This thesis investigates Aristotle's criticism and consequent reformulation of the Platonic method for formulating definitions called the Method of Division. For both Plato and Aristotle, the object of division is a natural kind, which consists in a class whose members stand in a homologous relationship to a single form. I argue that Aristotle's criticisms of the Method of Division fall under two categories: logical objections and ontological objections. The logical objections focus on division as a method for demonstrating definitions, a method that Aristotle wants to distinguish from his syllogistic logic, the centerpiece of his theory of scientific demonstration. The ontological objections focus on the question of whether the sort of account generated by division is sufficient to constitute a definition of its object. Aristotle's revised Method of Division is supposed to avoid the problems he raises by constructing definitions that satisfy the principles motivating his ontological objections through a logical process devised to make the resulting account a "necessary" consequence of the initial assumptions of the division. I argue that Aristotle?s ontological objections to the Method of Division reflect a deeper disparity between the Platonic and the Aristotelian notion of a form and natural kind. Underpinning Aristotle's notion of a natural kind is an ontology of discrete substances. Because the unity of substance is paramount in this ontology, Aristotle argues that a definition, which is supposed to give an account of the essence of a substance, must account for the unity of its object by itself possessing a non-accidental unity. Yet, on a Platonic ontology, a definition by division invokes a plurality of independent Forms whose conjunction does not constitute a unity. On the basis of this consideration, Aristotle argues that an ontology of abstract Forms cannot account for the unity of an individual substance. To this extent, I conclude, Aristotle's methodological objections to the Platonic Method of Division are a component of his broader criticisms of Platonic metaphysics.

In this dissertation I develop a theory of moral judgment as a natural kind. Instead of analyzing the concept of moral judgment, I develop an empirically grounded theory of its underlying nature. In chapter one I argue that moral judgment is a hybrid state of moral belief and moral emotion. The view is supported by a dual systems model of moral cognition and accounts for the internal but defeasible relationship between moral judgment and motivation. In chapter two I argue that in moral judgment moral norms are conceptualized as social, serious, general, authority-independent and objective. The view is supported by empirical research on the moral/conventional distinction and yields an empirical explanation of the possibility of genuine moral agreement and disagreement. In chapter three I explore whether psychopaths have the capacity for moral judgment, and thus whether they are real life "amoralists," individuals who make moral judgments but lack moral motivation. I argue that psychopaths have an impaired capacity for moral judgment and that prominent internalist accounts of moral judgment have difficulty accounting for psychopaths' peculiar combination of deficits.

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The thesis examines the direct reference theory of proper names and natural kind terms as expounded by Saul Kripke, Hilary Putnam and others and finds that it has not succeeded in replacing some kind of description theory of the reference of such terms - although it does concede that the traditional Fregean theory is not quite correct. It is argued that the direct reference theory is mistaken on several counts. First of all it is question-begging. Secondly, it is guilty of a 'use/mention' confusion. And thirdly, and most importantly, it fails to deal with the notion of understanding. The notion of understanding is crucial to the present thesis - specifically, what is understood by a proper name or natural kind term. It is concluded that sense (expressed in the form of descriptions) is at least necessary for reference, which makes a significant difference to Kripke's claim that there are necessary a posteriori truths as well as contingent a priori truths. It is also argued that sense could be sufficient for reference, if it is accepted that it is speakers who effect reference. In this sense, sense determines reference. The thesis therefore not only argues against the account of reference given by the direct reference theorists, it also gives an account of how proper names and natural kind terms actually do function in natural language. As far as the epistemology of necessity is concerned the thesis concludes that Kripke (along with many others) has not succeeded in establishing the existence of the necessary a posteriori nor the contingent a priori from the theory of direct reference. Whether such truths can be established by some other means, or in principle, is not the concern of the thesis; although the point is made that, if a certain view of sense is accepted, then questions of necessity and a priority seem inappropriate.

De jure and De facto Rigidity in the General Terms for Natural Kinds”. This paper will argue that one of rigidity’s central problems in general terms for natural kinds, is consequence of not distinguishing between de jure rigid terms and de facto rigid terms on these cases. The paper claims that necessary identity sentences defended by Kripke in Naming and Necessity consider the term’s occurrence to designate a same kind (kinds which share the transworld relation of being one same kind) through two rigidity terms, a de jure one, and a de facto one. This allows to explain the problems that arise from the notion of rigidity in the case of general terms for natural kinds, since it maintains the causal connection requirements, while at the same time it enunciates the identity criterion between these kinds, through the essential property(ies) of the abovementioned kind. / En este escrito se argumentará que uno de los problemas centrales de la rigidez en los términos generales para clases naturales es consecuencia de no distinguir entre términos rígidos de jure y términos rígidos de facto en dichos casos. Se sostiene que los enunciados de identidad necesarios defendidos por Kripke en Naming and Necessity consideran la ocurrencia de términos que designan a una misma clase (clases que poseen entre sí la relación transmundana de ser una misma clase) a través de dos términos rígidos, uno de jure y uno de facto. Esto permite explicar los problemas que la noción de rigidez plantea en los casos de los términos generales para clases naturales, pues mantiene los requerimientos de conexión causal y a su vez enuncia el criterio de identidad entre tales clases, a través de la(s) propiedad(es) esencial(es) de dicha clase.

This study is about the nature of persons and personal identity. It belongs to a tradition that maintains that in order to understand what it is to be a person we must clarify what personal identity consists in. In this pursuit, I differentiate between the problems (i) How do persons persist? and (ii) What facts, if any, does personal identity consist in? Concerning the first question, I argue that persons persist three-dimensionally (the endurance view), and not four-dimensionally (the perdurarne view), on the ground that objects must always fall under some substance sortal concept S (the sortal dependency of individuation), and that the concept person entails that objects falling under it are three-dimensional. Concerning the second question, I differentiate between Criterianists, who maintain that it is possible to specify a non-circular and informative criterion for personal identity, and Non-Criterianists, who deny that such a specification is possible. I argue against Criterianist accounts of personal identity on the ground that they are either (i) circular, (ii) violate the intrinsicality of identity or (iii) do not adequately represent what we are essentially. I further criticise three Psychological Non-Criterianist accounts of personal identity on the ground that they wrongly assume that 'person' refers to mental entities. Instead I formulate the Revised Animal Attribute View where person is understood as a basic sortal concept which picks out a biological sort of enduring animals. In this, I claim that the real essence of a person is determined by the real essence of the kind of animal he is, without thereby denying that persons have a real essence as persons. / digitalisering@umu

This study is about the nature of persons and personal identity. It belongs to a tradition that maintains that in order to understand what it is to be a person we must clarify what personal identity consists in. In this pursuit, I differentiate between the problems (i) How do persons persist? and (ii) What facts, if any, does personal identity consist in? Concerning the first question, I argue that persons persist three-dimensionally (the endurance view), and not four-dimensionally (the perdurarne view), on the ground that objects must always fall under some substance sortal concept S (the sortal dependency of individuation), and that the concept person entails that objects falling under it are three-dimensional. Concerning the second question, I differentiate between Criterianists, who maintain that it is possible to specify a non-circular and informative criterion for personal identity, and Non-Criterianists, who deny that such a specification is possible. I argue against Criterianist accounts of personal identity on the ground that they are either (i) circular, (ii) violate the intrinsicality of identity or (iii) do not adequately represent what we are essentially. I further criticise three Psychological Non-Criterianist accounts of personal identity on the ground that they wrongly assume that 'person' refers to mental entities. Instead I formulate the Revised Animal Attribute View where person is understood as a basic sortal concept which picks out a biological sort of enduring animals. In this, I claim that the real essence of a person is determined by the real essence of the kind of animal he is, without thereby denying that persons have a real essence as persons. / digitalisering@umu

Comprise pendant longtemps comme une entité sui generis dont les origines ne pouvaient être expliquées que par rapport à elle-même («omnis cultura excultura»), la notion de culture n’est plus le maître-mot du «culturalisme». Le naturalisme n’a pourtant pas non plus fini de faire d’elle une catégorie complètement naturalisée. Dans cette thèse, je propose une approche analytique et synthétique du concept éthologique de culture. Je pars de ses racines historiques, notamment autour de la notion de cultures ou traditions animales, en examinant le paysage épistémologique des mots-clés des auteurs publiant dans ce domaine, ainsi qu’en évaluant les engagements théoriques et philosophiques associés à certaines définitions de la culture. L’adaptationnisme méthodologique est également mis en œuvre pour révéler dans ce travail l’ampleur des conflits stratégiques, au sens de la théorie des jeux, présents dans certaines formes de transmission culturelle. L’ensemble nous mène à faire le bilan de ce que l’on a appelé la révolution éthologique dans la notion de culture, en soulignant les dimensions écologiques qui sont maintenant mises en avant, mais aussi les limites d’un concept qui précède de plusieurs siècles la compréhension scientifique des phénomènes concernés. / Long time understood as a sui generis entity whose origins could only be explained in relation to itself ("omnis cultura ex cultura"), the notion of culture is no longer the watchword that "culturalism" made of it. Naturalism, however, has not ended up turning culture into a completely naturalized category either. In this dissertation, regarding the ethological concept of culture, I am advancing an approach that is both analytic and synthetic. The historical roots of the notion of animal cultures (or animal traditions) are my starting point. Then follows a scrutiny of the epistemological landscape of author keywords in the field of animal cultures. An assessment of certain theoretical commitments and different philosophical positions associated to several definitions of culture is also offered. In addition, methodological adaptationism is put to work to reveal the scope of certain strategic conflicts that arise in a game-theoretic fashion in certain forms of cultural transmission. The whole enterprise allows us to take stock of what has come to be called the ethological revolution regarding the notion of culture. This is accomplished by underlining the ecological dimensions but also the limitations of a concept that, after all, predates by several centuries the scientific understanding of the phenomena it is purported to cover.

This thesis addresses key issues of scientific realism in the philosophy of biology and chemistry through investigation of an underexplored research domain: olfaction theory, or the science of smell. It also provides the first systematic overview of the development of olfactory practices and research into the molecular basis of odours across the 19th and 20th century. Historical and contemporary explanations and modelling techniques for understanding the material basis of odours are analysed with a specific focus on the entrenchment of technological process, research tradition and the definitions of materiality for understanding scientific advancement. The thesis seeks to make sense of the explanatory and problem solving strategies, different ways of reasoning and the construction of facts by drawing attention to the role and application of scientific representations in olfactory practices. Scientific representations such as models, classifications, maps, diagrams, lists etc. serve a variety of purposes that range from the stipulation of relevant properties and correlations of the research materials and the systematic formation of research questions, to the design of experiments that explore or test particular hypotheses. By examining a variety of modelling strategies in olfactory research, I elaborate on how I understand the relation between representations and the world and why this relation requires a pluralist perspective on scientific models, methods and practices. Through this work I will show how a plurality of representations does not pose a problem for realism about scientific entities and their theoretical contexts but, on the contrary, that this plurality serves as the most reliable grounding for a realistic interpretation of scientific representations of the world and the entities it contains. The thesis concludes that scientific judgement has to be understood through its disciplinary trajectory, and that scientific pluralism is a direct consequence of the historicity of scientific development.