Friedrich Nietzsche thought that philosophers were deeply mistaken about the nature and sources of philosophical activity. Where others took themselves to be motivated by a desire to know the truth, Nietzsche charged that his fellow philosophers, motivated by a pathological set of psychological and physiological characteristics, did little more than sublimate and rationalize their own prejudices. In this thesis, I sketch out in further detail and defend the plausibility and significance of this Nietzschean diagnosis of philosophers. I argue that since Nietzsche’s view of philosophers both offers a compelling explanation of some phenomena in contemporary philosophical practice and, were it true, would have significant upshot for how and even whether philosophy should be practiced, we philosophers ought to begin taking it seriously.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-29T14:23:01Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Jaderson Aparecido de Souza.pdf: 44357388 bytes, checksum: 02173ac48fd79c1048c84e4e39f73038 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011-08-29 / This study addresses the issue of the production of games and its scope as objects of knowledge and learning. Part of the current discussion is about theoretical elements of the games from the ontologically pragmatic assumptions of the metaphilosophy and of the general ontology of the metaverses and games. Methodologically, the production of a game is conceived as the production of a cultural and cognitive object which is organized according to the principles of the narrative designs, three-dimentional environments and characters integrated in the current cultural movement of the digital natives. It is discussed the relation among the methodological assumptions of the approach of the new technologies, the narratology and playful and the current educational reflections that take the games as cognitive objects. It approaches the production contexts of a game, focusing the hypermedia research areas which show the games as cultural agents that promote the human creativity and freedom in the digital era, its relevance as playfulness sense producer and as horizons of knowledge production. It resumes the discussion of the use of games in the educational process confronting them with the entertainment issues and the scientific research that uses the new technologies. It locates and delineates the methodological parameters and conceptual limits for the production of a game which has concepts as objects. It proposes the normative structure of a game design document, its parameter and its development in a high fidelity digital phototype. It culminates in the perspective of the games complexities as digital and cultural objects that locates in the horizons among art, ethics and science, fundamental to the development of the postmodern culture / conhecimento e de aprendizagem. Parte da discussão atual acerca dos fundamentos teóricos dos games, a partir dos pressupostos ontopragmáticos da topofilosofia e da ontologia geral dos metaversos e games. Metodologicamente, concebe a produção de um game como a produção de um objeto cultural e cognitivo que se organiza segundo princípios do design de narrativas, ambientes tridimensionais e personagens, integrados no movimento cultural atual dos nativos digitais. Discute a relação entre os pressupostos metodológicos da abordagem das novas tecnologias, com o binômio narratologia-ludologia e com as atuais reflexões educacionais que tomam os games como objetos cognitivos. Aborda os contextos de produção de um game, enfocando as pesquisas da área hipermídia, que mostram os games como agentes culturais que promovem a criatividade e liberdade humanas na era digital, a sua pertinência como ludicidade produtora de sentidos e como horizonte de produção de conhecimento. Retoma o debate do uso dos games nos processos educativos confrontando-os com as questões do entretenimento e da pesquisa científica que utiliza as novas tecnologias. Situa e delineia os parâmetros metodológicos e limites conceituais para a produção de um game que tenha por objeto conceitos. Propõe a estrutura normativa de um game design document, sua parametrização e seu desenvolvimento em um protótipo digital de alta fidelidade. Culmina na perspectiva da complexidade dos games como objetos digitais e culturais que se situam no horizonte entre arte, ética e ciência, fundamentais para o desenvolvimento da cultura pós-moderna

There are three central orientations, or modes, forming a “tripod” as it were, that grounds philosophy as a cultural activity. The two commonly known modes are, first philosophical geniuses who make models of reality in their “solitary burrows” (such as a Kant and Peirce); and, second, philosophical wanderers who have an embodied praxis, performing wisdom wherever they travel (such as Diogenes of Sinope and Takuan Soho). There is however another primary and largely neglected mode of philosophy which is mutually reinforced ethical praxis rooting in a shared cosmopolitan place. In this dissertation, I characterize and defend the neglected mode of philosophy, that I call “philosophical community,” by describing the constellation of metaethical principles — general, axiological, cultural, and dialectical — that articulate and promote its values. My philosophical methodology is radically empirical philosophy of culture. The principles will be drawn from an interpretation of the whole of philosophical communal experience, considered diachronically, or globally and historically. These principles are then organized as a synchronic (present focused) coordinate whole. By “principle,” at the very least, I mean a hypothetical ground presupposed in successful inquiry. I take “community” in the broad, Roycean spirit of those relationships that build an increasing determinacy of meaning in the universe, (i.e. a community of interpretation). A philosophical community, then, is not reducible to a collection of people but can be thought of as made of a special kind of community of interpretation, as it shares some sort of place. Taken together, this constellation of principles can help us refine for ourselves a vision of the best of philosophical community life, which should also help us frame a new “brocard” for this mode of philosophy in the twenty-first century.

[pt] Esta tese parte da ideia de que a percepção de desenvolvimento, a colonização do mundo da vida e a instrumentalização dos sujeitos na modernidade estão associadas às formas de perceber a espacialidade pelas filosofias, pelas ciências (neo)positivistas e por toda uma variedade de correntes de pensamento constituídas na modernidade. Acredita-se, aqui, que todas essas concepções de espaço praticam um epistemicídio do espaço, pois, ao ignorar intencionalmente a práxis no espaço social, interferem diretamente na gênese da concepção de espaço como ausente de contradições. Nesse sentido, busca-se a análise da genealogia de uma epistemologia política em Geografia a partir da incorporação da metafilosofia, através da teoria da alienação, no pensamento geográfico. A teoria da alienação exerce um papel central na reconstrução da noção de espaço no processo de renovação epistemológica em Geografia, desencadeado a partir da geografia crítica de viés marxista – uma vez que instaura um movimento de ruptura ontológica e epistemológica no pensamento geográfico – e esse movimento, balizado na atualização da filosofia da práxis (metafilosofia), apresenta repercussões prático-teóricas para além da Geografia, uma vez que nos permite deslocar o olhar do objeto de estudo dessa disciplina para o entendimento das espacialidades da reprodução das relações sociais de produção. / [en] This thesis starts from the idea that the perception of development, the colonization of the world of life and the instrumentalization of the subjects in modernity are associated with ways of perceive spatiality by philosophies, the (neo) positivist sciences and for a whole variety currents of thought constituted in modernity. It is believed here that all these conceptions of space practice an epistemicide of space, because, by intentionally ignoring praxis in the social space, directly interfere in the genesis of the conception of space as absent of contradictions. In this sense, is sought the analysis of the genealogy of a political epistemology in Geography from the incorporation of metaphilosophy, through the theory of alienation, in geographical thinking. The theory of alienation plays a role in reconstruction of the notion of space in the process of epistemological renew in geography, triggered from the critical geography of Marxist bias – once it establishes an ontological and epistemological rupture movement in geographical thinking - and this movement marked in updating philosophy of praxis (mataphilosophy) has repercussions practical-theoretical beyond geography since it allows us to shift the look at the object of study of this discipline for the understanding of spatialities of the reproduction of social relations of production.

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Nesta investigação tenho por fim estudar a translatio da lexicografia conceitual que parte do verbo grego ser (einai) chegando ao verbo latino ser (esse) à luz do de Hebdomadibus de Boécio. Neste percurso me deparo com a embriologia da doutrina dos transcendentais, na qual ser, bem e um são convertíveis ou coextensivos, como também me deparo com uma metafísica do bem, herdada pela Escolástica, pela qual tento especular Boécio em seu exercício filosófico, que consiste em tentar esclarecer o modo pelo qual as substâncias são boas nisto que são, contudo não são bens substanciais. / The aim of this study is the translatio of the conceptual lexicography following the Greek verb be (einai) through the Latin verb be (esse) in light of Boethius de Hebdomadibus. Throughout this journey I find myself facing the embriology of the doctrine of transcendentals, in which being, goodness and one are convertible or co-extensive, and I also face a metaphysics of goodness, inherited by the Scholastics, through which I then try to speculate Boethius in his philosophical endeavour, consisting in trying to clarify how substances are good in that they are, though they are not substantial goods.

In Otherwise than Being (1974), Levinas asked if and how philosophy could make justice of the concrete ethical meeting by philosophical practice, which is unconditionally conditioned by language. Language, understood as partly situated in being and ontology, is analysed as an appropriation of the other, who is other than being. Language could therefore according to Levinas never fully express the other – sometimes referred to as “otherism”. A condition, then, that needs to be fulfilled for philosophical practice to reach the goal of making justice for the other, and hence be meaningful in the Levinasian picture, is to transcend language through language. In the essay, I analyse through textual interpretation what appears to be a contradiction regarding Levinas’ answer to the possibility of transcendence through and by language in philosophy. On one hand, it appears as if philosophy could not overcome language through language, and that philosophical practice therefore is not meaningful. On the other hand, it appears as if sceptical discourse could overcome language through language. Scepticism might then be considered as the only meaningful practice and philosophy a game of deconstructive dialogue. Since skepticism is understood as a part of philosophy, this would imply that there is a contradiction. I argue that the contradiction could be understood as apparent when considering the criticism executed in Levinas’ analysis of language. I suggest that the contradiction is apparent because sceptical interchange is meaningful.

La philosophie d’Eric Weil présente une structure systématique dont l’interprétation des composants n’est pas facilement concevable. Le titre “Philosophie et histoire dans la pensée d'Eric Weil” propose une lecture complète du système weilian visant à sa compréhension à travers un élément qui traverse tout son travail : l’histoire. Notre hypothèse est que Weil présente une manière originale de penser à l’histoire qui, sans constituer une “philosophie particulière”, peut être un principe herméneutique pour l’interprétation de sa pensée. Nous voulons montrer que la question de l’histoire représente une position originale en s’éloignant de l’inspiration hegelienne et de la pensée heideggerienne; et fondamental, parce que la pensée de Weil ne peut être comprise sans référence à la réflexion sur l’histoire et à l’homme qui pose des questions sur l’histoire. Notre thèse se développe à partir de la tâche qui exige à la fois la présentation des problèmes inhérents à la conception d’une philosophie de l’histoire et la détermination du fil qui pointe vers son unité interne et son articulation avec le reste du système. Par conséquent, à chaque nouvelle étape, l’hypothèse est prise : la réflexion sur l’histoire sert de clé herméneutique légitime à approcher le travail weilien. Une première exigence a un caractère historique-exposant : énumérer les textes qui abordent les questions de la réflexion sur l’histoire. Il faut également lire systématiquement l’ensemble des textes et leur relation avec le système de philosophie articulé dans la Logique de la philosophie, en supposant que l’idée du système est la pierre angulaire de la validité de toute interprétation. Il ne s’agit donc pas de découper le corpus weilien en vue de l’indication des lieux où apparaît la question, mais de reconstruire l’unité entre les différentes parties de son travail. Notre enquête prend le travail de Weil en se concentrant sur l’histoire dans sa dimension logique-philosophique sans dispenser de la perspective histoire-politique. C’est donc une approche logique-argumentative qui tente de comprendre une philosophie qui est à la fois dialectique et critique. Nous avons divisé le travail en quatre chapitres. Le premier abordait la métaphilosophie dans la pensée weilienne à partir de son inspiration kantienne. Notre hypothèse fondamentale est le retour à l’affirmation du kantisme de Weil. Nous commençons par la définition de la philosophie en tant qu’acte humain de celui qui a librement choisi de comprendre le monde, une activité éminemment scientifique et transmissible et essentiellement historique. Le deuxième insère Eric Weil parmis les philosophes qui pensent l’histoire, plus précisément, il rélie Weil à la tradition d’une “critique de la raison historique” qui s’étend de Dilthey à Weber et à Aron. Le troisième prend les conditions des discours sur le sens de l’histoire dans le système des catégories discursives. Autrement dit, nous suivons la succession catégorielle de la Logique de la philosophie. Ce dernier constitue une deuxième partie du travail et reprend la tâche annoncée comme la récupération de la fonction sociale du philosophe, de la lecture weilienne de la Révolution française. / The philosophy of Eric Weil presents a systematic structure whose interpretation of the components is not easily conceivable. The title “Philosophy and history in the thinking of Eric Weil” proposes a comprehensive reading of the Weilian system aiming at its comprehension through an element that crosses all his work: history. Our fundamental hypothesis is that Weil is the original way of thinking about history, which, even without being a “particular philosophy”, is a hermeneutical principle for the interpretation of its thought. In our view, the theme has not yet found the deserved deepening among those who have been willing to think about Weilian philosophy both by the way the question of the relationship between philosophy and history is usually raised or as a tangent theme in the work or as a brand of his “Hegelianism”. We show that the question of history is taken from an original philosophical perspective by distancing itself from both Hegelian “inspiration” and Heideggerian thought; and fundamental, because Weil’s thinking can not be understood without reference to the reflection on history and the man who is interested in it. Our thesis develops from the task that demands both the presentation of the problems inherent to the design of a philosophy of history, and the determination of the thread that points to its internal unity and to its articulation with the rest of the system. Therefore, with each new step the hypothesis is taken that the reflection on the history serves as legitimate hermeneutic key of the work weiliana. A first requirement has a historical-expository character: to list texts that deal with the questions of thought about history. One should also systematically read the set of texts and their relation to the philosophy system articulated in the Logique de la philosophie, assuming the idea of ​​system as the touchstone of the validity of any interpretation. It is not, therefore, a question of cutting the Weilian corpus in view of the indication of the places where the question appears, but of rebuilding unity between the different parts of his work. Our investigation takes Weil’s work by concentrating on history in its logical-philosophical dimension without dispensing with that historical-political. It is, then, a logical-argumentative perspective that tries to understand a philosophy that is intended dialectic and critical. To do so, we divided the work into four chapters. The first deals with metaphilosophy in Weilian thought from its Kantian inspiration. Our fundamental hypothesis is the return to the affirmation of Weil’s kantism, Kantianism taken up by a philosopher who read and understood Hegel. We start from the definition of philosophy as a human act of one who freely chose to understand the world in a quest for meaning understood as an eminently scientific and communicable activity and, above all, essentially historical. The second is Eric Weil in the wake of philosophers who think of history, always according to Kantian inspiration, which implies associating it with the tradition of a “critique of historical reason” that starts from Dilthey and extends to Weber and Aron. The third takes the conditions of discourses on the meaning of history to the system of discursive categories. Put another way, we follow the categorial succession of the Logique de la philosophie. On the one hand, we discern the motives that hinder a historical discourse from the Truth to the Self, and on the other, we follow the development of the foundational discourses of an understanding of the history of the category of God to Wisdom. The latter constitutes a second part of the work and takes up the task announced as the recovery of the social function of the philosopher, from the Weilian reading of the French Revolution. / A filosofia de Eric Weil apresenta uma estrutura sistemática cuja interpretação dos componentes não é facilmente concebível. O título “Filosofia e história no pensamento de Eric Weil” propõe uma leitura abrangente do sistema weiliano visando sua compreensão através de um elemento que atravessa toda a sua obra: a história. Nossa hipótese fundamental é a de que se encontra subjacente, em Weil, uma forma original de pensar a história, que, mesmo sem constituir uma “filosofia particular”, é uma princípio hermenêutico para a interpretação do seu pensamento. A nosso ver, o tema ainda não encontrou o aprofundamento merecido entre os que se dispuseram a pensar a filosofia weiliana tanto pela forma como normalmente se põe a questão da relação entre a filosofia e a história ou como um tema tangente na obra ou como uma marca do seu “hegelianismo”. Mostramos que a questão da história é tomada numa perspectiva filosófica original por se distanciar tanto da “inspiração” hegeliana como do pensamento heideggeriano; e fundamental, porque o pensamento de Weil não pode ser compreendido sem referência à reflexão sobre a história e sobre o homem que por ela se interessa. Nossa tese se desenvolve a partir da tarefa que demanda tanto a apresentação dos problemas inerentes ao projeto de uma filosofia da história, como a determinação do fio condutor que aponta para a sua unidade interna e para a sua articulação com o restante do sistema. Portanto, a cada novo passo retoma-se a hipótese de que a reflexão sobre a história serve de chave hermenêutica legítima da obra weiliana. Uma primeira exigência tem caráter histórico-expositivo: elencar os textos que abordam as questões próprias do pensamento sobre a história. Deve-se também ler sistematicamente o conjunto dos textos e da sua relação com o sistema da filosofia articulado na Lógica da filosofia, assumindo a ideia de sistema como pedra de toque da validade de qualquer interpretação. Não se trata, portanto, de recortar o corpus weiliano em vista da indicação dos lugares em que a questão aparece, mas de reconstruir a unidade entre as diferentes partes da sua obra. Nossa investigação toma a obra de Weil concentrando-nos sobre a história na sua dimensão lógico-filosófica sem prescindir daquela histórico-política. Trata-se, então, de uma perspectiva lógico-argumentativa que tenta compreender uma filosofia que se pretende dialética e crítica. Para tanto, dividimos o trabalho em quatro capítulos. O primeiro aborda a metafilosofia no pensamento weiliano a partir da sua inspiração kantiana. Nossa hipótese fundamental é o retorno à afirmação do kantismo de Weil, kantismo retomado por um filósofo que leu e compreendeu Hegel. Partimos da definição da filosofia como ato humano próprio de quem escolheu, livremente, compreender o mundo numa busca de sentido entendida como atividade eminentemente científica e comunicável, e, acima de tudo, essencialmente histórica. O segundo, insere Eric Weil na esteira dos filósofos que pensam a história, sempre segundo a inspiração kantiana, o que implica associá-lo à tradição de uma “crítica da razão histórica” que parte de Dilthey e se prolonga até Weber e Aron. O terceiro leva as condições dos discursos sobre o sentido da história ao sistema das categorias discursivas. Dito de outro modo, seguimos a sucessão categorial da Lógica da filosofia. De um lado, discernimos os motivos que impedem um discurso histórico da Verdade ao Eu, e de outro, acompanhamos o desenvolvimento dos discursos fundantes de uma compreensão da história da categoria Deus até a Sabedoria. O último constitui uma segunda parte do trabalho e retoma a tarefa anunciada como a recuperação da função social do filósofo, a partir da leitura weiliana da Revolução francesa.

Nesta investigação tenho por fim estudar a translatio da lexicografia conceitual que parte do verbo grego ser (einai) chegando ao verbo latino ser (esse) à luz do de Hebdomadibus de Boécio. Neste percurso me deparo com a embriologia da doutrina dos transcendentais, na qual ser, bem e um são convertíveis ou coextensivos, como também me deparo com uma metafísica do bem, herdada pela Escolástica, pela qual tento especular Boécio em seu exercício filosófico, que consiste em tentar esclarecer o modo pelo qual as substâncias são boas nisto que são, contudo não são bens substanciais. / The aim of this study is the translatio of the conceptual lexicography following the Greek verb be (einai) through the Latin verb be (esse) in light of Boethius de Hebdomadibus. Throughout this journey I find myself facing the embriology of the doctrine of transcendentals, in which being, goodness and one are convertible or co-extensive, and I also face a metaphysics of goodness, inherited by the Scholastics, through which I then try to speculate Boethius in his philosophical endeavour, consisting in trying to clarify how substances are good in that they are, though they are not substantial goods.

Dans son œuvre, notamment dans The View From Nowhere, Thomas Nagel propose une réflexion unifiée sur certains problèmes philosophiques fondamentaux tels que la relation corps-esprit, l’identité personnelle, la liberté, la connaissance, la relation entre la raison et le réel. Il les comprend comme diverses formes d’un problème unique : le conflit entre certains aspects de notre conception subjective de la réalité, celle que nous développons spontanément depuis notre point de vue de créature particulière dans le monde, et certains aspects d’une conception objective de la réalité, indépendante de nos caractères particuliers, dont la recherche s’impose à nous et que nous tentons de développer. Nous avons mené un double travail : exposer les conceptions de Nagel à propos de la nature et de l’origine des problèmes philosophiques en question, prolonger ces réflexions. En effet, les conceptions de Nagel permettent de proposer une définition nouvelle et féconde de la métaphysique comme réflexion sur les conflits entre les points de vue interne et externe, d’élaborer une typologie a priori des solutions qui peuvent être apportées aux problèmes métaphysiques, de comprendre la nature et le ressort commun, de type idéaliste et anti-métaphysique, des courants dominants de la philosophie qu’ont été, durant la première partie du vingtième siècle, la phénoménologie et la philosophie de Wittgenstein. Enfin, cette typologie permet de clarifier la réflexion à propos des problèmes métaphysiques particuliers et de mesurer la portée des arguments en jeu. Nous avons établi ce point en abordant deux problèmes métaphysiques particuliers, celui de la relation corps-esprit et celui de la perception. / In his works, especially in The View From Nowhere, Thomas Nagel offers a unified reflection on some philosophical fundamental issues such as the mind-body link, the personal identity, the liberty, the knowledge and the relationship between reason and reality. He sees these matters as various forms of a sole issue: The conflict between certain aspects of our subjective understanding of reality - the one resulting from our spontaneous reflection as particular beings - and other aspects of an objective one - independent from our specific nature and which science facts imposed on us and that we try to develop. We have led a double task: first, to put forward Nagel’s conceptions of nature and of the origin of the philosophical issues at stake, then, to elaborate on these thoughts. Nagel’s conceptions allow, indeed, to give a new and fruitful definition of metaphysics as a reflection on the conflicts between the internal and external point of views. It also theoretically allows, to develop a typology of the possible solutions that can be brought to metaphysical concerns, to understand nature and the common responsibility - the idealistic and anti-metaphysical ones - of the main philosophical movements of the first part of the twentieth century. Wittgenstein’s phenomenology and philosophy that is. Eventually, this typology helps clarifying the reflection upon specific metaphysical issues and measuring the impact of the arguments at stake. We have came to this point by taking into consideration two specific metaphysical issues : the mind-body link and the perception.