This work aims to pursue the roots and sources of intentionality. Intentional structure of consciousness is the very core of Edmund Husserl's phenomenology and plays the main role since his Logical investigations. The problem of intentionality is complicated and complex and resonates through the Husserl lifelong work Our starting point is Husserl's late work Erfahrung und Urteil. The reason why we choose this work is twofold. First, this work shows the thoughts which result from the life long investigation of problematics. And the second reason is, this work hasn't been the subject of examination as much as Husserl's earlier works so far. The key to our work is the perspective in which every phenomenon shows. That's the reason, why we follow intentionality in three perspectives, which gradually uncovers itselves. The first perspective is the descent from acts of judgment to the original layers of intentionality. This brings us to the second perspective, which is the instinctive intentionality. This is the subject of following part of our work. The exposing of instinctive intentionality underlines the role of embodiment. The importance of embodiment in regard to intentionality is the final perspective. We investigate this with help of Maurice Merleau-Ponty Phenomenology of perception. This will...

RÉSUMÉ EN ANGLAIS / ENGLISH SUMMARY : The Simultaneity of the Incompossible as the Index of the Vertical Being in the Philosophy of M. Merleau-Ponty The principal field of investigation of this paper is the late philosophy of Maurice Merleau-Ponty in the form the author gave it in his lectures during the nineteen-fifties and in the project of The Visible and the Invisible. More accurately, the goal is to clarify the relationship between what this author calls "vertical" Being and the aspect of reciprocal exclusivity, or incompossibility, of the segments of the field through which we have access to it. This structural characteristic is studied principally on the levels of the perception, our relationships with the others, the language and other human institutions. First, the author of the paper elucidates what he think is the reference point of this ontological philosophy, that is to say the concept of visibility. By means of an interpretation of the three fundamental structures of the visibility, the visible, the invisible, and the vision (voyant), the author demonstrates the profound ontological unity of the element of the visibility. The concept of the "institution" (Stiftung, institution) is then introduced to demonstrate how the field of the visibility is internally organized in a manner that surpasses...

”Chock” är reaktionen på Francis Bacons måleri som såväl konstnären som kritiker och betraktare återkommer till. Hans uttalade ambition att orsaka en chock direkt i nervsystemet fick honom att medvetet gillra fällor som avses slå igen i exakt rätt ögonblick hos betraktaren innan denne hinner intellektualisera kring hans verk. Den här uppsatsen syftar till att undersöka hur han gillrade dessa fällor och varför de fungerar. Den fenomenologiska förklaringsmodellen av en upplevelse grundar sig i att kunskapen och erfarenheterna lagrar sig i betraktarens kropp snarare än i dess sinne och används här som beskrivande teori för att åskådliggöra hur Bacons verk upplevs i kroppen. Maurice Merleau-Ponty och Gilles Deleuze studier i fenomenologi inom konsten ligger till grund för hur detta resonemang förs. Francis Bacons arbetsmetoder, som delvis baseras på förvrängningar och bearbetningar av fotografier, har påvisats av Katharina Günther i hennes arbete med att katalogisera Bacons kvarlåtenskap och belyser i uppsatsen hans medvetna strategi att skapa anatomiska asymmetrier. Dessa påverkar i sin tur exponeringsprocesser i vår hjärna som resulterar i den chock som Bacon avsåg, vilket de två neurobiologerna Semir Zeki och Tomohiro Ishizu visar i sin studie som förklaras i uppsatsen.

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Ce mémoire traite du problème de la spécificité méthodologique de la phénoménologie critique. Cette dernière, depuis que Guenther en a forgé l’expression, a connu une effervescence remarquable qui est marquée par l’unité de sa visée : extirper la phénoménologie de sa posture contemplative pour en faire un instrument de critique sociale. Or en dépit du caractère distinctif de ce but, déterminer précisément ce qui distingue la phénoménologie critique de sa contrepartie classique demeure un problème d’envergure. En effet, la réponse d’abord formulée par Guenther, selon laquelle la phénoménologie critique procèderait à une subversion radicale de la méthode classique, s’est attirée plusieurs critiques. Contre une telle solution qui considère la méthode comme le critère fondamental de la distinction entre les approches phénoménologiques classique et critique, nous défendons dans le présent mémoire la thèse de l’unité méthodologique des deux approches par-delà leurs visées respectives. Plus précisément, nous reprenons à notre propre compte la position d’Oksala selon laquelle c’est le rejet de la réduction eidétique – soit la visée d’identification de structures universelles au sein de l’expérience consciente – qui constitue le critère fondamental de distinction de la phénoménologie critique vis-à-vis de l’approche classique. Cependant, contrairement à Oksala, nous soutenons que l’abandon d’une telle visée au sein de l’approche critique ne constitue pas une subversion de la méthode classique. Nous argumentons, d’une part, que la réduction eidétique demeure effectivement possible au sein de la phénoménologie classique et, d’autre part, que la poursuite d’une telle fin ne mine pas sa complémentarité avec la phénoménologie critique. Pour ce faire, nous déployons deux stratégies argumentatives. La première, plus succincte, consiste à répondre directement aux objections formulées par Oksala en ce qui a trait à l’insuffisance de la variation imaginative comme mode d’accomplissement de la réduction eidétique. La seconde, plus extensive, consiste à appliquer une analyse, en phénoménologie critique, d’un champ émergent de la phénoménologie contemporaine, soit la phénoménologie des normes perceptuelles. L’argument permet de démontrer qu’une analyse critique du rôle transcendantal des structures sociales relativement à l’expérience vécue des normes perceptuelles est parfaitement compatible avec l’identification de la forme eidétique de ces normes. / This master’s thesis addresses the problem of the methodological specificity of critical phenomenology. Since Guenther coined the term, critical phenomenology has experienced a remarkable effervescence marked by the unity of its aim: to extricate phenomenology from its contemplative posture and turn it into an instrument of social critique. But despite the distinctiveness of this aim, determining precisely what distinguishes critical phenomenology from its classical counterpart remains a major problem. Indeed, the answer formulated by Guenther, according to which critical phenomenology proceeds to a radical subversion of classical method, has attracted several criticisms. Against such a solution, which regards method as the fundamental criterion for distinguishing between classical and critical phenomenological approaches, this thesis recognizes a methodological unity between the two approaches which supercedes their respective aims. Specifically, I adopt Oksala's position: it is the rejection of eidetic reduction - the aim of identifying universal structures within conscious experience - that constitutes the fundamental criterion for distinguishing critical phenomenology from the classical approach. However, unlike Oksala, I argue that the rejection of such an aim within the critical approach does not constitute a subversion of the classical method. On the one hand, eidetic reduction remains effectively possible within classical phenomenology. On the other hand, the pursuit of such a goal does not undermine its complementarity with critical phenomenology. To demonstrate this, I employ two argumentative strategies. First, I respond directly to Oksala's objections regarding the inadequacy of imaginative variation as a mode of accomplishing the eidetic reduction. Secondly, I apply a critical-phenomenological analysis to an emerging field of contemporary phenomenology, namely the phenomenology of perceptual norms. The aim of this approach is to show that a critical analysis of the transcendental role of social structures in shaping the lived experience of perceptual norms is perfectly compatible with the identification of the eidetic form of these norms.

This dissertation examines the relation between embodiment and language, knowledge and memory, as explored in the poetry of South African poet Gabeba Baderoon. In her three published collections of poetry, namely, The Museum of Ordinary Life, The Dream in the Next Body and A Hundred Silences, she depicts seemingly trivial and everyday events or experiences with acute attention to detail, all of which are connected by her unique portrayal of their embodied nature. In doing so, her work illustrates that intellectual activities typically associated with the mind, such as language, knowledge and memory, in fact require the incorporation of the body. Therefore, this dissertation studies the mind-body relation represented in her work with regard to these thematic concerns, since it is a crucial aspect of her poetry and aids not only in understanding and interpreting her work, but also the discourse on embodiment in general. These concerns do, moreover, not remain on a thematic level, but are evident in her poetry itself; that is, her poems too act as a form of embodiment. Furthermore, Baderoon’s poems are able to transcend the supposed mind-body dichotomy in a way that shows much in common with phenomenology, and especially the perspective held by authors such as Maurice Merleau-Ponty. This dissertation incorporates phenomenological ideas on the body and embodiment, as these assist in interpreting Baderoon’s work, as well as for the reason that her poetry sheds new light upon the understanding of such phenomenological ideas, too. Thus, this dissertation seeks to elucidate the manner in which Gabeba Baderoon’s poetry transcends the mind-body dichotomy by means of her exceptional employment of the notion of embodiment on a thematic as well as formal level. / Thesis (MA (English))--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2012

AL'objectif de cette recherche est une réinterprétation de la pensée esthétique de Maurice Merleau-Ponty visant à la découverte de sa matrice morphologique, c’est-à-dire de sa pertinence et de ses dettes à l’égard la tradition goethéenne et de ses développements dans le domaine de la théorie de l'art et la philosophie de la nature. La thèse est divisée en trois chapitres, dont chacun cherche à mettre l'accent sur les différents aspects de cette filiation morphologique, suivant son développement dans la chronologie de la production merleau-pontienne. Le premier chapitre tente de relier la méthode morphologique et la méthode phénoménologique en évaluant la similarité de leurs contenus esthétologiques. Ce premier chapitre est organisé autour de trois concepts clés de la morphologie, à travers les quels il opère un premier examen de la philosophie merleau-pontienne, depuis ses débuts dans les années Quarante jusqu’à ses résultats ontologiques dans les années Cinquante et les années Soixante: l'ambiguïté de la notion goethéenne de forme nous permet de remonter à la genèse de la philosophie merleau-pontienne de la forme dans La structure du comportement et dans Phénoménologie de la perception; la notion corrélative de symbole permet d'aborder les notions merleau-pontiennes d’idée sensible et matrice symbolique, en les rapprochant à l’Urphänomen de Goethe; la catégorie transversale de style est configuré comme un outil d'enquête des questions morphologiques dans la pensée esthétique de la «nouvelle ontologie» (L’œil et l’esprit [1958] e le Notes de Cours au Collège de France 1958-1959 et 1960-1961). Dans ce chapitre, nous démontrons la confrontation essentielle et constante avec des expériences artistiques (Cézanne, Klee, Rodin, Bazaine et l’Ecole de Paris), convoquées par Merleau-Ponty à l'appui de ses théories esthétologiques. Le chapitre est clôt par un bref appendice sur la question de la fondation “scientifique” de l'esthétique, mis au point par une comparaison entre Merleau-Ponty et Konrad Fiedler. Cette annexe ouvre en même temps le champ de recherche du deuxième chapitre: en fait, compte tenu de la contribution à l'esthétique fournie par la psychologie et la physiologie de la perception, la thèse se plonge dans l'analyse de la voie gestaltiste de la dette merleau-pontienne de la morphologie. Le deuxième chapitre suit le passage qui porte – au sein de la production merleau-pontienne des années Cinquante – d’une philosophie de la forme à une philosophie de l’expression et il fournit la reconstruction de celle qui apparaît comme une véritable esthétique de l’expression et du mouvement. Cette recherche se fonde sur l’analyse attentive de l’inédit Le monde sensible et le monde de l’expression, actuellement conservé dans le Département de Manuscrits Occidentaux de la Bibliothèque Nationale de France et correspondant à la préparation du Cours du Jeudi tenu par Merleau-Ponty au Collège de France dans l’année académique 19952-1953. Le travail d’analyse de l’inédit nous a permis d’évaluer, en plus des inhérences déjà confirmées de l’esthétique merleau-pontienne à la Gestalttheorie (Köhler, Koffka, Wertheimer, Guillaume), une autre comparaison théorique capitale – et assez méconnue -, c’est-à-dire celle avec Viktor Von Weizsäcker par rapport les relations entre la perception et le mouvement. Le troisième chapitre se concentre sur la phase ontologique de la pensée merleau-pontienne, celle qui correspond à la production tardive de Merleau-Ponty et brusquement interrompue par sa mort prématurée en 1961. Central, dans ce troisième chapitre, est la reconstruction du destin de la notion de Gestalt dans Le visible et invisible, qui présente la novelle ontologie de la chair et un contexte philosophique complètement reformé par rapport aux écrits merleau-pontiens des années Quarante. Les paragraphes centraux de ce dernier chapitre se concentre - à travers une comparaison avec des auteurs étroitement liée à Merleau-Ponty - etc / The aim of this project is to provide an alternative reading of Merleau-Ponty’s aesthetics by discovering its morphological matrix and its debts towards the Goethean tradition and towards its developments in the field of art theory and the philosophy of nature. The dissertation is divided into three chapters, each of which seeks to focus on different aspects of the morphological roots of phenomenological aesthetics, in order to follow its developments in the Merleau-Ponty’s production. The first chapter is an attempt to relate morphological method and phenomenological method by evaluating the similarity of their aesthetological contents. This initial chapter is organized around three key concepts of morphology, through which it operates a first screening of merleaupontian philosophy, from its beginnings in the Forties up to its ontological outcomes during the Fifties and the Sixties: the ambiguity of Goethe's notion of form allows us to reconstruct the genesis of the philosophy of form in Merleau-Ponty’s Structure of Behavior and Phenomenology of Perception; the related concept of symbol helps us to realte Merleau-Ponty’s notions of idée sensible and symbolic matrix to Goethe’s Urphänomen; the transversal category of style is configured as a tool for investigation of the morphological issues in the aesthetic thought of the merleaupontian "new ontology". In this chapter we also demonstrate the crucial importance of constant confrontation of Merleau-Ponty with artistic experiences (such as Cézanne, Klee, Rodin, Bazaine and the Ecole de Paris), convened by the philosopher in support of his aesthetological theories. The chapter ends with a brief appendix on the question of the scientific foundation of aesthetics, developed through a comparison between Merleau-Ponty and Konrad Fiedler. This appendix opens simultaneously the search field of the second chapter: in fact, considering the contributions to the aesthetics provided by psychology and physiology of perception, the dissertation goes into the analysis of the role of the Gestalttheorie in Merleau-Ponty’s morphological debt. The second chapter follows the evolution of a theoretical passage in Merleau-Ponty’s production of the Fifties - from a philosophy of form to a philosophy of expression – ending up in the reconstruction of what seems to be a complete aesthetic of expression and of movement. This part of the research project is based on the deep analysis of an unpublished document (Le monde sensible et le monde de l'expression) - currently preserved at the Bibliothèque National de France - corresponding to the lectures given by Merleau-Ponty in the biennium 1952-1953 at the Collège de France. The work of analysis of the document was to assess, in addition to already confirmed inherences of Merleau-Ponty’s aesthetics to Gestalt psychology (Köhler, Koffka, Wertheimer, Guillaume), another crucial theoretical comparison of those years, the one with Viktor von Weizsäcker on the relations between perception and movement. The chapter closes with an appendix which tries to pick up the threads of the contributions to aesthetics theories that Merleau-Ponty develops within his philosophy of nature; this appendix embodies the attempt to read Merleau-Ponty’s aesthetics in terms of philosophy of morphogenesis and productivity The third chapter concentrates on the late ontological phase of Merleau-Ponty’s production - corresponding to the years between 1958 and 1961 - abruptly interrupted by his early death. Central, in this third chapter, is the reconstruction of the fate of the concept of Gestalt in the framework of the text The visible and the invisible, that is structured within the newly formed ontology of the flesh and on the background of a completely reformed philosophical landscape. The central paragraph of this chapter concentrate, through a comparison with two authors closely related to Merleau-Ponty - etc

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Made available in DSpace on 2015-04-14T13:55:24Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 459289.pdf: 904643 bytes, checksum: 494bba68668b2082672ac959477f8cff (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-06-26 / The text of the Phenomenology of inclusiveness characterizes itself as a new work in the area of phenomenology. Seeking phenomenological sources in Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, and Waldenfels, the text attempts to develop inclusiveness in order to contemplate the inclusive/exclusive paradox and, moreover, to show its efficacy in measuring the inclusive scope of any ethical theory ever developed. From Husserl, we find the basis for a phenomenology of inclusiveness, which was put forth in his Krisis. In order to solve the constitutive paradoxes, Husserl nurtures the idea of an inclusive basis. Such inclusiveness is characterized by a latent reflective attitude, an attitude of inclusion in the lifeworld, an attitude of not closing our thesis, and, finally, an attitude that avoids the reductionism of the subjective and objective poles. With the radicality of thought from Merleau-Ponty, the text presents support for a complicity of meaning. Now, the subject sees his/herself as complicit in his/her relationship with the liveworld thus withdrawing the heavy burden that previously was placed solely on the subject as the ultimate endower of all meaning. The constitutive process entails a radical attitude that enables an incarnate inclusiveness, conveying the inclusive scope to the horizontality of life. However, as Waldenfels investigated the progress of ethical theory, he added an ethical-practical character to the constitutive dimension. Waldenfels emphasized an inevitable response before any thesis, due to our being in the world, as an event that just happens, regardless of our will or objectivications. Such responsiveness promotes the threshold of the senses as a responsive ethical possibility. In response itself, we find a responsive content that is not objectified, guiding us to the thresholds, considering them as possibilities and not as threats. For Waldenfels, what was previously excluded from the established order appears at the threshold, providing inclusive opportunities. After these considerations, the text reveals an inclusiveness which is open, latent, included in the lifeworld, non-reductionist, complicit in the constitutive process, and has an ethically responsive character. Although the studied authors do not work directly with the theme of inclusiveness, we examine sufficient sources to propose a method of phenomenology that demonstrates inclusivity, i.e., that is phenomenologically inclusive. Although the method is neither a measure nor a foundation, nevertheless it provides a base that serves as the measure and foundation of all morality ever built. Thus, we can measure the inclusive scope of all ethics and see how far the inclusivity extends, but yet not present inclusivity as the determinative basis. The foundation of the base is phenomenological, i.e., predicted within the latency and horizontality of the lifeworld / O texto Fenomenologia da inclusividade se caracteriza por ser um novo trabalho na ?rea da fenomenologia. Buscando fontes fenomenol?gicas em Husserl, Merleau-Ponty e Waldenfels, o texto procura desenvolver uma inclusividade capaz de contemplar o paradoxo inclusivo/exclusivo e, indo al?m, mostrando-se eficaz para medir o escopo inclusivo de qualquer tese ?tica j? elaborada. A partir de Husserl, encontramos as bases para uma fenomenologia da inclusividade, que fora trabalhada em sua obra Krisis. Buscando resolver os paradoxos constitutivos, Husserl nutre a ideia de um fundamento inclusivo. Tal inclusividade se caracteriza por uma atitude reflexiva latente, uma atitude de inclus?o no mundo-da-vida, uma atitude de n?o fechamento de nossas teses e, por fim, uma atitude que evite o reducionismo dos polos subjetivo e objetivo. Com a radicalidade do pensamento de Merleau-Ponty, o texto encontra subs?dios para uma cumplicidade de sentido. Agora, o sujeito se v? c?mplice de toda significa??o em sua rela??o com o mundo-da-vida. Retira-se o pesado fardo que antes era concedido t?o somente ao sujeito como doador ?ltimo de todo o significado. O processo constitutivo enseja uma atitude radical que habilita uma inclusividade encarnada, avultando o escopo inclusivo ? horizontalidade da vida. Todavia, investigando os avan?os da teoria ?tica de Waldenfels, acresce-se, ? dimens?o constitutiva, um car?ter ?tico-pr?tico. Waldenfels enfatiza uma inevit?vel resposta dada antes de qualquer tese decorrente de nosso estar no mundo como um evento que simplesmente acontece, independente de nossa vontade ou objetifica??es. Tal responsividade promove a fronteiriza??o dos sentidos como possibilidade ?tico-responsiva. Na pr?pria resposta encontramos um teor responsivo n?o objetivado, guiando-nos ?s fronteiras, considerando-as como possibilidade e n?o como amea?as. Para Waldenfels, o que antes era exclu?do da ordem estabelecida aparece junto ao limiar, facultando possibilidades inclusivas. Feitas estas considera??es, o texto revela uma inclusividade aberta, latente, inclu?da no mundo-da-vida, n?o reducionista, c?mplice nos processos constitutivos e possuindo um car?ter ?tico-responsivo. Embora os autores estudados n?o trabalhem diretamente com o tema da inclusividade, obt?m-se fontes suficientes para elaborarmos uma fenomenologia com uma proposta inclusiva. O m?todo proposto ? fenomenol?gico inclusivo. Entretanto, apresenta-se como uma medida, como um fundamento que n?o ? nem uma medida nem um fundamento. Mas, mesmo assim, serve como medida e fundamento de toda a eticidade j? constru?da. Dessa forma, podemos medir o escopo inclusivo de toda eticidade, ver at? onde se estende sua inclusividade, mas sem se apresentar como um fundamento determinativo. O fundamento ao qual nos pautamos ? fenomenol?gico, ou seja, previsto dentro da lat?ncia e horizontalidade do mundo-da-vida