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International crimes prosecution case selection : the ICC, ICTR, and SCSLMahony, Christopher January 2013 (has links)
International crimes prosecutions have become more common since 1993, both domestically and at international courts and tribunals. The advance of this norm confronts realist state interests causing debate about the norm's status. Kathryn Sikkink views a norm as cascading when enough states adopt it to cause international influence, without domestic pressure, to procure levels of conformity. This thesis considers the degree of conformity by observing the level of case selection independence to determine whether this norm is cascading. By identifying the jurisdictional and functional elements of case selection independence, I develop a framework for observing the interface between politics and law. While Sikkink errs towards the quantity of international crimes prosecutions, I focus on the quality. This project examines case selection independence at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the International Criminal Court, in Uganda. The project considers whether case selection has become more or less independent at these courts - whether the norm of international crimes prosecution has cascaded or contracted. In observing the various case selection independence elements I attempt to explain the observed cascades and contractions at each court. I then consider whether a cascade or contraction occurred during the period of the courts' collective design and function. The research qualitatively observes a cumulative justice contraction. The research observes a combination of factors affecting case selection independence, including shifts in power dynamics between and among weak and powerful states, increasing state sophistication in international court engagement, a shift in jurisdiction triggering actors and forums, and realist state co-option of norm entrepreneurs via endearing explanation of independence-diminishing policies.
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Le principe de complémentarité entre la cour pénale internationale et la juridiction pénale nationale / The principle of complementarity between the international criminal court and the national criminal jurisdictionAshnan, Almoktar 16 June 2015 (has links)
L’objet de cette recherche est d’analyser le principe de complémentarité, de montrer la spécificité de la notion et d’en étudier la mise en œuvre à la lumière de la pratique de la Cour Pénale Internationale (CPI) afin de mettre en évidence les obstacles juridiques et politiques. Selon l’article 1er du Statut de Rome, la Cour est complémentaire des juridictions pénales nationales pour le crime de génocide, les crimes contre l’humanité, les crimes de guerre et le crime d’agression. Dans le cadre de ce principe, les juridictions nationales ont la priorité mais la compétence de la Cour prend le relais lorsqu’un État ne dispose pas des moyens techniques ou juridiques nécessaires pour juger et punir les auteurs desdits crimes ou bien s’il mène un procès truqué. Dès lors, le régime de complémentarité vise à mettre fin à l’impunité à l’égard des personnes impliquées dans les crimes les plus graves qui touchent l’ensemble de la Communauté internationale. Le Statut de Rome, notamment par les dispositions de son article 17, indique comment mettre en œuvre la complémentarité selon les critères de recevabilité qui sont l’incapacité, le manque de volonté et la gravité. Les articles 18 et 19, pour leur part, fournissent le mécanisme de décision préjudicielle sur la recevabilité et la contestation. Par ailleurs, le rôle du Conseil de sécurité face à la complémentarité est aussi considéré comme un élément essentiel pour bien comprendre l’effectivité et l'impact juridique de cette Cour. En effet, les pouvoirs que le Statut de Rome et le chapitre VII de la Charte des Nations Unies confèrent au Conseil lui permettent de saisir la CPI, de suspendre son activité, d’imposer aux États de coopérer avec la Cour, ou encore de qualifier un acte de crime d’agression, et ceci bien que l'indépendance de l’enquête et du procès soit l’épine dorsale de toute la justice pénale, si celle-ci veut être efficace. / The purpose of this research is to analyse the principle of complementarity, to show the specific character of the notion and to study its implementation in the light of the practice of the International criminal court (ICC) in order to highlight the political and legal obstacles. In accordance with Article 1, the Court is complementary to national criminal jurisdictions for crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and crime of aggression. Under this principle, national jurisdictions have priority over ICC but the Court’s jurisdiction takes over when a State lacks the technical or legal means, which are necessary to try and punish the perpetrators of such crimes, or if a rigged trial took place. Therefore, complementarity aims to bring an end to impunity for those responsible for the most serious crimes of international concern. The Rome Statute, namely with the provisions of Article 17, indicates how to implement complementarity according to the criteria for admissibility which are inability, unwillingness and seriousness. Articles 18 and 19, for their part, provide the mechanism of preliminary ruling regarding admissibility and challenge. Furthermore, the role of the Security Council regarding complementarity is also considered as essential to understand the effectiveness and the legal impact of this Court. Powers which are conferred under the Rome Statute and chapter VII of the United Nations Charter allow the Security Council to refer a situation to the ICC, to suspend an ICC investigation, to require States to cooperate with the ICC, or to qualify a crime as aggression, and this despite the fact that the independence of the investigation and of the trial is the backbone of criminal justice ensuring it is efficient.
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