本文試結合禮物致贈和待客之道，討論其在經典文學作品和人類學記錄中，隱含對文明發展及個人主體的省思。禮物實踐的弔詭和難題，自人類學家摩斯（Marcel Mauss）以來，到文學批評學者德希達（Jacques Derrida），屢在當代不同學科引發興趣。禮物的經濟效益似乎直接挑戰命題本身，搖擺於權宜交換的迷思和禮物的形上真諦。待客之道，則屬當代法國哲學家列維納斯（Emmanuel Levinas）的倫理思想中心。列維納斯認為待客之道隱喻無限可能的化身，能解套傳統主體為上的僵局，亦為主體對未知／上帝的責任。德希達將之援引，同視為（不）可能任務。在此脈絡下，本文試圖在不同文本／文明間對照，探究禮物和待客之道所指之善行本質，超越的欲望，及與他人／它者互動的界限辯證。所用方法主要為重新闡述西方文明重要來源之《聖經》，文藝復興時期莎士比亞四大悲劇中的《李爾王》，以及作為西方文明它者的泛伊斯蘭文學遺產《一千零一夜》。本文認為，以顯在(present/presence)為軸的人文精神，其先驗的暴力特質，一方面淋漓表現於禮物(gift/present)及待客之道；一方面正因這不可迴避的暴力和超越可能性(possibility)恆使文學作品以禮物和待客之道作為生命常軌之外的轉折點，彷彿是作家和學者對於智識外的不可計算(uncalculated economy)，以不可能(the impossibility, the absolute other)的踪跡(the trace)形式，留下對彼在(there is)／他者(the other)的悅納(welcome)。 / The themes of hospitality and gift-giving in literature oftentimes pass unnoticed by literary critics because the themes seem to be so naturally embedded in literature that perhaps an event of murder might interest the critics more. But hospitality and gift-giving are important because, as part of our living experience and with the possibility of going beyond the logic of exchange and altruism, hospitality and gift-giving subtly reveal to us the eternal concerns of astonishment, death, God, violence, and human relations. In this respect, hospitality and gift-giving radically challenge our conception of subjectivity. The following dissertation which consists of my collection of thoughts is therefore, metaphorically, a tangent touching, or better yet, approaching yet without appropriating the other in the postmodern philosophical context. My interpretation of “the absolute other” aims to make an argument that actions of hospitality and gift-giving, albeit without the acknowledgement of the subject, exhibit the desire of approaching “the absolute other” and simultaneously acknowledge the limit of subjectivity. In this attempt to lay open the interrelationships between hospitality and gift-giving by illustrating the “otherness” in subjectivity, responsibility, and God “the absolute other,” I draw from various sources in philosophy, sociology, anthropology, and Lacanian psychoanalysis. Through review of these multiple sources I contend that genuine hospitality and gift-giving can give rise to various levels of meanings to the absolute alterity of otherness. The selected literary texts under the discussion respectively are: the Bible, King Lear, and the Arabian Nights. The reasoning behind this choice is an intention to comprehend the otherness across cultural boundaries. I examine the Bible to contend for the Hebraic tradition and Pauline Christianity, King Lear the renaissance enlightenment, and the Arabian Nights the Western other.

本論文以列維納斯(Emmanuel Levinas)早期的著作《整體與無限》(Totality and Infinity)為啟蒙探討其倫理思想所提倡的他者哲學，進而分析阿爾比《誰怕吳爾芙？》劇中的倫理關係(ethical relationship)。列氏試圖顛覆古典哲學以降的本體論霸權，並提倡他者哲學為第一哲學。論文第二章以列氏思想對於西方哲學傳統的批判為主調，揭開整體性(totality)或本體論(ontology)之暴力性。列氏反思與抨擊西方哲學淪於以自我為中心的自我學(egology)並泛稱其為本體論。本體論中對於他者的認知往往是藉由一個中立的詞來化約他者為同者。同者把他者當成一個主題或客體的展現以便理解或掌握他者；他者在此認知過程中被納入同者的整體當中，因此他者在黑格爾辯證法中被否定為「非我」；他者甚至被同化為「另一個我」；海德格式本體論獨尊存有(Being)的同時，與他者的關係被矮化為廣泛的存有關係。藉由否定、同化等手法，他者被化約為「非我」、「另一個我」以及存有的一部份，並納入同者的整體範疇當中。在《誰怕吳爾芙？》劇中同者對於他者的整體性暴力(totalizing violence)化約過程透過數個例子可一窺其究竟。第一例為同者對他者的「化約」：瑪莎所講述的拳擊故事中，瑪莎父親要求喬治與其對打，呈現出瑪莎父親欲強迫喬治接受其所定義的男子氣概形象。第二例為同者對他者的「同化」：尼克所影射的遺傳學工程願景中，人人被創造為同一模樣，透露出同者欲同化他者的野心。第三例為同者對他者的「否定」：瑪莎刻意與尼克發生性關係來激怒喬治，並否定喬治的男人尊嚴。第三章著重於尼克與蜜糖的來訪所帶來的影響，如同他者的出現般，要求喬治與瑪莎做出回應。在列氏倫理中，他者與同者的關係乃是一種「離開」(separation)的狀態。唯有在此「離開」的狀態中，他者的激進他異性(the alterity of the Other)方成可能。他者的激進他異性使他者不會落入同者的整體性暴力之中，讓他者成為絕對他者並延伸出他者的無限性。他者的臉龐(face)，或可稱為他者在這世上所留下的痕跡(trace)，向我呼喚並索求倫理責任。在此劇中，尼克與蜜糖的出現猶如他者的出現般震撼了喬治與瑪莎的幻想世界。喬治與瑪莎虛構自己生了一個兒子來滿足他們現實生活中的失望與空虛，就像列氏倫理所描述他者未出現前，同者在其所處的外在世界中找到有別於自我的物質，並賴以生存所產生的喜悅般，這虛構的孩子對喬治和瑪莎而言，是他們私密幻想世界中最大的幸福喜悅與慰藉寄託。但因瑪莎過於沉溺在自我幻想世界之中，不小心在蜜糖面前將兩人虛構的孩子說溜嘴而惹喬治生氣。虛構的孩子永遠不會變成真人，也無法擁有列氏所提出的他者的激進他異性；尼克與蜜糖的來訪猶如他者的降臨般，使得喬治與瑪莎私密幻想世界中虛構出來的孩子，一旦公開後卻成為現實生活中互相爭執的核心。在瑪莎宣稱她結婚的意義是不斷地鞭打折磨喬治時，喬治才終於領悟到瑪莎真的生病了而且病得不輕。更重要的是，瑪莎的不貞與其背後所表現出帶有毀滅性的整體性暴力迫使喬治做出回應。瑪莎的不道德行為喚醒了喬治自身對於瑪莎的責任與使命感。基於對瑪莎深刻的愛與關懷，喬治做出殺掉心愛虛構孩子之沉痛決定。喬治的動機絕對不是為了報復瑪莎，而是以拯救瑪莎為出發點，避免她繼續墮入這極端的整體性暴力。第四章為本論文的終章；透過數個例子(尤其是瑪莎的通姦)，解析列氏所批判的本體論式整體性暴力之多重面貌，本篇論文指出喬治對瑪莎的深切關懷，恰恰實現列氏倫理思想中的他者哲學，正是一種為他人著想的哲學。 / This thesis examines the totalizing violence overrunning in Albee's Who's Afraid of Virginia Woolf? and a call for responsibility to and for the Other in Emmanuel Levinas's propositions of ethical relationship. In this play, the illusion of life can also be counted as an inconvenient truth, yet the playwright urges people to acknowledge the difference between illusion and reality. George and Martha build their marriage on a life game, their imagined son. When Nick and Honey arrive, an interrelation between private and public and illusion and reality disturbs all four characters. Martha's totalizing indulgence goes into extremes when she is lost in her fantasy world gradually and commits adultery deliberately. Sensing the seriousness of Martha's situation, George finally wakes up from his own illusion and decides to kill the imagined son for Martha's sake. It is an act of profound love and care that George dispels the illusion in his and Martha's marriage life. Chapter Two examines different forms of ontology, which is embodied by the three major philosophical systems: I and not-I in the Hegelian dialectic, ego and alter ego, and the Heideggerian primacy of Being and then demonstrates various examples of the totalizing violence through the reduction of Martha's father, the symbolic assimilation of Nick, and, particularly, the destructive negation of Martha. Committing adultery is an extreme manner to claim one’s power. George's reaction to Martha's ethical transgression is crucial. Chapter Three explores one's responsibility to and for the Other in the ethical relationship between self and other and argues that George’s decision of killing the imagined son reflects Levinas's ethical concern. Recognizing his own alienation from society and deciding to take the responsibility to help Martha eliminate her internalized ontological violence, George fully represents Levinas's concept of responsibility to and for the Other. A dialogue of Albee's dramatic text and Levinas's propositions highlight the importance of ethical relationship between self and other on a genuine basis. Through their works about violence and compassion, both Albee and Levinas have high concern for the Other.

本文嘗試以和平問題與暴力問題為焦點，重新理解列維納斯道德形上學之梗概，並解決其政治蘊義所造成的疑難。列維納斯的哲學基本上是一種和平哲學，其所論之和平乃被界定為對暴力的非暴力抵抗，並在其前期作品中具體展現為倫理學對政治學的抵抗。但此一抵抗關係隨著列維納斯的思想進程而逐漸呈現出一種兩歧性，從而引發其思想是否前後不一致的批判，亦產生對和平之純粹性的質疑。筆者的努力即在於說明此一疑難的成因並構想一調和方案。筆者主張，應將列維納斯的思想進程視為一條闡發其倫理學之政治蘊義的思路，但這條從倫理學走到政治學的和平之路，須途經社會學的迂迴方才可能，而如此一種中介性的社會學之建構，惟在列維納斯的他勒目詮釋中獲得。因此，本文綜觀列維納斯的哲學作品與宗教作品，先是闡述責任倫理學的和平蘊義，再從其宗教詮釋學對以色列社群的刻畫得到那基於倫理學之社會學的基本模式，最後參照解構主義的批判，在對質疑政治學與回答社會學的構想中，統括列維納斯的倫理思想與政治思想。 / Peace, as the non-violence resistance to violence, is one of the main topics of Levinas's philosophy. In this dissertation, I attempt to summarize Levinas's moral metaphysics and reflect its political implications by investigating the relation of peace and violence. The relation which in Levinas's early works could be seen as an opposition between ethics and politics has some ambiguity in his later works that emerges in a dialectical way: ethics both opposes and demands politics. My opinion is that this problem can be solved by referring to his religious works, especially his interpretations of the Talmud. In brief, the path of argument is from ethics to politics through sociology. First, I describe the basic principles of Levinas's ethical metaphysics by illustrating the typology of the other and the genealogy of the same, i.e. the phenomenology of the face of the other and the transformation from the same in itself to the same for the other. Second, I find the basic political model in terms of the hermeneutics of Talmud, especially the texts about the people of Israel. Final, I try to appeal to the postmodern thoughts in order to reconcile the risk of violence in Levinas's religious works, and integrate Levinas's ethical thoughts and political thoughts by constructing the politics of questioning and the sociology of response.