Which grand strategies do Great Powers adopt towards rising challengers? When do Great Powers conciliate their potential rivals, and when do they opt for strategies of containment? In this master’s report, I outline an argument to answer these and related questions. I add to the existing literatures on grand strategy and power transitions in several key respects. First, I model power shifts between Great Powers as contests over access to externally located benefits rather than as contests over power for its own sake. Second, I emphasize the weight of domestic politics in shaping states’ preferences over the apportionment of these benefits. Third, I highlight the role of diplomacy in determining whether established Great Powers choose to conciliate or else contain potential rivals. Empirically, I provide four vignettes of Great Power responses to rising states: the United States’ strategy towards Japan during the Cold War; Britain’s appeasement of the United States, 1890-1914; the United States’ containment of the Soviet Union under Ronald Reagan; and Britain’s containment of Wilhelmine Germany. / text

This case study traced the American reaction to Chinese activities in Africa from the year 2000 to the present. Two keys to understanding how this reaction might unfold were power-transition theory, which predicts that rising states will challenge the hegemon in an international system in order to revise the rules, and status-based competition theories. The U.S. appeared delayed in reacting to competition in Africa from its rising challenger there, China, until it understood that competition to be status-based. A clear, progressive reaction on the part of American leaders was traced. First, there was a split between the reactions of members of Congress and diplomats on-the-ground, who were concerned about China in Africa around the year 2005, and leaders in the White House and State Department, who publicly denied there was any kind of problem. White House and State Department leaders’ reaction then grew somewhat as relative gains concerns were activated by economic and power losses in Africa. These leaders then engaged in quiet diplomacy with China and Africa, perhaps to try to socialize China and to moderate its less favorable activities. The U.S. at this time did not seem to be fully aware of the status threat China was presenting. However, in about 2011, the U.S. appears to have begun to perceive the status losses it had sustained in Africa. Through policy changes, discourse, summitry and public diplomacy, including social media, leaders launched what appeared to be a public campaign, designed to position the U.S. as opposed to the values of China, and as a better partner for Africans. This can be seen as status competition because the U.S. had little to gain economically in Africa and its domestic public remained unconcerned with Africa. Loss of status appears to have motivated the U.S. to take action when nothing else had, inspiring policy changes vis-a-vis Africa, the first-ever U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit, two presidential trips to Africa, and a public diplomacy campaign designed to showcase American strengths.

本研究主要探討中國如何介入中東地區，並且檢視其多重戰略操作現況，其中包括了安全議題、能源議題、以及經貿議題。透過中國藉由上述議題介入中東事務的發展，本研究期望能呈現中國的中東外交政策及其未來發展趨勢。本研究以中國與美國兩強是否會在中東地區發生權力轉移的可能作為研究問題，有鑑於此，本研究以AFK Organski的權力轉移理論作為全文的概念化基礎，並且重新檢視權力轉移理論在近年來的發展與實踐。就此，本研究將回應下列幾個問題:中國的中東外交政策之主要戰略目的為何?此一政策在中國全方位外交政策中的權重與定位為何?中國與中東國家的交往及雙邊關係中，所具備的優勢與劣勢為何?從結構層次來說，中國與美國在中東是否將達到權力平衡的局面?最後，中國是否滿意現階段自身在中東的地位以及中東地緣政治本身的現況?又或者中國傾向改變中東現狀，並且有意取代美國。本研究透過對上述問題的重新檢視，發現如果中國在中東所介入的勢力與議題越廣泛，並且以挑戰美國霸權為前提全力推進中國的中東介入政策，這意味著中東的現狀與規則將會被調整與改變，進而產生權力轉移的情況。不過，中國現階段並未有意、有能力挑戰美國在中東的戰略地位，因為這將使得中國與美國的結構性矛盾導向衝突。 / This study aims at examining the different aspects of China’s involvement in the Middle East: security, energy and economy, in the context of its evolving foreign policy and changing international status. The main question of the research is whether a power transition between the US and China is possible in the region of the Middle East. Hence. The power transition theory developed by AFK Organski in the 1950s is the basis of this research. The main question is answered by several secondary questions: What is China's foreign policy in the Middle East, and how does it combine into its overall foreign policy; What are the strong points as opposed to the weak points of China's relations with Middle Eastern countries; Is China on the course of achieving parity with the US in the region of Middle East? And the last one, is China satisfied with its current role in the Middle East and the regional existing order, or it would like to alter it in order for it to be able to replace the US as the hegemonic power in the area. If China is indeed becoming more powerful in the area and is challenging the American hegemony, the transformation of the current order and accepted rules of the games in the region could be changed to accommodate China’s needs, and this might lead to tension between China and the US or even conflicts.

This study uses defensive realism, offensive realism and power transition theory (PTT) in order to examine the great powers’ grand strategies in the Arctic region, aiming to recontextualise the security theatre in the Arctic as a reflection of the return of great power politics and the end of Arctic exceptionalism, and to examine the explanatory power of the different strands of realism on the great power behaviour identified in their Arctic strategies. The study is conducted using qualitative content analysis and utilises Jacob Westberg’s theorisation of grand strategies through the categories of context, ends, means and ways as analytical framework, to which the theoretical framework is applied. The result shows that realism is a suitable theory for predicting great power behaviour in the Arctic, where PTT provides the strongest explanatory power; that the dichotomy between hard and soft security is eroding; and that the strategies were highly context-dependent, thus rendering generalisable results difficult to discern.