Le projet proposé est le suivant : d’abord tenter de comprendre quelle place joue l’indicible dans le langage et quelle forme prend — au niveau fondamental — la violence exercée à son endroit en suivant l'oeuvre d'Emmanuel Levinas et de Ludwig Wittgenstein. Ensuite, poursuivre l’analyse des formes de violence du langage en se penchant sur les conditions de possibilité d’une telle violence ou plutôt sur certaines manifestations historiques d’un tel exercice à l'aide du Différend (1983) de Jean-François Lyotard. Et finalement, appliquer les distinctions établies dans les deux chapitres précédents pour mettre en place les conditions d’établissement d’un espace discursif ouvrant à la possibilité du témoignage non-violent visant à reconnaître l’expérience de la survivante auparavant réduite au silence. / The current project aims to understand the role played by the “unspeakable” in language and what form—at a fundamental level—does the violence perpetrated towards it take by following the works of Emmanuel Levinas and Ludwig Wittgenstein. Then, the analysis of linguistic violence continues by examining the different manifestations of this wrong and their conditions of possibility or more precisely, by scrutinizing certain historical incidences of such a reproduction of violence by proposing a close reading of Jean-François Lyotard’s Le Différend (1983). Finally, an attempt will be made at establishing the conditions necessary for the construction of a discursive safe-space opening the possibility of a non-violent witnessing and testimony oriented towards the recognition of the experience of the once silenced survivor.

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According to philosopher, Emmanuel Levinas, alterity can exist only in its infinite and fluid nature in which the aspects of it that exceed the human ability to fully understand it remain unthematized in language. Levinas sees the encounter between self and other as the moment that instigates ethical responsibility, a moment so vital to avoiding mastering what is external to oneself that it should replace Western philosophy’s traditional emphasis on being as philosophy’s basis, or “First Philosophy.” Levinas’s conceptualization of language as a fluid, non-mastering saying, which one must continually re-enliven against a congealing and mastering said, is at the heart of his ethical project of relating to the other of alterity with ethical responsibility, or proximity. The imaginative poetic language that some contemporary poetry enacts, resonates with Levinas’s ethical motivations and methods for responding to alterity. The following project investigates facets of this question in relation to Levinas: how do the contemporary poets Peter Blue Cloud, Jorie Graham, Joy Harjo, and Robert Hass use poetic language uniquely to engage with alterity in an ethical way, thus allowing it to retain its mystery and infinite nature? I argue that by keeping language alive in a way similar to a Levinasian saying, which avoids mastering otherness by attending to its uniqueness and imaginatively engaging with it, they enact an ethical response to alterity. As a way of unpacking these ideas, this inquiry will investigate the compelling, if unsettled, convergence in the work of Levinas and that of Blue Cloud, Graham, Harjo, and Hass by unfolding a number of Levinasian-informed close readings of major poems by these writers as foregrounding various forms of Levinasian saying. / Ph. D.

[pt] O presente trabalh o investiga o pensamento teológico político de Johann Baptist Metz, em diálogo com filósofos judeus século XX enfatizando a memória subversiva da s vítimas, como um critério comum de autoridade. Fundamenta a busca por transformação de estruturas sociais injustas no retorno às tradições judaico cristãs e m harmonia com o e spírito do Concílio Vaticano II, assum indo o projeto do Reino de Deus para a paz no mundo Os pontos convergentes incluem a Alteridade a Responsabilidade Ilimitada, o Rosto do Outro, o diálogo do Eu e Tu, a Linguagem Profética e a pol í tica engajada pela paz. A tese possui três partes: a bi ografia do autor, a Teologia do Mundo, o tempo ilimitado, história e relação da humanidade com Deus; a práxis da Teologia Fundamental, a mudança hermenêutica e a sua eficácia teológic a O segundo bloco apresenta os pensadore s de origem judaica, que sofreram com a perseguição nazista Abraham Heschel, Emmanuel Levinas, Hans Jonas e Martin Buber, relacionando suas experiências e contribuições teológicas e filosóficas. A última parte aborda o silêncio de Deus, a autoridade da vítima, o sofrimento humano, a anamnese no cristianismo, a didática narrativa, a compaixão e a responsabilidade do cristianismo na Shoá. A tese busca enfatizar o diálogo entre esses autores, rec onhecendo a relevância de suas contribuições para aproximar judaísmo e cristianismo e refletir sobre questões injustas da sociedade. Espe ra se que o trabalho desperte o interesse pelo pensamento de Metz e suas contribuições para a teologia da América Latina e do mundo, encorajando reflexões sobre importantes questões frequentemente desconsideradas. / [en] The present work investigates the theological-political thought of Johann Baptist Metz in dialogue with 20th century Jewish philosophers, emphasizing the subversive memory of the victims as a common criterion of authority. It grounds the search for the transformation of unjust social structures in return to Judeo-Christian traditions. In harmony with the spirit of the Second Vatican Council, embracing the project of God s Kingdom for peace in the world. Converging points include Otherness, Unlimited Responsibility, the Face of the Other, the dialogue of Self and Thou, Prophetic Language, and peace-engaged politics. The thesis is divided into three parts: the author s biography, the Theology of the World, unlimited time, history, and humanity s relationship with God; the praxis of Fundamental Theology, hermeneutical change, and its theological effectiveness. The second section presents thinkers of Jewish origin who suffered under Nazi persecution: Abraham Heschel, Emmanuel Levinas, Hans Jonas, and Martin Buber, relating their experiences and theological and philosophical contributions. The final part addresses the silence of God, the authority of the victim, human suffering, anamnesis in Christianity, narrative didactics, compassion, and Christianity s responsibility in the Shoah. The thesis aims to emphasize the dialogue among these authors, recognizing the relevance of their contributions to bringing Judaism and Christianity closer together and reflecting on unjust issues in society. It is hoped that this work will spark interest in Metz s thought and his contributions to Latin American and global theology, encouraging reflections on important and often overlooked questions.

Thesis (MPhil (Philosophy))--University of Stellenbosch, 2005. / This study seeks to give a philosophical account of, and justification for the intuition that subjectivity is not a stable “Archimedean point” on the basis of which an intersubjective relation can be founded, but is instead profoundly affected by each different “Other” with which it enters into a relation. As a preliminary to the positive philosophical account of how this might work in Part II of the thesis, there is an attempt to critique certain of the classical accounts of intersubjectivity found in phenomenology, in order to show that these positions cannot give a satisfactory account of the type of intersubjective relation which gives rise to the abovementioned intuition. The thesis therefore starts off by examining the account of intersubjectivity in Husserl’s Cartesian Meditations (especially the Fifth Meditation). Husserl is there engaged in an attempt to overcome the charge of solipsism that might be levelled at phenomenology, since phenomenology is concerned with experience as, by definition, the experience of the subject. We try to show that Husserl cannot give a satisfactory account of the Other because he tries to derive it from the Subject, and hence reduces the Other to the Same. We then turn to two other phenomenological thinkers – Merleau-Ponty and Levinas, both of whom are themselves critical of Husserl – to examine whether they provide a better account, but conclude that (although each represents a certain advance over Husserl), neither are able to provide a decisively better account, since each is still too caught up in phenomenology and its focus on consciousness. In Part II of the thesis, we then turn to a non- (or even anti-) phenomenological thinker, namely Gilles Deleuze, to try and find an alternative theory that would be able to provide the account we seek. Our contention is that Deleuze, by seeking to give an account of the constitution of the subject itself, simultaneously provides an account of the constitution of the Other as arising at the same time as the Subject. Crucial to this account is the inversion of priority between the poles of a relation and the relation itself. Deleuze argues that a relation is “external to its terms”, and precedes these terms. Hence, by returning to a level which precedes consciousness and the order of knowledge – that is, by returning to the level of the virtual multiplicities and singular events that underlie and precede the actualization of these events and multiplicities in distinct subjects and objects – we argue that Deleuze shows that, contra phenomenology, there is in fact no primordial separation between subject and Other. The contention is therefore that the problem of intersubjectivity as posed by phenomenology is a false one that can be eluded by means of Deleuze’s philosophy. This philosophy is not based on the subject, but instead shows the subject to be the product of an underlying network of relations. Finally, we turn to Deleuze’s appropriation of Nietzsche to trace out the transformation of “ethics” that result from adopting a position like that of Deleuze.

Thesis (MPhil (Philosophy))--University of Stellenbosch, 2006. / This study constitutes a conceptual analysis and critique of the notion of the subject, and the concomitant notion of responsibility, as it has developed through the philosophical history of the modern subject. The aim of this study is to present the reader with a critical notion of responsibility. This study seeks to divorce such a position from the traditional, normative view of the subject, as typified by the Cartesian position. Following Derrida, a deconstructive reading of the subject’s conceptual development since Descartes is presented. What emerges from this reading is that, despite various re-conceptualisations of the subject by philosophers as influential and diverse as Nietzsche, Heidegger and Levinas, their respective positions continue to affirm the subject as human. The position presented in this study challenges this notion of the subject as human, with the goal of opening-up and displacing the ethical frontier between human and non-human. It is argued that displacing this ethical frontier introduces complex responsibilities. These complex responsibilities resist the violence inherent to normative positions that typically exclude the non-human – particularly the animal – from the sphere of responsibility.

本論文以列維納斯(Emmanuel Levinas)早期的著作《整體與無限》(Totality and Infinity)為啟蒙探討其倫理思想所提倡的他者哲學，進而分析阿爾比《誰怕吳爾芙？》劇中的倫理關係(ethical relationship)。列氏試圖顛覆古典哲學以降的本體論霸權，並提倡他者哲學為第一哲學。論文第二章以列氏思想對於西方哲學傳統的批判為主調，揭開整體性(totality)或本體論(ontology)之暴力性。列氏反思與抨擊西方哲學淪於以自我為中心的自我學(egology)並泛稱其為本體論。本體論中對於他者的認知往往是藉由一個中立的詞來化約他者為同者。同者把他者當成一個主題或客體的展現以便理解或掌握他者；他者在此認知過程中被納入同者的整體當中，因此他者在黑格爾辯證法中被否定為「非我」；他者甚至被同化為「另一個我」；海德格式本體論獨尊存有(Being)的同時，與他者的關係被矮化為廣泛的存有關係。藉由否定、同化等手法，他者被化約為「非我」、「另一個我」以及存有的一部份，並納入同者的整體範疇當中。在《誰怕吳爾芙？》劇中同者對於他者的整體性暴力(totalizing violence)化約過程透過數個例子可一窺其究竟。第一例為同者對他者的「化約」：瑪莎所講述的拳擊故事中，瑪莎父親要求喬治與其對打，呈現出瑪莎父親欲強迫喬治接受其所定義的男子氣概形象。第二例為同者對他者的「同化」：尼克所影射的遺傳學工程願景中，人人被創造為同一模樣，透露出同者欲同化他者的野心。第三例為同者對他者的「否定」：瑪莎刻意與尼克發生性關係來激怒喬治，並否定喬治的男人尊嚴。第三章著重於尼克與蜜糖的來訪所帶來的影響，如同他者的出現般，要求喬治與瑪莎做出回應。在列氏倫理中，他者與同者的關係乃是一種「離開」(separation)的狀態。唯有在此「離開」的狀態中，他者的激進他異性(the alterity of the Other)方成可能。他者的激進他異性使他者不會落入同者的整體性暴力之中，讓他者成為絕對他者並延伸出他者的無限性。他者的臉龐(face)，或可稱為他者在這世上所留下的痕跡(trace)，向我呼喚並索求倫理責任。在此劇中，尼克與蜜糖的出現猶如他者的出現般震撼了喬治與瑪莎的幻想世界。喬治與瑪莎虛構自己生了一個兒子來滿足他們現實生活中的失望與空虛，就像列氏倫理所描述他者未出現前，同者在其所處的外在世界中找到有別於自我的物質，並賴以生存所產生的喜悅般，這虛構的孩子對喬治和瑪莎而言，是他們私密幻想世界中最大的幸福喜悅與慰藉寄託。但因瑪莎過於沉溺在自我幻想世界之中，不小心在蜜糖面前將兩人虛構的孩子說溜嘴而惹喬治生氣。虛構的孩子永遠不會變成真人，也無法擁有列氏所提出的他者的激進他異性；尼克與蜜糖的來訪猶如他者的降臨般，使得喬治與瑪莎私密幻想世界中虛構出來的孩子，一旦公開後卻成為現實生活中互相爭執的核心。在瑪莎宣稱她結婚的意義是不斷地鞭打折磨喬治時，喬治才終於領悟到瑪莎真的生病了而且病得不輕。更重要的是，瑪莎的不貞與其背後所表現出帶有毀滅性的整體性暴力迫使喬治做出回應。瑪莎的不道德行為喚醒了喬治自身對於瑪莎的責任與使命感。基於對瑪莎深刻的愛與關懷，喬治做出殺掉心愛虛構孩子之沉痛決定。喬治的動機絕對不是為了報復瑪莎，而是以拯救瑪莎為出發點，避免她繼續墮入這極端的整體性暴力。第四章為本論文的終章；透過數個例子(尤其是瑪莎的通姦)，解析列氏所批判的本體論式整體性暴力之多重面貌，本篇論文指出喬治對瑪莎的深切關懷，恰恰實現列氏倫理思想中的他者哲學，正是一種為他人著想的哲學。 / This thesis examines the totalizing violence overrunning in Albee's Who's Afraid of Virginia Woolf? and a call for responsibility to and for the Other in Emmanuel Levinas's propositions of ethical relationship. In this play, the illusion of life can also be counted as an inconvenient truth, yet the playwright urges people to acknowledge the difference between illusion and reality. George and Martha build their marriage on a life game, their imagined son. When Nick and Honey arrive, an interrelation between private and public and illusion and reality disturbs all four characters. Martha's totalizing indulgence goes into extremes when she is lost in her fantasy world gradually and commits adultery deliberately. Sensing the seriousness of Martha's situation, George finally wakes up from his own illusion and decides to kill the imagined son for Martha's sake. It is an act of profound love and care that George dispels the illusion in his and Martha's marriage life. Chapter Two examines different forms of ontology, which is embodied by the three major philosophical systems: I and not-I in the Hegelian dialectic, ego and alter ego, and the Heideggerian primacy of Being and then demonstrates various examples of the totalizing violence through the reduction of Martha's father, the symbolic assimilation of Nick, and, particularly, the destructive negation of Martha. Committing adultery is an extreme manner to claim one’s power. George's reaction to Martha's ethical transgression is crucial. Chapter Three explores one's responsibility to and for the Other in the ethical relationship between self and other and argues that George’s decision of killing the imagined son reflects Levinas's ethical concern. Recognizing his own alienation from society and deciding to take the responsibility to help Martha eliminate her internalized ontological violence, George fully represents Levinas's concept of responsibility to and for the Other. A dialogue of Albee's dramatic text and Levinas's propositions highlight the importance of ethical relationship between self and other on a genuine basis. Through their works about violence and compassion, both Albee and Levinas have high concern for the Other.

Made available in DSpace on 2015-04-14T13:54:56Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 385288.pdf: 1614445 bytes, checksum: b2ec545a66a5a2dff2ceff6ad5d81de6 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2006-10-31 / Na contram?o das pesquisas sobre a humanitas do homo humanus no s?culo XX, principalmente a que se fez no exerc?cio da filosofia como fenomenologia em Heidegger, Sartre e Levinas, ergo aqui a possibilidade da Leveza. Considerando que nestes se delineia, pari passu ao sentido do humano, um peso existencial expresso como o fardo da finitude (Heidegger), do excessivo centramento em si (Sartre) e da responsabilidade infinita (Levinas), sugiro a Tese de que ? vi?vel filosoficamente coadunar, a um s? tempo, humanidade e leveza, sem que se decaia a um sentido dionis?aco ou alienado da descri??o do que ? o homem. Em s?ntese, transito aqui no fato de que ? sustent?vel a Leveza do Humano, quando do olhar para a fenomenalidade do evento da generosidade e quando se adentra de vez no sentido do humano tecido a partir da responsabilidade, o que desde Levinas se delineia como disposi??o an?rquica ao Bem anterior ao ser. Reino da Bondade que de nenhum modo ? um fardo e um peso sobre os ombros do homem.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-28T20:39:32Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Iaraci Fernandes Advincula.pdf: 501317 bytes, checksum: 6b05d8fd6875740a5cf75c1f3df9b1d2 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2007-08-31 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / The objective of this work is to entertain the idea that the field of the human experience, in the complexity of clinical situations, requires an opening to the imponderable. This creates the proper conditions for the vitalization of the existencial event. Initially, it was necessary to develop a theoretical framework presenting and linking some aspects of the Heiddeggerian, the Levinasian and the Winnicottian perspectives in their respectives matrices of intersubjectivity; showing, through clinical dynamics, the paradoxical articulation of these different matrices in the constitution of subjectivities; showing the implications of these matrices of intersubjective conception in the understanding and in the implementation of effective clinical approaches. Finally, we focused, in the context of therapeutic situations, on the importance of paradoxical interventions in the constitution of intrapsychic Intersubjectivity. This study showed that the selves" referring both to my self and to the self of the other person is far beyond our absolute comprehension. Something alien to us, coming from our inner self and from the inner self of the other person with whom we relate, will always be emerging. We conclude this study with the realization of both the paradox and the complexity of the intersubjective constitutions, beyond the limit of human knowledge, which requires an ethical approach of waiting for what transpires within the meandering setting of the clinical work. The clinical work, by itself, demands therapeutic interventions equally complex and paradoxical / Este trabalho teve como objetivo considerar a idéia de que o campo da experiência humana, na complexidade das situações clínicas, exige a abertura para o imponderável, criando condições para a vitalização do acontecimento existencial. Para isso, buscou-se, inicialmente, construir um arcabouço teórico que apresentasse e relacionasse alguns pontos das perspectivas heideggeriana, levinasiana e winnicottiana nas matrizes de intersubjetividade correspondentes, mostrando, por meio da dinâmica clínica, a articulação paradoxal dessas diferentes matrizes de intersubjetividade nas constituições subjetivas; indicando as implicações das matrizes de concepção intersubjetiva na compreensão e nos efetivos manejos clínicos e, finalmente, focalizando, em situações terapêuticas, a importância das intervenções paradoxais para o psiquismo humano na sua constituição intersubjetiva intrapsíquica. Revelou-se, por meio deste estudo, que o si-mesmo tanto de si como do outro escapa à nossa capacidade totalizadora. Algo estranho a nós, proveniente de nossa interioridade e do outro com o qual nos relacionamos, estará sempre irrompendo. Conclui-se com o reconhecimento do paradoxo e da complexidade das constituições intersubjetivas, além do limite do conhecimento humano, o qual exige uma posição ética de espera do que se revela nos meandros do trabalho clínico, que, por sua vez, demanda intervenções terapêuticas, igualmente, paradoxais e complexas

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-27T17:27:28Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Sybil Safdie Douek.pdf: 1865791 bytes, checksum: ebc827ec6b5f55d21c76a00bfc6d1d0e (MD5) Previous issue date: 2009-06-03 / The present dissertation intends to confront Paul Ricoeur and Emmanuel Levinas philosophy, from an essential point of view: the relationship between the subject and the other, subjectivity and alterity. Question which relevance seems to be dramatic after the Two World Wars, particularly after the Shoah: which could be, subsequent to this historical experience, the meanings of words such as subject, man and ethics? Aware of the necessary and indispensable critics toward classic humanism, and willing to withdraw the subject of his central position in philosophy, since Descartes, both authors seem to rehabilitate the subject, and put again faith in him, without paying to the subject unrestricted reverence. The result is the idea of a subject that includes in itself alterity: self as another , says Ricoeur; the other in the same , says Levinas. But which is the place assigned to the other? Levinas insists in the absolute priority of the other, and proposes the deposition of the subject in behalf of the other: the subject substitutes himself to the other, it is hostage of the other, being absolutely passive in his relationship with him. Ricoeur, in his turn, defends the importance of both (oneself and other) and prefers to think in terms of reciprocity, and receptivity of the subject. These different perspectives concerning relationship between subject and other imply two conceptions of ethics: for Levinas, ethics of responsibility and election; for Ricoeur, ethics of promise, of good living together and mutuality. It implicates also two different attitudes in regard of a question not always considered as philosophical: transcendence or the Name of God. For both, God is a question which deserves attention, but Ricoeur excludes the Name of his philosophical speech, building a hermeutics of the self without the support of transcendence; while for Levinas, the problem of subjectivity goes along this the problem of transcendence. Therefore, a question is born: the presence or absence of the Name of God in their philosophy of subjectivity could have connections or correspondences with their respective religious traditions Ricoeur´s Protestantism and Levinas Judaism? Traditions never denied by both of them, although kept far from their philosophical reflections, each one in his own way / A presente tese se propõe a confrontar as filosofias de Paul Ricoeur e Emmanuel Lévinas, a partir de uma questão essencial: a relação do sujeito com a alteridade. Questão cuja relevância se coloca de modo dramático após a experiência histórica das duas Guerras Mundiais, em particular da Shoah: que sentido dar, hoje, às palavras: sujeito, homem ou ética? Conscientes da necessária e incontornável crítica ao humanismo clássico e, desejosos de retirar o sujeito da posição central que vem ocupando na filosofia, desde Descartes, ambos parecem querer reabilitar o sujeito, fazer-lhe novamente confiança, sem por isso, render-lhe irrestritas homenagens. O resultado é uma concepção de sujeito que inclui em si próprio a alteridade: si mesmo como um outro , diz Ricoeur; o outro no mesmo , diz Lévinas: mas que lugar dar a outrem? Lévinas insiste na prioridade absoluta do outro, propondo a deposição do sujeito em favor de outrem: o sujeito se substitui ao outro, é refém do outro, sendo absolutamente passivo na relação; Ricoeur, por seu lado, defende a importância dos dois pólos e prefere falar em reciprocidade da relação e em receptividade do sujeito. As diferentes perspectivas na relação sujeito-outrem implicam em duas concepções de ética: em Lévinas, ética da responsabilidade e da eleição; em Ricoeur, ética da promessa, do bem viver-junto e da mutualidade. Como também em duas atitudes diferentes, no que diz respeito a uma questão nem sempre considerada filosófica: a transcendência ou o nome de Deus. Se para ambos Deus é uma questão que merece atenção, Ricoeur O exclui de seu discurso filosófico, construindo uma hermenêutica do si que não necessita da transcendência para se sustentar; enquanto para Lévinas, o problema da subjetividade e o da transcendência caminham juntos. Nasce uma questão: a presença ou a ausência do nome de Deus nas filosofias do sujeito de Ricoeur e Lévinas poderia ter conexões ou correspondências com suas respectivas tradições religiosas - o protestantismo de Ricoeur e o judaísmo de Lévinas? Tradições que eles nunca negaram, embora as tenham mantido afastadas, cada um a seu modo, de suas reflexões filosóficas