AIM The purpose of this study is to assess the appropriateness of Justin Martyr‘s apologetical arguments as contained in his genuine works, namely First and Second Apologies and Dialogue with Trypho the Jew, in response to the so-called “five-fold attack” against Christianity in the second century AD. Methodologically, by ‘appropriate‘ in this study is meant ‘suitable‘ or ‘proper,‘ taking into account the rhetorical and literary conventions of second-century Graeco-Roman culture, the contemporary social situation, Justin‘s rhetorical and/or intended audience and his purpose. Would Justin‘s arguments from the point of view of second-century standards have been reasonable, possessing at least a potential for effectiveness, or would they have been either ignored, dismissed without serious consideration, or even worsened the plight for Christians? I believe this work fills a significant gap in our knowledge of Justin, being the first time a comprehensive analysis of the effectiveness, or otherwise, of Justin‘s arguments has been made in one single study. SCOPE This Thesis is divided into six major chapters, plus a Conclusion: (i) In Chapter One I provide a brief introduction discussing how and why the Apologists emerged during the second century AD to meet the challenges of the day, as well as outlining the aim and scope of this study. (ii) In Chapter Two I discuss the nature of Christian Apology, its relationship to petitions to the Roman emperors, and how it compares to other (non-Christian) apologetic, protreptic, educational and missionary discourses. I also examine the rhetorical and literary conventions of the second century Graeco-Roman world and outline how Justin employed rhetoric in his three known works. (iii) In Chapter Three I outline in detail the particular attacks experienced by the Christians in Justin‘s time. (iv) In Chapter Four I examine the questions of intended destination, structure and purposes of Justin‘s apologetical works. (v) In Chapter Five I analyse the appropriateness of Justin‘s apologetical arguments in 1 and 2 Apologies. (vi) In Chapter Six I analyse the appropriateness of Justin‘s apologetical arguments in Dialogue. In all, eight distinct arguments from the Apologies (Behaviour, Beliefs, Due Process, Threat, Similitude, Dependence/Source, Antiquity/Prophecy, Miracles) and four distinct arguments from Dialogue (Superiority, Fulfilled Prophecy, Miracles, True Israel) are outlined in detail and then analysed giving the reasons for and against their appropriateness. CONCLUSIONS In my Conclusion, I argue that all of Justin‘s arguments were appropriate for one or more reasons, with only the argument of Threat in the Apologies being largely inappropriate. At the same time, all his arguments contained notable weaknesses, except for the argument of Similitude. The following table is provided, listing each of Justin‘s apologetical arguments and the number of reasons I give for their respective appropriateness/inappropriateness, together with a yes/no/mixed conclusion in the final column: [Table not shown].This table is simplistic, nevertheless it does illustrate that the question of appropriateness is rarely a simple one, as more often than not there exist simultaneous reasons for and against the appropriateness of any particular argument. How has this study furthered our knowledge and understanding of Justin and his apologetical works? What can we conclude about Justin and his works based on the appropriateness or inappropriateness of his arguments? It is clear that for both the Apologies and Dialogue the strengths of Justin‘s arguments outweigh their weaknesses. The strengths generally pertain to philosophical, religious, or ethical aspects of the works that are presented logically and cogently while the weaknesses, by and large, result from Justin‘s tendency towards arrogance and abuse. Justin wrote very much the way he lived. As a philosopher and skilled debater Justin was not above offending and demeaning those with whom he did not agree if he thought this would increase the reception of his message. His brilliance and arrogance proved to be a lethal combination and led to his ultimate silencing. It perhaps also curtailed the effectiveness of his writings for no change of policy was ever effected during his lifetime, or at least universally implemented.

No description available.

Travail réalisé en cotutelle (Université de Paris IV-La Sorbonne). / Cette étude vise à exposer le rôle méthodologique que Martin Heidegger attribue à la conscience (Gewissen) dans Être et temps et à faire ressortir les implications de son interprétation de « l’appel de la conscience » comme le moyen de produire l’attestation (Bezeugung) de l’existence authentique en tant que possibilité du Dasein (ou être-dans-le-monde). Notre objectif initial est de montrer comment la notion heideggérienne de conscience a évolué avant la publication d’Être et temps en 1927 et d’identifier les sources qui ont contribué à l’interprétation existentiale de la conscience comme « l’appel du souci. » Notre analyse historique révèle notamment que Heidegger n’a jamais décrit la conscience comme un « appel » avant sa lecture du livre Das Gewissen (1925) par Hendrik G. Stoker, un jeune philosophe sud-africain qui a étudié à Cologne sous la direction de Max Scheler. Nous démontrons plus spécifiquement comment l’étude phénoménologique de Stoker—qui décrit la conscience comme « l’appel du devoir (Pflichtruf) » provenant de l’étincelle divine (synteresis) placée dans l’âme de chaque personne par Dieu—a influencé l’élaboration du concept de « l’appel existentiel » chez Heidegger. Mettant l’accent sur le rôle méthodologique de la conscience dans Être et temps, nous soulignons aussi l’importance des liens entre son concept de la conscience et la notion de « l’indication formelle » que Heidegger a mise au cœur de sa « méthode » dans ses cours sur la phénoménologie à Freiburg et Marbourg. Alors que de nombreux commentateurs voient dans « l’appel de la conscience » une notion solipsiste qui demeure impossible en tant qu’expérience, nous proposons un moyen de lever cette difficulté apparente en tentant de faire ressortir ce qui est « indiqué formellement » par la notion même de la conscience (Gewissen) dans Être et temps. Cette approche nous permet d’affirmer que le concept de conscience chez Heidegger renvoie à un phénomène de « témoignage » qui est radicalement différent de la notion traditionnelle de conscientia. Guidé par les principes mêmes de la phénoménologie heideggérienne, nous procédons à une analyse « destructrice » de l’histoire du mot allemand Gewissen qui nous révèle que la signification originelle de ce mot (établie dans le plus ancien livre préservé dans la langue allemande : le Codex Abrogans) était testimonium et non conscientia. À l’origine, Gewissen signifiait en effet « attestation »—ce qui est précisément le rôle assigné à la conscience par Heidegger dans Être et temps. Sur la base de cette découverte, nous proposons une manière de comprendre cette « attestation » comme une expérience possible : l’écoute du « témoignage silencieux » du martyr qui permet à Dasein de reconnaître sa propre possibilité d’authenticité. / This study aims to exhibit the methodological role that Martin Heidegger assigns to conscience (Gewissen) in Being and Time and to reveal the implications of his interpretation of the “call of conscience” as the means of producing the attestation (Bezeugung) of authentic existence as a possibility of Being-in-the-world (or Dasein). We begin by seeking to understand how Heidegger’s notion of conscience evolved prior to the 1927 publication of Being and Time and to identify the sources which contributed to his interpretation of conscience as the “call of care.” Our historical analysis notably reveals that Heidegger never once describes conscience as a “call” before reading Das Gewissen (1925) by Hendrik G. Stoker, a young South African philosopher who studied under Max Scheler’s direction at the University of Cologne. We specifically examine how Stoker’s phenomenological study—which describes conscience as the “call-of-duty” issued to each human being by the divine “spark” (synteresis) placed in his or her soul by God—contributed to shaping Heidegger’s account of the “existential call.” Focusing on the methodological role of conscience in Being and Time, we analyze Heidegger’s major work in light of his early lectures on phenomenology at Freiburg and Marburg. This approach confirms the relation between conscience in Being and Time and the concept of “formal indication” that Heidegger placed at the heart of his evolving “method” of phenomenological investigation. While many commentators have argued that Heidegger’s “call of conscience” is solipsistic and impossible to experience, we propose a way of reconsidering this apparent impasse by examining what Being and Time itself “formally indicates” with regard to conscience. We show that Heidegger’s conscience points to a phenomenon of existential “testimony” which is radically different from the traditional notion of conscientia. Guided by Heidegger’s “formal indication” of conscience, we “destructively” review the history of the German word Gewissen and reveal its original meaning to be “testimonium” not “conscientia.” In recognizing that Gewissen originally meant “attestation,” we show how Heidegger’s existential phenomenon of conscience can be understood as Dasein’s experience of hearing the “silent testimony” of the martyr.

Cette étude vise à exposer le rôle méthodologique que Martin Heidegger attribue à la conscience (Gewissen) dans Être et temps et à faire ressortir les implications de son interprétation de « l’appel de la conscience » comme le moyen de produire l’attestation (Bezeugung) de l’existence authentique en tant que possibilité du Dasein (ou être-dans-le-monde). Notre objectif initial est de montrer comment la notion heideggérienne de conscience a évolué avant la publication d’Être et temps en 1927 et d’identifier les sources qui ont contribué à l’interprétation existentiale de la conscience comme « l’appel du souci. » Notre analyse historique révèle notamment que Heidegger n’a jamais décrit la conscience comme un « appel » avant sa lecture du livre Das Gewissen (1925) par Hendrik G. Stoker, un jeune philosophe sud-africain qui a étudié à Cologne sous la direction de Max Scheler. Nous démontrons plus spécifiquement comment l’étude phénoménologique de Stoker—qui décrit la conscience comme « l’appel du devoir (Pflichtruf) » provenant de l’étincelle divine (synteresis) placée dans l’âme de chaque personne par Dieu—a influencé l’élaboration du concept de « l’appel existentiel » chez Heidegger. Mettant l’accent sur le rôle méthodologique de la conscience dans Être et temps, nous soulignons aussi l’importance des liens entre son concept de la conscience et la notion de « l’indication formelle » que Heidegger a mise au cœur de sa « méthode » dans ses cours sur la phénoménologie à Freiburg et Marbourg. Alors que de nombreux commentateurs voient dans « l’appel de la conscience » une notion solipsiste qui demeure impossible en tant qu’expérience, nous proposons un moyen de lever cette difficulté apparente en tentant de faire ressortir ce qui est « indiqué formellement » par la notion même de la conscience (Gewissen) dans Être et temps. Cette approche nous permet d’affirmer que le concept de conscience chez Heidegger renvoie à un phénomène de « témoignage » qui est radicalement différent de la notion traditionnelle de conscientia. Guidé par les principes mêmes de la phénoménologie heideggérienne, nous procédons à une analyse « destructrice » de l’histoire du mot allemand Gewissen qui nous révèle que la signification originelle de ce mot (établie dans le plus ancien livre préservé dans la langue allemande : le Codex Abrogans) était testimonium et non conscientia. À l’origine, Gewissen signifiait en effet « attestation »—ce qui est précisément le rôle assigné à la conscience par Heidegger dans Être et temps. Sur la base de cette découverte, nous proposons une manière de comprendre cette « attestation » comme une expérience possible : l’écoute du « témoignage silencieux » du martyr qui permet à Dasein de reconnaître sa propre possibilité d’authenticité. / This study aims to exhibit the methodological role that Martin Heidegger assigns to conscience (Gewissen) in Being and Time and to reveal the implications of his interpretation of the “call of conscience” as the means of producing the attestation (Bezeugung) of authentic existence as a possibility of Being-in-the-world (or Dasein). We begin by seeking to understand how Heidegger’s notion of conscience evolved prior to the 1927 publication of Being and Time and to identify the sources which contributed to his interpretation of conscience as the “call of care.” Our historical analysis notably reveals that Heidegger never once describes conscience as a “call” before reading Das Gewissen (1925) by Hendrik G. Stoker, a young South African philosopher who studied under Max Scheler’s direction at the University of Cologne. We specifically examine how Stoker’s phenomenological study—which describes conscience as the “call-of-duty” issued to each human being by the divine “spark” (synteresis) placed in his or her soul by God—contributed to shaping Heidegger’s account of the “existential call.” Focusing on the methodological role of conscience in Being and Time, we analyze Heidegger’s major work in light of his early lectures on phenomenology at Freiburg and Marburg. This approach confirms the relation between conscience in Being and Time and the concept of “formal indication” that Heidegger placed at the heart of his evolving “method” of phenomenological investigation. While many commentators have argued that Heidegger’s “call of conscience” is solipsistic and impossible to experience, we propose a way of reconsidering this apparent impasse by examining what Being and Time itself “formally indicates” with regard to conscience. We show that Heidegger’s conscience points to a phenomenon of existential “testimony” which is radically different from the traditional notion of conscientia. Guided by Heidegger’s “formal indication” of conscience, we “destructively” review the history of the German word Gewissen and reveal its original meaning to be “testimonium” not “conscientia.” In recognizing that Gewissen originally meant “attestation,” we show how Heidegger’s existential phenomenon of conscience can be understood as Dasein’s experience of hearing the “silent testimony” of the martyr. / Travail réalisé en cotutelle (Université de Paris IV-La Sorbonne).

This thesis investigates the phenomenon of making martyrs in the Protestant Church in Korea (PCK) especially the relationship between the institution and the designation. Tracing the historical development of ideology of martyrdom linguistically and semantically from the pre-Constantinian base-line, the writer points out that martyrdom is not a fixed or universal concept but is variously employed in different times, settings, and places to justify, legitimate and memorialise a death in a specific group and frequently for a specific reason or purpose. It may also be directly linked with the identity of one persecuted community setting a firm boundary between it and the hostile persecuting group. Furthermore, the designation of martyr is an intentional act which speak to the living not the dead. In other words, martyrdom is a part of the interpretive semantics of a particular death seen by particular lives for particular purposes. Martyrdom pertains to the politics of death, yet at the same time to the politics of the living. Martyrs for the PCK represent three major periods of Korean Protestants’ death-events: the late Chosun Dynasty (1866-1905), the rule of Japanese imperialism (1905-1945), and before and during the Korean War (1945-1953). Most Protestant Christians’ deaths occurred as a result of a clash between religion and the political power represented in each era. The PCK only started to ‘make martyrs’ by collecting and interpreting the first such deaths after 1926 and increasingly from 1983 onwards. However, their work of martyr-making has exposed PCK leaders to misusing the term, by including death after natural disasters and accidents. It is arguable that the situation in post-World War II Korea was such that the strands of anticommunism and ethnic nationalism profoundly influenced the historicity of the death-event. Martyr-making processes in the PCK context, therefore, functioned politically to define the persistently common enemy of communism and anti-nationalism, mobilizing Christians against them, and justifying creative martyr-making by its effect. Thus it will be argued that martyr-making is part of the power structure of the PCK: and power, any power, always has the potential to be wrongly used. To analyse the operation of PCK’s martyr-making more specifically, this thesis includes two case studies. The first is of Rev R. J. Thomas who is said to be ‘the first Protestant martyr in Korea,’ whose martyr status was tentatively designated in 1926 and elevated at the time of the 1884-1984 celebration of Protestantism in Korea. And the second is Rev Son Yang-Won, widely known as ‘the atomic bomb of love’ from 1948 when he adopted the killer of his two sons amid the ideological conflict between the leftist and rightist, whose reputation as the ‘martyr of love’ increased from 1950 immediately after being killed by communists in the early stage of the Korean War. The Thomas case uncovers the ethnic nationalistic tendency of the PCK’s martyr-making, and their anticommunist attitude in the treatment of Rev Son. In short, it will be argued that PCK leaders controlled the collective memory about deaths in the specific historical contexts to sustain their socio-political views, placing and displacing some death-events to commemorate some or intentionally exclude others, based as much on the ruling ideologies of South Korean society, mainly anticommunism and ethnic nationalism, as on the image of Jesus’ death. What this may mean for the PCK now and in future is briefly explored in the final comment.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-07-27T13:46:32Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 EDUARDO SOARES DE OLIVEIRA.pdf: 1633591 bytes, checksum: 2e1f5e9c6dd64c889dabe214f60ee22e (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-12-04 / Esta tese apresenta o apologista Tertuliano de Cartago e seu projeto, que busca defender o cristianismo diante das arbitrariedades do Império Romano e sua consequente e injusta perseguição. O principal tema desta pesquisa é o martírio e tem como principal objeto os textos arrolados de Tertuliano. O presente trabalho tem como objetivo e problemática principal demonstrar a importância do martírio no cristianismo africano durante o período imperial romano e sua função na construção de um projeto identitário para o cristianismo. É nesse momento que se tem na região africana do Império as condições que favoreceram o crescimento do incipiente movimento cristão que buscava se afirmar na África romanizada. Dentre a vasta obra do autor, em que se apresenta o seu posicionamento político favorável aos cristãos, várias destas obras se destacam, são elas Apologeticum, Ad Martyras, Scorpiace, Ad Scapulam. Para tanto, esta pesquisa está estruturada em três capítulos. No primeiro capítulo, busca-se identificar como se apresenta o cristianismo na transição do segundo para o terceiro século d.C., destacando-se o domínio de Roma sobre a África. No segundo capítulo, analisa-se o martírio e suas características e perspectivas dentre as quais se identifica o papel das perseguições como fundamentais neste processo. Chamam a atenção para o sacrifício como representação identitária e a conformação da memória cristã martirial a partir da literatura cristã latina, enquanto ponto fundamental e simbólico do momento martirial. Já no terceiro capítulo, esta postura martirial cristã é vista como consolidadora do movimento cristão na África. Ao se ter em vista que os mártires se tornem exemplum de fé e compromisso para com o evangelho, percebe-se que o sacrifício cristão, a partir do martírio, se afirma enquanto projeto identitário deste cristianismo africano latino-romano.

No description available.

Travel literature has been understood to comment on the expectations and impressions of the traveler as they encountered foreign spaces, customs, and people. There has been an unspoken understanding, at best, that travelers who wrote their tales used these foreign spaces to engage in debates that were meaningful to their domestic audience. However, the author has been central to much of the analysis, disconnecting travel literature from other linguistic exercises that more directly offered observations that were directly rooted in domestic culture. Author-centered analysis isolates the traveler from the wider world in which they engaged. It also ignores the other voices that are inherent in the works. As the disparate kingdoms of England and Scotland began their process of unification under King James VI and I, society did not emerge as distinctly novel in a short period of time. Religious beliefs inherited from a unified Christian Europe helped travelers engage with other confessions. They also provided models to help travelers both understand their experiences and relate them to their readers. Powerful Christian ideas, such as martyrdom, pilgrimage, and shared devotion, infused the thoughts of travelers, readers, and those who brought the two together in the marketplace. The travel works relating William Lithgow's adventures at the dawn of the seventeenth century provide an exceptional opportunity to glimpse the development of a traveler's identity. They also provide the opportunity to place the various editions within the context of his domestic culture, as he was re-inculcated before once again debarking on new adventures. As England and Scotland fluctuated between a state of stronger alliance and greater distance, Lithgow became a subtle example of political and religious unity. Understanding that early modern Europeans, in general, travelers more specifically required the ability to easily adopt variant persona are critical to recognizing the protagonist of an adventure tale as a political partisan and tolerant zealot.

This dissertation traces the metaphysical underpinnings of the Protestant Reformation through a close reading of the work of the Protestant reformer Peter Martyr Vermigli (1499-1562). It is premised on the assumption that all theological reasoning is metaphysical insofar as it simultaneously depends on and conveys a vision of how God and the world relate. This opens the possibility to analyse the implied metaphysics of theological work. The study focuses on four areas of Peter Martyr Vermigli’s work: divine and human agency, grace and justification, the Eucharist, and political theology. It analyses Vermigli’s thought by enquiring what structures of being and causality it displays in each of these areas. The key research question is whether Vermigli’s theology implicitly construes ‘being’ as a neutral category, univocally applying to God’s being as well as created being, or whether it conceives of Divine being as transcendent and pre-eminent, with all other being participating in it. Divine and human causation is moreover construed differently in other of these ontological alternatives. The main argument of this dissertation is that the metaphysical framework sustaining Peter Martyr Vermigli’s thought is complex. When examined in terms of its structures of being and causality, Vermigli’s theology simultaneously inhabits two different metaphysical frameworks, one based on ontological participation and the other on the univocity of being. If Vermigli is representative of the Reformation more broadly – an argument which is made based on recent developments in Calvin and Luther scholarship – then this finding is significant for the hermeneutics of the Protestant reformation in two ways. First, it nuances the Reformation’s role in the genesis of modernity, vis-à-vis certain commentators’ suggestion of a causal link between Reformation thought and modernity, while predicating the latter on a univocal ontology. Secondly, the history and development of Protestantism may be better understood by considering possible long-term effects of the metaphysical complexity at the heart of Reformation thought.

Made available in DSpace on 2014-07-29T16:17:48Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 PDF EDUARDO DISSERTACAO.pdf: 559168 bytes, checksum: 5905abc7c41c0183fc5fd74c58a1d4b8 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2009-12-14 / This study aims to analyze the subject from the sacrifice the issue of martyrdom, and in particular, as the construction and influence. Tertullian, this apologist African city of Carthage, which present as the largest and most influential Christian center in Africa, is presented as a critic and champion of African Christians, from his works Ad Martyras and Apologeticum objectives of this study. African Christianity has greatly developed during the transition period between the II and III century d. C., in Africa Romanized. The works in question are present in the moment of confrontation between the new religion, Christianity, and traditional religious expressions Roman paganism. This confrontation is the persecution of Christians, the latter having a role in the emergence force and expansion of the Christian martyrs during the reign of the Roman Empire in Africa. / O presente trabalho visa analisar a partir do tema sacrifício a questão martirial, e em especial, como se da sua construção e influência. Tertuliano, este apologista africano da cidade de Cartago, que se apresenta enquanto o maior e o mais influente centro cristao da África, se apresenta enquanto um crítico e defensor dos cristãos africanos, especialmente a partir de suas obras Apologeticum e Ad Martyras objetos deste trabalho. O cristianismo africano tem grande desenvolvimento no período de transicão entre o II e o III Séc. d. C., na Africa romanizada. As obras em questão se apresentam dentro do momento de confronto entre a nova religião, o cristianismo, e as tradicionais expressoes religiosas romanas, o paganismo. Deste confronto surgirá as perseguições aos cristãos, tendo estas um papel fundamental no surgimento, fortalecimento e expansão dos mártires cristãos durante o domínio do Império Romano na África.