrente de algo anunciar-se como estranho, inconcebível, há uma exigência de que o eu tome para si o encargo desse excesso, o que constitui o paradoxo de que, recebendo da imprevisibilidade e da estranheza do diferente, mais do que pode conter ou compreender, o eu precisa sair de si para construir sua subjetividade a partir da diferença. A exigência do responsabilizar-se pelo que é traumático, inconcebível para os parâmetros de organização do sujeito está presente nas teorias de Freud e Levinas. A constituição da subjetividade é mais do que reconhecimento do outro, ela depende do outro, e por este motivo, para Levinas, ela implica na responsabilidade incondicional e infinita por ele.O Eu é o único que pode acolher aos outros, porque é ao Eu que a proximidade do Outro oferece o vestígio do infinito. Falamos então da constituição da subjetividade a partir da alteridade, item do segundo capítulo que nos encaminha para os temas do discurso e da escuta. Entre a identidade do Mesmo e a alteridade do Outro, há um descompasso de temporalidades, uma brecha que convida à turbulenta e instigante novidade do Outro. O acontecer da relação é tornado possível pelo que pode se introduzir neste intervalo, na tentativa de atravessá-lo: o discurso. Com o discurso, não há unificação nem reciprocidade, e ao mesmo tempo, há relação. É uma aventura que nunca pode acolher perfeitamente o que o Outro revela, pois a cada vez se reabre em novos enigmas para o Mesmo, revelando a fluidez do tempo. Na psicanálise freudiana, o discurso também não é entendido em sua linearidade, mas em sua fratura, o que permite que sejam articuladas sempre novas significâncias. Vemos assim que através das diferenças entre os legados de Freud e Levinas ilumina-se um ponto em comum: a escuta é a escuta do Outro, estranho e estrangeiro que, como alteridade, desarticula o tempo da identidade para, na articulação de um outro tempo, manter a construção incessante do eu, como subjetividade.

CoordenaÃÃo de AperfeiÃoamento de Pessoal de NÃvel Superior / A Abordagem Centrada na Pessoa (ACP), fundada por Carl Rogers, sà pode ser justificada a partir de um conjunto de valores e de uma Ãtica e nÃo somente como uma aplicaÃÃo de tÃcnicas e conhecimentos. AlÃm disto, a partir dos estudos de Figueiredo (1996) fica estabelecida a importÃncia do Ãthos como busca de um lugar para o Outro na constituiÃÃo das psicologias. Naquilo que se refere ao Lugar do Outro na constituiÃÃo da subjetividade, Freire (2002) investiga o lugar para a alteridade nas diversas psicologias modernas e afirma que, na ACP, o lugar para a alteridade radical levinasiana està vacante, assim como nas demais psicologias. O Outro, conforme postulado por LÃvinas (2008 [1961]), à precedente e transcendente ao Eu; nÃo sendo possÃvel totalizÃ-lo e compreendÃ-lo inteiramente, ele apresenta a dimensÃo do estranho na experiÃncia psicolÃgica. Este Outro nÃo à figura tÃo cara para as psicologias como aparenta ser. Por outro lado, Peter Schmid (1999) concebe que a Ãtica à a primeira questÃo a ser pensada quando se trata da ACP, quer de sua teoria, quer de sua prÃtica. Daà que este trabalho objetivou apresentar a obra de Peter Schmid à comunidade brasileira da abordagem rogeriana. A perspectiva deste autor està alicerÃada em um diÃlogo importante com as filosofias do diÃlogo e uma visÃo do humano como radicalmente pessoa, o que oferece outra forma de encarar a alteridade na teoria e prÃtica rogerianas. Tal mudanÃa apresenta uma profÃcua aproximaÃÃo com a filosofia Ãtica de Emmanuel LÃvinas. Como metodologia para o estudo, utilizou-se um quase-mÃtodo inspirado nas filosofias de LÃvinas (2008 [1961]) e Derrida (2008), em que buscamos, entre outras coisas, pÃr à mostra a polissemia dos discursos estudados. Concluiu-se que, apesar da perspectiva formulada por Schmid apresentar divergÃncias com a Ãtica levinasiana, ao fazer releituras dos principais conceitos da ACP, ela apresenta uma maior aproximaÃÃo com aquela e uma nova forma de lidar com a alteridade dentro do arcabouÃo da abordagem rogeriana. Espera-se, com este trabalho, fomentar um maior diÃlogo e produÃÃo acerca do cuidado clÃnico e psicoterapÃutico com a pessoa e o lugar oferecido para a alteridade na psicologia rogeriana. / The Person Centred Approach (PCA), founded by Carl Rogers, can only be justified from a set of values and ethics and not only as an application of skills and knowledge. Furthermore, from studies of Figueiredo (1996), it is established the importance of ethos as a search for a place to the Other in the constitution of psychologies. In what refers to the place of the Other in the constitution of subjectivity, Freire (2002) investigates the place to alterity in several modern psychologies and states that in PCA, the place for Levinasâ radical alterity is vacant, as in other psychologies. The Other, as postulated by Levinas (2008 [1961]), is precedent and transcendent to the I; not being possible to totalize and understand it fully; it shows the dimension of the strange in the psychological experience. This Other is not so dear figure to psychologies as it appears to be. On the other hand, Peter Schmid (1999) conceives that ethics is the first issue to be considered when it comes to PCA, either its theory or its practice. Hence, the present paper aims to present the work of Peter Schmid to the Brazilian community of Rogerian approach. The perspective of this author is grounded in an important dialogue with the philosophies of dialogue and a vision of the human as radically a person, which offers another way to face the alterity in Rogerian theory and practice. Such change presents a fruitful approach to ethical philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas. A methodology for the study, we used an almost-in-method inspired by the philosophies of Levinas (2008 [1961]) and Derrida (2007), in which we seek, among other things, to put on display the polysemy of the studied speeches. We conclude that, despite the divergences among the prospect formulated by Schmid with Levinasian ethics, doing readings of the main concepts of the PCA, it shows a closer relationship with that one and a new way of dealing with the alterity within the framework of the Rogerian approach. With this work, we hope to foment a greater dialogue and production on the clinical and psychotherapeutic care of the person and the place offered to otherness in Rogerian psychology.

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Si la philosophie d’Emmanuel Levinas fut souvent présentée comme une philosophie de l’éthique, et fut identifiée à des notions telles que le visage, autrui ou la responsabilité, cette thèse vise à démontrer que ces notions se comprennent à partir d'un primat accorde au temps, voire d’une métaphysique de la temporalité. Il s’agira d'établir que la philosophie levinassienne inaugure une nouvelle philosophie du temps que nous pouvons qualifier de « discontinuiste », s’opposant aux pensées de la continuité comme la philosophie bergsonienne de la durée et husserlienne du flux. La constitution de la subjectivité par émergence et distinction d’avec l'existence atemporelle, encore nommée « l'il y a », son rapport au monde comme sa rencontre avec autrui ne se comprennent qu’à l’aune de leur temporalisation. Toutefois, cette structuration temporelle du sujet et de l’altérité invite à dégager différents types de temporalité et à spécifier l’essentielle dialectique entre le temps et l’autre. / If Emmanuel Levinas' philosophy has often been introduced as a philosophy of ethics, determined by famous notions such as the face, the other or the responsibility, this thesis aims at demonstrating that these notions can be understood thanks to the primacy of time, and to a metaphysics of temporality. The goal lies in explaining how Levinas' philosophy ushers a philosophy of time that we can qualify as « discontinuist », opposed to Bergson's philosophy of duration and Husserl's theory of time flow. Subjectivity is processed through a distinction with the atemporal existence or the « there is », the connection to the world and relations to the others can be appreciated thanks to the notion of temporalisation.However this temporal structuration of the subject and the otherness encourages us to make several distinctions between different types of temporality and to consider the essential dialectic between time and the other.

The main topic of the doctoral dissertation Intersubjectivity and postmodern society: On the phenomenology of the Other is the problem of intersubjectivity. The work discusses the question of the other with the particular part of phenomenological thinking which does ask how we experience the other. Our starting point stems from the context of postmodern society, which we discusse in the first chapter ("The paradox of atomicity"). The aim of the second chapter ("Tacitness") is to enable us to phrase the question of the other properly. The third chapter ("Searching for the other in dialogue with Edmund Husserl") at first introduces selected fundamental concepts of the Husserl's phenomenology related to our topic (e.g. epoché) and then discusses the understanding of the other in Husserl's works Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy - Second Book and Cartesian Meditations. The fourth chapter ("Breaches of harmony") is focused on such types of experience that problematize and disturb the altogether harmonic world of Husserlian intersubjectivity. We deal with the phenomenology of the blindness (Jana Moravcová) and the phenomenology of emotions (Jean-Paul Sartre). The fifth chapter ("Strange, weired eyes") uses the them of exile in the poetry of Josef Straka to...

Emmanuel Levinas on human freedom and relation to the other Ján Hreško ABSTRACT This dissertation deals with the philosophical problem of human freedom from an intersubjective and ethical point of view. It interprets and elaborates Emmanuel Levinas' understanding of freedom and shows that he paid considerable attention to this issue in his works. The thesis is based primarily on the formulation of this problem in his main post-war works but makes its thematic elaboration. It shows what role freedom plays within his ethics and its key ideas. The research follows the constitution of freedom of the corporal and economic being. It explains the criticism of freedom, the argument of justifying freedom and finally its investiture. Separately it focuses on the question of human position in history. Finally, it clarifies Levinas' main claim that responsibility precedes freedom. At the same time, it asks: In what sense did Levinas understand the ambiguous concept of freedom? Are there more notions of freedom? What is the relationship between my freedom and the freedom of the other? What does it mean that acceptance of ethical demand does not depend on my will or choice? And what is the positive significance of responsibility for the other? The main thesis of this work can be expressed as follows: according to...

Emmanuel Levinas élabore une éthique en rupture avec la logique, la phénoménologie et l’ontologie. L’idée de l’infini, qu’il emprunte aux Méditations métaphysiques de Descartes, accomplit cette rupture et produit une philosophie d’un genre nouveau. Notre travail entend ainsi déterminer la façon dont cette idée permet à l’éthique de penser au sein de la philosophie une intrigue qui l’excède. L’idée de l’infini fait l’objet d’un triple discours : elle exprime la forme d’une pensée pensant plus qu’elle ne pense, elle décrit le sens de ce paradoxe dans la responsabilité infinie pour le visage de l’autre homme, et elle pratique une emphase conduisant au-delà de l’être. L’entrelacement de ces trois discours dans l’éthique de l’idée d’infini introduit en philosophie une question plus originaire que la question de l’être : la mise en question de mon être par l’infinie parole d’autrui, la mesure de mon être à l’aune de la question de l’infini, qui me vient à l’idée dans une exigence de justice. / The ethics that Emmanuel Levinas develops breaks with logic, phenomenology and ontology. The idea of infinity borrowed from Descartes’s Meditations on first Philosophy accomplishes this rupture and produces a new kind of philosophy. Our thesis aims to define the role played by the idea of infinity in enabling ethics to think within philosophy an intrigue which exceeds philosophy. This idea is subject to a triple discourse: it expresses the structure of a thought thinking more than it can think, it describes the meaning of this paradox as an infinite responsibility towards the other, and produces an emphasis that goes beyond essence. The unification of these three discourses within the ethics of the idea of infinity introduces a philosophical question that is more radical than the question of being: the question of infinity, which puts my being into question. Infinity comes to mind as a call for justice.

In this thesis, I ask how our understanding of human relations carries implications for the way we understand the affordances of communication technology on human relations. To this end, I examine and compare two opposed perspectives of human relations and social life. The first perspective, networked individualism, is a version of network theory that begins with a foundation of agentic individuals who actively construct and manage their social worlds. Levinasian relationalism, the second perspective, offers a contrasting view that sees human relations as constitutive of human subjectivity. In comparing these two perspectives, I argue that networked individualism is an inadequate framework inasmuch as its ontological assertions prevent it from seeing some of the significant affordances of technology on human relations, and I suggest that Levinasian relationalism is a viable alternative.

Schooling provided to Native American children in the United States has been portrayed by many native and nonnative scholars as a major factor in undermining traditional languages and cultures, and as playing a role in the perpetuation of generational poverty and marginalization in indigenous communities. Historical accounts also suggest that schools have been settings for the emergence of an intertribal identity and shared political agenda that has been instrumental in generating Red Power activism and maintaining the sovereignty of North America's first nations into the 21 st century. This heuristic study draws upon the ethics of alterity in the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas to refract testimony from interviews with elders who attended boarding schools in the 1930s and 40s, student activists who staged an occupation of a native college in 2005, and educators working in tribal, public and federal schools, to shed light on native perceptions of how the continuing evolution of Indian identity in teaching and learning is contributing to a revitalization of heritage lifeways.