Made available in DSpace on 2015-04-14T13:54:56Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 408410.pdf: 266243 bytes, checksum: dfe63b1bdb0f4b6cb75dabc4d2c4b118 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008-11-19 / A inten??o do presente estudo ? apurar a potencial contribui??o da ?tica da alteridade de Emmanuel Levinas na qualifica??o da rela??o m?dico-paciente. Levinas prop?e uma ?tica fundamentada na n?o nega??o da alteridade, onde o Outro, que se apresenta de modo significativo, provoca um abalo na estrutura do Mesmo. Este questionamento do Mesmo demanda uma resposta que deve ser dada, n?o existindo possibilidade de escapar ? responsabilidade de responder ao comando do Outro. Quando o eu ? chamado inicia-se a instaura??o da justi?a, ou seja, surge o campo para a rela??o ?tica. Rela??o que inicia no di?logo inaugurado na apresenta??o do Outro, atrav?s do desvelamento do rosto. A import?ncia da ?tica como fundamento ? ressaltada na cr?tica ? id?ia de que a tecnologia afasta o m?dico do paciente e na den?ncia que o indiv?duo nunca foi o foco principal da medicina moderna. Por fim, ? sugerida a literatura como instrumento de aux?lio na ruptura da Totalidade do saber m?dico, assim como, o uso respons?vel da tecnologia sendo um caminho na constru??o da justi?a.

Made available in DSpace on 2015-04-14T13:55:20Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 453071.pdf: 1049026 bytes, checksum: c653f56f532c6c806c05ae4bd9bbde81 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013-11-25 / Responsibility is the term connection between the thought of Emmanuel Levinas and Viktor Frankl, by which is consistent moral consciousness as a possible encounter with another human. Freedom and responsibility before any deliberate or intentional subject, in which the respondent by human indigence of another Master who reports to break the monism of a strong bio psyche and sociology, whose predominant aspect is the person in charge of any condition. Consciousness previous intelligibility while Bad conscience that does not close in a circularity of Even, putting into crisis selfhood and meaning to be found and updated in meetings and confrontation with the social meanings . Encounters through the traces inscribed in face epiphenomenon of the other's presence and Absent, the "He" that is the otherness that recognizes the other in its absolute say. Pronounceable say the flow of time in sensitivity brought to disinterestedness and input Others meeting as anarchical and dissymmetry, causing the other the trauma of what would be the obvious. Meaning of life post as liability prior to any free initiative of the subject, which collects on the Other traces of the third, the "He" look like infinitive - face that speaks to me, I want the clutter in your selfhood, and exposes the human to justice before the others, absolutely another. Confrontation with the responsibility of nakedness and misery of Others, which calls for the unity of the one- respondent, taking him hostage in unconditional replacement source of appeal arising from (Illeit?) he-ity and calls for replacement, give support to the less is more, the infinite in ethical language. / Responsabilidade ? o termo de liga??o entre o pensamento de Viktor Frankl e Emmanuel Levinas, pelo qual se coaduna a consci?ncia moral como possibilidade de encontro com o outro humano. Consci?ncia anterior ? liberdade e a qualquer ato deliberado ou intencional do sujeito, em que o humano respondente pela indig?ncia do outro, Mestre que reporta ? quebra do monismo de um bio-psiquismo e sociologismo forte, cujo aspecto preponderante ? a pessoa como respons?vel sobre toda a circunst?ncia. Consci?ncia anterior ? inteligibilidade, enquanto M? consci?ncia em que n?o se fecha numa circularidade do Mesmo, pondo em crise a egoidade e o sentido para s?-la encontrado e atualizado nos encontros e confronto com os sentidos sociais. Encontros por meio dos tra?os inscritos no rosto, epifen?meno da presen?a do outro e do Ausente, do Ele que ? a alteridade que reconhece o outro em seu absoluto Dizer. Dizer pronunci?vel no fluxo do tempo de uma sensibilidade levada para o desinteresse e na entrada do Outrem como encontro an?rquico e pela dissimetria, provocando no outro o trauma daquilo que seria a obviedade. Sentido da vida posto como responsabilidade anterior a qualquer iniciativa livre do sujeito, que diante do Outro recolhe os vest?gios do terceiro, do Ele como infini??o do olhar-rosto que fala ao eu, Desejo que o desordena em sua egoidade, e exp?e o humano para justi?a diante do outrem, absolutamente outro. Confronto com a responsabilidade diante da nudez e mis?ria de Outrem, que clama pela unicidade do um-respondente, tomando-o como ref?m na incondicional substitui??o nascente do apelo que surge da eleidade e conclama para a substitui??o, dar suporte ao que ? mais no menos, do infinito na linguagem ?tica.

Made available in DSpace on 2015-04-14T13:55:28Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 396312.pdf: 1497848 bytes, checksum: 4577c9f2673476ed6b18dc00543ab1a3 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2007-08-06 / Numa leitura itinerante do pensamento de Emmanuel Levinas, que refaz e articula seus principais momentos, intentamos aprofundar o sentido ?tico da subjetividade enquanto responsabilidade pelo Outro ou um-para-o-Outro, mostrando que o humano se abre com a possibilidade extraordin?ria de que a alteridade do Outro venha a contar para o sujeito antes que a sua pr?pria identidade para si mesmo. O ponto agudo deste projeto ? sustentar que o sentido ?tico da subjetividade n?o emerge de modo suficiente sem uma exaustiva refer?ncia ? sua dimens?o sens?vel e encarnada. Esta articula??o nodal entre ?tica e encarna??o, ou responsabilidade e sensibilidade, torna-se patente ? medida em que se descreve o arco de constitui??o da subjetividade, quer como ser para-si, no gozo sens?vel e na apropria??o econ?mica das coisas do mundo, quer como um-para-o-Outro, na suscetibilidade a ser afetado pela alteridade de outrem e responder por ela com o dom dos pr?prios recursos ou, em ?ltima inst?ncia, com o dom de si mesmo, uma vez que o sujeito primariamente se constitui a partir do que ele frui e tem. Esta afetabilidade responsiva inscrita na sensibilidade humana, que a torna n?o-indiferente ? diferen?a do Outro antes de seu pr?prio poder de decis?o, ? descrita por Levinas com o termo vulnerabilidade e encontra na maternidade o seu analogon por excel?ncia.

Submitted by Setor de Tratamento da Informa??o - BC/PUCRS (tede2@pucrs.br) on 2016-07-26T14:29:37Z No. of bitstreams: 1 DIS_AGUEDA_VIEIRA_MARTINELLI_PARCIAL.pdf: 180030 bytes, checksum: 9852f7f9f2842f05529186c99bd02854 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-07-26T14:29:37Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 DIS_AGUEDA_VIEIRA_MARTINELLI_PARCIAL.pdf: 180030 bytes, checksum: 9852f7f9f2842f05529186c99bd02854 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-03-29 / Funda??o de Amparo ? Pesquisa do Estado do Rio Grande do Sul - FAPERGS / This work aims to expose the critique of ontology and subject in the work of Emmanuel Levinas. We shall see, from his first works onwards, the origin of aexistents in existence that tries to escape himself, to evade himself. This being, this subject that is the ?I?, lives in a world in which he is able to maintain himself through work and consumption. But the ?I? encounters a resisting being, the ?Other?. We will show how in the I a Desire comes to existence that opens in him the possibility of receiving this Otherness, in a way that the ethical relationship between the I and the Other becomes possible. We will see the importance of the erotical relationship for the author, for it is opening, through the child, to the relationships in society and society itself, besides constituting the transcendence of the I in his son. We shall analyze some questions about the feminine. To better understand its nature in the tought of Levinas. We will approach, at last, of responsibility which constitutes the subjectivity of the I in the relationship with the other, so that the I becomes ?one-for-another?, and even substitution. Since the relationship of responsibility is only possible in the ?face-to-face?, between two terms, justice emerges so that the third is not excluded from ethics, so that responsibility pervades the relationships in society. / Este trabalho tem como objetivo evidenciar na obra de Emmanuel Levinas a cr?tica a ontologia e ao sujeito. Veremos, desde seus primeiros trabalhos, o surgimento de um existente na exist?ncia que tenta escapar de si, evadir-se. Este existente, este sujeito que ? o eu, vive em um mundo no qual consegue se manter atrav?s do trabalho e do consumo. Por?m, o eu encontra um ser que resiste, o Outro. Mostraremos como no eu surge o Desejo que abre nele a possibilidade de acolher esta alteridade, de modo que a rela??o ?tica entre o Eu e o Outro seja poss?vel. Veremos a import?ncia da rela??o er?tica para o autor, pois ? a abertura, atrav?s do filho, para as rela??es em sociedade e para a pr?pria sociedade, al?m de ser a transcend?ncia do eu em seu filho. Analisaremos algumas quest?es acerca do feminino, para melhor compreender sua relev?ncia no pensamento de Levinas. Trataremos, por ?ltimo, da responsabilidade que constitui a subjetividade do eu na rela??o com o Outro, de maneira que o eu se torna um-para-o-outro, at? a substitui??o. Como a rela??o de responsabilidade somente ? poss?vel no face a face, entre dois termos, a justi?a surge para que o terceiro n?o seja exclu?do da ?tica, de maneira que a responsabilidade perpassa as rela??es em sociedade.

I have structured my master's thesis in terms of an opposition between Kojeve's existentialist, Marxist philosophical formulation of Hegel's Phenomenology and Levinas's post-Heideggerian, anti-Hegelian phenomenology in Totality and Infinity. While Levinas's project is explicitly anti-totalitarian, Kojeve's reading of the Phenomenology emphasizes the End of History in Hegel's philosophy without shrinking from its totalizing aspects. While the philosophical project of each thinker is generally antithetical to the other, it is my contention that the universal and homogeneous state, conceived by Kojeve to be the rational realization of the end of history, is a legitimate moral project for Levinasian ethics. This thesis provides both an exegesis of Kojeve's reading of Hegel's master/slave dialectic in the Phenomenology and an interpretation of the tragedy of the slave understood in terms of Holderlin's theory of the tragic. It is through the master/slave dialectic that history consummates in the end of history. Later in the thesis, I outline Levinas's project as an ethics as first philosophy in opposition to the Eleatic traditions in Western philosophy. We can trace Levinas's project in his unconventional reading of the cogito and the idea of infinity. Whereas Descartes represents a philosophical return home for Hegel, Levinas's reading of Descartes represents a philosophical sojourn away from home in the second movement of the Meditations. With these notions, we have a formal basis in accounting for the conflict in Levinas's thought between the moral necessity of universal rights and the dangers of assimilation. Finally, I argue for why the universal and homogeneous state is an ethically worthy goal from a Levinasian perspective. On this question, I engage the thought of a number of thinkers of the left: Kojeve, Derrida, Horkheimer, Adorno and Zizek. I conclude that Levinas's thought on universalism and eschatology can serve as a moral basis for the left-Hegelian project of realizing a universal and homogeneous state. Because such a state is distinguishable from a totalizing End of History, the eschatological concern for one's singularity within history is compatible with the prophetic call to strive for political universality. Ultimately, it is the responsibility to this prophetic call that guarantees one's singularity.

Du déclin de la religiosité cléricale, associé à la période historique de la Renaissance et de la modernité, on voit naître un Occident industriel, raisonnable, émancipé. Arrive subséquemment le 20e siècle avec deux guerres menées par la technique, raisonnables. La raison éclairée semble avoir échoué à sa promesse d'émancipation. Des philosophes s'interrogent sur le problème et tentent de voir de quelles façons le logos a pu mener et même justifier ces moments inédits de l'histoire. Ils ouvrent les voies d'une possible reconstruction d'« humanité ». Ce mémoire montre que leurs discours, plus particulièrement ceux d'Emmanuel Levinas et de Walter Benjamin (tous deux juifs et contemporains des deux Guerres mondiales), sont teintés d'une certaine religiosité et d'un rapport avec une « transcendance ». Celle-ci est ancrée dans l'expérience, notamment dans l'éthique et le langage. Les voies de la recomposition philosophique face à « l'échec des Lumières » passent-elles nécessairement par une réintroduction du religieux? Le dialogue culturel est-il religieux en lui-même? Nous offrons des pistes de réponse à ces questions en réfléchissant sur la place du judaïsme dans notre culture, prenant appui pour ce faire sur les écrits de Shmuel Trigano. Les œuvres de Levinas et de Benjamin indiquent ainsi qu'au cœur d'une philosophie rationnelle, la transcendance ne devient plus condition extérieure, irrationnelle, mais bien cœur et nécessité - hors-catégorie peut-on dire - d'un penser logique. ______________________________________________________________________________ MOTS-CLÉS DE L’AUTEUR : Walter Benjamin, Emmanuel Levinas, judaïsme, transcendance, rationalité, éthique, épistémologie, crise culturelle, philosophie, langage.

Ce mémoire analysera une des thèses majeures de l’œuvre d’Emmanuel Levinas, à savoir le primat de l’éthique sur l’ontologie. L’argumentation se penchera surtout sur la description phénoménologique de l’approche de l’altérité, incarnée dans la concrétude du visage du prochain et dans laquelle se retrouve l’idée de l’infini, inspirée dans sa formulation de Descartes. Cette idée, n’étant pas qu’un simple concept mais plutôt une réalité phénoménale transcendante, amène Levinas à questionner le rôle de la conscience thématisante dans l’expérience morale, caractérisée par son immédiateté et par la présence d’un Autre. Est-ce que l’essentiel de la conscience se comprend comme liberté et savoir ? Y aurait-il un autre aspect, oublié par la rationalité que Levinas qualifie de grecque, qui serait plus propre à décrire la conscience ? L’ontologie ne repose-t-elle pas sur une conception de l’homme comme un sujet autonome et en contrôle ? Par ses fines analyses plutôt ontologiques dans Totalité et infini, et par sa prose plus déconstructrice d’Autrement qu’être, ou au-delà de l’essence, Levinas ébranle les fondations du sujet moderne tout en ramenant au centre des préoccupations philosophiques une idée que la tradition occidentale a eu tendance à évacuer, c’est-à-dire l’altérité. Et cette altérité, irréductible aux concepts immanents de la conscience d’un sujet, est ce qui justifie le primat de l’éthique, posant devant le je un tu qui appelle et demande une responsabilité absolue. Plusieurs auteurs et commentateurs seront mis à contribution, dont surtout Husserl et Heidegger, ainsi que S. Critchley, B. Bergo, J.-M. Salanskis et Jacques Roland. / This paper will analyze one of the major theses of the work of Emmanuel Levinas, his affirmation of the primacy of ethics over ontology. The argument will concentrate on the phenomenological description of the approach of Otherness, incarnated in the concreteness of the neighbour’s face, in which we could encounter the idea of infinity. This idea would not be a concept, but a transcendent phenomenal reality, leading Levinas to question the role of thematizing consciousness in the moral experience, characterised by the immediacy of the presence of an Other. Does the essential part of consciousness consist of liberty and knowledge ? Is there not another aspect, forgotten by a rationality qualified as Greek, which would be better suited to the nature of consciousness? Does ontology rely on a subject conceived as autonomous and in control of its destiny? Through his analysis in an ontological language in Totality and infinity, and through his deconstructive prose in Otherwise than Being, Levinas compromises the very core of the modern subject, bringing back to the forefront of philosophical inquiries an idea that the western tradition tended to evacuate from its discourse : Otherness. And this Otherness, irreducible to the immanent concepts of a subject’s consciousness, is what justifies the primacy of an ethic, positioning the I in front of a you that demands absolute responsibility. The contribution of several authors and commentators will be taken into account in this paper, mainly Husserl and Heidegger, but also S.Critchley, B. Bergo, J.-M. Salanskis and Jacques Roland.

This practice-led research was initiated in response to a series of violent encounters that occurred between my fragile installations and viewers. The central focus of this study was to recuperate my installation practice in the wake of such events. This led to the development of a ‘responsive practice’ methodology, which reframed the installation process through an ethical lens developed from Emmanuel Levinas’ ethical phenomenology. The central propositions of this research are the reconceptualisation of ‘violent encounters’ in terms of difference whereby I accept viewers responses, even those which are violent, destructive or damaging, and secondly that the process operates as a generative excess for practice through which recuperative strategies can be found and implemented. By re-examining this process as it unfolded in the three phases of the practical component, I developed strategies whereby violated, destroyed or damaged works could be recuperated through the processes of reconfiguration, reparation and regeneration. Therefore my installations embody and articulate vulnerability but also demonstrate resilience and renewal.

Zugl.: Freiburg (Breisgau), Univ., Diss.

xii, 278 p. / My dissertation is an existential-phenomenological account of human relations and ethics in dialogue with feminist care ethics. Using the work of Emmanuel Levinas, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Simone de Beauvoir, I describe how the ambiguity of human relationships results in an ambivalent ethical orientation, contingent as it is on negotiating the interrelated yet separable interests of the self and the other. Central to my work is a phenomenological description of maternal ambivalence (mothers' simultaneous desires to nurture and reject their children), an empirical case study that demonstrates how the conflicted nature of human relationships operates. Ultimately, I argue that ethical ambivalence is morally productive insofar as it helps one to avoid moral absolutism, recognize the alterity of others, attend to the particularities of situation, and negotiate one's own needs and desires with those of other people. This dissertation includes previously published material. / Committee in charge: Dr. Beata Stawarska, Co-Chair; Dr. Bonnie Mann, Co-Chair; Dr. Mark Johnson, Member; Dr. Sara Hodges, Outside Member