Ce mémoire cherche à comprendre un paradoxe : les États-providence les plus généreux, façonnés par des partis sociaux-démocrates, sont financés par des taxes beaucoup plus régressives que les États-providence les moins généreux où les partis de droite, plus souvent au pouvoir, mettent en place une taxation plus progressive. Pour comprendre ce paradoxe, ce mémoire débute en analysant les pressions induites par la mondialisation des capitaux sur la taxation. Ensuite, le mémoire explore les causes institutionnelles des régimes fiscaux en effectuant une revue de la littérature analytique. Ces contraintes institutionnelles et fonctionnelles sur le comportement et les préférences des acteurs politiques permettent de définir trois idéaux-types de régimes fiscaux. Ces idéaux-types cadrent avec la typologie des régimes d’État-providence d’Esping-Andersen. En regroupant des typologies sur les régimes fiscaux et les régimes d’État-providence, ce mémoire souligne que le financement des politiques publiques représente une composante cruciale de l’économie politique de l’État-providence. / This thesis is about a paradox: the most generous welfare states, built by social-democratic parties, are financed by more regressive taxes than residual welfare states, which are funded by progressive taxes, despite the fact that they are governed by right parties more often. To understand this paradox, this thesis starts by analysing the pressures that globalisation puts on taxation. Then, the thesis reviews the literature of political science research on taxation to understand the institutional origins of distinct tax regimes. Three ideal types of tax regimes are defined by the study of institutional and functional constraints on political actors’ preferences and behaviour. These ideal types fit with Esping-Andersen’s typology of welfare states regimes. By regrouping typologies on tax and welfare regimes, this thesis explores the link between revenues and expenses while showing that the funding of public policies is a crucial feature of the political economy of welfare states.

Em seu Law and Disagreement, Jeremy Waldron apresenta o que denomina de uma teoria democrática do direito, uma teoria normativa sobre a autoridade do direito baseada em sua legitimidade democrática. Para Waldron é a legitimidade do direito enquanto fruto de um processo de deliberação e votação majoritária que sustenta sua autoridade. Esse trabalho busca explicar a teoria democrática do direito de Waldron apresentando-a no contexto do liberalismo e do positivismo normativo. Dada a importância da legitimidade para a autoridade do direito em Waldron, esse trabalho discute também o que Waldron entende por legitimidade e sua distinção em relação à justificação, e defende a teoria de Waldron acerca da legitimidade como superior a outra teoria semelhante, defendida por John Simmons. Esse trabalho apresenta a teoria democrática do direito de Waldron no contexto das denominadas circunstâncias da política – a necessidade sentida de uma decisão comum e o desacordo sobre qual deve ser essa decisão. Essa tese defende que Waldron apresenta dois argumentos distintos em defesa de sua teoria: a) um argumento epistêmico, baseado na tese da justificação normal da autoridade, de Joseph Raz, adaptada ao contexto das decisões majoritárias, e que está suscetível a certos tipos de crítica, e b) um argumento de equidade, que recorre à igual consideração e respeito nas circunstâncias da política, o qual está suscetível a outros tipos de crítica. Essa tese defenderá que, dependendo do argumento, a posição de Waldron levará a distintos resultados teóricos e práticos (normativos). / In his Law and Disagreement, Jeremy Waldron presents what he names a democratic jurisprudence, a normative theory about the authority of law based in his democratic legitimacy. To Waldron, it is the legitimacy of law as a result of a process of deliberation and majoritarian voting that sustains its authority. This work seeks to explain Waldron’s democratic jurisprudence presenting it in the context of liberalism and normative positivism. Since legitimacy is important to the authority of law, this work also discuss what Waldron understands by legitimacy and its distinction from justification, and defends that Waldron’s theory about legitimacy is superior to another similar theory, defended by John Simmons. This work presents Waldron’s democratic jurisprudence in the context of the said circumstances of politics - the felt need for a common decision and the disagreement about what ought to be this decision. This thesis defends that Waldron presents two distinct arguments in defense of his theory: a) an epistemic argument, that is based on the normal justification thesis of Joseph Raz adapted to the context of majoritarian decision, and that is susceptible to certain kinds of critic, and b) an argument of fairness, that calls for equal considerations and respect in the circumstances of politics, and that is susceptible to other kinds of critic. This thesis will defend that, depending on the argument, Waldron’s position will lead to distinct theoretical and practical (normative) results.

Em seu Law and Disagreement, Jeremy Waldron apresenta o que denomina de uma teoria democrática do direito, uma teoria normativa sobre a autoridade do direito baseada em sua legitimidade democrática. Para Waldron é a legitimidade do direito enquanto fruto de um processo de deliberação e votação majoritária que sustenta sua autoridade. Esse trabalho busca explicar a teoria democrática do direito de Waldron apresentando-a no contexto do liberalismo e do positivismo normativo. Dada a importância da legitimidade para a autoridade do direito em Waldron, esse trabalho discute também o que Waldron entende por legitimidade e sua distinção em relação à justificação, e defende a teoria de Waldron acerca da legitimidade como superior a outra teoria semelhante, defendida por John Simmons. Esse trabalho apresenta a teoria democrática do direito de Waldron no contexto das denominadas circunstâncias da política – a necessidade sentida de uma decisão comum e o desacordo sobre qual deve ser essa decisão. Essa tese defende que Waldron apresenta dois argumentos distintos em defesa de sua teoria: a) um argumento epistêmico, baseado na tese da justificação normal da autoridade, de Joseph Raz, adaptada ao contexto das decisões majoritárias, e que está suscetível a certos tipos de crítica, e b) um argumento de equidade, que recorre à igual consideração e respeito nas circunstâncias da política, o qual está suscetível a outros tipos de crítica. Essa tese defenderá que, dependendo do argumento, a posição de Waldron levará a distintos resultados teóricos e práticos (normativos). / In his Law and Disagreement, Jeremy Waldron presents what he names a democratic jurisprudence, a normative theory about the authority of law based in his democratic legitimacy. To Waldron, it is the legitimacy of law as a result of a process of deliberation and majoritarian voting that sustains its authority. This work seeks to explain Waldron’s democratic jurisprudence presenting it in the context of liberalism and normative positivism. Since legitimacy is important to the authority of law, this work also discuss what Waldron understands by legitimacy and its distinction from justification, and defends that Waldron’s theory about legitimacy is superior to another similar theory, defended by John Simmons. This work presents Waldron’s democratic jurisprudence in the context of the said circumstances of politics - the felt need for a common decision and the disagreement about what ought to be this decision. This thesis defends that Waldron presents two distinct arguments in defense of his theory: a) an epistemic argument, that is based on the normal justification thesis of Joseph Raz adapted to the context of majoritarian decision, and that is susceptible to certain kinds of critic, and b) an argument of fairness, that calls for equal considerations and respect in the circumstances of politics, and that is susceptible to other kinds of critic. This thesis will defend that, depending on the argument, Waldron’s position will lead to distinct theoretical and practical (normative) results.

Em seu Law and Disagreement, Jeremy Waldron apresenta o que denomina de uma teoria democrática do direito, uma teoria normativa sobre a autoridade do direito baseada em sua legitimidade democrática. Para Waldron é a legitimidade do direito enquanto fruto de um processo de deliberação e votação majoritária que sustenta sua autoridade. Esse trabalho busca explicar a teoria democrática do direito de Waldron apresentando-a no contexto do liberalismo e do positivismo normativo. Dada a importância da legitimidade para a autoridade do direito em Waldron, esse trabalho discute também o que Waldron entende por legitimidade e sua distinção em relação à justificação, e defende a teoria de Waldron acerca da legitimidade como superior a outra teoria semelhante, defendida por John Simmons. Esse trabalho apresenta a teoria democrática do direito de Waldron no contexto das denominadas circunstâncias da política – a necessidade sentida de uma decisão comum e o desacordo sobre qual deve ser essa decisão. Essa tese defende que Waldron apresenta dois argumentos distintos em defesa de sua teoria: a) um argumento epistêmico, baseado na tese da justificação normal da autoridade, de Joseph Raz, adaptada ao contexto das decisões majoritárias, e que está suscetível a certos tipos de crítica, e b) um argumento de equidade, que recorre à igual consideração e respeito nas circunstâncias da política, o qual está suscetível a outros tipos de crítica. Essa tese defenderá que, dependendo do argumento, a posição de Waldron levará a distintos resultados teóricos e práticos (normativos). / In his Law and Disagreement, Jeremy Waldron presents what he names a democratic jurisprudence, a normative theory about the authority of law based in his democratic legitimacy. To Waldron, it is the legitimacy of law as a result of a process of deliberation and majoritarian voting that sustains its authority. This work seeks to explain Waldron’s democratic jurisprudence presenting it in the context of liberalism and normative positivism. Since legitimacy is important to the authority of law, this work also discuss what Waldron understands by legitimacy and its distinction from justification, and defends that Waldron’s theory about legitimacy is superior to another similar theory, defended by John Simmons. This work presents Waldron’s democratic jurisprudence in the context of the said circumstances of politics - the felt need for a common decision and the disagreement about what ought to be this decision. This thesis defends that Waldron presents two distinct arguments in defense of his theory: a) an epistemic argument, that is based on the normal justification thesis of Joseph Raz adapted to the context of majoritarian decision, and that is susceptible to certain kinds of critic, and b) an argument of fairness, that calls for equal considerations and respect in the circumstances of politics, and that is susceptible to other kinds of critic. This thesis will defend that, depending on the argument, Waldron’s position will lead to distinct theoretical and practical (normative) results.

民主國家中選舉是獲得政治職位、聲望或權力的主要途徑之一，有許多因素會影響選舉結果，其中選舉制度是決定在位者與挑戰者去留的關鍵，決定如產生當選者，選舉制度往往會影響候選人的參選動機、競選方式、選民的投票行為，甚至會造成不同類型的政黨政治。本研究主要探究立委選舉從第七屆開始實行單一選區兩票制後，區域立委候選人的政治立場相較於過去在複數選區單記不可讓渡投票制下，是否有所不同或發生改變。本研究以兩岸議題為例，以第五屆及第七屆區域立法委員候選人為分析單位，並依其選舉公報採內容分析法為研究焦點。本研究有幾個研究發現：首先、選制改革有相當程度反映在屆別的差異上，對立委候選人兩岸立場造成影響；其次、雖然新選制下立委候選人提出更多的兩岸政見，但所提出的兩岸政見，新選制相較於舊選制，不但統獨立場趨中，且論述語氣略微和緩，此一發現支持中位選民定理，也就是說，在單一選區相對多數決制之下，立委候選人的兩岸議題不管在方向或是程度上，相較SNTV制度均有往中間靠攏的趨勢，意即新選制下的立委候選人在政見立場方向，是符合理論預期往意識形態光譜中間移動，傾向提出方向趨中且統獨維持現狀或中立的兩岸政見。 / In democratic country, election is the main approach for the politicians to receive position, reputation, and power. Many factors affect the result. Electoral system is one of the key causes to determine who-incumbent and challenger- will win the election. In addition, electoral systems also affect the process of producing winner, the candidates’ motive and campaign, the electorate’s voting behaviors. and even different types of party politics. This paper targets on the district legislators’ behaviors. Do their behaviors change after the electoral reform transiting from SNTV to Single-District Two-Votes System? To be more specific, I focus on the fifth and seventh terms of legislators as the analysis unit, and explore their attitudes or campaign platform on Cross-Strait issue, which are published on the campaign communique. I used the content analysis to analyze the campaign communique. There are several findings implied from this research. First, electoral system indeed affects legislators’ positions on Cross-Strait issues. There is significant difference between the fifth and seventh terms of legislators. Second, comparing with the fifth term, although the seventh term of legislators propose more Cross-Strait-related campaign platform, their attitudes are more moderate. This finding supports the median voter theorem. Under the Single-District System, comparing with SNTV, legislators will stand on moderate position on Cross-Strait issue, no matter on direction or intensity. In conclusion, the findings fit to my expectation that the seventh term of legislators stand on moderate position on the political spectrum. They are incline to propose more neutral campaign platform. They prefer maintaining the status quo to unification or independence.

In the interplay between protection of rights and majoritarianism, the court is the arena. This research focuses on the conflicting role of the court within a constitutional democracy and a contestation of the counter-majoritarian dilemma that emerges from such a role. The counter-majoritarian dilemma centres on the idea that judges overturning decisions of the legislature through judicial review undermines democracy by thwarting the will of the majority through a subjective reading of abstract constitutional principles. As a point of departure, the counter-majoritarian dilemma is contested by revealing that the court can be seen as a democratically consistent institution if democracy can be reconceptualised. The examination of the South African jurisprudential climate and the adjudicative guidelines followed by the court suggests a rejection of such anti-democratic contention. The court upholds the commitments consented to at the time of the Constitution’s adoption and adjudication is reflective of the values undertaken by the country in reaction to its past. Within these values, minority rights can find a lifeline. Thus minority rights can exist through the implications of majoritarian consent. This research further identifies, in response to the counter-majoritarian dilemma, a constraining self-consciousness on the part of the court and an acute awareness of the court’s precarious role within a democratic infancy. The core of the counter-majoritarian dilemma is the view that interpretative indeterminacy of the Constitution means that the will of the people could be substituted for judicial preference. Through the examination of the court’s interpretative strategies and judicial subjectivity, this research suggests that within judicial subjectivity, adjudication continues to be reflective of the will of the people. Far from a constraining and mechanistic interpretation to avoid judicial subjectivity, the research reveals that open and non-formalist interpretative strategies are necessary to effectuate democratic conciliation within the judicial mandate. The results of this research suggest that, far from being a democratically deviant institution, the court in the current South African jurisprudential context, is the most suited to uphold the concept of democracy. / Jurisprudence / LL. M.