Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-27T17:27:20Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Vicente Beur Miranda Lima.pdf: 1320109 bytes, checksum: af91f52d25eff82f756a36909c7968b0 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2007-10-31 / The ethic discussion in the last time has roused a great interest in many thinkers such as Ernest Thungendart, Jurgen Habbermas, Jacques Derrida, Rosmini, Bonhoefer, Guardini, Mancini. They try to put out this discussion at the present day, beside the new philisophic tendencies as: Language Philosophy, Knowledge Theory and Politic Philosophy. Among these thinkers, it has specifically in Emmanuel Levinás , a new proposal for ethic. The present paper intends to present this new proposal clearly, that in its own way break up with those others, at the same time that it goes to another point of reference to think about the real ethic, that comes from another one. According to Levinás, the reference point of ethic is not in a transcendentalism of I must , but it is in the relationship of face to face that happens when the other person is next to. This is the way how Lévinas excels the other types of ethic, because they are still in an ontologic horizon. At the same time, with this finality, it has as a main point in research, investigate the concept of Love in this new ethic scenery that Lévinas proposes. Check up about: the context, through Lévinas itinerary existential-philosophic, where it can be noted in a strong way the influence of Judaism in his intellectual formation; the dialogue with names that belong to philosophy and that influenced his thought directly. Finally, it is going to investigate what he brought of genuine in his Philosophy, the place of Love, as a member of his Ethic of Alterity, proposing a change in the philosophy view, that is, love for knowledge, to a Knowledge of Love / O debate ético nos últimos tempos tem despertado um grande interesse em muitos pensadores, tais como Ernest Thungendart, Jürgen Habbermas, Jacques Derrida, os quais procuram recolocá-lo na ordem do dia, ao lado de novas tendências filosóficas como Filosofia da Linguagem, Lógica, Teoria do Conhecimento e Filosofia Política. Dentre estes, tem-se especificamente em Emmanuel Lévinas, uma nova proposta ética. O presente trabalho tem por finalidade, apresentar de forma sucinta, esta nova proposta ética, que a seu modo rompe com as anteriores, na medida em que parte de um outro ponto de referência para pensar a própria ética, isto é, o outro. Para Lévinas, o ponto referencial da ética não reside num transcendentalismo do eu devo , mas na relação do face-a-face que se estabelece com a proximidade do outro. É desta forma que Lévinas supera as outras modalidades éticas, por aquelas permanecerem ainda num horizonte ontológico. Concomitantemente a esta primeira finalidade, tem-se como ponto principal da pesquisa, averiguar o conceito do Amor neste novo cenário ético proposto por Lévinas. Para tal, investigar-se-á: seu contexto vivencial, através de seu itinerário-existencial-filosófico, em que se percebe fortemente a influência do judaísmo em sua formação intelectual; a interlocução com nomes próprios da filosofia que influenciaram diretamente seu pensamento; para num último momento, averiguar, naquilo que traz de genuíno em sua filosofia, o lugar do Amor, como constituinte de sua Ética da Alteridade; propondo assim uma mudança de horizonte da própria filosofia, isto é, de uma amor à sabedoria, para uma Sabedoria do amor

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-25T19:20:46Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Maria Angelica Santana.pdf: 2027639 bytes, checksum: e69bc877a0199d677003b2ce59bc8ac0 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2007-06-04 / In this work we aboard the face as icon of the solidary ethics and the responsibility on the other, in accordance with the theory of Emmanuel Levinas. Ahead of the face of the Other, the people discover him responsible and the Infinite it comes to the idea. Philosophically, Levinas perceives that the occidental thought, beginning from the Greek philosophy, developed as domination speech. Of Descartes, Levinas keeps the discovery of the idea of the infinite, taking as Metaphysical orientation for its ethics. Levinas conserves in his philosophy influences of the Husserlian phenomenological method and the Heideggerian analytical existential, however distanced of both essentially. It will be, therefore, of great importance, to discover the ethics in practices of the good. The choice of the Levinasian philosophy in this work considers the contribution that Levinas can us offer in the creation of an ethical language, a simple speech. The construction of ethics based on the alterity breaches the identity of I, but it is clearly, in the direction to see the other as reference for the ethical construction, this does not mean negation of the identity of I. This work inquired the voluntary work, the Levinasian s ethic as a principle of the event of the good and the religious practice of LSCSP through the field study. A LSCSP that in the Christian tradition of the religion, has a solidary life on behalf of the fraternity, idea established for the catholic ladies under the perspective of a society more joust. Levinas does not explain the human fraternity being for the similarity, but for the irrepetível unicity of the other, an equality that breaks the difference, that knows to receive the message from the face of the other. Only from the face, that LSCSP sees the possibility to fulfill the law to love God and the next , as well as for Levinas, the revelation it gives for the face of the next. Justice is born, thus, of the mercy, of the responsibility for the other, recognition of the unicity of LSCSP and the other. The force and originality of the philosophy of Levinas consist of the conjuncture that joins and opens, in the face of Other, where it joins the recognition of God with the recognition of the humanity of the Other / Neste trabalho abordarmos a face como ícone da ética solidária e da responsabilidade sobre o outro, de acordo com a teoria de Emmanuel Levinas. Diante da face do Outro, o sujeito se descobre responsável e lhe vem à idéia o Infinito. Filosoficamente, Levinas percebe que o pensamento ocidental, a partir da filosofia grega, desenvolveu-se como discurso de dominação. De Descartes, Levinas guarda a descoberta da idéia do infinito, tomada como orientação metafísica para a sua ética. Levinas conserva em sua filosofia influências do método fenomenológico husserliano e da analítica existencial heideggeriana, porém distancia-se de ambos essencialmente. Será, portanto, de grande importância, descobrir a ética na pratica do bem. A escolha da filosofia Levinasiana neste trabalho, vem considerar a contribuição que Levinas pode nos oferecer na criação de uma linguagem ética, um discurso simples. A construção de uma ética baseada na alteridade rompe a identidade do eu, mas é claro, no sentido de ver o outro como referência para a construção ética, isso não significa negação da identidade do eu. Neste trabalho foi averiguado o trabalho voluntário, a ética levinasiana como um princípio do acontecimento do bem e a pratica religiosa da LSCSP, através do estudo de campo. Uma LSCSP que na tradição cristã da religião tem uma vida solidária em nome da fraternidade, idéia fundada pelas senhoras católicas sob a perspectiva de uma sociedade mais justa. Levinas não explica a fraternidade humana pela semelhança, mas pela unicidade irrepetível do outro, uma igualdade que parte da diferença, que sabe acolher a mensagem da face do outro. Somente a partir da face, que a LSCSP vê a possibilidade de cumprir a lei amar a Deus e ao próximo , como também para Levinas, a revelação dá-se pela face do próximo. A justiça nasce, assim, da misericórdia, da responsabilidade pelo outro, reconhecimento da unicidade da LSCSP e do outro. A força e originalidade da filosofia de Levinas consistem na conjuntura que se une e abre na face de outrem, onde se une o reconhecimento de Deus com o reconhecimento da humanidade do outro

Univ., Diss.--Zürich, 2006.

Text in German, summaries in German and English / Diese Masterarbeit handelt von Transzendenzmomenten angesichts des Anderen und nimmt damit Bezug auf einen der einflussreichsten Philosophen der Gegenwart, Emmanuel Levinas. Philosophiegeschichtlich bildet der linguistic turn den Kontext dieses Diskurses. So wird der Wandel im Denken, der mit dem linguistic turn einhergeht, anhand verschiedener philosophischer und theologischer Essays reflektiert und auf das Problem der Gewalt im Prozess des Erkennens hin zugespitzt. In Diskussion mit den Schriften Dietrich Bonhoeffers leistet diese Arbeit hinfort einen Beitrag zum systematisch-theologischen Diskurs über Gottesoffenbarung in zwischenmenschlichen Beziehungen und über Ethik. In Auseinandersetzung mit Levinas und Bonhoeffer baut diese Arbeit eine Brücke zwischen postmodernem, dekonstruktivistischem Denken und der fortwährenden theologischen Aufgabe, Gottes Sein mittels menschlicher Sprache Ausdruck zu verleihen. / This master thesis is about moments of transcendence in face of the other by means of one of the most important philosophers in our days, Emmanuel Levinas. The philosophically based historical context is represented by the term linguistic turn which marks a change of thinking within the 20th century. To outline this change the thesis brings several philosophical and theological essays up for discussion which leads to the problem of power in the process of recognition. Bringing up Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s writings, this research will make a contribution to the systematic-theological discourse about God revealing himself within relationships and about ethics. Furthermore it builds a bridge between postmodern anti-constructivist thinking and the continual theological task of using human language to explore God’s being. / Philosophy, Practical and Systematic Theology / M. Th. (Systematic Theology)

Thesis (MPhil (Philosophy))--University of Stellenbosch, 2005. / This study seeks to give a philosophical account of, and justification for the intuition that subjectivity is not a stable “Archimedean point” on the basis of which an intersubjective relation can be founded, but is instead profoundly affected by each different “Other” with which it enters into a relation. As a preliminary to the positive philosophical account of how this might work in Part II of the thesis, there is an attempt to critique certain of the classical accounts of intersubjectivity found in phenomenology, in order to show that these positions cannot give a satisfactory account of the type of intersubjective relation which gives rise to the abovementioned intuition. The thesis therefore starts off by examining the account of intersubjectivity in Husserl’s Cartesian Meditations (especially the Fifth Meditation). Husserl is there engaged in an attempt to overcome the charge of solipsism that might be levelled at phenomenology, since phenomenology is concerned with experience as, by definition, the experience of the subject. We try to show that Husserl cannot give a satisfactory account of the Other because he tries to derive it from the Subject, and hence reduces the Other to the Same. We then turn to two other phenomenological thinkers – Merleau-Ponty and Levinas, both of whom are themselves critical of Husserl – to examine whether they provide a better account, but conclude that (although each represents a certain advance over Husserl), neither are able to provide a decisively better account, since each is still too caught up in phenomenology and its focus on consciousness. In Part II of the thesis, we then turn to a non- (or even anti-) phenomenological thinker, namely Gilles Deleuze, to try and find an alternative theory that would be able to provide the account we seek. Our contention is that Deleuze, by seeking to give an account of the constitution of the subject itself, simultaneously provides an account of the constitution of the Other as arising at the same time as the Subject. Crucial to this account is the inversion of priority between the poles of a relation and the relation itself. Deleuze argues that a relation is “external to its terms”, and precedes these terms. Hence, by returning to a level which precedes consciousness and the order of knowledge – that is, by returning to the level of the virtual multiplicities and singular events that underlie and precede the actualization of these events and multiplicities in distinct subjects and objects – we argue that Deleuze shows that, contra phenomenology, there is in fact no primordial separation between subject and Other. The contention is therefore that the problem of intersubjectivity as posed by phenomenology is a false one that can be eluded by means of Deleuze’s philosophy. This philosophy is not based on the subject, but instead shows the subject to be the product of an underlying network of relations. Finally, we turn to Deleuze’s appropriation of Nietzsche to trace out the transformation of “ethics” that result from adopting a position like that of Deleuze.

Thesis (MPhil (Philosophy))--University of Stellenbosch, 2006. / This study constitutes a conceptual analysis and critique of the notion of the subject, and the concomitant notion of responsibility, as it has developed through the philosophical history of the modern subject. The aim of this study is to present the reader with a critical notion of responsibility. This study seeks to divorce such a position from the traditional, normative view of the subject, as typified by the Cartesian position. Following Derrida, a deconstructive reading of the subject’s conceptual development since Descartes is presented. What emerges from this reading is that, despite various re-conceptualisations of the subject by philosophers as influential and diverse as Nietzsche, Heidegger and Levinas, their respective positions continue to affirm the subject as human. The position presented in this study challenges this notion of the subject as human, with the goal of opening-up and displacing the ethical frontier between human and non-human. It is argued that displacing this ethical frontier introduces complex responsibilities. These complex responsibilities resist the violence inherent to normative positions that typically exclude the non-human – particularly the animal – from the sphere of responsibility.

Made available in DSpace on 2015-04-14T13:54:56Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 385288.pdf: 1614445 bytes, checksum: b2ec545a66a5a2dff2ceff6ad5d81de6 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2006-10-31 / Na contram?o das pesquisas sobre a humanitas do homo humanus no s?culo XX, principalmente a que se fez no exerc?cio da filosofia como fenomenologia em Heidegger, Sartre e Levinas, ergo aqui a possibilidade da Leveza. Considerando que nestes se delineia, pari passu ao sentido do humano, um peso existencial expresso como o fardo da finitude (Heidegger), do excessivo centramento em si (Sartre) e da responsabilidade infinita (Levinas), sugiro a Tese de que ? vi?vel filosoficamente coadunar, a um s? tempo, humanidade e leveza, sem que se decaia a um sentido dionis?aco ou alienado da descri??o do que ? o homem. Em s?ntese, transito aqui no fato de que ? sustent?vel a Leveza do Humano, quando do olhar para a fenomenalidade do evento da generosidade e quando se adentra de vez no sentido do humano tecido a partir da responsabilidade, o que desde Levinas se delineia como disposi??o an?rquica ao Bem anterior ao ser. Reino da Bondade que de nenhum modo ? um fardo e um peso sobre os ombros do homem.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-28T20:39:32Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Iaraci Fernandes Advincula.pdf: 501317 bytes, checksum: 6b05d8fd6875740a5cf75c1f3df9b1d2 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2007-08-31 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / The objective of this work is to entertain the idea that the field of the human experience, in the complexity of clinical situations, requires an opening to the imponderable. This creates the proper conditions for the vitalization of the existencial event. Initially, it was necessary to develop a theoretical framework presenting and linking some aspects of the Heiddeggerian, the Levinasian and the Winnicottian perspectives in their respectives matrices of intersubjectivity; showing, through clinical dynamics, the paradoxical articulation of these different matrices in the constitution of subjectivities; showing the implications of these matrices of intersubjective conception in the understanding and in the implementation of effective clinical approaches. Finally, we focused, in the context of therapeutic situations, on the importance of paradoxical interventions in the constitution of intrapsychic Intersubjectivity. This study showed that the selves" referring both to my self and to the self of the other person is far beyond our absolute comprehension. Something alien to us, coming from our inner self and from the inner self of the other person with whom we relate, will always be emerging. We conclude this study with the realization of both the paradox and the complexity of the intersubjective constitutions, beyond the limit of human knowledge, which requires an ethical approach of waiting for what transpires within the meandering setting of the clinical work. The clinical work, by itself, demands therapeutic interventions equally complex and paradoxical / Este trabalho teve como objetivo considerar a idéia de que o campo da experiência humana, na complexidade das situações clínicas, exige a abertura para o imponderável, criando condições para a vitalização do acontecimento existencial. Para isso, buscou-se, inicialmente, construir um arcabouço teórico que apresentasse e relacionasse alguns pontos das perspectivas heideggeriana, levinasiana e winnicottiana nas matrizes de intersubjetividade correspondentes, mostrando, por meio da dinâmica clínica, a articulação paradoxal dessas diferentes matrizes de intersubjetividade nas constituições subjetivas; indicando as implicações das matrizes de concepção intersubjetiva na compreensão e nos efetivos manejos clínicos e, finalmente, focalizando, em situações terapêuticas, a importância das intervenções paradoxais para o psiquismo humano na sua constituição intersubjetiva intrapsíquica. Revelou-se, por meio deste estudo, que o si-mesmo tanto de si como do outro escapa à nossa capacidade totalizadora. Algo estranho a nós, proveniente de nossa interioridade e do outro com o qual nos relacionamos, estará sempre irrompendo. Conclui-se com o reconhecimento do paradoxo e da complexidade das constituições intersubjetivas, além do limite do conhecimento humano, o qual exige uma posição ética de espera do que se revela nos meandros do trabalho clínico, que, por sua vez, demanda intervenções terapêuticas, igualmente, paradoxais e complexas

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-27T17:27:28Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Sybil Safdie Douek.pdf: 1865791 bytes, checksum: ebc827ec6b5f55d21c76a00bfc6d1d0e (MD5) Previous issue date: 2009-06-03 / The present dissertation intends to confront Paul Ricoeur and Emmanuel Levinas philosophy, from an essential point of view: the relationship between the subject and the other, subjectivity and alterity. Question which relevance seems to be dramatic after the Two World Wars, particularly after the Shoah: which could be, subsequent to this historical experience, the meanings of words such as subject, man and ethics? Aware of the necessary and indispensable critics toward classic humanism, and willing to withdraw the subject of his central position in philosophy, since Descartes, both authors seem to rehabilitate the subject, and put again faith in him, without paying to the subject unrestricted reverence. The result is the idea of a subject that includes in itself alterity: self as another , says Ricoeur; the other in the same , says Levinas. But which is the place assigned to the other? Levinas insists in the absolute priority of the other, and proposes the deposition of the subject in behalf of the other: the subject substitutes himself to the other, it is hostage of the other, being absolutely passive in his relationship with him. Ricoeur, in his turn, defends the importance of both (oneself and other) and prefers to think in terms of reciprocity, and receptivity of the subject. These different perspectives concerning relationship between subject and other imply two conceptions of ethics: for Levinas, ethics of responsibility and election; for Ricoeur, ethics of promise, of good living together and mutuality. It implicates also two different attitudes in regard of a question not always considered as philosophical: transcendence or the Name of God. For both, God is a question which deserves attention, but Ricoeur excludes the Name of his philosophical speech, building a hermeutics of the self without the support of transcendence; while for Levinas, the problem of subjectivity goes along this the problem of transcendence. Therefore, a question is born: the presence or absence of the Name of God in their philosophy of subjectivity could have connections or correspondences with their respective religious traditions Ricoeur´s Protestantism and Levinas Judaism? Traditions never denied by both of them, although kept far from their philosophical reflections, each one in his own way / A presente tese se propõe a confrontar as filosofias de Paul Ricoeur e Emmanuel Lévinas, a partir de uma questão essencial: a relação do sujeito com a alteridade. Questão cuja relevância se coloca de modo dramático após a experiência histórica das duas Guerras Mundiais, em particular da Shoah: que sentido dar, hoje, às palavras: sujeito, homem ou ética? Conscientes da necessária e incontornável crítica ao humanismo clássico e, desejosos de retirar o sujeito da posição central que vem ocupando na filosofia, desde Descartes, ambos parecem querer reabilitar o sujeito, fazer-lhe novamente confiança, sem por isso, render-lhe irrestritas homenagens. O resultado é uma concepção de sujeito que inclui em si próprio a alteridade: si mesmo como um outro , diz Ricoeur; o outro no mesmo , diz Lévinas: mas que lugar dar a outrem? Lévinas insiste na prioridade absoluta do outro, propondo a deposição do sujeito em favor de outrem: o sujeito se substitui ao outro, é refém do outro, sendo absolutamente passivo na relação; Ricoeur, por seu lado, defende a importância dos dois pólos e prefere falar em reciprocidade da relação e em receptividade do sujeito. As diferentes perspectivas na relação sujeito-outrem implicam em duas concepções de ética: em Lévinas, ética da responsabilidade e da eleição; em Ricoeur, ética da promessa, do bem viver-junto e da mutualidade. Como também em duas atitudes diferentes, no que diz respeito a uma questão nem sempre considerada filosófica: a transcendência ou o nome de Deus. Se para ambos Deus é uma questão que merece atenção, Ricoeur O exclui de seu discurso filosófico, construindo uma hermenêutica do si que não necessita da transcendência para se sustentar; enquanto para Lévinas, o problema da subjetividade e o da transcendência caminham juntos. Nasce uma questão: a presença ou a ausência do nome de Deus nas filosofias do sujeito de Ricoeur e Lévinas poderia ter conexões ou correspondências com suas respectivas tradições religiosas - o protestantismo de Ricoeur e o judaísmo de Lévinas? Tradições que eles nunca negaram, embora as tenham mantido afastadas, cada um a seu modo, de suas reflexões filosóficas