This dissertation examines the ways in which military personnel interacted with religion during World War II. It argues that the challenges of wartime service provided the impetus and the opportunity to improvise religious practices, refine religious beliefs amid new challenges, and broaden religious understanding through interaction with those from other traditions. Methodologically, this dissertation moves beyond existing analyses that focus primarily on institutions and their representatives such as military chaplains. Instead, it explores first-person accounts left by men and women who were not part of the chaplain corps and analyzes ways in which non-chaplains engaged religion. The exigencies of war contributed to religious innovation as soldiers and sailors improvised religious practices. Lay leaders sometimes filled in to lead services as chaplains were often not available. Soldiers and sailors also modified individual religious practices such as diet, fasting, and prayer to fit the context of military service. The challenges of wartime service also led troops to refine previously held religious beliefs as well as to adopt new interpretations based on personal experiences. Soldiers and sailors often clung to whatever religious beliefs or practices they saw as potentially beneficial. Finally, religious mixing combined with social dislocation and stress to create an atmosphere in which troops questioned and reformulated their religious identities. As soldiers and sailors formed bonds with those from other traditions, it became more difficult to maintain previous assumptions rooted in suspicion and rumor about other faiths. Understanding how soldiers and sailors interacted with religion in World War II anticipates significant aspects of what many scholars have described as a religious revival in the two decades following the war. It suggests that many veterans returned to civilian life with more confidence in their own religious agency and with sharpened conceptions of what they considered religious essentials.

Submitted by Oliveira Santos Dilzaná (dilznana@yahoo.com.br) on 2016-03-15T16:04:00Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação_Leonardo F de Jesus.pdf: 2406778 bytes, checksum: 1491c3122d9bf2c53723fa065c3286ab (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Ana Portela (anapoli@ufba.br) on 2016-03-28T19:13:08Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação_Leonardo F de Jesus.pdf: 2406778 bytes, checksum: 1491c3122d9bf2c53723fa065c3286ab (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-03-28T19:13:08Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação_Leonardo F de Jesus.pdf: 2406778 bytes, checksum: 1491c3122d9bf2c53723fa065c3286ab (MD5) / FAPESB / Este trabalho analisa conflitos religiosos na Bahia durante os anos de 1862 e 1874. Para tanto, traça um panorama do campo religioso baiano no século XIX, destacando a situação do catolicismo, "Religião do Império" brasileiro, em seu contexto geral (relação Brasil – Roma) e local, observando aspectos que foram determinantes para a inserção de grupos religiosos concorrentes na Bahia. A partir da segunda metade do século XIX, protestantes e espíritas, com o objetivo de difundir suas crenças entre os brasileiros, iniciaram trabalhos de divulgação no Brasil. Com estratégias de propaganda diferentes, esses grupos também desenvolveram esforços proselitistas na Bahia. Diante da ameaça a sua hegemonia, a Igreja Católica na Bahia reagiu. Destaca-se o desempenho de Dom Manoel Joaquim da Silveira, Arcebispo da Bahia e Primaz do Brasil que escreveu cartas pastorais condenando o protestantismo e o espiritismo. Além dos debates e polêmicas religiosos, a inserção de grupos religiosos concorrentes também motivou discussões acerca da liberdade religiosa e do acesso a direitos civis no Brasil. This paper examines religious conflicts in Bahia during the years 1862 and 1874 Therefore, traces the Bahia religious field in the nineteenth century, highlighting the situation of Catholicism, "Religion Empire" Brazilian in its general context (relation Brazil. - Roma) and local, noting aspects that were crucial for the insertion of competing religious groups in Bahia. From the second half of the nineteenth century, Protestants and Spiritualists, with the aim of spreading their beliefs among Brazilians, began outreach work in Brazil. With various advertising strategies, these groups have also developed proselytizing efforts in Bahia. Faced with the threat to its hegemony, the Catholic Church reacted in Bahia. We highlight the performance of Dom Manoel Joaquim da Silveira, Archbishop of Bahia and Primate of Brazil who wrote pastoral letters condemning Protestantism and spiritualism. Besides the religious debates and controversies, the inclusion of competing religious groups also prompted discussions about religious freedom and access to civil rights in Brazil.

In early 2001, as I began exploring the role of religion in conflict, I came across a declaration by a then little-known leader, Osama bin Laden, and his fellows. That declaration was of the World Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders. Many analysts now see it as one of the founding documents of al Qaeda, the amorphous terrorist umbrella group. The purpose of the declaration was to issue a fatwa that, because United States troops were stationed in the holy Arabian peninsula and threatened Muslims, particularly in Iraq, it was every Muslim's duty 'to kill the Americans and their allies - civilians and military - ... in any country in which it is possible to do it'. Of course, the first thing that struck me, as an American, was that here was a group that wished to kill me solely because of my birthplace. They did not seem to care that I might not support specific actions of my government, even if I supported that government generally. Nor was there any discussion of whether methods other than violence might be more useful in persuading my fellow citizens as to the justice of their cause. I wondered, as a student of peace studies, what I could do in the face of such seemingly implacable hatred. The second thing that struck me about the declaration was its language. I noticed, in particular, a certain flourish that one does not often find in political analysis. The image that 'nations are attacking Muslims like people fighting over a plate of food' has always stayed in my mind because the simple image has such rhetorical power. I also noticed, in accordance with my research interests, the use of religious teachings as a justification for violence. Yet poetic rhetoric and religious dogma were not the only contents of that declaration. Bin Laden and his fellows made coherent political points. They cited as examples of the harm caused by the United States: the post-Gulf War presence of US troops in Saudi Arabia, 'dictating to its rulers [and] humiliating its people;' the continued bombing of Iraq 'even though all [Saudi] rulers are against their territories being used to that end;' and, finally, the way that these actions contributed to the security of Israel by weakening Arab nations. Thus, beneath its religious expression the declaration contained political points with which I could engage. Now, as I categorically oppose the use of violence, I unreservedly reject the conclusion of the fatwa. Moreover, I do not assume that a single statement is evidence of this group's true intent. It may very well be the case, as analysts more versed in their politics than I have argued, that al Qaeda's real goal is the establishment of an Islamic caliphate. Its affiliation with Afghanistan's Taliban certainly supports this argument. In spite of these things, though, their use of political arguments meant they were trying to reach an audience that cared about such things. I could address that audience as well, and try to propose different courses of action that would address the same concerns. Thus, I could step outside of my original framework, in which I envisioned implacable hatred, and argue for nonviolent ways of addressing the issues. Yet the religious idiom of the declaration was also an important factor. Given that the declaration addressed Muslims as Muslims, by only trying to argue political points with them I might alienate people for whom the religious language meant a great deal. Already in my research I had come to the conclusion, drawing on R. Scott Appleby's The Ambivalence of the Sacred, that the people best placed to show the peaceful potential of a religion are believers in that religion. I am not, however, religious. Thus, this conclusion left me with no recourse in the face of the religious aspects of conflict. I began to wonder what role a nonreligious - or, as I came to think of myself, a secular - person could play in peacemaking when religion is an element of a conflict. Moreover, I saw that different seculars would have different reactions to bin Laden's arguments. Some would reject the message because of the religious medium. Some, like I first did, would perceive the sociopolitical elements but continue to ignore the religious language. Others, as I also briefly did, might consider the religious element but leave out the issue of their own secular nature. Yet no perspective provided a good model for what I, as a secular, might do. Thus, the goal of my thesis became to analyze the various models of secularity, find the most beneficial principles, and construct from these a model for secular best practice. That Osama bin Laden's words should catalyze this thesis brings me to two important points. First, this is not a thesis about Islam. If a disproportionate number of the examples that I use throughout the thesis focus on Islam, this should not indicate that Islam deserves special attention concerning conflict and violence. Rather, the focus here is always on secularity and secular responses to religion in situations of conflict. However, particularly after September 11th, the largely secular policy and scholarly establishments of Europe and North America have produced a great deal of material concerning Islam. Thus, while I sought out more diverse sources dealing with secularity, I often used the religion most commented on by secular sources as an exemplar. That leads to the second point, which is that this is not a thesis about terrorism. Given its scope and the place of religion in it, most obvious case study to use in this thesis is the 'war on terror' - which I call such for ease of use, as that is what the Western media generally call it, not because I think it is an adequate designation. I will cover this topic in the final chapter, but because the thesis is about peace and violence in conflict, and not about specific forms of violence, it will not figure elsewhere. Because this thesis is concerned with violence and, specifically, with the promotion of peace, it has an overt prescriptive element. This stems in large part from my Peace Studies background. Peace Studies entails a normative commitment to pursue peaceful situations through nonviolent means. Thus, at several points I actively enjoin readers to take or not take certain types of action because, by my analysis, that is the best way to promote peaceful relationships. More generally, by the title of this thesis, I ask readers to 'rethink secular and sacred' - both what these terms mean, and more importantly how they relate to one another. In particular, this goal leads me to avoid discussing the concept of tolerance. Tolerance is often held to be a virtue by those who seek to promote nonconfrontational religious interaction. However, as many other writers have pointed out, the word 'tolerance' itself stems from physiological and biological studies, where it means the ability to withstand negative factors, such as poisons or drugs. Thus I find that its social meaning is essentially negative, denoting forbearance of what one finds repugnant. While in a very limited sense I feel that tolerance is necessary, it is only as a first step to actively engaging with what one might at first find off-putting.

Pendant des décennies, le Sénégal a gardé dans l’imaginaire académique et international sa vielle image d’un pays exclusivement confrérique où le marabout exercerait un pouvoir de taille sur le disciple. Depuis quelques années, toutefois, les observateurs ont pu constater une évolution de la pratique religieuse au Sénégal due à l’arrivée de nouveaux courants réformistes tels que le wahhabisme. La rencontre entre ce dernier et les confréries soufies a fait naitre un débat doctrinal et un choc des idéologies. Dans ce choc, la Tijāniyya est la confrérie qui a été la plus attaquée. L’objet de notre thèse est d’analyser ce conflit idéologique entre le wahhabisme et la Tijāniyya au sud du Sahara, le Sénégal étant notre terrain de complexification. Notre analyse tente de répondre aux questions suivantes : quels sont les points de divergence entre les deux courants ? Comment les savants wahhabites et tijānīs abordent-ils ces points de divergence ? Comment les désaccords idéologiques se manifestent-ils dans la littérature que nous étudions ? Quelles sont les stratégies des protagonistes des deux mouvements pour avoir une plus grande influence au sud du Sahara de manière générale et plus précisément au Sénégal ? / During decades, the international academic sphere has portrayed Senegal as a country exclusively sectarian in which the marabou would have some authority on his disciples. However, over the past few years researchers noticed an evolution of the religious practices in Senegal due to the arrival of new reformist currents such as Wahhabism. As a matter of fact the encounter between Wahhabism and the sufi brotherhoods triggered a doctrinal debate and an ideological shock. In this clash, the Tijāniyya is the first target of the criticisms. Therefore, the purpose of this thesis is to analyse this ideological conflict between Wahabism and the Tijāniyya in the South of the Sahara, focussing on Senegal. This work will answer the following questions: what are the main sticking points between the two ideological trends? How do the wahhabist and tijānī scholars tackle those issues? To what extent do those ideological disagreements appear in the literature under study? What are the strategies used by the figures of those two groups to expand their power in the sub-Saharan areas, and more specifically in Senegal?

Le présent travail s’intéresse à dix pièces écrites et jouées entre 1580 et 1625. Le corpus retenu inclut des pièces rédigées par Robert Daborne, Thomas Dekker, Thomas Heywood, Christopher Marlowe, Philip Massinger, Thomas Middleton, Samuel Rowley et William Shakespeare et Nathaniel Woodes. Cette étude tâche principalement de révéler en quoi les dramaturges de la Renaissance se sont appropriés et ont transformé des codes appartenant à la tradition de la disputatio médiévale afin de mettre en scène les dissensions religieuses de leur époque. Nous avons pris en compte deux acceptions du terme « dispute ». Il peut en effet être défini comme un débat formel et dialectique et comme la manifestation d’un désaccord violent entre deux personnes ou plus.La première partie étudie les éléments conflictuels que l’on trouve dans les scènes de dispute, observant comment les dramaturges mettent en scène les différents aspects du conflit théologique et se sont emparés de l’idée d’hybridité religieuse qui caractérise la période. Cette partie s’interroge sur la mesure dans laquelle la scène de dispute reflète mais aussi nourrit le conflit religieux. Toutefois, une seconde partie analyse ces dialogues et rencontres conflictuelles, souvent violents, comme une manière paradoxale de négocier une certaine forme de coexistence et de décréter une trêve. Une troisième partie se concentre enfin sur les procédés dramatiques mis en œuvre par les auteurs pour proposer une résolution du conflit et atteindre un compromis littéraire entre une forme artistique élitiste et populaire. Ce travail souligne également le lien entre une célébration de l’art du théâtre comme un art fondamentalement hybride et la représentation du conflit religieux à travers les scènes de dispute. / This study focuses on ten plays written and performed between 1580 and 1625. The corpus includes plays by Robert Daborne, Thomas Dekker, Thomas Heywood, Christopher Marlowe, Philip Massinger, Thomas Middleton, Samuel Rowley, William Shakespeare and Nathaniel Woodes. The primary aim of this work is to determine the extent to which Renaissance dramatists appropriated and transformed the old tradition of the medieval disputatio in order to stage the religious dissensions of their time. Two definitions of the word ‘dispute’ were considered. Indeed, it can be defined both as a formal dialectical debate and as a violent disagreement between two or more people.The first part explores the conflictual elements to be found in a scene of dispute, looking at how the playwrights staged the different aspects of the conflict and dealt with the idea of religious hybridity which characterises the period. This part questions the extent to which the scene of dispute reflects but also fuels the religious feuds. Nevertheless, the second part analyses these conflictual, and sometimes violent, encounters and dialogues as a paradoxical way to negotiate a certain form of coexistence and to call a truce. Finally, a third part focuses on the way the playwrights used drama to suggest a solution to the conflict and to reach a compromise between an elitist and a popular form of art. This study also explores the link between the vindication of the art of theatre as something fundamentally hybrid and the representation of the religious conflict through scenes of dispute.

Este trabalho discutiu a história religiosa do Brasil, especificamente em Pernambuco a partir do confronto entre católicos e protestantes, com o advento das primeiras atividades missionárias protestantes em Pernambuco no século XX. Enfrentou o obstáculo recorrente na investigação histórica no que refere aos embates da teoria historiográfica, sobre uma história política, das idéias, das mentalidades, da cultura, intelectual, mas o tema proposto era atinente a História da Idéias, referência adotada. A tese central deste trabalho é que a inserção do protestantismo em Pernambuco constituiu um conflito, e que este foi de caráter ideológico e não confessional, em torno de duas concepções distintas de estabelecimento da Ordem Social, ou da organização social. Para este fim buscamos mostrar que o protestantismo é uma concepção de mundo, um sistema ideológico (em sentido lato, conjunto de idéias), não apenas uma confissão religiosa ou sistema religioso. Assim sendo se objeto foi o protestantismo em Pernambuco, enquanto expressão sócio-política de um sujeito religioso, para responde ao problema acerca da forma como a emergência deste um novo sujeito, estabeleceu um conflito com o sujeito religioso estabelecido, o catolicismo romano. Responde-se o que aconteceu então? Com esta problematização demonstramos a identidade dos sujeitos investigados, a natureza do conflito, a configuração do conflito, e a. solução / acomodação do conflito. Concluímos então que embora sujeitos substantivamente 9 religiosos, conflitaram politicamente, reafirmando que o antagonismo gerado com a presença protestante e a conseqüente reação católica se deveu mais ao risco a ordem social do que a heterodoxia religiosa, de onde a crise que intitula o trabalho. / This work has discussed the religious history of Brazil, specifically in Pernambuco, from the confrontation between Catholics and Protestants, with the advent of the first missionary work Protestants in Pernambuco, in the twentieth century.

Este trabalho discutiu a história religiosa do Brasil, especificamente em Pernambuco a partir do confronto entre católicos e protestantes, com o advento das primeiras atividades missionárias protestantes em Pernambuco no século XX. Enfrentou o obstáculo recorrente na investigação histórica no que refere aos embates da teoria historiográfica, sobre uma história política, das idéias, das mentalidades, da cultura, intelectual, mas o tema proposto era atinente a História da Idéias, referência adotada. A tese central deste trabalho é que a inserção do protestantismo em Pernambuco constituiu um conflito, e que este foi de caráter ideológico e não confessional, em torno de duas concepções distintas de estabelecimento da Ordem Social, ou da organização social. Para este fim buscamos mostrar que o protestantismo é uma concepção de mundo, um sistema ideológico (em sentido lato, conjunto de idéias), não apenas uma confissão religiosa ou sistema religioso. Assim sendo se objeto foi o protestantismo em Pernambuco, enquanto expressão sócio-política de um sujeito religioso, para responde ao problema acerca da forma como a emergência deste um novo sujeito, estabeleceu um conflito com o sujeito religioso estabelecido, o catolicismo romano. Responde-se o que aconteceu então? Com esta problematização demonstramos a identidade dos sujeitos investigados, a natureza do conflito, a configuração do conflito, e a. solução / acomodação do conflito. Concluímos então que embora sujeitos substantivamente 9 religiosos, conflitaram politicamente, reafirmando que o antagonismo gerado com a presença protestante e a conseqüente reação católica se deveu mais ao risco a ordem social do que a heterodoxia religiosa, de onde a crise que intitula o trabalho. / This work has discussed the religious history of Brazil, specifically in Pernambuco, from the confrontation between Catholics and Protestants, with the advent of the first missionary work Protestants in Pernambuco, in the twentieth century.

羅興亞穆斯林(Rohingya Muslim)或稱阿拉干穆斯林(Arakanese Muslim)，是居住在鄰近孟加拉的緬甸若開邦北部 (或稱阿拉干Arakan)穆斯林社群，大批印度穆斯林在二十世紀初殖民時期遷徙至阿拉干地區，形成新(印度)、舊(阿拉干)穆斯林混居，也導致羅興亞人之身分多有爭議。 因經濟資源壟斷、政治力量競爭及宗教文化衝突等原因，緬甸在1930年及1938年分別爆發反印度及反穆斯林暴動。而阿拉干穆斯林發起將阿拉干地區併入東巴基斯坦（即孟加拉）的政治行動未果後，除了以聖戰軍(Mujahideen)與緬甸政府對抗，並尋求設立自治區外，自1960年代發展以標榜阿拉干原住民的「羅興亞」認同，爭取內部凝聚及外部支持。 在宇努政府(U Nu)主政下，羅興亞人尚能以公民身份獲得參政權，而尼溫軍政府1978年發動清查非法入境者的龍王行動(Nagamin)及1982年實施新公民法後，羅興亞人公民權被徹底剝奪，並被迫在1978、1991-92、2012、2015及2016年間經歷數波難民離散，遷徙至孟加拉、馬來西亞及泰國等國。 「阿拉干羅興亞難民委員會」( RARC)是難民自身所建立的難民社群組織(RCOs)，不僅為羅興亞社群發聲，亦與聯合國難民署(UNHCR) 及非政府組織(NGOs)等單位合作，發展其社群力量。而在馬來西亞政府默許及容忍下，羅興亞難民獲得安全棲身之所，除可透過通婚取得永久居留外，在開放羅興亞難民工作許可等政策開放下，羅興亞難民在地融合及生活發展。 本文以滯留馬來西亞安邦的緬甸羅興亞難民社群為主研究對象，探討羅興亞溯源、緬甸佛教徒與穆斯林之宗教衝突、羅興亞離散、及難民社群組織發展。 / Rohingya Muslim (or Arakanese Muslim) have been residing in Northen Rakhine (or Arakan) in Burma/Myanmarfor centuries , with the mass inflow of Indians during British Colonial Period into Burma, Muslim population grew up and it resulted in competition,then ethnic tension simmered between Indians and Burmeses. The conflicts between Buddhist and Muslim bursted between 1930 and 1938 , and fail of integration of Arakan with East Pakistan (Bangladesh ) triggered Arakanese Muslim’s militant autonomy operation and the Arakanese Muslim created the “Rohingya” ethnic identity movement in the 1960s. The cleaning of illegal immigrant operation “ Nagamin ” in1978 , implementation of new Citizen Law in 1982, and religious and ecthnic conflict had resulted Rohingya in exile in 1978 ,1991-2, 2013, 2015 and 2016 , therefore Rohingya migrated to Bangladesh , Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia. With the help of UNHCR and Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs) ,the Refugee Community Organizations(RCOs) such as Rohingya Arakanese Refugee Committee (RARC) not only play the role as intermediator between community and NGOs , but also lobbied the Malaysia government. This dissertation focuses on the Burmese Rohingya communities in Ampang Malaysia and the origin of Rohingya, the ethnic and religious conflicts between Buddhists and Muslims , the Rohingya Diaspora and development of RCOs.

No description available.

In early 2001, as I began exploring the role of religion in conflict, I came across a declaration by a then little-known leader, Osama bin Laden, and his fellows. That declaration was of the World Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders.1 Many analysts now see it as one of the founding documents of al Qaeda, the amorphous terrorist umbrella group. The purpose of the declaration was to issue a fatwa that, because United States troops were stationed in the holy Arabian peninsula and threatened Muslims, particularly in Iraq, it was every Muslim¿s duty ¿to kill the Americans and their allies ¿ civilians and military ¿ ... in any country in which it is possible to do it.¿ Of course, the first thing that struck me, as an American, was that here was a group that wished to kill me solely because of my birthplace. They did not seem to care that I might not support specific actions of my government, even if I supported that government generally. Nor was there any discussion of whether methods other than violence might be more useful in persuading my fellow citizens as to the justice of their cause. I wondered, as a student of peace studies, what I could do in the face of such seemingly implacable hatred. The second thing that struck me about the declaration was its language. I noticed, in particular, a certain flourish that one does not often find in political analysis. The image that ¿nations are attacking Muslims like people fighting over a plate of food¿ has always stayed in my mind because the simple image has such rhetorical power. I also noticed, in accordance with my research interests, the use of religious teachings as a justification for violence. Yet poetic rhetoric and religious dogma were not the only contents of that declaration. Bin Laden and his fellows made coherent political points. They cited as 1 bin Laden, Osama; al-Zawahiri, Ayman; Taha, Abu-Yasir Rifa¿i Ahmad; Hamzah, Mir; Rahman, Fazlul, 1998, ¿Nass Bayan al-Jabhah al-Islamiyah al-Alamiyah li-Jihad al-Yahud wa-al-Salibiyin¿ (¿Declaraton of the World Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders¿), al-Quds al-Arabi (UK) 9(2732), 23 Feb.: 3, <data.alquds.co.uk/Alquds/1998/02Feb/23%2520Feb% 2520Mon/QudsPage03.pdf>. Cornell University Library hosts an English translation and a photocopy of the original at <www.library.cornell.edu/colldev/mideast/wif.htm> and <./fatw2.htm>, respectively (all web addresses as at 27 Jan. 2005). examples of the harm caused by the United States: the post-Gulf War presence of US troops in Saudi Arabia, ¿dictating to its rulers [and] humiliating its people;¿ the continued bombing of Iraq ¿even though all [Saudi] rulers are against their territories being used to that end;¿ and, finally, the way that these actions contributed to the security of Israel by weakening Arab nations. Thus, beneath its religious expression the declaration contained political points with which I could engage. Now, as I categorically oppose the use of violence, I unreservedly reject the conclusion of the fatwa. Moreover, I do not assume that a single statement is evidence of this group¿s true intent. It may very well be the case, as analysts more versed in their politics than I have argued, that al Qaeda¿s real goal is the establishment of an Islamic caliphate. Its affiliation with Afghanistan¿s Taliban certainly supports this argument. In spite of these things, though, their use of political arguments meant they were trying to reach an audience that cared about such things. I could address that audience as well, and try to propose different courses of action that would address the same concerns. Thus, I could step outside of my original framework, in which I envisioned implacable hatred, and argue for nonviolent ways of addressing the issues. Yet the religious idiom of the declaration was also an important factor. Given that the declaration addressed Muslims as Muslims, by only trying to argue political points with them I might alienate people for whom the religious language meant a great deal. Already in my research I had come to the conclusion, drawing on R. Scott Appleby¿s The Ambivalence of the Sacred,2 that the people best placed to show the peaceful potential of a religion are believers in that religion. I am not, however, religious. Thus, this conclusion left me with no recourse in the face of the religious aspects of conflict. I began to wonder what role a nonreligious ¿ or, as I came to think of myself, a secular ¿ person could play in peacemaking when religion is an element of a conflict. Moreover, 2 Appleby, R. Scott, 2000, The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence, and Reconciliation (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield). I saw that different seculars would have different reactions to bin Laden¿s arguments. Some would reject the message because of the religious medium. Some, like I first did, would perceive the sociopolitical elements but continue to ignore the religious language. Others, as I also briefly did, might consider the religious element but leave out the issue of their own secular nature. Yet no perspective provided a good model for what I, as a secular, might do. Thus, the goal of my thesis became to analyze the various models of secularity, find the most beneficial principles, and construct from these a model for secular best practice. That Osama bin Laden¿s words should catalyze this thesis brings me to two important points. First, this is not a thesis about Islam. If a disproportionate number of the examples that I use throughout the thesis focus on Islam, this should not indicate that Islam deserves special attention concerning conflict and violence. Rather, the focus here is always on secularity and secular responses to religion in situations of conflict. However, particularly after September 11th, the largely secular policy and scholarly establishments of Europe and North America have produced a great deal of material concerning Islam. Thus, while I sought out more diverse sources dealing with secularity, I often used the religion most commented on by secular sources as an exemplar. That leads to the second point, which is that this is not a thesis about terrorism. Given its scope and the place of religion in it, most obvious case study to use in this thesis is the ¿war on terror¿ ¿ which I call such for ease of use, as that is what the Western media generally call it, not because I think it is an adequate designation. I will cover this topic in the final chapter, but because the thesis is about peace and violence in conflict, and not about specific forms of violence, it will not figure elsewhere. Because this thesis is concerned with violence and, specifically, with the promotion of peace, it has an overt prescriptive element. This stems in large part from my Peace Studies background. Peace Studies entails a normative commitment to pursue peaceful situations through nonviolent means. Thus, at several points I actively enjoin readers to take or not take certain types of action because, by my analysis, that is the best way to promote peaceful relationships. More generally, by the title of this thesis, I ask readers to ¿rethink secular and sacred¿ ¿ both what these terms mean, and more importantly how they relate to one another. In particular, this goal leads me to avoid discussing the concept of tolerance. Tolerance is often held to be a virtue by those who seek to promote nonconfrontational religious interaction. However, as many other writers have pointed out, the word ¿tolerance¿ itself stems from physiological and biological studies, where it means the ability to withstand negative factors, such as poisons or drugs.3 Thus I find that its social meaning is essentially negative, denoting forbearance of what one finds repugnant. While in a very limited sense I feel that tolerance is necessary, it is only as a first step to actively engaging with what one might at first find off-putting. By itself, tolerance does not encourage one to rethink one¿s relationship with something, and thus a nonconfrontational situation is not necessarily a peaceful one. As I researched the thesis, although I was aware of academic work concerning tolerance, I found that none of it contributed to my goals. Thus, the thesis took shape in such a way that a treatment of tolerance was unnecessary. As a final note I would like to mention another topic that did not fit into this thesis, which I regard as something of a loss ¿ gender. During my research, I was also aware of work in this field, and, again, the structure of this thesis is such that it was not necessary to mention it explicitly. However, if there is one single issue that cuts across religious and secular groups, as well as the conflicts I analyze, it is the effect of gender roles and issues. Yet the very breadth of the topic put me in a bind ¿ either I could thoroughly treat it and produce a much different thesis, or I could cursorily treat it, perhaps in the chapter on theory and methodology. I chose to do neither, because the first option would have obscured the value that this thesis does have, and the second would have been a paltry treatment of such a weighty topic. However, the theoretical schools I use 3 See, for example, the Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd ed. (1st 1933), Simpson, J.A., and Weiner, E.S.C., co-eds., in. al. (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1989), v. 18, pp. 199-200. in this thesis are amenable to a gendered interpretation. This is particularly the case with integral theory, the chief proponent of which, Ken Wilber, has addressed gender issues in a number of his primary works. One can easily discern what I define in this thesis as a strong-open analysis in his analysis of feminisms. He notes both the strength of the radical feminist perspective that champions female distinctiveness as well as the desire of liberal feminists to open social and political spheres traditionally closed to women, and seeks to bring them together.4 Thus, I am confident that this thesis can bolster future research that specifically addresses gender issues as they arise in conflicts with a religious element.