Ce travail est consacré à l'étude de systèmes de Lyndon (pour la relation d'ordre alterné) et àla dynamique symbolique des développements des nombres en base négative. Pour un réel ß > 1fixé, nous construisons un code préfixe récurrent positif permettant non seulement de montrerl'intrinsèque ergodicité du —ß-shift mais aussi de déterminer la fonction zêta qui lui est associée.Nous étudions les conditions pour lesquelles le —ß-shift possède la spécification.En outre, lorsque ß est strictement plus petit que le nombre d'or, le langage du —ß-shift admet desmots intransitifs. Cet état de fait engendre dans le système dynamique des cylindres négligeablespar rapport à la mesure d'entropie maximale. Ces cylindres génèrent sur Iß=[—ß/(ß+1),1/(ß+1)[ depetits intervalles de mesure nulle (la mesure considérée étant l'unique mesure ergodique sur Iß).Nous en faisons une étude détaillée, en particulier nous déterminons ces intervalles "trous".Par ailleurs, nous étudions l'unicité des systèmes de numération des entiers relatifs en base négative et nous montrons qu'à chaque mot de Lyndon correspond un tel système. / This work deals with the study of the Lyndon systems (for alternate order) and the symbolicdynamics of the expansions of real numbers in negative base. For a given real ß > 1, we showthe intrinsic ergodicity of the —ß-shift using a positive recurring prefix code and we determine theassociated zeta function. We study the conditions for which the —ß-shift admits the specificationproperty.Moreover, when ß is less than golden ratio, the language of the —ß-shift contains intransitive words.These words lead to some cylinders negligible with respect to the measure with maximal entropy.In the interval Iß=[—ß/(ß+1),1/(ß+1)[, these cylinders correspond to some gaps: small interval withmeasure zero (with respect to the unique ergodic measure on Iß). We make a detailed study ofthese gaps.Otherwise, we study the uniqueness of the number systems of integers in negative base and weshow that to each Lyndon word corresponds to a such system.

This dissertation provides a detailed examination of the influence of Thomas Clifton Mann on the Latin American policy of the United States of America. A Foreign Service Officer from 1942, Mann eventually rose to the position of Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs, and was President Lyndon Johnson’s most valued adviser on inter-American policy until his retirement from government service in May 1966. Commonly portrayed as highly conservative, insensitive to Latin American needs, and opposed to U.S. aid programs, Mann was a far more complex character than his critics have allowed. During the Eisenhower administration Mann’s influence was vital in reorienting policy priorities in Washington, emphasising the need for price stabilisation measures and limited development aid. During the Kennedy administration he opposed the Bay of Pigs invasion, before serving as Ambassador to Mexico where he successfully resolved the nation’s longest running border dispute. Most influential under Lyndon Johnson, Mann sought to place U.S. policy on a stable and sustainable path, reining in unrealistic expectations while fending off attacks from fiscal conservatives opposed to aid measures of any kind. In studying Mann’s career, much is revealed regarding the nature of U.S.-Latin American relations during a crucial period of history. While U.S. goals remained largely consistent, the nature of the challenges faced and the tactics used to counter them did not. Mann’s career saw the Cold War come to Latin America, and was met with both aid and military intervention, often in the form of counterinsurgency training and operations. Mann’s role in developing those polices reveals the contrasts and, more often, consistencies between the administrations he served, and undermines claims that the transition from Kennedy to Johnson witnessed a radical policy overhaul. Studying Mann’s career also illuminates divisive internal debates over the nature and meaning of inter-American relations, and the role and influence of an individual within Washington’s policymaking bureaucracy.

The United States Information Agency (USIA) was the official propaganda agency of the American government. During the period of the Johnson administration, its programme in Italy was the second largest in Western Europe, right after West Germany and immediately before France. This dissertation examines the USIA programme, and places it within the larger context of American policy towards Italy at this crucial juncture in the history of both countries. Beginning in the 1950s, following the traumatic experience of World War II and the unthinkable implications of nuclear warfare, the bipolar conflict was progressively channelled into non-military means of combat. In addition to the better known methods of traditional diplomacy, the threat of force, and economic aid, the United States deployed new instruments to win the ‘battle for hearts and minds’ against the Soviet Union. These new instruments included public diplomacy, cultural and educational exchanges, and ‘overt’ and ‘covert’ propaganda operations. This exercise of soft power became one of the main instruments used to stop the expansion of communism and to unite NATO countries behind American leadership. Yet this task was particularly demanding during the Johnson years, when the image of the Unites States abroad was tarnished as never before by the civil rights struggle and the escalation of the Vietnam War. Italy is a particularly interesting and important case study of American psychological warfare in Western Europe. Not only did the country host the largest Communist Party in the West, the Partito Comunista Italiano (PCI), for the entire duration of the cold war, –– but Italy also had more than twenty governments in the first two decades of the post-war era. At a deeper level, the country oscillated between two different political formulas, centrismo and a centre-left coalition. As a result it proved impossible to carry out the structural reforms needed to ensure the country’s stability. The government’s inability to ‘keep Italy on track’ and to effectively oppose the communist threat led to the deployment of an extensive USIA programme in Italy. Surprisingly, this topic has not been studied intensively. Although there is a rich literature on American influence in the Italian election of 1948, and there has been some discussion of American psychological warfare in Italy during the fifties, no scholar has carried out an in-depth study on the role of US public diplomacy in Italy during the sixties, particularly the Johnson era. The dissertation is based on detailed research in the Johnson and Nixon libraries as well as at the National Archives in College Park, Maryland where the official documents of the USIA (RG 306) are located. On the Italian side, I have analyzed the major Italian newspapers, radio and TV shows targeted by the agency.

Dans ce mémoire, nous proposons de discuter le rapport entre le cinéma et l'histoire. Plus précisément, nous tenterons de tisser des liens entre deux films historiques peu orthodoxes, soit Barry Lyndon de Stanley Kubrick et L'Anglaise et le duc de Éric Rohmer et l'écriture de l'histoire. En fait, c'est la représentation historique dans ces films situés au XVIIIe siècle qui servira de point de départ à la recherche. De plus, nous allons aussi traiter de la connaissance du langage cinématographique comme prérequis à toute tentative de compréhension de la représentation de l'histoire au cinéma. Notre travail va se diviser en trois chapitres agrémentés d'un prologue et d'un épilogue. Le prologue servira de mise en place des sources, soit les films comme tels. Nous allons les décrire et surtout décrire la réception de ces films à leur sortie en salles. Le premier chapitre traitera spécifiquement de l'écriture de l'histoire et du travail de l'historien. Lors du second chapitre, nous allons faire entrer les deux cinéastes étudiés et tenter de démontrer comment, le temps de ces films, ils ont pu traiter de l'histoire au cinéma d'une manière semblable à celle des historiens de l'écrit. Le troisième chapitre discutera du langage cinématographique (mis en parallèle avec le linguistic turn dont nous parlerons au premier chapitre) et de son importance pour saisir la représentation historique des films. Ce chapitre se placera aussi du côté de la réception du spectateur. Enfin, l'épilogue proposera une analyse métahistorique du film historique en général et des deux films étudiés en particulier. En débutant ce mémoire, nous poserons deux hypothèses. La première visera à démontrer si et comment les deux cinéastes en cause (Stanley Kubrick et Éric Rohmer) peuvent être considérés, à la lumière de leur utilisation des sources, comme des historiens dans leur travail cinématographique. La seconde hypothèse visera à montrer si et comment la connaissance préalable du langage cinématographique est une condition sine qua non de la compréhension de la représentation historique dans le cas de ces deux films en particulier. À la suite de cette recherche, nous pouvons dire que ces deux cinéastes ont proposé une approche certes différente mais tout à fait valide de la représentation historique par leur utilisation des sources qui privilégie un retour au passé sans médiation vers notre époque contemporaine. Les films présentent et « représentent » le passé comme si le cinéma avait existé au XVIIIe siècle. De plus, la maîtrise du langage cinématographique de ces réalisateurs fait que la connaissance de ce langage est nécessaire au spectateur qui veut comprendre leur représentation du passé. Contrairement aux films qui ont utilisé l'aide d'historiens, ces films présentent l'histoire sans recours à la « démonstration » historique mais présentent l'histoire de manière brute, à l'aide des sources et des « ressources » cinématographiques. ______________________________________________________________________________ MOTS-CLÉS DE L’AUTEUR : Dix-huitième siècle, Cinéma historique, Rohmer, Kubrick, Tournant linguistique.

Lyndon Johnson, the thirty-sixth President, had a profound affect on the Democratic Party in America. Johnson was contradictory, supportive, and harmful to the Democratic Party during the middle decades of the twentieth century. In a new interpretation of Johnson the politician, this dissertation explores Johnson's early partisan development and ascent as Democratic Leader in the United States Senate. Furthermore this dissertation evaluates the reasons for Johnson's ambiguous relationship with the Democratic Party. Johnson's first teacher in the art of Democratic politics was his father, Sam Ealy Johnson. This revisionist study of Johnson emphasizes for the first time how Sam Ealy Johnson taught his son about the art of pragmatic political behavior. However, his father's lessons and Johnson's early application of political knowledge was in the context of the Democratic one-party world of Texas politics. Johnson took his understanding of politics in a hegemonic Democratic system and soon applied it to a series of positions first as a Congressional Secretary, then as a New Deal administrator, and later as Congressman and Senator. By the end of his first senate term, Johnson's vision of what it meant to be a Democrat had changed little. Yet his focus on achieving consensus put him in opposition to the political objective of other Democrats. The partisan problems Johnson encountered after six years only increased later in his Senate career and as President. / text

Thesis (M.A. in History)--S.M.U. / Title from PDF title page (viewed Mar. 16, 2009). Source: Masters Abstracts International, Volume: 47-03. Adviser: Thomas J. Knock. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (M.S.)--University of North Texas, Dec., 2009. / Title from title page display. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (M.A.)--Baylor University, 2006. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 134-139).

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Texas Christian University, 2007. / Title from dissertation title page (viewed June 26, 2007). Includes abstract. Includes bibliographical references.

Lyndon Johnson's opponents used the outcome of his 1948 senatorial bid to demonstrate his dishonesty. This win by eighty-seven disputed votes gave him the derogatory title, "Landslide Lyndon." Johnson's initial senate campaigns in 1941 and 1948 are examined for Texas Politics as usual. Upon Senator Sheppard's death in 1937, a special election precipitated with Martin Dies, Gerald Mann, Lyndon Johnson, and W. Lee O'Daniel as the candidates. Although this election has not received the notoriety of 1948, it exemplifies Texas Politics as usual where thousands of manipulated votes resulted in O'Daniel's late victory. Johnson's next race for the senate came in 1948. He ran against George Peddy and Coke Stevenson. This expensive campaign rested upon two hundred two invalid votes from Jim Wells County. In reality, tens of thousands of manipulated votes on both sides resulted in litigation making its way to the United States Supreme Court.