Human powers of moral reasoning and motivation are fragile. How should citizens committed to the achievement of liberal justice respond to this fact? This dissertation theorises a class of moral requirements that are central to the practice of liberal democracy but have been recently overlooked by political philosophers: the fortificational duties, which enjoin citizens to design and submit to civic practices that improve both their moral reasoning and the motivational resilience of their sense of justice. It considers the proposition that a conception of justice is unjustified if unlikely to generate its own freely willed maintenance, or stability, in the face of human nature, and it argues that this proposition is false. If justice may face overwhelming resistance unless steps are taken to fortify ourselves against our own fallibility, the right response is to pursue precisely such fortification. Chapter One sketches the orienting ideal of the dissertation: an ideal of a social world in which citizens live together as free and equal. Chapter Two assesses the proposition that we ought to modify or abandon this ideal if we determine that it is unlikely to be freely realised without serious civic or institutional assistance—a move suggested by John Rawls’s “stability test”—and it argues that the candidate arguments for this conclusion fail. The chapter instead argues that citizens are subject to moral requirements to fortify their sense of justice by designing and submitting to measures that increase the likelihood that they will accurately identify and freely comply with their fundamental moral duties. These measures together constitute a liberal democracy’s “stability charter.” Chapters Three to Six explore proposed elements of citizens’ stability charter. Chapter Three discusses the fortification of moral reasoning through democratic deliberation. Chapter Four considers what institutional mechanisms could keep democracy oriented toward the achievement of justice despite human fallibility, and it defends a minimalist conception of judicial review as a case study. Chapter Five argues that the practice of criminal punishment is justified by the duties of wrongdoers to pursue additional fortificational measures in the aftermath of their moral powers’ defective operation. And Chapter Six focuses on the special problem posed to the enduring achievement of justice by “unreasonable citizens” who reject fundamental liberal values. The distinctive contribution of the dissertation lies, firstly, in its novel appropriation of the Rawlsian ideal of stability—reconceiving stability not as a justificatory condition set by reason on our convictions, but as a practical challenge that our own convictions set for us—and, secondly, in its deployment of that insight to motivate novel arguments about the character of democratic deliberation, the limits and role of judicial review, the proper purposes of criminal punishment, and the ideal method of engagement with unreasonable citizens.

This thesis is a critique of the prominent strand of contemporary liberal political theory which maintains that liberal political authority must, in some sense, rest on the free consent of those subjected to it, and that such a consensus is achieved if a polity’s basic structure can be publicly justified to its citizenry, or to a relevant subset of it. Call that the liberal legitimacy view. I argue that the liberal legitimacy view cannot provide viable normative foundations for political authority, for the hypothetical consensus it envisages cannot be achieved and sustained without either arbitrarily excluding conspicuous sectors of the citizenry or commanding a consent that is less than free. That is because the liberal legitimacy view’s structure is one that requires a form of consent that carries free-standing normative force (i.e. normative force generated by voluntariness), yet the particular form of hypothetical consent through public justification envisaged by the view does not possess such force, because of its built-in bias in favour of liberalism. I also argue that the liberal legitimacy view is the most recent instantiation of one of two main strands of liberal theory, namely the nowadays dominant contract-based liberalism, which seeks to ground liberal political authority in a hypothetical agreement between the citizens. My case against the liberal legitimacy view, then, contributes to the revitalisation of the other main approach to the normative foundations of liberalism, namely the substantivist one, which legitimates liberal political authority through an appeal to the substantive values and virtues safeguarded and promoted by liberal polities.

Democratic Ethical Life and the Struggle for Recognition: AReconstruction of Hegel’s Inluence on Deliberative Democracy”. Hegel’s politicalphilosophy represents a signiicant contribution to the understanding of moderndemocracy and social dynamics. As regards modern democracy, the concept ofdemocratic ethical life presented by Wellmer allows for the integration of equalsubjective rights and citizen participation in a deliberative culture that illsdemocracy with citizen vitality without going against individual liberties. As forsocial dynamics, they can be explained by the need for reciprocal recognition asthe key to the constitution of subjectivity, which explains the moral motivation inthe struggles of social groups. Both concepts are closely interwoven because thestruggle for recognition allows for an explanation of the dynamics of democraticethical life. Thus, democratic ethical life and the struggle for recognition, asinterwoven concepts, offer two key notions for the solution of some of the obstacleswith which contemporary political philosophy must deal. / La ilosofía política de Hegel ofrece una signiicativa contribución parala explicación de la democracia moderna y de la dinámica social. En el primercaso, el concepto de eticidad democrática, que Wellmer postula, permite integrarderechos subjetivos iguales y la participación ciudadana en una cultura deliberativaque dota a la democracia de vitalidad ciudadana sin violentar libertadesindividuales. En el segundo caso, la dinámica social puede ser explicada a partirde la necesidad de reconocimiento recíproco como clave de la constitución de lasubjetividad, que explica la motivación moral de las luchas de los grupos sociales.Ambos conceptos se encuentran internamente ligados ya que la lucha porel reconocimiento permite explicar la dinámica de una eticidad democrática. Deesta forma, eticidad democrática y lucha por el reconocimiento, en tanto conceptosinternamente ligados, ofrecen dos claves conceptuales para la solución dealgunos de los bloqueos que debe enfrentar la ilosofía política contemporánea.

Pour David Miller, l’inclusion des immigrants implique leur intégration culturelle. Une inclusion simplement politique sans ancrage culturel embrouille l’arrière-plan culturel de l’État-nation déjà mis à l’épreuve par la globalisation, les revendications identitaires et indépendantistes. Or, l’homogénéité culturelle lui assure une identité nationale solide, requise pour la citoyenneté, la délibération démocratique et la justice sociale. L’objectif de ce mémoire est de montrer que cette approche substantialiste est exigente outre mesure, que l’identité nationale ainsi comprise ne doit pas être un prérequis sine qua non pour une identité politique libérale viable, et qu’elle est en plus incompatible avec une société pluraliste. Ce mémoire propose donc une approche alternative fondée sur une interprétation spécifique de la théorie de la raison publique rawlsienne. Deux objectifs seront dès lors explorés : la plausible dissociation du régime libéral et de la culture au sens fort, et, par conséquent, la fondation en raison d’une société pluraliste. / For David Miller, the inclusion of immigrants requires their cultural integration. A mere political inclusion of immigrants without cultural anchoring muddles the cultural background of the nation-state, already tested by globalization, sub-state nationalisms and fragmented identities. Therefore, cultural homogeneity provides the nation-state a strong national identity required for citizenship, democratic deliberation and social justice. Our aim in this memorandum is to show that this substantialist approach is too strong a requirement, that this conception of national identity should not be a sine qua non prerequisite for a viable liberal political identity, and that it is incompatible with a pluralist society. We are proposing, instead, a political approach founded on a specific interpretation of Rawl’s public reason theory. Hence, two objectives will be explored: the plausible dissociation of national identity and citizenship, and consequently, the foundation of a pluralist society.

No description available.

In this essay, I aim to elucidate a concept of public justification. I outline several challenges faced by political philosophers, including a desire to secure stability and treat people respectfully against a background of reasonable pluralism. I suggest that John Rawls‟ account of public reason provides a helpful starting point for accomplishing these goals. But critics have been both persistent and persuasive in their objections to public reason‟s central element of reasons all can accept. I explicate three dominant criticisms: incomprehensibility, attenuation and exclusion. First, some critics have argued that the very idea of reasons all can accept cannot be plausibly articulated. Second, critics maintain that the set of reasons all can accept is insufficiently robust to solve constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice. Third, critics note that if public justification is constrained by reasons all can accept, then many informative and effective arguments must be excluded from the public sphere. In response to these criticisms, I argue for an interpretation of reasons all can accept which is sensitive to critics‟ reasonable demand for an explicit account of each element of the doctrine. My interpretation demonstrates the superfluity of what I call the sharability constraint—the thesis that only reasons acceptable to all can function as justifications in the public sphere. Once the sharability constraint is rejected, I argue that the problem of exclusion dissipates, but that substantive restrictions on acceptable reasons are still possible. I am optimistic that this approach is less attenuating than one constrained by sharability and that, at least under favourable empirical conditions, more problems can be resolved by this approach than by standard Rawlsian theory. I draw on actual convergence in the international realm to bolster this optimism. Finally, I relate this approach to the widespread influence of deliberative democracy. I argue that procedural apparatuses are insufficient for political legitimacy, but that deliberation may be an invaluable tool for uncovering reasons required by substantive justification. / Graduate

Em 1993, John Rawls, notável filósofo e professor da distinta Harvard University, publicou seu Political Liberalism, um livro em que pela primeira vez sintetiza sistematicamente o conceito de razão pública, uma ideia chave de sua teoria da justiça como equidade (justice as fairness). Segundo Rawls, a razão pública consiste fundamentalmente no modo e conteúdo adequados ao debate e à fundamentação de escolhas essenciais de justiça no espaço público de uma democracia constitucional. Nesse sentido, Rawls advoga que o único meio razoável de justificação da coerção estatal reside no reconhecimento e/ou obtenção de consensos (overlapping consensus) em relação às escolhas essenciais de uma sociedade democrática, o que só é possível se atores públicos e privados se despojarem de suas respectivas doutrinas filosóficas ou morais abrangentes ao debater e decidir tais questões essenciais de justiça. A presente dissertação tem por objetivo analisar a proposta de razão pública de Rawls, dentro do contexto de sua teoria da justiça como equidade, propondo-se a verificar se o pensamento rawlsiano procede no contexto jurídico-filosófico da pós-modernidade e se a sua teoria pode ser concretamente aplicada aos ordenamentos jurídicos contemporâneos, em especial no que tange ao conteúdo e pleno exercício da liberdade religiosa pelos cidadãos de um estado constitucional democrático. / In 1993 John Rawls, a notable American philosopher and professor of the distinguished Harvard University, published his Political Liberalism, a book that presents for the first time Rawlss idea of public reason, a key concept of his theory of justice. To Rawls public reason is fundamentally the proper form and content of public debate, as well as the justification of essential decisions of basic justice in a constitutional democracy. In this sense, Rawls claim that the only reasonable justification for state coercion lays on an overlapping consensus regarding the essential choices of a democratic society, which is possible only if public and private actors surpass their own personal moral or philosophical comprehensive doctrines when engaging in public debate of such essential decisions of basic justice. This dissertation thesis aims to verify the rawlsian proposal of public reason in the context of justice as fairness, reflecting whether Rawls proposal fits a post-modern juridical and philosophical reality. The work also aims to analyze if Rawls theory can be effectively applied to modern constitutional states, especially regarding the content and exercise of religious freedom by the citizens of a democratic constitutional state.

Em 1993, John Rawls, notável filósofo e professor da distinta Harvard University, publicou seu Political Liberalism, um livro em que pela primeira vez sintetiza sistematicamente o conceito de razão pública, uma ideia chave de sua teoria da justiça como equidade (justice as fairness). Segundo Rawls, a razão pública consiste fundamentalmente no modo e conteúdo adequados ao debate e à fundamentação de escolhas essenciais de justiça no espaço público de uma democracia constitucional. Nesse sentido, Rawls advoga que o único meio razoável de justificação da coerção estatal reside no reconhecimento e/ou obtenção de consensos (overlapping consensus) em relação às escolhas essenciais de uma sociedade democrática, o que só é possível se atores públicos e privados se despojarem de suas respectivas doutrinas filosóficas ou morais abrangentes ao debater e decidir tais questões essenciais de justiça. A presente dissertação tem por objetivo analisar a proposta de razão pública de Rawls, dentro do contexto de sua teoria da justiça como equidade, propondo-se a verificar se o pensamento rawlsiano procede no contexto jurídico-filosófico da pós-modernidade e se a sua teoria pode ser concretamente aplicada aos ordenamentos jurídicos contemporâneos, em especial no que tange ao conteúdo e pleno exercício da liberdade religiosa pelos cidadãos de um estado constitucional democrático. / In 1993 John Rawls, a notable American philosopher and professor of the distinguished Harvard University, published his Political Liberalism, a book that presents for the first time Rawlss idea of public reason, a key concept of his theory of justice. To Rawls public reason is fundamentally the proper form and content of public debate, as well as the justification of essential decisions of basic justice in a constitutional democracy. In this sense, Rawls claim that the only reasonable justification for state coercion lays on an overlapping consensus regarding the essential choices of a democratic society, which is possible only if public and private actors surpass their own personal moral or philosophical comprehensive doctrines when engaging in public debate of such essential decisions of basic justice. This dissertation thesis aims to verify the rawlsian proposal of public reason in the context of justice as fairness, reflecting whether Rawls proposal fits a post-modern juridical and philosophical reality. The work also aims to analyze if Rawls theory can be effectively applied to modern constitutional states, especially regarding the content and exercise of religious freedom by the citizens of a democratic constitutional state.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-08-18T12:54:31Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 DISSERTACAO_JOSE MURILO DUAILIBE SALEM NETO.pdf: 1318942 bytes, checksum: d4606d5b976747e139eb98856c88b4db (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-05-08 / FUNDAÇÃO DE AMPARO À PESQUISA E AO DESENVOLVIMENTO CIENTIFICO E TECNOLÓGICO DO MARANHÃO / The present research studies the diffused constitutionality control, specifically through the Extraordinary Appeal, and its possibility to be a warrant of rights as integrity, against the changes that expanded its effects, as well as implemented institutes that also changed its admissibility requirement. In that order, is exposed how the constitutional supremacy ideal was accomplished, based on the constitutionalism of fundamental rights and the assignment of constitutional States of right. Highlighting the legitimacy arguments of the constitutionality control, especially for the warrant of fundamental rights, as well as analyzes the origination of this instrument and its history on the brazilian State. Highlighting the functions of the recent changes on the diffused constitutionality control, in a analyzis about the hard relation between the warrant of integrity and the rationalization of the judicial protection, with the creation of access requirements. / A presente pesquisa estuda o controle de constitucionalidade difuso, em especial o realizado através do Recurso Extraordinário, e sua possibilidade de garantia do direito como integridade, diante das modificações que ampliaram seus efeitos, bem como implantaram institutos que modificaram seus requisitos de admissibilidade. Neste intuito, expõe como se firmou o ideal de supremacia constitucional, baseado no constitucionalismo de direitos e no exercício de Estados constitucionais de direito. Destacando os argumentos de legitimidade do controle de constitucionalidade, mormente para garantia de direitos fundamentais, bem como analisa a criação deste instrumento e seu histórico no Estado brasileiro. Destacando as funções das alterações recentes no controle de constitucionalidade difuso, em uma análise sobre a difícil relação entre garantia da integridade e racionalização da tutela jurisdicional, com a criação de requisitos de acesso à prestação jurisdicional pelo STF.

Submitted by Caroline Xavier (caroline.xavier@pucrs.br) on 2017-07-03T13:27:49Z No. of bitstreams: 1 DIS_FELIPE_GOULART_TOMKOWSKI_COMPLETO.pdf: 661319 bytes, checksum: 652d7011baedb676606b1b58f3f86c31 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-07-03T13:27:49Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 DIS_FELIPE_GOULART_TOMKOWSKI_COMPLETO.pdf: 661319 bytes, checksum: 652d7011baedb676606b1b58f3f86c31 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-03-30 / A presente disserta??o tem por objetivo investigar o valor instrumental do comportamento humano para o funcionamento da democracia atrav?s da ideia de raz?o p?blica. A intera??o que existe entre governo e cidad?os ? determinante para que as pol?ticas p?blicas de um pa?s sejam condizentes com as prefer?ncias da popula??o e n?o de grupos de poder. Sendo assim, torna-se importante analisar a ideia subjacente ? democracia de "governo pela discuss?o" ? luz de teorias que nos iluminem tanto no que diz respeito ? ideia de decis?o coletiva justa, quanto, ao real comportamento humano. Para tal, primeiramente ? apresentada a ideia de raz?o p?blica a contraponto, em particular, as vis?es de Rawls e Sen, dando ?nfase para ao conceito de imparcialidade nas decis?es pol?ticas. Em seguida, na terceira se??o, trabalham-se as ideais de racionalidade, razoabilidade, introduzindo-se os conceitos de heur?sticas, vieses, e valores sociais. Assim, constr?i-se uma associa??o para se pensar sobre os resultados de diferentes tipos de comportamento humano para a democracia e como ? poss?vel refletir a partir dele sobre as ideias de objetividade posicional e transcendental. Finalmente, na se??o IV, realiza-se uma investiga??o emp?rica atrav?s da base de sobre a rela??o entre percep??es sobre informa??es e disposi??es pol?ticas e a frequ?ncia de conversa sobre pol?tica com os amigos. Utiliza-se um modelo de regress?o log?stica ordenada, com dados do Latino Bar?metro de 2015 para o Brasil, aliado ao m?todo de componentes principais para capturar dimens?es explicativas relevantes. Os seguintes resultados obtidos contradizem as hip?teses pr?vias: a falta de confian?a no governo e a percep??o de garantias faltantes n?o significativos, o ativismo dissociado a causas espec?ficas reduz, ao passo que, um senso de cidadania ao reverso aumenta as chances de se conversar sobre pol?tica com mais frequ?ncia com amigos. / The present dissertation aims to investigate the instrumental role of human behaviour for democracy through the idea of public reason. The interaction between government and citizens is decisive for a country's public policies to be in line with population preferences rather than power groups. Thus, it becomes important to analyse the idea underlying democracy of "government by discussion" in the light of theories that enlighten us both with regard to the idea of just collective decision and real human behaviour. To this end, we first counterpoint the idea of public reason, in particular, of Rawls and Sen, with an emphasis on the concept of impartiality in political decisions. Then, in the third section, we work on the notions of rationality, reasonableness, introducing the concepts of heuristics, biases, and social values. Thus, an association is constructed for thinking about the results of different types of human behavior for democracy and how the ideas of positional and transcendental objectivity fit this purpose well. Finally, in section IV, we conduct an empirical investigation based on the relationship between perceptions of relevant political information and dispositions and the frequency of political talk with friends. We use a logistic regression model, with data from the 2015 Latin Barometer for Brazil, combined with principal components method to capture relevant explanatory dimensions. The following results contradict previous hypotheses: lack of trust in the government and the perception of absent guarantees are not significant, while activism dissociated of specific causes reduces and a reverse sense of citizenship increases the chances of talking about politics more frequently with friends.