Ce travail étudie les discours sur les songes dans la philosophie spéculative du siècle des Lumières jusqu’à Diderot, en revenant préalablement aux sources du cartésianisme. Puis il s’intéresse aux songes brefs comme récits-cadres des années 1730 à 1790.Dans un premier temps, il montre que le rêve est de plus en plus étudié comme un épisode de la vie de l’esprit ; il gagne la veille et en vient à éclairer le fonctionnement de l’esprit, dans les opérations de la mémoire ou de l’imagination. C’est un fonctionnement pétri par la matière et par le monde, qui devient comme chez Denis Diderot un modèle pour aborder l’esprit et un modèle de découverte scientifique. Dans un second temps, nous nous tournons vers les songes littéraires comme récits-cadre, petits textes désinvoltes, rassemblés en série comme chez d’Argens ou Mercier. Cette forme favorise l’exploration des confins obscurs du sujet, dans le pèlerinage amoureux, la satire ou le songe philosophique : hédonisme triomphant, sentiment océanique, pulsion scopique, pulsion de mort dirigé contre les autres ou contre soi. / The Dream in the Eighteenth Century or the Testing of the Self This thesis investigates the discourse about dreams in philosophy of mind of the Enlightenment to Diderot, after an initial examination of the sources of Cartesianism. Next it proceeds to study the dream frame narratives produced in the 1730-1790 period.First, it shows that the dream is increasingly studied as an episode in the life of the mind; dreams pervade the wake, soon unfolding the operations of our mind, memory and imagination. They involve world and matter, and become a model reflecting all aspects of the mind, finally turning into a model of scientific discovery in Denis Diderot’s writings. Secondly, we turn to literary dreams as frame narratives, short flippant texts, significantly grouped together in series by Argens or by Mercier. This form favours the exploration of the dark confines of the self, in the love pilgrimage, in satirical or philosophical dreams : triumph of hedonism, Oceanic Feeling, scopic drive, drive towards death and self destruction.

Desde fins do século XIX foram escritas obras em que se repertoriou a produção filosó-fica brasileira. Traço comum em muitas delas é o caráter de precariedade atribuído ao objeto sobre o qual se dedicam. Procuraremos examinar o modo de constituição desse juízo, levando em consideração a maneira pela qual categorias filosóficas foram produ-zidas por autores que, autodenominando-se filósofos, eram assim reconhecidos no sécu-lo XIX no Brasil. Selecionaremos, no conjunto desses autores, textos e questões que possam lhes conferir inteligibilidade e legibilidade nesse espaço particular de criação e circulação do conhecimento. Concentrando-nos de modo geral na segunda metade do século XIX, procuraremos investigar como se deu a formação de uma ideia de século que opera como medida de pertencimento coletivo a produções filosóficas muito diver-sas, mas cujos sentidos temporais divergem a ponto de poder-se falar em uma história de temporalidades. / Since the end of the nineteenth century Brazilian philosophical production was recorded in many different works. A common trait in many of them is the character of precari-ousness attributed to the object to which they devote themselves. We shall try to exam-ine the manner in which this judgment is constituted, taking into account the way in which philosophical categories were produced by authors who, calling themselves phi-losophers, were thus recognized in the nineteenth century in Brazil. We will select, from the set of these authors, texts and questions that can confer intelligibility and readability to this particular space of creation and circulation of knowledge. Generally focusing on the second half of the nineteenth century, we will try to investigate how the idea of a century arose an idea which operates as a measure of collective belonging to very di-verse philosophical productions, but whose temporal senses diverge up to the point that allows us to speak of a history of temporality.

Neste trabalho procuramos examinar a maneira pela qual o discurso filosófico de Mau-rice Merleau-Ponty é contruído. Num primeiro momento, os temas da linguagem e tem-poralidade são analisados tendo em vista sua participação na interrogação filosófica em geral. O principal interlocutor que escolhemos para este passo é Henri Bergson. Em segundo lugar, tentamos trazer para a discussão avaliações distintas acerca do fazer lite-rário, as quais foram empreendidas por autores com quem Merleau-Ponty dialogou em sua obra. Essa interlocução, aliás, esclarece também a importância da presença da não-filosofia no discurso filosófico merleau-pontyano. Por fim, buscamos traçar alguns pa-ralelos com a obra romanesca de Proust, escritor muito presente nos textos de Merleau-Ponty, a fim de levantar questões acerca da proximidade entre narrativa literária e filo-sofia, tanto no que diz respeito à construção discursiva, quanto à função da temporali-dade. / In this academic work we examine the way by which Maurice Merleau-Ponty\'s philoso-phical discourse is constructed. Firstly, the themes of language and temporality are analised in regards to its part in philosophical questioning in general. The main interlocutor chosen for this section is Henri Bergson. Secondly, we try to bring into discussion distinct avaliations of literary practice, made by authors Merleau-Ponty stablished dialogue with in his work. Such dialogue, by the way, sheds light on the importance of non-philosophy in Merleau-Ponty\'s philosophical discourse. Finally, we attempt to trace some parallels with Proust\'s romanesque work a writer very frequent in Merleau-Ponty\'s work in order to rise questions on the proximity between literary narrative and philosophy, in what concerns discoursive construction as well as the function of temporality.

Desde fins do século XIX foram escritas obras em que se repertoriou a produção filosó-fica brasileira. Traço comum em muitas delas é o caráter de precariedade atribuído ao objeto sobre o qual se dedicam. Procuraremos examinar o modo de constituição desse juízo, levando em consideração a maneira pela qual categorias filosóficas foram produ-zidas por autores que, autodenominando-se filósofos, eram assim reconhecidos no sécu-lo XIX no Brasil. Selecionaremos, no conjunto desses autores, textos e questões que possam lhes conferir inteligibilidade e legibilidade nesse espaço particular de criação e circulação do conhecimento. Concentrando-nos de modo geral na segunda metade do século XIX, procuraremos investigar como se deu a formação de uma ideia de século que opera como medida de pertencimento coletivo a produções filosóficas muito diver-sas, mas cujos sentidos temporais divergem a ponto de poder-se falar em uma história de temporalidades. / Since the end of the nineteenth century Brazilian philosophical production was recorded in many different works. A common trait in many of them is the character of precari-ousness attributed to the object to which they devote themselves. We shall try to exam-ine the manner in which this judgment is constituted, taking into account the way in which philosophical categories were produced by authors who, calling themselves phi-losophers, were thus recognized in the nineteenth century in Brazil. We will select, from the set of these authors, texts and questions that can confer intelligibility and readability to this particular space of creation and circulation of knowledge. Generally focusing on the second half of the nineteenth century, we will try to investigate how the idea of a century arose an idea which operates as a measure of collective belonging to very di-verse philosophical productions, but whose temporal senses diverge up to the point that allows us to speak of a history of temporality.

Neste trabalho procuramos examinar a maneira pela qual o discurso filosófico de Mau-rice Merleau-Ponty é contruído. Num primeiro momento, os temas da linguagem e tem-poralidade são analisados tendo em vista sua participação na interrogação filosófica em geral. O principal interlocutor que escolhemos para este passo é Henri Bergson. Em segundo lugar, tentamos trazer para a discussão avaliações distintas acerca do fazer lite-rário, as quais foram empreendidas por autores com quem Merleau-Ponty dialogou em sua obra. Essa interlocução, aliás, esclarece também a importância da presença da não-filosofia no discurso filosófico merleau-pontyano. Por fim, buscamos traçar alguns pa-ralelos com a obra romanesca de Proust, escritor muito presente nos textos de Merleau-Ponty, a fim de levantar questões acerca da proximidade entre narrativa literária e filo-sofia, tanto no que diz respeito à construção discursiva, quanto à função da temporali-dade. / In this academic work we examine the way by which Maurice Merleau-Ponty\'s philoso-phical discourse is constructed. Firstly, the themes of language and temporality are analised in regards to its part in philosophical questioning in general. The main interlocutor chosen for this section is Henri Bergson. Secondly, we try to bring into discussion distinct avaliations of literary practice, made by authors Merleau-Ponty stablished dialogue with in his work. Such dialogue, by the way, sheds light on the importance of non-philosophy in Merleau-Ponty\'s philosophical discourse. Finally, we attempt to trace some parallels with Proust\'s romanesque work a writer very frequent in Merleau-Ponty\'s work in order to rise questions on the proximity between literary narrative and philosophy, in what concerns discoursive construction as well as the function of temporality.

Le but de cette étude est de tirer profit de la contribution de Ludwig Wittgenstein à la question de la fonction éthico-thérapeutique du discours philosophique à la lumière du modèle de la vie philosophique de Pierre Hadot, dont le modèle stoïcien nous sert de cas de figure, et au sein duquel cette fonction occupe une place centrale. L’ensemble de l’étude est composé de quatre chapitres. Le premier chapitre vise à faire ressortir et analyser les cinq composantes fondamentales de la conception hellénistique et romaine de la vie philosophique tirée de l’interprétation de Hadot qui serviront par la suite de lignes directrices pour l’exploration de ces thèmes chez Wittgenstein : la subordination du discours philosophique au mode de vie éthique, la conversion philosophique comme transformation individuelle, l’askesis comme méthode de conversion philosophique, l’idéal de sagesse comme visée éthique de la conversion philosophique et le modèle analogique de la thérapeutique philosophique. Dans le deuxième chapitre, nous examinons comment Wittgenstein peut nous aider à penser la question de la subordination du discours philosophique au mode de vie éthique. En premier lieu, il apparaît que le discours philosophique peut avoir la fonction éthique d’exprimer un certain vouloir. Plus précisément, les valeurs fondamentales, en relation avec un contre-vouloir (besoins, tendances, désirs, sentiments) à la base de préconceptions cristallisées dans des images captivantes, forment un caractère philosophique particulier et orientent implicitement les différentes conceptions que le philosophe, par l’usage de sa volonté, fait le choix d’exprimer par le biais du discours philosophique. En second lieu, le discours philosophique peut avoir la fonction éthique de générer de bonnes habitudes de vie, c’est-à-dire de produire un effet éthique sur les comportements que nous adoptons et les actions que nous posons de façon répétée. En effet, certains arrangements conceptuels, s’ils sont en accord avec l’éthique telle qu’elle est vécue dans les pratiques effectives de la forme de vie humaine, jettent un éclairage sur notre mode de vie éthique, en fonction de la conception du bonheur que nous valorisons, de façon à ce que nous puissions orienter nos actions habituelles en ce sens. Le troisième chapitre vise à mettre à profit la contribution de Wittgenstein à la question du discours philosophique comme outil de transformation individuelle conçue selon le modèle de la conversion philosophique. En premier lieu, il semble que le discours philosophique peut opérer une conversion de la volonté, synonyme d’une conversion à soi, et qui désigne l’arrachement à l’égard d’un certain vouloir inauthentique, indissociable d’un contre-vouloir au fondement de la pensée exprimée par le langage, pour revenir à un vouloir authentique qui coïncide avec le domaine qui est propre au sujet éthique que nous sommes. En second lieu, la fonction éthique du discours philosophique peut également s’exprimer à travers la visée éthique de la conversion qui peut être conçue comme un idéal asymptotique et philosophique de bonheur au sens de paix ou d’absence de trouble fondé sur une éthique de la finitude, de la liberté et de l’authenticité comportant une dimension transpersonnelle. Le quatrième chapitre aborde la conception wittgensteinienne de la méthode philosophique à partir de la question du discours philosophique comme askesis. En premier lieu, le discours philosophique peut avoir ici une fonction éthique lorsqu’il est utilisé pour opérationnaliser une méthode de conversion consistant en un ensemble de techniques discursives pratiquées de façon répétée en vue d’adopter une attitude éthique. En second lieu, cette fonction peut être thérapeutique dans la mesure où la méthode de conversion peut être conçue à partir du modèle analogique de la thérapeutique philosophique, c’est-à-dire à partir d’une conception implicite ou explicite de la maladie, de la thérapie et de la santé philosophiques telle qu’en témoigne la thérapeutique holistique du langage qu’il semble possible de tirer de la pensée du second Wittgenstein. / The purpose of this study is to examine Ludwig Wittgenstein’s contribution to the issue of the ethical and therapeutic function of philosophical discourse in the light of the model of philosophical life of Pierre Hadot, exemplified by the Stoic model, and in which this function is central. The whole study consists of four chapters. The first chapter aims to highlight and analyze the five basic components of the Hellenistic and Roman conception of philosophical life drawn from the interpretation of Hadot which will then serve as guidelines for the exploration of these themes in Wittgenstein’s thought : the subordination of philosophical discourse to the ethical way of life, philosophical conversion as personal transformation, askesis as a method of philosophical conversion, the ideal of wisdom as ethical aim of philosophical conversion and the analogic model of philosophical therapy. In the second chapter, we examine how Wittgenstein can help elucidate the issue of subordination of philosophical discourse to the ethical way of life. First, it appears that philosophical discourse can have the ethical function to express a certain will. Specifically, core values, in connection with a counter-will (needs, tendencies, desires, feelings) underlying preconceptions crystallized in captivating images, form a particular philosophical character and implicitly determine the different conceptions that the philosopher, by the use of his will, makes the choice to express through philosophical discourse. Second, philosophical discourse can have an ethical function to generate good habits, that is to say, to produce an ethical impact on the behaviors that we adopt and the actions that we take repeatedly. Indeed, some conceptual arrangements, if they are in agreement with the effective practices of the human form of life, shed light on our ethical way of life, according to the conception of happiness that we value, so that we can orientate our habitual actions consequently. The third chapter aims to build on Wittgenstein's contribution to the question of philosophical discourse as a tool for personal transformation based on the model of philosophical conversion. First, it seems that philosophical discourse can give rise to a conversion of the will, synonymous with a conversion of the self to itself, which refer to the tearing away from a certain inauthentic will, inseparable from a counter-will at the foundation of thought expressed through language, to return to an authentic will that coincides with the domain that is specific to the ethical subject that we are. Second, the ethical function of philosophical discourse can also be expressed through the ethical aim of conversion that can be seen as an asymptotic and philosophical ideal of happiness as peace or absence of disturbance based on an ethics of finitude, freedom and authenticity with a transpersonal dimension. The fourth chapter discusses Wittgenstein's conception of philosophical method through the question of philosophical discourse as askesis. First, philosophical discourse here can have an ethical function when used to operationalize a conversion method consisting of a set of discursive techniques used repeatedly in order to adopt an ethical attitude. Second, this function can be therapeutic in that the conversion method can be elaborated through the analogic model of philosophical therapy, that is to say, as an implicit or explicit conception of disease, of therapy and philosophical health as evidenced by the holistic therapy of language it seems possible to draw from the second period of Wittgenstein’s thought. / Réalisé en cotutelle avec L'École des hautes études en sciences sociales de Paris

Réalisé en cotutelle avec L'École des hautes études en sciences sociales de Paris / Le but de cette étude est de tirer profit de la contribution de Ludwig Wittgenstein à la question de la fonction éthico-thérapeutique du discours philosophique à la lumière du modèle de la vie philosophique de Pierre Hadot, dont le modèle stoïcien nous sert de cas de figure, et au sein duquel cette fonction occupe une place centrale. L’ensemble de l’étude est composé de quatre chapitres. Le premier chapitre vise à faire ressortir et analyser les cinq composantes fondamentales de la conception hellénistique et romaine de la vie philosophique tirée de l’interprétation de Hadot qui serviront par la suite de lignes directrices pour l’exploration de ces thèmes chez Wittgenstein : la subordination du discours philosophique au mode de vie éthique, la conversion philosophique comme transformation individuelle, l’askesis comme méthode de conversion philosophique, l’idéal de sagesse comme visée éthique de la conversion philosophique et le modèle analogique de la thérapeutique philosophique. Dans le deuxième chapitre, nous examinons comment Wittgenstein peut nous aider à penser la question de la subordination du discours philosophique au mode de vie éthique. En premier lieu, il apparaît que le discours philosophique peut avoir la fonction éthique d’exprimer un certain vouloir. Plus précisément, les valeurs fondamentales, en relation avec un contre-vouloir (besoins, tendances, désirs, sentiments) à la base de préconceptions cristallisées dans des images captivantes, forment un caractère philosophique particulier et orientent implicitement les différentes conceptions que le philosophe, par l’usage de sa volonté, fait le choix d’exprimer par le biais du discours philosophique. En second lieu, le discours philosophique peut avoir la fonction éthique de générer de bonnes habitudes de vie, c’est-à-dire de produire un effet éthique sur les comportements que nous adoptons et les actions que nous posons de façon répétée. En effet, certains arrangements conceptuels, s’ils sont en accord avec l’éthique telle qu’elle est vécue dans les pratiques effectives de la forme de vie humaine, jettent un éclairage sur notre mode de vie éthique, en fonction de la conception du bonheur que nous valorisons, de façon à ce que nous puissions orienter nos actions habituelles en ce sens. Le troisième chapitre vise à mettre à profit la contribution de Wittgenstein à la question du discours philosophique comme outil de transformation individuelle conçue selon le modèle de la conversion philosophique. En premier lieu, il semble que le discours philosophique peut opérer une conversion de la volonté, synonyme d’une conversion à soi, et qui désigne l’arrachement à l’égard d’un certain vouloir inauthentique, indissociable d’un contre-vouloir au fondement de la pensée exprimée par le langage, pour revenir à un vouloir authentique qui coïncide avec le domaine qui est propre au sujet éthique que nous sommes. En second lieu, la fonction éthique du discours philosophique peut également s’exprimer à travers la visée éthique de la conversion qui peut être conçue comme un idéal asymptotique et philosophique de bonheur au sens de paix ou d’absence de trouble fondé sur une éthique de la finitude, de la liberté et de l’authenticité comportant une dimension transpersonnelle. Le quatrième chapitre aborde la conception wittgensteinienne de la méthode philosophique à partir de la question du discours philosophique comme askesis. En premier lieu, le discours philosophique peut avoir ici une fonction éthique lorsqu’il est utilisé pour opérationnaliser une méthode de conversion consistant en un ensemble de techniques discursives pratiquées de façon répétée en vue d’adopter une attitude éthique. En second lieu, cette fonction peut être thérapeutique dans la mesure où la méthode de conversion peut être conçue à partir du modèle analogique de la thérapeutique philosophique, c’est-à-dire à partir d’une conception implicite ou explicite de la maladie, de la thérapie et de la santé philosophiques telle qu’en témoigne la thérapeutique holistique du langage qu’il semble possible de tirer de la pensée du second Wittgenstein. / The purpose of this study is to examine Ludwig Wittgenstein’s contribution to the issue of the ethical and therapeutic function of philosophical discourse in the light of the model of philosophical life of Pierre Hadot, exemplified by the Stoic model, and in which this function is central. The whole study consists of four chapters. The first chapter aims to highlight and analyze the five basic components of the Hellenistic and Roman conception of philosophical life drawn from the interpretation of Hadot which will then serve as guidelines for the exploration of these themes in Wittgenstein’s thought : the subordination of philosophical discourse to the ethical way of life, philosophical conversion as personal transformation, askesis as a method of philosophical conversion, the ideal of wisdom as ethical aim of philosophical conversion and the analogic model of philosophical therapy. In the second chapter, we examine how Wittgenstein can help elucidate the issue of subordination of philosophical discourse to the ethical way of life. First, it appears that philosophical discourse can have the ethical function to express a certain will. Specifically, core values, in connection with a counter-will (needs, tendencies, desires, feelings) underlying preconceptions crystallized in captivating images, form a particular philosophical character and implicitly determine the different conceptions that the philosopher, by the use of his will, makes the choice to express through philosophical discourse. Second, philosophical discourse can have an ethical function to generate good habits, that is to say, to produce an ethical impact on the behaviors that we adopt and the actions that we take repeatedly. Indeed, some conceptual arrangements, if they are in agreement with the effective practices of the human form of life, shed light on our ethical way of life, according to the conception of happiness that we value, so that we can orientate our habitual actions consequently. The third chapter aims to build on Wittgenstein's contribution to the question of philosophical discourse as a tool for personal transformation based on the model of philosophical conversion. First, it seems that philosophical discourse can give rise to a conversion of the will, synonymous with a conversion of the self to itself, which refer to the tearing away from a certain inauthentic will, inseparable from a counter-will at the foundation of thought expressed through language, to return to an authentic will that coincides with the domain that is specific to the ethical subject that we are. Second, the ethical function of philosophical discourse can also be expressed through the ethical aim of conversion that can be seen as an asymptotic and philosophical ideal of happiness as peace or absence of disturbance based on an ethics of finitude, freedom and authenticity with a transpersonal dimension. The fourth chapter discusses Wittgenstein's conception of philosophical method through the question of philosophical discourse as askesis. First, philosophical discourse here can have an ethical function when used to operationalize a conversion method consisting of a set of discursive techniques used repeatedly in order to adopt an ethical attitude. Second, this function can be therapeutic in that the conversion method can be elaborated through the analogic model of philosophical therapy, that is to say, as an implicit or explicit conception of disease, of therapy and philosophical health as evidenced by the holistic therapy of language it seems possible to draw from the second period of Wittgenstein’s thought.

Submitted by William Justo Figueiro (williamjf) on 2015-07-17T22:15:39Z No. of bitstreams: 1 31c.pdf: 2212020 bytes, checksum: bda4619f2d24eee5876f4cf308042ea6 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2015-07-17T22:15:39Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 31c.pdf: 2212020 bytes, checksum: bda4619f2d24eee5876f4cf308042ea6 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-06-30 / CAPES - Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / PROSUP - Programa de Suporte à Pós-Gradução de Instituições de Ensino Particulares / Parte da filosofia contemporânea propõe um discurso amplamente teórico e distante dos problemas da existência humana. Em sua origem, além de amor à sabedoria, a filosofia, em parte, era uma escolha de vida filosófica, entretanto, tal função da filosofia foi relegada, em nome de uma busca cada vez mais teórica e desprovida dos anseios próprios do ser humano que se propõe a filosofar. O objetivo principal desta dissertação é propor a filosofia como postura existencial, como uma propedêutica à busca do saber e da virtude, e sua implicação na própria existência humana. A dissertação apresenta-se em três capítulos, revisitando três diálogos platônicos. O primeiro capítulo propõe (a) uma interpretação do Filebo de Platão, explicitando que a tese principal do diálogo é a busca do bem na vida humana, através de uma espécie de dialética existencial própria do filósofo, que permite que este faça escolhas que o torne melhor, através de uma opção por uma vida mediana, mista entre prazer e saber; e (b) a interpretação do Filebo por Gadamer, a partir de sua tese de habilitação, que não só corrobora nossa proposta e enfatiza o fator dialético deliberativo como define os momentos ontológicos que se apresentam nos momentos do Dasein, isto é, que asseguram o percurso em busca do bem na existência humana. O segundo capítulo apresenta (a) uma interpretação do Sofista de Platão, de modo que, se o primeiro capítulo enfatizava o modo como age o filósofo em busca da boa vida, o segundo enfatiza quem é o filósofo e como este se define, via negativa, por meio das definições do sofista e seu modo de ser; e (b) uma interpretação a partir das preleções de Heidegger sobre o Sofista, enfatizando a metodologia hermenêutica de interpretar Platão à luz de Aristóteles, a interpretação fenomenológica e a ênfase no Dasein e na existência do filósofo e a correspondência do discurso autêntico em comparação ao modo de existência sofístico e o discurso inautêntico, descomprometido com seu modo de ser. O terceiro capítulo apresenta (a) uma interpretação do Alcibíades I, no qual abordamos a fundamentação de nossa dissertação, a saber, da filosofia compreendida como um cuidado de si e uma forma de prática que reestrutura a existência do filósofo; (b) a recondução do Alcibíades I, através da incorporação de Foucault — nas teses de sua filosofia tardia —, que enfatiza a filosofia como práticas de si, pelas quais o sujeito se compreende, se relaciona com a verdade e busca tornar sua existência mais autêntica; e (c) as contribuições da tese de Hadot, a quem Foucault deve sua inspiração e quem primeiro desenvolveu a noção de filosofia como exercício espiritual, a partir das tradições platônica e pós-platônica, como algo prático, uma conversão de si. Como conclusão, apresentamos uma reintrodução da filosofia contemporânea repensada a partir das práticas da filosofia grega, interligando os três diálogos, seus comentadores e apresentando uma filosofia mais ligada à existência do filósofo. / Part of contemporary philosophy proposes a broadly theoretical discourse and distant of the issues of human existence. In its origin, despite love of wisdom, philosophy was partly a choice of philosophical life, however, this function of philosophy was relegated on behalf of a life within theory and increasingly deprived from the pursuits of human being who intends to philosophize. The main objective of this dissertation is to propose philosophy as existential stance, as a propaedeutic to the search for knowledge and virtue, and its implication on the very human existence. The dissertation presents itself into three chapters, revisiting three platonic dialogues. The first chapter proposes (a) an interpretation of Plato’s Philebus, emphasizing that the main thesis of that dialogue is to seek the good in human life, through a kind of philosopher’s own existential dialectic, which allows him to make choices that makes him better through an option for a median life, mixed between pleasure and knowledge; and (b) the interpretation of the Philebus by Gadamer, from his habilitation thesis, which not only corroborates our thesis and emphasizes the dialectical deliberative factor, but determines ontological moments that present themselves in moments of Dasein, i.e., ensure the course in searching for the good in human existence. The second chapter presents (a) an interpretation of Plato’s Sophist, so that if the first chapter has emphasized the way the philosopher acts searching for the good life, the second emphasizes who the philosopher is and how he is defined, via negativa, by the definitions of the sophist and his way of being; and (b) an interpretation from Heidegger’s lectures on the Sophist, emphasizing the hermeneutic methodology of reading Plato through the Aristotelian categories, the phenomenological interpretation and the stress on Dasein and the way the philosopher behaves and the correspondence of his authentic discourse compared to the sophist’s way of existence, and his inauthentic discourse, uncommitted to his way of being. The third chapter introduces (a) an interpretation of Plato’s Alcibiades I, in which we approach the core of our dissertation, namely, of philosophy understood as a care of the self and a way of practice that rebuild the philosopher’s existence; (b) the reconduction of Plato’s Alcibiades I, through Foucault’s incorporation—in his late philosophical thesis—, which highlights philosophy as practices of the self, by which the subject comprehends himself, creates a relationship with the truth and tries to turn his own existence more authentic; and (c) the contributions of Hadot’s thesis, whom Foucault owes his inspiration and who first developed the notion of philosophy as a spiritual exercise, since platonic and post-platonic traditions, as something practical, a conversion of the self. In conclusion, we present a reintroduction of contemporary philosophy, rethought since the Ancient Greek philosophical practices, interconnecting the three dialogues, its commentators and presenting a philosophy much more related to the philosopher’s existence.

En prenant le contre-pied des méthodes généralisées et universalisantes d’évaluation mondiale des institutions de la science, la présente thèse décrit les savoirs générés par le discours universitaire au moment de leur mise à l’épreuve de validation par des instances d’évaluation d’un espace localisé. Le cadre d’observation est le système d’évaluation en vigueur au Cameroun qui sert de dispositif de promotion sociale des enseignants-chercheurs, et de légitimation du travail universitaire. Le décryptage des formes de savoirs produits en situation d’évaluation endogène prend appui sur l’épistémologie historique et l’archéologie foucaldienne des discours. Les résultats de l’analyse montrent que le savoir produit, s’inscrivant dans une temporalité discursive est anonyme et marqué historiquement, culturellement et géographiquement. Ce savoir appartient en outre à un réseau de discours qui dépasse la seule sphère des universités et des disciplines. Les mécanismes et stratégies d’élaboration des savoirs sont soumis à des règles et à des normes qui elles-mêmes produisent de manière permanente des formes de pouvoir. Les référents théoriques et méthodologiques mobilisés dans ce travail participent à l’enrichissement des cadres de référence traditionnels des sciences de l’information et de la communication. / In addition to the general and universal evaluation methods of scientific instituions, this thesis describes knowledge generated by university discourse during validation by local authorities. The framework of experience is the evaluation system in force in Cameroon which serves as social promotion for university lecturers and researchers and legitimizes university work. Deciphering forms of knowledge produced in an endogenous evaluation system is based on historical epistemology and Foucaldian archeology of discourse. The results of the analysis show that knowledge produced falls within the purview of discursive temporality and is anonymous and geographically, culturally and historically marked. It belongs moreover to a network of discourse which goes beyond the lone sphere of universities and disciplines. Knowledge generation mechanisms and strategies are subject to rules and standards which themselves permanently produce forms of power. The theoretical and methodological referents mobilised in this work contribute to the development of traditional frames of information and communication sciences

<p>   </p> <p>Motivated by the lack of research that has explored the rhetorical structure of research articles in the humanities, this dissertation analyzes professional philosophical discourse using move-analysis as an approach. A corpus of 60 research articles was compiled from some of the leading philosophy journals. The articles were selected from three sub-disciplinary areas: (a) metaphysics and epistemology, (b) the history of philosophy, and (c) ethics. To analyze the articles, a move analysis codebook was developed, which identified the rhetorical functions (i.e., moves and steps) that different text segments played. The codebook was then applied to the entire research article structure of the 60 research articles. Linguistic features of certain functional units were also identified via corpus analysis techniques. The results of the study show that rhetorical structure of philosophical writing is distinctive compared to other fields and disciplines. On one hand, at the macro level, philosophical writing uses a problem-solution structure rather than the IMRD (intro-methods-results-discussion) structure, common in the social and natural sciences. At the move and step level, philosophical writing heavily relies on evaluation to critically analyze solutions to philosophical problems. Finally, the dissertation found systemic rhetorical functions that permeated the entire research article. Most notably, philosophers heavily qualify and outline their arguments throughout the text. </p> <p>  </p>