This study was performed to examine the performance of an equity based crowdfunding campaign, as well as seeking to describe the risks, complications and the opportunities that this kind of funding brings. The study was conducted by an empirical case study of a company that was about to initiate an equity based crowdfunding campaign. The conclusion is that the planning of an equity based crowdfunding campaign is time consuming and requires knowledge in many different areas. Therefore it is important to identify in which areas skills and resources already are available within the company, and where it must be obtained through a learning process. The report also highlights that equity based crowdfunding, because of legal restrictions surrounding the issue of unlisted shares, can not be marketed as other types of crowdfunding. This leads to the conclusion that those who invest in equity based crowdfunding do not necessarily belong to the crowd that crowdfunding is generally associated with. Arguments can be made that this crowdfunding model rather resemble traditional angel networks. A technical study was also made about the company's products. The result of the technical study can be used by customers to get a clearer understanding of the company's products, but also by the company itself as a good insight into how their products work in practice and to develop the existing products.

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Corruption is a major cause and result of poverty around the globe. It arises at all levels of society, from national governments and military to small businesses and sports. Corruption affects all elements of society in some way as it undermines democracy and economic growth as well as the environment and people’s health. The main purpose of this thesis is to examine if corruption has a significant effect on economic growth in developing countries. The empirical analysis is conducted with a regression analysis, using data from recognized institutions. Other variables that can affect GDP per capita growth are also examined such as the level of democracy, fertility rate, life expectancy, education and the Initial GDP per capita to test for conditional convergence. In our main model, the empirical results show that corruption does not have a significant effect on economic growth but this is basically due to that the model exhibits multicollinearity. In our second model, where we omitted the variables Democracy, Initial GDP and Life expectancy, we found that corruption has a significant, negative effect on economic growth. This is in accordance with previous empirical results which hold that more corruption in a nation leads to less economic growth.

The principal-agent problem is an important model in the field of Economics of Information. In this thesis we study only a particular type of principal-agent problem which is called moral hazard model and by the principal-agent problem we mean it is moral hazard model. The moral hazard model actually belongs to the class of bilevel programming problems in Mathematics. In Economics. the first order approach is used to reduce the principal-agent problem to a single level optimization problem. However, this approach is only valid under some strong conditions. Moreover the approach can only be used under the assumption that the optimal action of the principal-agent problem and its relaxed problem appears only at an interior point. In this thesis, we consider a new relaxed problem. Under more general assumptions. we can solve the principal-agent problem without restricting the optimal action of the agent to be in the interior.

Managing public forestland is a challenging enterprise as the government must steward the actions of private forest companies while simultaneously considering public values, natural disturbance, markets, revenue generation and environmental services. Governments use timber sales, volume-based, and area-based tenures to delegate forest harvesting activities to individual timber companies. By delegating forest management, government must wisely navigate the principal-agent relationship to avoid unexpected outcomes. However, the agents’ response is often overlooked despite the likelihood that the agents may possess company-centric financial motivations. The British Columbia context, where the government is facing the aftermath of a catastrophic mountain pine beetle epidemic, provides a fruitful location for the study of the principal-agent dilemma. If forest companies share a future forest focus with the government, such that agents respond with actions that lead to the government’s first best outcome, the government could reduce policy analysis to an examination of the tradeoff between short-term revenue generation and sustainable differentiated product supply. But review of the silviculture funding mechanism reveals that the very regulatory mechanism used to achieve government’s results may affect the future forest estate by reducing the amount of salvage once the value of the forest is degraded below the cost to harvest and regenerate it. Relying primarily on harvest-based silviculture funding, the principal is shown to forego a 20 per cent increase in forest growth in the study area by not using the agents’ forestry expertise to improve the long term productive potential of the forest. A bi-level linear programming model is developed to merge the goals of government with the behavioural responses of the two predominant volume-based tenures used in BC. Results show that the government’s choice of harvest level, timber price and tenure instrument in recognition of agent response is the only way to achieve the government’s forest stewardship objective. Treating each element in isolation neglects the nature of the institutional system and will result not only in unintended outcomes, but very likely, policy failure. / Graduate

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The aim of this paper is twofold: 1) to examine the determinants of residential energy expenditures and compare them on a regional level; and, 2) attempt to identify and measure the effect of possible principal-agent (PA) problems on residential energy efficiency in Austria. The results of this paper are partially based on findings from a master's thesis, which focused more directly on the PA problem. This paper expands on those results to include regional aspects in energy expenditures. A conditional demand model is regressed on a large number of variables representing housing characteristics, socioeconomic factors, occupancy type, and regional characteristics sourced from the EU Statistics on Income and Living Conditions dataset. The analysis indicates that significant regional differences exist in the determinants of residential energy expenditures and that PA problems appear to be an unimportant factor in energy efficiency in Austria, even at the regional level. The paper concludes with some possible explanations as to why this is the case.

Energy policy in the European Union (EU) is a patchwork of diverging interests and preferences. While the European Commission pushes for a common energy policy, Member States are responsible for their own separate energy policies. These divergences in interests and preferences might create a conflict situation between the Commission and Member States. This thesis explores the Commission’s behaviour vis-à-vis the Member States, investigating the conditions under which the Commission is likely to try to deviate from Member States’ preferences in the external dimension of the EU internal energy market. Adopting a Principal-Agent Model (PAM), this thesis conceptualizes the Member States as principals and the Commission as their agent. A qualitative case study approach and process-tracing method are applied to appreciate the variety of preferences of the actors involved, and provide a means to study the various shades of post-delegation agent’s behaviour. This thesis looks at four in-depth case studies: 1) Decision 994/2012 on establishing an information exchange mechanism with regard to intergovernmental agreements between Member States and third countries in the field of energy; 2) Directive 2009/73/EC on common rules for the internal market in gas; 3) Energy Community Treaty; and 4) Energy Charter Treaty. These were selected based on their relevance to the research question. Findings suggest that two factors are likely to affect the Commission’s deviation from Member States’ preferences: a) the preference alignment among the principals and b) the preference alignment between the principals and the agent. This thesis suggests that when the preferences between the agent and the principals are heterogeneous, the agent is more likely to deviate from the preferences of the principals. This thesis also suggests that the preference alignment among the principals only has a secondary effect on the agent’s deviation. Finally, this research contributes to the further development of the PAM offering a possible categorisation of post-delegation agent’s behaviour going beyond the dichotomy of deviation and non-deviation.

This study argues that the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy is a constrained agent of Europe’s foreign policy. The 2009 Lisbon Treaty reform created the remodelled version of the High Representative of the Union as a potentially powerful agent to represent and coordinate Europe’s foreign policy. However, the analysis shows how and why the member states granted only limited discretion to the new foreign policy actor during the first years of the post’s existence. The aim of the study is to reveal the conditions of discretion of the High Representative. With the use of a principal-agent (PA) approach, the study shows that conflicting preferences of the member states, tight control mechanisms, as well as inadequate cooperation with the European Commission limited the High Representative’s room for manoeuvre. The findings suggest that the PA approach can be developed further in the future in order to better explain limited discretion of agents in matters of foreign policy. Based on the findings, the study also puts forward a number of characteristics of a ‘constrained agent’. It is suggested that the post of High Representative has the potential to emancipate from its status of a constrained agent over time, and to gain credibility as a foreign policy actor.

China’s state-led finance to overseas projects becomes increasingly important, represents a growing financial trend among emerging market economies, and leads to the puzzle: to what extent are state-owned (policy) bank driven by state or by its own interest. The project compares China’s practice of overseas energy finance with Japan – a well-studied case of state-supported development – to highlight the characteristics of Chinese public financiers and integrate their practice into development theories. The project speaks to three major development theories: the market model, in which banks pursue profit; the state model, in which banks are commanded by state; and the interest group model, in which conflicting goals clash in the repeating game between stakeholders. The project argues that banks balance their self-interest and state assignments depending on the regulator-bank and bank-client bargains. In the project, the first research article compiles publicly available data on policy bank loan and calculates the influence of various determinants on loans granted by policy banks. The findings are that Chinese and Japanese banks are driven by both profit and non-market goals and tend to invest in recipients with high risks. Going beyond large-N statistical modeling, the second article uses archives and interviews to investigate to what extent do investment in risky projects are driven by state goals. The article develops an interest-group bargaining model, in which the analysis focuses on four sets of actors in the process of project formation, crisis emergence, and resolution/or lack of resolution. While projects with innate high risk are often considered as economic diplomacy, evidences suggest the projects are mostly driven by recipient governments and for-profit banks. The third, and final, research article relies on elite interviews and archival analysis to investigate the domestic politics of policy bank regulation and the formation of loan policies. Between China and Japan, the article formulates two different institutional structures that govern the effectiveness of policy bank regulation. In Japan, the structure is vertical, with paired ministry-bank regulations. In China, the institutional structure is more like umbrella-shaped joint regulation. This leads to more interactions between the leading regulator and banks and occasionally more efficient policy implementation.