The Cultural Landscape Inventory is a comprehensive inventory of all historically significant landscapes within the National Park Service. This cultural landscape inventory documents the Johnson Settlement Area at the Lyndon B. Johnson National Historical Park in Johnson City, Texas. The Johnson Settlement Area served as the headquarters for former president Lyndon B. Johnson’s paternal grandparents, Samuel Ealy Johnson and Eliza Bunton’s, open-range cattle ranch from 1867 through 1872. After the collapse of the cattle ranching enterprise, the land was sold to James Polk Johnson and later converted into a small-scale farm by John Bruckner. From 1970 through 1972, Lyndon B. Johnson was involved with the planning, acquisition, and donation of a portion of the original settlement property to the National Park Service. In 1972, a major restoration and reconstruction project was completed as the property was converted into an historic interpretive landscape administered by the National Park Service. The Johnson Settlement Area is primarily an open pastoral landscape with reconstructed livestock corrals and a cluster of restored and reconstructed building and structures that collectively convey the ranching and frontier heritage of former president Lyndon B. Johnson. The cultural landscape inventory documents the physical development and historical significance of the Johnson Settlement Area. The inventory evaluates the landscape characteristics of the district and considers the integrity and overall condition of this historic vernacular landscape. Further, the inventory assesses eligibility for the National Register of Historic Places. The Johnson Settlement Area Cultural Landscape Inventory expands the 1990 National Register of Historic Places nomination in its period of significance, boundaries and acreage, and National Register Criteria. / text

The presented thesis is an analysis of American foreign policy thinking applying comprehensive analysis of three presidential administrations. The analysis is embedded in the historical context of the Suez Crisis, and provides a picture of the change in US foreign policy after the Suez Crisis comparing the three foreign policy doctrines related to this particular period of history - D. D. Eisenhower, J. F. Kennedy and L. John Johnson. The foreign policy doctrine represents a particular expression, image of foreign policy of a given state. The American political system is known by several historically and politically significant foreign policy doctrines. The thesis describes how the US foreign policy is created and what leads to the process of formulation of the presedential doctrines. An important element in the background of the analysis is the Cold War itself. Besides the theoretical definition, the work also provides the complex features of the administrations of the three presidents submited to analysis. Part of the characteristic is the analysis of individual foreign policy doctrines that points out the difference among administrations derived from the historical moment of the Suez crisis. The results of the comparison will draw conclusions on the similarity as well as possible differences...

This thesis is a work that focuses on how significant the press was to the success and failure of President Lyndon Baines Johnson. In the thesis, three aspects of the Johnson years are analyzed. The first chapter discusses the media's portrayal of Lyndon Johnson during the presidential campaign of 1964. The second chapter is an analysis of how the press reported on President Johnson concerning the issue of civil rights. The third chapter dissects the media's perception of Lyndon Johnson during the Vietnam conflict. The primary research used in the thesis is a culmination of polls, editorials, personal letters, and memos from the Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Library. Through use of these sources and a number of secondary materials, one is able to witness the period in which the popularity of the Johnson Administration began to experience a downturn.

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This dissertation explores an analogue of the prime number theorem for polynomials over finite fields as well as its connection to the necklace factorization algorithm T-transform and the string complexity measure T-complexity. Specifically, a precise asymptotic expansion for the prime polynomial counting function is derived. The approximation given is more accurate than previous results in the literature while requiring very little computational effort. In this context asymptotic series expansions for Lerch transcendent, Eulerian polynomials, truncated polylogarithm, and polylogarithms of negative integer order are also provided. The expansion formulas developed are general and have applications in numerous areas other than the enumeration of prime polynomials. A bijection between the equivalence classes of aperiodic necklaces and monic prime polynomials is utilized to derive an asymptotic bound on the maximal T-complexity value of a string. Furthermore, the statistical behaviour of uniform random sequences that are factored via the T-transform are investigated, and an accurate probabilistic model for short necklace factors is presented. Finally, a T-complexity based conditional string complexity measure is proposed and used to define the normalized T-complexity distance that measures similarity between strings. The T-complexity distance is proven to not be a metric. However, the measure can be computed in linear time and space making it a suitable choice for large data sets. / Graduate / 0544 0984 0405 / nrebenich@gmail.com

This thesis reviews the significance of the 1969 Japan-US Summit between Prime Minister Satii Eisaku and President Richard Nixon in light of official documents that have been disclosed in Japan since 2010 and in the United States since the 1990s. Based on newly available sources, this thesis shows that the 1969 Summit should be considered a Japanese-led initiative with two aims: firstly, to announce a deadline for Okinawa's return with all nuclear weapons removed; and secondly, to reform the Japan-US security treaty system without repeating the kind of outright revision concluded in 1960. The Japanese plan to reform the security treaty system involved simplifying the prior consultation formula by making a public commitment to the security of South Korea of sufficient strength that the United States would agree to the dissolution of the 1960 secret 'Korea Minute'. The Japanese Government achieved its first aim but only partially succeeded in its second. Whilst the return of Okinawa was announced, the status of US bases in Okinawa and mainland Japan continued to be governed by an elaborate web of agreements, public and secret, which damaged public confidence and hampered an improvement in relations between Japan and its neighbouring countries. This thesis shows that commonly held academic opinions about the 1969 Summit are incorrect. Firstly, there was no quid pro quo in which Japan linked its security to South Korea in exchange for Okinawa: both these outcomes were in fact Japanese objectives at the beginning of the summit preparations. Secondly, the success of the summit did not depend on 'backchannel' negotiations between Wakaizumi Kei and Henry Kissinger: it is likely that an announcement on Okinawa's reversion would have been achieved in 1969 even if preparations for the summit had been left to the Japanese Foreign Ministry and the US State Department. Word Limit: Approx. 98,000 words, excluding Bibliography

This study argues that despite the basic inertia in U.S. China policy during the Kennedy and Johnson years, the period nonetheless witnessed a fundamental evolution in the strategic presumptions underlying Washington’s approach to the China “problem.” By increments, U.S. policymakers began to seriously question the wisdom of a policy predicated on the idea that the containment of the People’s Republic of China necessitated its political and economic isolation. Inversely, a basic consensus emerged in interested corners of the U.S. foreign policy bureaucracy that considered attempts to engage the Chinese—on levels bilateral and multilateral, official and unofficial—could serve to socialise China’s revolutionaries, thereby facilitating a reduction in Sino-American tensions and paving the way to a bilateral rapprochement. Critically, in this analysis “engagement” was seen as a means of enhancing, rather than simply supplanting, the larger effort to contain China. The dynamics involved in the emergence of this consensus are manifold and complex, and cannot be properly understood without close reference to changes in both the international strategic environment and the domestic political context through the 1960s. At the heart of this process, however, were advocates of policy moderation within the U.S. bureaucracy, mediating external pressures for policy movement, and championing the case for a more conciliatory approach to Sino-American relations. The growing acceptance of what was sometimes articulated as “containment without isolation”—shorthand for a policy framework that implicitly rejects the either/or choice between containment and engagement—found expression in, and was in turn fostered by, basic adjustments in Washington’s posture toward Mao’s China. By the end of 1968 senior U.S. officials had repeatedly signalled that Washington was reconciled to the reality of a Communist-controlled mainland China, and would in fact welcome expanded efforts toward bilateral accommodation and even cooperation. These postural shifts may not have been matched by concrete policy changes, yet they remain significant. In the most immediate sense, the less provocative posture toward China enhanced Washington’s capacity to communicate U.S. intent to China’s leadership, thereby helping avert a direct Sino-American conflict in the 1960s, even as the two sides pursued antithetical objectives in the Asian region. In a longer-term frame of reference, the more flexible posture adopted in the 1960s played an important role in challenging the domestic politicisation of China policy, while establishing a rhetorical framework and conceptual foundation for more substantive policy movement. In the course of tracing these developments, this study also provides new interpretative insights on a number of specific issues pertaining to U.S. China policy in the Kennedy and Johnson years, including the policy preferences, relationships, and roles of key U.S. officials in shaping the policy process; the impact of domestic politics, alliance politics, and various Cold War strategic concerns on policy outcomes; the question of how to deal with China’s nuclear development; and the manner in which major China-related events and developments in the 1960s—such as the failure of Mao’s Great Leap Forward, the 1962 Taiwan Strait crisis, the Sino-Indian border war, China’s involvement in Vietnam, and the Cultural Revolution— were interpreted by U.S. officials, and, in turn, shaped understandings of and responses to the China problem. / http://proxy.library.adelaide.edu.au/login?url= http://library.adelaide.edu.au/cgi-bin/Pwebrecon.cgi?BBID=1330812 / Thesis (Ph.D.) -- University of Adelaide, School of History and Politics, 2008

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