Tendo em vista o pluralismo religioso e a importância política que as tradições religiosas e as comunidades de fé assumiram nos últimos anos, essa dissertação se dedica ao estudo do conceito moderno de tolerância a partir da interpretação pós-secular de Jürgen Habermas, a qual toma como base a concepção enunciada por Rainer Forst. Tal conceito tem papel de destaque na formação deliberativa da vontade de cidadãos que desejam reconhecer-se como iguais em sociedades marcadas por uma profunda diversidade cultural. O desafio foi, diante do multiculturalismo das sociedades modernas pluralizadas e secularizadas, identificar um procedimento capaz de atender à exigência que se impõe com o fato do pluralismo - um conceito de justiça eticamente neutro - sem, contudo, que isto se desse à custa do desrespeito às minorias religiosas e culturais. A reflexão acerca da tolerância e das dificuldades de sua realização nas sociedades contemporâneas tomou, em grande parte do estudo, o ponto de vista da diversidade religiosa e do crescente papel que a religião desempenha na esfera pública. / Considering the religious pluralism and the political significance that religious traditions and communities of faith have taken recently, the subject of this dissertation is the modern concept of toleration, starting from the post-secular perspective of Jürgen Habermas, which takes as its basis the conception enunciated by Rainer Forst. Such a concept plays a major role in the deliberative will-formation of citizens who wish to recognize themselves as equals in societies characterized by a deep cultural diversity. The challenge has been, in face of the multiculturalism of secular and pluralized modern societies, to identify a procedure capable of meeting the requirement that is imposed by the fact of pluralism - an ethically neutral concept of justice - without, however, disregarding religious and cultural minorities interests. The reflection on toleration took, most of the time, the point of view of the religious diversity and of the increasing role played by religion in the public sphere.

Tendo em vista o pluralismo religioso e a importância política que as tradições religiosas e as comunidades de fé assumiram nos últimos anos, essa dissertação se dedica ao estudo do conceito moderno de tolerância a partir da interpretação pós-secular de Jürgen Habermas, a qual toma como base a concepção enunciada por Rainer Forst. Tal conceito tem papel de destaque na formação deliberativa da vontade de cidadãos que desejam reconhecer-se como iguais em sociedades marcadas por uma profunda diversidade cultural. O desafio foi, diante do multiculturalismo das sociedades modernas pluralizadas e secularizadas, identificar um procedimento capaz de atender à exigência que se impõe com o fato do pluralismo - um conceito de justiça eticamente neutro - sem, contudo, que isto se desse à custa do desrespeito às minorias religiosas e culturais. A reflexão acerca da tolerância e das dificuldades de sua realização nas sociedades contemporâneas tomou, em grande parte do estudo, o ponto de vista da diversidade religiosa e do crescente papel que a religião desempenha na esfera pública. / Considering the religious pluralism and the political significance that religious traditions and communities of faith have taken recently, the subject of this dissertation is the modern concept of toleration, starting from the post-secular perspective of Jürgen Habermas, which takes as its basis the conception enunciated by Rainer Forst. Such a concept plays a major role in the deliberative will-formation of citizens who wish to recognize themselves as equals in societies characterized by a deep cultural diversity. The challenge has been, in face of the multiculturalism of secular and pluralized modern societies, to identify a procedure capable of meeting the requirement that is imposed by the fact of pluralism - an ethically neutral concept of justice - without, however, disregarding religious and cultural minorities interests. The reflection on toleration took, most of the time, the point of view of the religious diversity and of the increasing role played by religion in the public sphere.

A tese examina a relação entre justiça e bem nos trabalhos tardios de John Rawls e, em especial, no livro O Liberalismo Político (1991). É argumentado que as mudanças nos trabalhos tardios de Rawls podem ser compreendidas como resultado de uma reorientação em seu pensamento. Rawls redesenhou alguns aspectos de sua filosofia para que ela cumpra um conjunto específico de papéis na cultura política pública das sociedades democráticas. Apesar das mudanças, os trabalhos tardios carregam consigo uma estrutura da relação entre justiça e bem que possui implicações importantes sobre o modo como os cidadãos, ao aceitar princípios políticos liberais, concebem suas doutrinas religiosas, filosóficas e morais a respeito do bem. A tese examina, portanto, como essas mudanças podem ser explicadas como resultado de uma reorientação que carrega consigo consequências relevantes para a relação entre justiça e bem. / This thesis examines the relationship between justice and good in the late works of John Rawls and, especially, in the book Political Liberalism (1991). It is argued that the changes in Rawls\' late work can be understood as as a result of a reorientation in his thinking. Rawls has redesigned some aspects of his philosophy so that it fulfills a specific set of roles in the public political culture of democratic societies. Despite the changes, late work carries with it a structure of the relationship between justice and well which has important implications for the way in which citizens, in accepting liberal political principles, conceive of their religious, philosophical and moral doctrines of good. The thesis examines, therefore, how these changes can be explained as a result of a reorientation that carries with it relevant consequences for the relationship between justice and good.

Made available in DSpace on 2014-08-20T13:17:40Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Mateus_Lima_Dissertacao.pdf: 879099 bytes, checksum: ad58866192d093a371ab045299d11970 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011-08-26 / The aim of this dissertation is to address the justification of public morality through the category of the public reason in John Rawls s theory of justice. With this we seek understand how Rawls operates the objectivity of morality judgments applied to basic structure of society with no resulting in a comprehensive morality. Our concern lies in the thesis of reasonable pluralism avoiding any imposition on individual ethics. We will discuss the way that the category public reason lies on systematic of theory of justice, in a constructivism structure, the moral judgments in the public sphere. Taking as a starting point the conception of publicity in A Theory of Justice, to the investigation of political constructivism in Political Liberalism, the research investigates the kind of rationality appropriate to public space, emphasizing the public role of principles. Later, the research analyzes the conception of public reason itself investigating the role of public reasonableness of the procedure of justification that, pragmatically, it permits a cognitive conception of moral judgment (reciprocity, duty of civility, toleration, social union) through a deliberative democracy whose goal is the stability for right reasons without plead the true as correspondence / O objetivo desta pesquisa é abordar a justificação da moralidade através da categoria de razão pública na teoria da justiça como equidade de John Rawls. Com isso buscamos compreender como Rawls opera a objetividade dos juízos morais aplicados à estrutura básica da sociedade sem implicar numa moralidade abrangente. Nossa preocupação se situa na tese do pluralismo razoável de doutrinas abrangentes evitando qualquer imposição ética na esfera individual. Abordaremos a forma com que Rawls situa a categoria de razão pública na sistematicidade de sua teoria, objetivando os juízos morais na forma de um construtivismo político. Tendo como ponto de partida a concepção de publicidade em A Theory of Justice, até a investigação do construtivismo político no Political Liberalism, a pesquisa investiga o tipo de racionalidade adequada ao espaço público, evidenciando o papel público dos princípios. Posteriormente, a pesquisa analisa a concepção de razão pública propriamente dita, investigando o papel da razoabilidade do procedimento público de justificação que, de forma pragmatista, possibilita uma concepção cognitivista dos juízos morais (reciprocidade, dever de civilidade, tolerância, união social), através de uma democracia deliberativa cujo objetivo é a estabilidade pelas razões corretas sem, contudo, apelar para a verdade tomada como correspondência

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This thesis examines the abilities of constitutional mini-publics to make legitimate constitutions. Legitimacy in this thesis is defined as following the ideal of public reason. It is a quantitative study of the third weekend of the Irish Convention on the Constitution (a constitutional mini-public). They deliberated on and recommended amending the Constitution to allow same-sex marriage. Previous research into the legitimacy of constitutional mini-publics has been limited to studying their form, for example, participant selection or decision-making process. This thesis analyses the content of the deliberation. A series of theme analyses were performed to discover the reasons used. The reasons were categorised as public or nonpublic. The Convention on the Constitution justified all their decisions with public reasons. Showing constitutional mini-publics can make legitimate constitutions based on the ideal of public reason under the right circumstances.

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This study investigates the subject of Muslims’ citizenship in contemporary Western European societies from the viewpoint of John Rawls’s political liberalism, in particular in light of the ‘idea of public reason’ [see John Rawls, Political Liberalism, expanded edition (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005) and the 1997 essay “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” originally published in University of Chicago Law Review 64 (1997), 765-807 and now included in Political Liberalism, expanded edition, 440-490]. By its very nature, political liberalism does not prescribe a single model for being Muslim in contemporary Europe. Thus, one may wonder if it is too vague as a point of departure for the analysis. On the other hand, however, here I argue that political liberalism specifies a peculiar evaluative framework that allows citizens to answer questions such as “What is politically at stake when citizens of Muslim faith are publicly presented as permanent aliens in contemporary European societies?”, “On what grounds is such exclusion based?”, and “What requirements can European citizens be reasonably expected to meet?” in a distinctively political way and, ideally, to solve the political and social problems from which those questions spring. In this research, I claim that public reason provides a common discursive platform that establishes the ground for a public political identity and for shared standards for social and political criticism. Together, these two elements solve the two dimensions of the problem of ‘stability for the right reasons’ (in Rawls’s terms) in contemporary European societies, because they secure both the political inclusion of Muslims on an equal footing as citizens and civic assurance that they will remain committed to fair terms of social cooperation. A joint solution of these two apparently conflicting demands of stability for the right reasons (i.e. inclusion and mutual assurance) requires an effort in political reconciliation. After having compared public reason citizenship with two prominent normative alternatives, I will conclude that the former is an adequate ideal conception of citizenship for European societies. Finally, I will apply the justificatory evaluative methodological framework (whose requirements I will specify starting from the idea of public reason itself) to a conception of citizenship elaborated by one of the most renowned Muslim public intellectuals in Europe: Tariq Ramadan. (I justify the choice of this author in sections 2.3 and 6.1). Such an evaluation sheds light on one of the main insights of this research, that is, the idea that public reason makes a decompression of the public space possible: it frees the public space from those forces that would prevent citizens from the possibility of exercising effectively their two moral powers (once more in Rawls’s words, the ‘capacity for a sense of justice and for a conception of the good’) as free equals. In this sense, public reason tries to reconcile ideal political consensus and the fact of reasonable pluralism on a public political ground. I believe that this is the deepest meaning of what Rawls calls ‘reconciliation through public reason’: its aspiration is to reabsorb reasonable pluralism politically without annihilating it.This research is structured in three parts: the first is methodological, the second is reconstructive, and the third is evaluative. Each part is composed of two chapters.In chapter one (“General Framework”), I begin from some empirical observations about the role of perceptions and identities in relation to the issue of Muslims’ citizenship in contemporary Europe. I claim that from this point of view Islam seems to “make problem” in a very specific sense. This does not mean that Islam is a problem, but that Islam is frequently publicly presented and perceived as a problem. This is the background problem from which my work starts. Thus, I explore some dimensions of such a problem (see 1.1). Subsequently, I provide a more specific formulation of the research problem and questions and of the aims of this study. Then, the main research question (Q) is stated in these terms: Which ideal conception of citizenship should provide the common normative perspective in contemporary Western European societies, which are characterised by both demands of inclusion of Muslims and the need for solving a ‘problem of mutual assurance’ [on which, see in particular Paul Weithman, Why Political Liberalism? On John Rawls’s Political Turn (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010)] concerning citizens’ commitment to shared terms of social cooperation, so that those societies can be stable for the right reasons? In order to answer this question, I also specify three sub-questions that I call respectively Q1, Q2, and Q3 (see 1.2).In chapter two (“Toward a Justificatory Evaluative Political Theory”), I firstly try to frame the problem of public justification within Rawls’s political liberalism (see 2.1). I then consider a specific approach to the question of Muslim citizenship in liberal democracies which can be adopted from a Rawlsian perspective: namely, reasoning from conjecture (see 2.2). Finally, I explain my own approach (which I call justificatory evaluative political theory) by means of comparison with the method of reasoning from conjecture (see 2.3). In presenting the evaluative framework specified from a political liberal standpoint, I point out three political liberal evaluative requirements: the reciprocity requirement (RR), the consistency requirement (CR), and the civility requirement (CiR).Chapter three (“What is Public Reason?”) deals with the history of the notion of public reason from Kant to Rawls and its enunciation within Rawls’s work (see 3.1 and 3.2 respectively). In doing so, I also identify three specifications for the three political liberal evaluative requirements considered in the second chapter. Furthermore, in chapter three I also unpack CR in three different dimensions (PR1, PR2, and PR3).Chapter four (“Public Reason and Religion. Reinterpreting the Duty of Civility”) completes the reconstructive stage by analysing Rawls’s ‘wide view’ of public reason and two major lines of objection to it (see 4.1). After having discussed such criticisms, I then introduce my own interpretation of the ‘proviso,’ which is structured around a two-level (or bifurcate) model of the ‘duty of civility’ (see 4.2).Chapter five (“Reconciliation through Public Reason: Justificatory Evaluative Political Theory between Modelling and Application”) bridges the second and the third part, that is, the reconstructive and the evaluative stage respectively. In the first section of the chapter, I summarise the political liberal evaluative requirements developed in the second part. In doing this, my purpose is to present my justificatory evaluative model of public reason citizenship (see 5.1). In the second section, I firstly argue that a conception of citizenship grounded in public reason is not only possible in existing European societies, but also preferable if compared with alternative conceptions (I consider liberal multiculturalism and Cécile Laborde’s critical republicanism [Cécile Laborde, Critical Republicanism: The Hijab Controversy and Political Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008)]) with reference to the problem under scrutiny in this research. In conclusion, I show that public reason citizenship is able to solve the theoretical problem and the main research question mentioned above: Which ideal conception of citizenship should provide the common normative perspective in contemporary Western European societies, which are characterised by both demands of inclusion of Muslims and the need for solving a problem of mutual assurance concerning citizens’ commitment to shared terms of social cooperation, so that those societies can be stable for the right reasons? In the final part of chapter five, I try to demonstrate that public reason citizenship can both include Muslim citizens and solve the assurance problem because it provides both shared standards for political criticism and a common political identity on the basis of which citizens politically recognise one another as free equals. If my argument succeeds, then public reason citizenship not only could but also should be adopted as the ideal conception of citizenship in European societies (see 5.2).In the sixth chapter (“Tariq Ramadan’s European Muslims and Public Reason”) I apply the evaluative framework based on public reason to the conception of citizenship for Muslims in Europe developed by Tariq Ramadan. (According to a principle introduced in chapter two which I call the “plausibility principle” PP, I argue that Ramadan’s theory of citizenship can be plausibly presented as a “European Muslim” approach to the issue of citizenship, see 6.1). The purpose of such an evaluative work is twofold. Firstly, it aims at examining whether and how the idea of public reason accounts for a version of European citizenship for Muslims coming from Muslims themselves. Secondly, it aims at disclosing whether what such a Muslim conception of citizenship in Europe says about the two dimensions of ‘stability for the right reasons’ of the system of social cooperation (namely, inclusion and ‘mutual assurance’) is consistent with the provisions of public reason citizenship (see 6.2-6.5). / Doctorat en Sciences politiques et sociales / N.B. 1) Le lieu de défense de la thèse en cotutelle est ROME (Luiss Guido Carli)2) L'affiliation du co-promoteur de la thèse en cotutelle (Sebastiano Maffettone) est: LUISS Guido Carli / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished