The debate between scientific realism and constructive empiricism is often cast in terms of a debate over what it is "rational" to accept about successful scientific theories. I cast this debate differently: I place these conflicting philosophies of science within our current political context, asking the question "which of these philosophies gives us the conceptual tools we need to allow science to adequately inform our public policy decisions?" I argue that most cases of long-term planning based on current science. such as curbing carbon emissions based on global warming theory. are decisions that can only be made if we approach scientific theories realistically. This vindicates the project of developing a realist epistemology, for only by inquiring into the truth with respect to unobservables can we make adequately informed public policy decisions.

Submitted by Noeme Timbo (noeme.timbo@metodista.br) on 2017-10-06T19:46:11Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Amanda Pereira2.pdf: 2672065 bytes, checksum: c965b7e1cad8efcab7ba8969d65fdf7e (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-10-06T19:46:11Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Amanda Pereira2.pdf: 2672065 bytes, checksum: c965b7e1cad8efcab7ba8969d65fdf7e (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-05-10 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPES / This research is motivated by the question What is Media in the approaches circumscribed by the national production? Because of this, the surveys are specifically related to the field of Communication have been integrally linked to the references were used in Stricto Sensu courses and in periodicals and annals of national scope of the last seven years. With the objective of mapping conceptual proposals about Media and based on Lope’s methodology (2005), an analysis of recent publications and texts that can be designated as Communication Classics was carried out, which was subdivided into methodical-technical and theoretical-epistemological procedures of in order to identify and evaluate arguments on Media issue. Through the results obtained the main conclusions are: in recent texts media is a conceptual gap, since the problematization directed to the concept itself is representative in less than 1% of the texts analyzed. In relation to the classical texts, although there are some clues of space for the f hypothetical constructions that collaborate for the conceptualization, the intuition of the epistemological debate, on the prominence of the non-specialized use of the term are confirmed / Esta pesquisa é motivada pela pergunta Que é Meio de Comunicação nas abordagens circunscritas pela produção nacional? Em razão disso, os levantamentos realizados especificamente sobre o domínio da Comunicação foram integralmente vinculados às referências utilizadas nos cursos de pós-graduação Stricto Sensu e em periódicos e anais de abrangência nacional dos últimos sete anos. Com o objetivo de mapear proposituras conceituais acerca de Meio de Comunicação e baseada na proposta metodológica de Lopes (2005), foi realizada uma análise subdivida em procedimentos de cunho metódico-técnico e teórico-epistemológico das publicações recentes e de textos que podem ser designados como clássicos da área, visando identificar e avaliar argumentos sobre a questão. Mediante os resultados obtidos as principais conclusões são: em textos recentes Meio de Comunicação é uma lacuna conceitual, visto que a problematização direcionada ao conceito em si é representativa em menos de 1% dos textos analisados. Em relação aos textos clássicos, embora se tenha algumas pistas de espaços para a formulação de construções hipotéticas que colaborem para a conceituação, confirmam-se as intuições do debate epistemológico que apontam para a proeminência do uso não especializado do termo.

Objects are characterised by their properties. If an object is a red postbox, then it has the property of being red, and the property of being a postbox. This thesis is an attack on a particular view of the metaphysics of properties, according to which some properties are privileged over others. The most well-known theories of privileged properties are Armstrong’s theory of sparse immanent universals (1979b) and Lewis’ natural properties (1983). According to their supporters, only privileged properties perform certain jobs, such as featuring in laws of nature, or grounding similarity between objects. Metaphysical posits are theoretically virtuous if they can account for a range of different phenomena in a relatively parsimonious manner. The ability of privileged properties to perform a range of worthwhile ‘work’, therefore, is what justifies a belief in them. The conclusion I reach is that a single group of properties is not capable of satisfying the key roles commonly attributed to the privileged properties. Without satisfying these roles in concert, a belief in mainstream versions of privileged properties is not justified. The first part of this thesis is devoted to an explication of privilege and the roles which privileged properties are taken to perform. I conclude that three roles in particular, Supervenience, Similarity and Magnetism are key roles for mainstream theories of privilege. In part two, I show that the properties which satisfy the Supervenience role are not the same as those which satisfy the Similarity and Magnetism roles. In the final chapter of this thesis I discuss the implications of my findings for support for theories of privilege.

Inferences from scientific success to the approximate truth of successful theories remain central to the most influential arguments for scientific realism. Challenges to such inferences, however, based on radical discontinuities within the history of science, have motivated a distinctive style of revision to the original argument. Conceding the historical claim, selective realists argue that accompanying even the most revolutionary change is the retention of significant parts of replaced theories, and that a realist attitude towards the systematically retained constituents of our scientific theories can still be defended. Selective realists thereby hope to secure the argument from success against apparent historical counterexamples. Independently of that objective, historical considerations have inspired a further argument for selective realism, where evidence for the retention of parts of theories is itself offered as justification for adopting a realist attitude towards them. Given the nature of these arguments from success and from retention, a reasonable expectation is that they would complement and reinforce one another, but although several theses purport to provide such a synthesis the results are often unconvincing. In this paper I reconsider the realist's favoured type of scientific success, novel success, offer a revised interpretation of the concept, and argue that a significant consequence of reconfiguring the realist's argument from success accordingly is a greater potential for its unification with the argument from retention.

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Jacques Joseph Scientific Realism and the Natural World M.A. thesis Abstract The main topic of this work is the relation between the natural world and the world of the natural sciences, and furthermore the relation of both these worlds to our conception of an external reality "as it really is". The core of the work is rooted mainly in the Anglo-American analytical philosophy of science, namely the debate concerning scientific realism, with a section dedicated to Husserl's conception of the relation between the natural world and natural sciences (as described in his Krisis). The goal of this work is to show scientific realism as broken beyond repair, and to then offer an alternative. The problems that plague realism run deep into its roots, many of which it shares with its opponents, the new alternative theory therefore needs to be completely different. This work suggests the "Natural ontological attitude" (NOA) presented by Arthur Fine, a theory that tries to salvage the intuitions that made realism seem so attractive. NOA is then developped, using texts by W. V. O. Quine and D. Davidson, as a minimalistic metaphysics based strongly on language that still manages to provide a relation to an extra-linguistic reality.

O objetivo principal desta tese é argumentar a favor da intuição básica do realismo científico, com o apoio de uma versão fortalecida e articulada do argumento do milagre. O realismo científico é uma concepção filosófica da ciência que assume uma atitude epistêmica otimista frente aos resultados da investigação científica que abrangem aspectos do mundo tanto observáveis como inobserváveis. Segundo o realismo científico, as entidades inobserváveis postuladas pelas teorias científicas bem-sucedidas têm existência real e essas teorias são verdadeiras ou aproximadamente verdadeiras. Essa atitude positiva é contestada por diversas perspectivas filosóficas conhecidas coletivamente como formas de antirrealismo científico (positivismo lógico, instrumentalismo, empirismo construtivo, historicismo, construtivismo social etc.). Procuramos analisar e rebater três importantes modalidades de argumentação antirrealista: a subdeterminação empírica das teorias, a indução pessimista e a circularidade viciosa da inferência da melhor explicação. Argumentamos que não obstante as diferenças que se mantêm entre as concepções realistas da ciência, o chamado argumento do milagre constitui uma peça central na defesa do realismo científico. Esse argumento se expressa na célebre formulação de Putnam (1975, p. 73), [...] o realismo científico é a única filosofia que não faz do sucesso da ciência um milagre. Para o realista científico, a ciência é bem-sucedida em explicar e prever fenômenos, inclusive novos, porque suas melhores teorias (maduras, não ad hoc, bem-sucedidas empírica e instrumentalmente, provedora de previsões novas, fecundas etc.) são (parcial ou aproximadamente) verdadeiras e as entidades inobserváveis postuladas por essas teorias realmente existem. Argumentamos também que outros esquemas de explicação para o êxito científico baseados em visões antirrealistas ou não-realistas da ciência são insatisfatórios. Examinamos diversas formas de fortalecer o argumento do milagre mediante as qualificações de novidade preditiva e fecundidade teórica, e concluímos que esse argumento continua sendo basilar e estratégico na defesa do realismo científico. / The main objective of this thesis is to argue in favor of the basic intuition of scientific realism, with the support of a strengthened and articulated version of the miracle argument. Scientific realism is a philosophical conception of science that takes an optimistic epistemic attitude towards the results of scientific research concerning both observable and unobservable aspects of the world. According to scientific realism, the unobservable entities postulated by successful scientific theories actually exist, and these theories are true or approximately true. This positive attitude is challenged by various philosophical perspectives known collectively as forms of scientific antirealism (logical positivism, instrumentalism, constructive empiricism, historicism, social constructivism, etc.). We analyze and rebut three important modalities of the antirealist argument: empirical underdetermination of theories, pessimistic induction, and the vicious circularity of inference to the best explanation. We argue that despite the differences that remain between the realist conceptions of science, the so-called miracle argument is a centerpiece in the defense of scientific realism. This argument is expressed in Putnams famous formulation (1975a, p. 73): [...] realism is the only philosophy that doesnt make the success of the science a miracle. For the scientific realist, science is successful in explaining and predicting phenomena, including new ones, because its best theories (mature, not ad hoc, successful empirically and instrumentally, providing new forecasts, fruitful, etc.) are (partially or approximately) true and the unobservable entities postulated by these theories really exist. We also argue that other schemes of explanation of scientific success, based on antirealist or non-realist views of science, are unsatisfactory. We examine various ways of strengthening the miracle argument based on the notions of predictive novelty and theoretical fruitfulness, and we conclude that this argument remains fundamental and strategic in the defense of scientific realism.

A number of philosophical questions, all connected to modern research in quantum gravity, are discussed in this dissertation. The goal of research in quantum gravity is to find a quantum theory for gravitation; the other fundamental forces are already understood in terms of quantum physics. Quantum gravity is studied within a number of different research programmes. The most popular are string theory and loop quantum gravity; besides these a number of other approaches are pursued. Due to the lack of empirical support, it is relevant to assess the scientific status of this research. This is done from four different points of view, namely the ones held by: logical positivists, Popper, Kuhn and Lakatos. It is then argued that research in quantum gravity may be considered scientific, conditional on scientists being open with the tentative and speculative nature of their pursuits. Given the lack of empirical progress, in all approaches to quantum gravity, a pluralistic strategy is advised. In string theory there are different theoretical formulations, or dualities, which are physically equivalent. This is relevant for the problem of underdetermination of theories by data, and the debate on scientific realism. Different views on the dualities are possible. It is argued that a more empiricist view on the semantics of theories, than what has been popular lately, ought to be adopted. This is of importance for our understanding of what the theories tell us about space and time. In physics and philosophy, the idea that there are worlds or universes other than our own, has appeared in different contexts. It is discussed how we should understand these different suggestions; how they are similar and how they are different. A discussion on, how and when theoretical multiverse scenarios can be empirically testable, is also given. The reliability of thought experiments in physics in general and in quantum gravity in particular is evaluated. Thought experiments can be important for heuristic purposes, but in the case of quantum gravity, conclusions based on thoght experiments are not very reliable.