In the wake of atrocities arising from internal armed conflicts in the 1990s, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty introduced the Responsibility to Protect doctrine (“R2P”) as a solution to reconcile the notion of state sovereignty with the need to protect citizens. The lack of available protection for internal armed conflicts and the subsequent evolution of the humanitarian intervention debate facilitated the unanimous acceptance of R2P’s fundamental principles by all UN member states. This paper examines the development of the R2P doctrine and its current status as customary law. By identifying its inadequacies, the paper raises questions of the doctrine’s viability in fulfilling the emerging norm of the collective responsibility to protect. In order to remedy these shortfalls and ensure the doctrine’s effectiveness, the paper argues the need to incorporate post-conflict investigatory mechanisms into the R2P.

In the wake of atrocities arising from internal armed conflicts in the 1990s, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty introduced the Responsibility to Protect doctrine (“R2P”) as a solution to reconcile the notion of state sovereignty with the need to protect citizens. The lack of available protection for internal armed conflicts and the subsequent evolution of the humanitarian intervention debate facilitated the unanimous acceptance of R2P’s fundamental principles by all UN member states. This paper examines the development of the R2P doctrine and its current status as customary law. By identifying its inadequacies, the paper raises questions of the doctrine’s viability in fulfilling the emerging norm of the collective responsibility to protect. In order to remedy these shortfalls and ensure the doctrine’s effectiveness, the paper argues the need to incorporate post-conflict investigatory mechanisms into the R2P.

By comparing the post-conflict reconstruction patterns of Cyprus and Sri Lanka, it is possible to evaluate what was or was not effective in the Cyprus case and how these lessons may be applied to Sri Lanka. Considering the underlying similarities of the two islands’ respective conflicts, the focus determining the best course of action for Sri Lanka, so that it does not face the same stalemate situation as Cyprus. The recommended policy contrasts with the consociationalist models proposed for Cyprus, and is instead based on the unique Basque model of autonomy.

The purpose of this study was to analyze and compare the agonistic behaviors and reconciliation in captive and free-ranging Formosan macaques (Macaca cyclopis). The dominance style of Formosan macaques was compared with long-tailed, rhesus and Japanese macaques. I have used scan, focal sampling and ad libitum on aggressions of adult macaques. I have recorded post-conflict (PC) focal samplings on victims and compared those with matched control (MC) focal samplings. Agonistic behaviors had significantly higher frequency in captive than in free-ranging Formosan macaques. The frequencies of hostile and submission were significantly higher in captive than in free-ranging Formosan macaques. The captive adult females of higher rank had higher frequency of threat and hostile, and lower frequency of submission. Threat was the most frequent aggression (52-72%) expressed by both the captive and free-ranging adult monkeys. The victims in captive and free-ranging Formosan macaques usually submitted immediately after aggression (82-89%). The proportion of counter aggression in captive and free-ranging Formosan macaques were relative low (9-16%). The aqerage conciliatory tendency for adult Formosan macaques was 14.3% to 19.6%. The affiliative contacts in PC and MC in captive and free-ranging Formosan macaques were striking that both preferred grooming. The Formosan macaques significantly reconciled more during PC than MC period both in captive and free-ranging conditions. In addition, both had significantly more attracted than dispersed PC-MC pairs. The conciliatory tendencies in captive and free-ranging Formosan macaques were similar regardless of kin and non-kin partners. This study indicated that Formosan macaques were close to the macaques of Fascicularis group. Therefore, Formosan macaques had a despotic dominance style as suggested by Phylogenetic hypotheses.

Following the war in Kosovo in 1999, the international community embarked on the most extensive international peace- and state-building project to date. From the early UN administration of Kosovo until the end of 'supervised independence' in 2012, various international organisations played a critical role in shaping the post-war polity. Throughout this engagement, the international community was driven by normative commitments to multi-ethnicity. However, while international organisations were committed to making Kosovo 'multi-ethnic', lack of clarity prevailed about what this goal entailed, or why it was so important. The thesis seeks to answer two inter-related questions: what was meant by multi-ethnicity on the part of its proponents, and what explains the prominence of commitments to this idea. Taking the form of three sections, the thesis examines these commitments' origins, manifestations, and explanations. International normative commitments to multi-ethnicity are found to originate in a shifting conception of the relationship between ethnic diversity and legitimate statehood during the twentieth century. Their manifestations in Kosovo are studied in three policy domains: the return of displaced persons, decentralisation of government to the local level, and minority rights. The thesis finds that international efforts in the pursuit of multi-ethnicity in Kosovo exhibited conflicting notions of multi-ethnicity, which shifted from integrationist ambitions to notions that reconciled the reality of segregation between ethnic groups on the ground through a 'politics of recognition'. The goal of multi-ethnicity remained, but was transformed. Explanations for the commitments to multi-ethnicity are found in both normative and consequentialist considerations, by uncovering unspoken underlying assumptions, and in the identity and self-image concerns of international actors. These findings indicate the power of the normative environment in shaping the actions of international organisations and provide insights into the thus far under-theorised normative dimension of the international state-building project in Kosovo.

Background: Iraq is a higher middle-income country with a GDP of $223.5 billion (as of 2014). In the 1970s and 1980s, an extensive network of primary, secondary and tertiary health facilities was built, and the country recorded some of the best health indicators in the Middle East. However, two decades of conflict (both inter- and intra-state), sanctions and poor planning have reversed many of the previous gains. In the aftermath of the 2003 war, the government of Iraq introduced a Basic Health Services Package (BHSP) with a user fee component. International actors often advocate BHSPs as a means of rapidly scaling-up services in health systems that are devastated by conflict. User fees have also been promoted as a way of raising revenue to enhance the financial sustainability of healthcare systems in such contexts. While Iraq is a conflict-affected state, it has retained an extensive healthcare infrastructure and has a ministry of health with considerable financial and administrative capacity. In such a context, the introduction of a BHSP is a notable and distinctive feature of health policy in this setting, and the process through which this occurred have not yet been examined. Aim: To explore the processes through which the BHSP was conceived and designed in Iraq. It compares Iraq’s BHSP with similar policies in other post-conflict settings. It examines the roles of domestic and external actors and models in the policy’s conception and design. It explores the preferences of internal and external actors about the financing of service delivery through user fees. The study also examines the extent of policy transfer in the formulation of Iraq’s BHSP. Methodology: The thesis utilises a qualitative case study approach, incorporating analysis of semi-structured elite interviews and documents. Twenty Skype, phone, and face-to- face interviews were conducted between January 2013 and August 2014. Interviewees included former ministers of health, directors of departments of health, academics and officials at donor agencies, bilateral and multi-lateral bodies and consultancies. Documents included 47 official government publications, evaluations, reports, policy briefs and assessments. Literature review: A search of the literature on health policy making in post-conflict and fragile settings identified three key gaps in existing evidence; first, there is a dearth of published work examining health policy in post-conflict Iraq. Second, the literature focuses mainly on the impact of policy action in post-conflict contexts, largely neglecting the processes through which those policies are introduced. Third, while the literature concentrates on the roles of external actors, it pays limited attention to the role of domestic actors and politics. Results: Iraq’s BHSP shares commonalities with the other selected countries (Uganda, Afghanistan, and Liberia) in its primary aims, influential actors, interventions included or excluded, and financing principles. However, Iraq’s BHSP also aims at broader, and longer-term, structural reform, while the BHSP in other countries is often motivated by short-term objectives. The MoH in Iraq also appears to assume a prominent role in this case relative to others. Also, Iraq’s BHSP includes a greater number of interventions compared to the other countries. The Iraq war of 2003 offered the opportunity for wide-ranging structural change in the healthcare system. External actors, especially the WHO, were influential in advocating for a BHSP drawing on the recent experience of a similar initiative in what was in some ways the similar context of Afghanistan. However, the removal of former politicians and the emergence of internal policy actors with considerable technical and financial capacity allowed the domestic authorities to debate, dispute and challenge the recommendations of external actors. Relatedly, some of the internationally distinctive features of the BHSP in Iraq, including user fees, are similar to those that exist elsewhere in the health system. Most interviewees agreed that the BHSP was a means of enhancing financial sustainability and that it would help to enhance efficiency by targeting resources at population health need. The BHSP, according to some, represented the categories of healthcare that the government should finance, while allowing the private sector to meet demand for other services. However, many domestic actors supported the introduction of user fees as part of the BHSP. Several external actors either distanced themselves from this decision or declared no position, claiming that this was properly a matter for the government of Iraq. Discussion: While the BHSP’s ‘label’ is new in the context of Iraq, its substantive content is not. The BHSP can be seen as the outcome of the combination of old (existing) technologies and instruments presented in new (and introduced) ways. The existing health system offered ideas, techniques and processes that were maintained and reproduced even if these were packaged in new ways, to create a policy framework which is genuinely novel. External experts highlighted the idea of the BHSP and provided models (such as Afghanistan) on which the policy could be based. Internal decision-makers, however, were active players in policy formulation, not passive recipients who did not question or modify the policy during the process of transfer. On the contrary, it seems that the latter exerted considerable influence. User fees represent one aspect of that continuity. Ownership of policies by ministries of health in post-conflict is often advocated. However, such involvement introduces the potential for replicating old structures and policies, and may result in a degree of policy incoherence. Policy ideas are likely to change significantly where there is considerable local engagement in policy design and implementation.

Em dezembro de 2012, após treze anos, três mandatos de operações de paz e dois mandatos de missões políticas, a ONU se retirava do território do Timor-Leste de maneira bastante discreta. Fechava-se, naquele momento, um ciclo de participação da Organização na vida política e econômica daquele país, que se iniciara com os episódios de violência de 1999, quando milicianos pró-indonésia tentaram impedir o processo político de autodeterminação do povo timorense. Herdando um país com suas infraestruturas destruídas e mais de um quarto de sua população refugiada ou deslocada internamente, a ONU não apenas pacificou o território como também empreendeu ali um processo de Post-conflict Peacebuilding (PCPB), onde sua participação variou entre o exercício pleno de todos os poderes soberanos atinentes às funções de governo de qualquer Estado ao apoio de assessores altamente especializados em prol do governo independente do Timor-Leste. O balanço final dessa participação é positivo na medida que revela um país com estruturas governamentais consolidadas, formalmente democrático e com boas taxas de crescimento econômico. Por outro lado, o combate à pobreza, a consolidação da pacificação social, a necessidade de maior participação popular na política e a redução da dependência de sua economia em relação ao petróleo seguem sendo desafios não resolvidos e, em grande medida, externalidades provocadas pela própria ONU. / In December 2012, after thirteen years, three mandates of peace operations and two mandates of political missions, the UN withdrew from the territory of Timor-Leste in a rather discreet manner. At that moment, a cycle of the Organization's participation in the political and economic life of that country, which began with the 1999 episodes of violence, occurred when pro-Indonesian militiamen tried to impede the political process of self-determination of the Timorese people. Inheriting a country with its destroyed infrastructure and more than a quarter of its population refugee or internally displaced, the UN not only pacified the territory but also undertook a Post-conflict Peacebuilding (PCPB) process, where its participation ranged from full exercise of all sovereign powers pertaining to the government functions of any State to the support of highly specialized advisers for the independent government of Timor-Leste. The final balance of this participation is positive insofar as it reveals a country with consolidated government structures, formally democratic and good rates of economic growth. On the other hand, the fight against poverty, the consolidation of social pacification, the need for greater popular participation in politics and the reduction of dependence of its economy on oil remain unresolved challenges and, to a large extent, externalities caused by the UN itself.

The defense of human rights in a post-conflict society is a great challenge for any civilized society.The post-conflict in Colombia must be a process that is addressed by the political and legal parameters of the Constitution in force in the country. Nevertheless, to guarantee a model social state of law based on respect for human dignity, work and solidarity of its members and the prevalence of general interest. Second, to provide legal security to the State, civil society and demobilized groups to the latter political and democratically participate in the governance of the state, with the horizon of their actions respect for human rights and thereby ensures that the damage caused to the victims is solved by the Truth, Justice and Reparation. / La defensa de los Derechos Humanos en una sociedad de posconflicto es un gran reto para toda sociedad civilizada. El postconflicto en Colombia se presenta como uno de los últimos ensayos políticos para cerrar brechas de violencia y desigualdad en América Latina. Colombia se presenta como un laboratorio de paz al cabo de setenta años de guerra continua no declarada entre las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (en adelante, FARC) y el ejército colombiano. Las conversaciones de paz de La Habana parecen ir encaminadas a asentar un proceso de paz duradera que está poniendo a prueba los parámetros políticos y jurídicos de la Constitución Nacional vigente en el país de 1991. Sin embargo, para poder garantizar un modelo de Estado Social de Derecho fundamentado en el respeto a la dignidad humana, el trabajo, la solidaridad de sus asociados y la prevalencia del interés general, lo pactado en La Habana tendrá que seguir los lineamientos establecidos en el Derecho Internacional Humanitario, los cuales ya han sido enmarcados ampliamente por la ley y la jurisprudencia de la Corte Constitucional, que, a su vez, han establecido que el respeto de los derechos humanos en una sociedad de posconflicto debe solucionarse con altos y claros estándares de Verdad, la Justicia y Reparación.

[pt] O principal objetivo deste trabalho é discutir e problematizar o modo como a categoria ex-criança soldado vem sendo formada e projetada dentre os discursos do trauma e da resiliência que traduzem o seu prefixo temporal ex por meio certos esquecimentos (temporais e subjetivos) e superação. Desse modo, o ideal para a reintegração social bem-sucedida das ex-crianças soldado está inscrito na possibilidade de superação do passado militar e na projeção de um futuro estável. Além disso, penso ser a relação desta produção temporal entre passado militar traumático e futuro do sujeito resiliente para ex-criança soldado que revela as construções do entendimento de sua categoria no presente como em uma posição de espera. Espera no sentido tanto de aguardo (da criança que espera pertencer ao mundo adulto) quanto de esperança (da ex-criança soldado que espera ser resiliente). De outro lado, questionando a produção do tempo como linear, junto com a relação, essencialmente, opositora entre os discursos do trauma e da resiliência, pretendo refletir sobre as (des)continuidades temporais entre a categoria (ex-) criança soldado, o envolvimento militar e o (pós-) conflito, que marcam seus desenhos temporais difusos. Assim, o parêntese que guarda o prefixo ex traduz uma forma de abranger as múltiplas temporalidades que coexistem nas histórias e estórias das (ex-) crianças soldado e bagunçam com a noção moderna da infância e do conflito armado. A categoria (ex-) criança soldado e sua posição temporal confusa, portanto, incomoda certos binarismos, como: adulto e criança; guerra e paz; público e privado, etc. / [en] The central aim of this work is to discuss and problematize the way that the former child soldier category has been formed and projected into the trauma and resilience discourse, translating the temporal word former through certain forgetfulnesses (temporal and subjective) and overcoming. The ideal plan for the successful social reintegration of former child soldiers lies in the possibility of overcoming the military past and of projecting a stable future. Besides, I think that the relation of this temporal production between military and traumatic past and the future of the resilient subject reveals the constructions for understanding the former child soldier category in the present as in a waiting position. The waiting position, in this sense, refers to the Portuguese word espera, which means both wait (the child who waits to become an adult) and hope (the former child soldier who hopes to be resilient). On the other hand, I intend to think about the temporal (des)continuities among the (former) child soldiers, the military involvement and the (post-) conflict, which define the category s diffuse temporal drawing, by questioning the linear production of time and the mainly oppositional relation between the trauma and the resilience discourses. Thus, the parentheses in the word former translate a manner of embracing the multiples temporalities which coexist inside the (former) child soldiers stories and mess up the modern notion of childhood and armed conflict. On that account, the former child soldier category and its confused temporal position are able to disturb some binarisms, such as adult and child; war and peace; public and private, etc.

After more than 50 years of internal armed conflict, Colombia has entered into a stage of postconflict after a peace agreement was signed in 2016. This process will be challenging for the country, as the conflict has created increased poverty and segregation as well as a lack of opportunities for those that have been affected by the conflict. This thesis collects perceptions of international humanitarian actors working in the Colombian context, and their perception on how humanitarian action can be used to strengthen the Colombian post-conflict process. Through a theoretical standpoint of Institutionalization Before Liberalization (IBL) theory by Roland Paris (2004), the findings were collected. Key findings include the need to recognize the humanitarian needs in Colombia despite the conflict ending, the importance of building knowledge in society about the peace agreement and make room for transition of experience and knowledge from the humanitarian field to the government and development actors. Analysing the findings, it shows that Colombia’s current peace transition would be furthered by strengthening the nation’s institutions and making long-term strategies on how to create electoral and societal systems that would unite and reconcile the population. It also shows that while the IBL theory is applicable to the Colombian post-conflict process, it fails to capture educational components that are deemed essential by the interviewed organizations. The thesis concludes that humanitarian organizations should be viewed as pivotal actors for the implementation of the Colombian peace agreement and that the Colombian government and international donors needs to put aside long-term resources and time to create a post-conflict society that will foster guarantees of the armed conflict not returning to Colombia.