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  • About
  • The Global ETD Search service is a free service for researchers to find electronic theses and dissertations. This service is provided by the Networked Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations.
    Our metadata is collected from universities around the world. If you manage a university/consortium/country archive and want to be added, details can be found on the NDLTD website.
21

When the Leading Tone Doesn't Lead: Musical Qualia in Context

Arthur, Claire 30 August 2016 (has links)
No description available.
22

L'argument de la connaissance de Frank Jackson et les qualias 1982-1998

Martineau, Vincent-Pierre January 2008 (has links)
L'argument de la connaissance de Frank Jackson est l'un des arguments les plus célèbres en philosophie analytique. Son objectif est de démontrer que certains de nos états mentaux, nommément les états mentaux associés à l'effet que cela fait de percevoir ou de ressentir, ou qualia, ne peuvent pas être expliqués par une conception exclusivement matérialiste de l'esprit. L'argument de la connaissance s'inscrit dans une famille d'arguments en philosophie de l'esprit qui soulèvent le débat jamais résolu entre matérialisme et dualisme. Depuis sa parution en 1982, l'argument de la connaissance de Jackson a suscité de nombreuses réponses de la part des matérialistes qui ont tenté de le réfuter. Jackson lui-même s'est laissé convaincre par certaines de ces réponses et en 1998, il a finalement renoncé à son célèbre argument. Ce mémoire a pour objectif de présenter une classification des réponses adressées à l'argument de la connaissance ainsi qu'une analyse de chacune d'entre elles. Cette analyse permet de montrer que la seule réponse adéquate à l'argument de la connaissance est celle formulée par Jackson lui-même lorsqu'il a rejeté son argument. Ce mémoire montre également que la réponse de Jackson permet d'entrevoir une réfutation adéquate à tout un ensemble d'arguments dualistes en philosophie de l'esprit.
23

Representational theories of phenomenal character

Macpherson, Fiona January 2000 (has links)
This thesis is an examination and critique of naturalistic representational theories of phenomenal character. Phenomenal character refers to the distinctive quality that perceptual and sensational experiences seem to have; it is identified with 'what it is like' to undergo experiences. The central claims of representationalism are that phenomenal character is identical with the content of experience and that all representational states, bearing appropriate relations to the cognitive system, are conscious experiences. These claims are taken to explain both how conscious experiential states arise and their nature. After examining the desiderata for naturalistic explanations, I argue that theories which ascribe nonconceptual content to experiences are the most plausible versions of representationalism. Further, causal covariation and teleological theories yield distinctive and interesting representationalist positions, hence, they become the focus of this study. To assess representationalism, I investigate whether all differences in phenomenal character can be correlated with differences in content. I claim that a useful distinction can be drawn between implicit and explicit content, which allows one to best describe the phenomena of perfect and relative pitch. I then argue that ambiguous figures show that two experiences can have the same content but different phenomenal character. I explicate the Inverted Earth hypothesis and claim that to identify content and phenomenal character, representationalists either have to condone the possibility of philosophical zombies, or hold that people lack authoritative first-person knowledge of their current experiences. Both these positions are unpalatable. Finally, I argue that representationalists cannot ascribe contents to experiences of novel colours to account for their phenomenal character. I also question, in light of dissociation phenomena, whether there is one distinctive relationship that all experiences bear to the cognitive system. I conclude that phenomenal character cannot be identical with the type of content under investigation, and that naturalistic representationalist theories cannot fully explain conscious experience.
24

Das Leib-Seele-Problem - Von der Philosophi zu den Neurowissenschaften /

Britschgi, Mirjam. January 2007 (has links) (PDF)
Diplomarbeit Hochschule für Angewandte Psychologie Zürich, 2007.
25

Kan vi tro på kvalia? : En granskning av Amy Kinds underkännande av transparenstesen / Can we Believe in Qualia? : Scrutinizing Amy Kind's denying of the transparency thesis

Wettström, Rune January 2017 (has links)
Denna uppsatsen granskar Amy Kinds argument för kvaliarealism. I artikeln från 2008, ”How to Believe in Qualia”, hävdar hon att transparenstesen utgör ett hot mot kvaliarealism. En stor del av min uppsats handlar därför om att undersöka hennes avfärdande av transparenstesen. Uppsatsen ger henne ett visst, men inte fullt, stöd i detta och följaktligen också ett visst stöd för kvaliarealism. Samtidigt visar uppsatsen på andra argument gentemot transparenstesen, som också utgör ett hot mot kvaliarealism. / In this thesis Amy Kind’s argument for qualia realism is scrutinized. In the paper from 2008, “How to Believe in Qualia”, she claims that the transparency thesis pose a threat to qualia realism. A major part of this thesis therefore deals with investigating her refutation of the transparency thesis. The thesis gives her some, but not fully, conclusive support and consequently gives some support for qualia realism. The thesis also sets out other arguments against the transparency thesis, arguments which however pose a threat to qualia realism.
26

Kan vi tro på kvalia? : En granskning av Amy Kinds underkännande av transparenstesen / Can we Believe in Qualia? : Scrutinizing Amy Kind's denying of the transparency thesis

Wettström, Rune January 2017 (has links)
Denna uppsatsen granskar Amy Kinds argument för kvaliarealism. I artikeln från 2008, ”How to Believe in Qualia”, hävdar hon att transparenstesen utgör ett hot mot kvaliarealism. En stor del av min uppsats handlar därför om att undersöka hennes avfärdande av transparenstesen. Uppsatsen ger henne ett visst, men inte fullt, stöd i detta och följaktligen också ett visst stöd för kvaliarealism. Samtidigt visar uppsatsen på andra argument gentemot transparenstesen, som också utgör ett hot mot kvaliarealism. / In this thesis Amy Kind’s argument for qualia realism is scrutinized. In the paper from 2008, “How to Believe in Qualia”, she claims that the transparency thesis pose a threat to qualia realism. A major part of this thesis therefore deals with investigating her refutation of the transparency thesis. The thesis gives her some, but not fully, conclusive support and consequently gives some support for qualia realism. The thesis also sets out other arguments against the transparency thesis, arguments which however pose a threat to qualia realism.
27

Against the Reduction of Qualia to Indexicality

Stealey, Patrick Thomas 03 June 2013 (has links)
No description available.
28

Qualia

Siebert, Carsten 08 July 1998 (has links)
Thema der Arbeit sind die Konzepte von 'phänomenaler Erfahrung' und 'Bewußtsein' in verschiedenen empirischen und philosophischen Theorien über das Verhältnis von physiologischen und mentalen Prozessen. Der 1. Teil klärt das Umfeld des Problems: Kapitel 1 und 2 erläutern, warum die Diskussion phänomenaler Qualitäten oder Qualia zum Lackmustest der neuen Theorien des Bewußtseins geworden ist. Kapitel 3 und 4 zeigen, inwiefern ein Großteil der Verwirrung bezüglich von Qualia auf den impliziten Annahmen bestimmter Wahrnehmungstheorien beruhen. Sinnesepisoden (und damit zumindest eine wichtige Klasse phänomenaler Episoden) können nur auf der Ebene von Systemen erklärt werden, die in angemessener Weise auf Eigenschaften ihrer Umgebung reagieren können. Von dieser Einsicht ausgehend, verhandelt der 2. Teil mit verschiedenen konkreten Versuchen, Qualia innerhalb empirischer Kontexte zu erklären. Kapitel 5 untersucht konnektionistische Modelle, die sich einer Vektorkodierungsstrategie bedienen (Churchland, Clark, Flanagan) und sich an die Theorie der Selektion neuronaler Gruppen (Edelman) anzubinden. Wenn aber das Qualia-Problem nicht so einfach neurophilosophisch gelöst werden kann, so fährt Kapitel 6 fort, ist es verlockend, mentale Zustände als informationstragende neurophysiologische Zustände zu betrachten. Das ist der sogenannte Repräsentationalismus oder Intentionalismus (Dretske, Beckermann, Tye). Kapitel 7 behauptet, daß diese Versuche, Bewußtsein im direkten Verweis auf die empirische Forschung zu erklären, philosophisch nicht befriedigend sind, weil Bewußtsein keine 'natürliche Art' ist, d.h. kein einheitliches Phänomen, das isoliert durch eine Einzeldisziplin (einschließlich des Funktionalismus) untersucht werden könnte. In Kapitel 8 analysiere ich Damasios Theorie somatischer Marker als Versuch, Searles Intuition bezüglich der phänomenalen Grundierung aller bewußter Prozesse empirisch zu plausibilisieren. Nicht Gehirne (also sub-personale Systeme) sind Träger bewußter Zustände, sondern potentielle Handlungssubjekte. Alle empirischen Theorien etablieren höchstens eine gutbestätigte Kovarianz zwischen Gehirnzuständen und mentalen Zuständen. Im abschließenden Kapitel 9 verteitige ich demgemäß einen nicht-puritanischen, eklektischen Naturalismus, der sich dem Bewußtseinsproblem unter Aufbietung aller theoretischen Paradigmata nähert, die sich als heuristisch produktiv erwiesen haben. Fragen des Bewußtseins involvieren immer auch eine Selbstinterpretation des Fragenden. Das allein ist schon Grund genug zu der Vermutung, keine naturwissenschaftliche Einzeldisziplin werde je für sich allein alle dieser Fragen klären können. / "Qualia - Phenomenal states as a problem for philosophical and empirical theories of consciousness" In this essay, I examine the concepts of 'phenomenal experience' and 'consciousness' in several empirical and philosophical theories about the relation between physiological and mental processes. Part I sets the stage for the problem: Chapters 1 and 2 establish why the discussion of phenomenal qualities or qualia has become a litmus test for current theories of consciousness. Chapters 3 and 4 show how large parts of the confusion about qualia rest on implicit assumptions that characterize certain theories of perception. Against mainstream inferentialist theories, I defend a vaguly Gibsonian direct theory. Sensory episodes (and thus at least one important class of phenomenal episodes) can be explained only on the level of systems that have the ability to usefully react to features of their environment. Using this insight as its point of departure, Part II deals with several concrete attempts to explain qualia in an empirical context. Chapter 5 examines connectionist models using vector coding strategies (Churchland, Clark, Flanagan) and tries to connect them to the Theory of Neuronal Group Selection (Edelman). If the qualia-problem cannot be simply solved by means of neurophilosophy, I go on to argue in Chapter 6, it is tempting to regard mental states as information-bearing neurophysiological states. This is the position taken by Representationalism or Intentionalism (Dretske, Beckermann, Tye). Chapter 7 claims that these attempts to explain consciousness with direct reference to empirical research are not philosophically satisfactory because consciousness is no 'natural kind', no unified phenomenon that lends itself to examination in any single scientific discipline (including all kinds of functionalims). In Chapter 8, I analyze Damasio's Theory of Somatic Markers as an attempt to empirically support Searle's intuition concerning the necessary phenomenal grounding of all conscious processes. Bearers of conscious states are not brains (sub-personal systems), but subjects with the potential to act; consciousness is embodied consciousness. All of these theories establish at most a good covariance between brain states and mental states. In the concluding Chapter 9, I defend a non-puritan, eclectic naturalism which approaches consciousness using all theoretical paradigms that have proved themselves to be heuristically productive. Questions about consciousness always involve questions of self-interpretation. This alone is reason enough to suspect that no single scientific discipline will be in a position to solve them all.
29

Religion och Qualia : I gränslandet mellan medvetandestudier och religionsvetenskap

Nielsen, Varg January 2015 (has links)
Up to this date there are several scientific disciplines that deal with religion´s underlying mechanisms and certain functions of our consciousness, but there isn´t anyone who takes into account the entire aspect of consciousness. The aim of the present work is to bring the entire aspect of our consciousness into the scientific discussion of religion. To help in doing this, the philosophical concept of qualia is used. First the concept is problematized, then an examination whether the concept has explanatory value in the science of religion and in the understanding of religious experience is done.  The concept of qualia has in this manner been applied to several scientific theories of religion and place-related entity continuity has been used as an example of religious experience. The present work is developed as a literature study and uses literature and theories from de scientific disciplines of philosophy of mind, cognitive neuroscience, neurotheology, cognitive science of religion and psychology of religion. As an underlying method the epistemological theory of holistic coherentism is used because it enables such an interdisciplinary study as this work is.   What this work shows is that qualia have a high explanatory value in the science of religion and in the understanding of religious experience and how we form religious concepts. However, the concept of qualia is problematic and great care must be exercised when inferences are made.
30

O debate da imagética mental / The imagery debate

Battilani, Patricia Fernandes 21 March 2013 (has links)
O debate da imagética mental consiste de uma controvérsia iniciada nos anos 1970 a respeito da forma das representações mentais, e foi travada principalmente entre Stephen Kosslyn, que propunha uma forma imagética, e Zenon Pylyshyn, que propunha um formato simbólico-estrutural, além de apontar falhas conceituais na teoria da afiguração implícita no modelo pictorialista. Nesta dissertação, apresenta-se um balanço filosófico deste debate, levando em conta também críticas adicionais de Daniel Dennett aos pressupostos da abordagem pictorialista. / The mental imagery debate is a controversy that began in the 1970s concerning the form of mental representation, and was carried out mainly by Stephen Kosslyn, who defended a picture-like representation, and Zenon Pylyshyn, who proposed a symbolic-structural format. The latter also pointed out conceptual problems of the pictorialist model. This thesis presents a philosophical discussion of the debate, also taking into account additional criticisms by Daniel Dennett to the presuppositions of the pictorialist approach.

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