Submitted by Fabricia Fialho Reginato (fabriciar) on 2015-06-27T01:35:46Z No. of bitstreams: 1 GuilhermeFeldens.pdf: 1528101 bytes, checksum: a23634d266eb33989f293ebba6206ac6 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2015-06-27T01:35:46Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 GuilhermeFeldens.pdf: 1528101 bytes, checksum: a23634d266eb33989f293ebba6206ac6 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-08-11 / Nenhuma / O senso de justiça é um dos elementos essenciais para a criação de uma comunidade justa e democrática nos moldes apresentados em A theory of justice. A virada política de Rawls, centrada na análise da estabilidade social e da legitimidade do poder diante a pluralidade de concepções morais presentes nas sociedades atuais, não eliminou totalmente a importância do senso de justiça na justificação pública proposta em Political liberalism. Nesse sentido, afirma-se que a moralidade em Rawls tem uma função social, pois visa defender o indivíduo frente à sociedade sem ter a coerção externa como principal fonte de motivação para cumprir seus preceitos. A partir desse quadro, o presente trabalho objetiva demonstrar que Rawls apresenta uma concepção de Direito embasada em princípios de justiça expressos no acordo Constitucional. Rawls garante um modelo de sistema jurídico afastado do positivismo jurídico e do utilitarismo, capaz de garantir um sentido democrático diferente, afastado da mera tentativa de legitimação da autoridade política através de um discurso normativo. Por fim, conclui-se que tal modelo garante uma atividade jurisdicional caracterizada pela responsabilidade de manter os princípios de justiça aceitos por todos os cidadãos no acordo constitucional. Dessa forma, as decisões relativas às questões sociais essenciais não serão influenciadas por interesses de maiorias transitórias, nem pelas concepções morais individuais dos julgadores, respeitando a coerência de um sistema de justiça construído a partir de juízos democráticos. / The sense of justice is one of the essential elements for the creation of a fair and democratic community as presented in A theory of justice. Rawls's political shift, focusing on the analysis of social stability and legitimacy of power before the plural moral concepts present in current societies, has not totally eliminated the relevance of the sense of justice in the public justification proposed in Political liberalism. In this sense, it is said that morality in Rawls has a social function, once it aims at defending the individual before society without external coercion as a main source of motivation to fulfill its precepts. Based on this picture, the purpose of this study is to show that Rawls presents a concept of Law based on principles of justice expressed in the constitutional settlement. Rawls establishes a model for the legal system distant from legal positivism and utilitarianism, one that is capable of assuring a different democratic sense, distant from the mere attempt to legitimize political authority through a normative discourse. Finally, it is concluded that such model assures a jurisdictional activity characterized by the responsibility to make all citizens in the constitutional settlement accept the justice criteria. Thus, decisions regarding essential social issues shall not be influenced by interests of the transient majorities, nor by the individual moral conceptions of the judges, this way respecting the coherence of a legal system built on democratic judgments.

The public’s views on what constitute appropriate reactions to crime, have come to assume an increasingly central position in the crime policy rhetoric of western countries. In Sweden this manifests itself in recurrent referrals to the public’s sense of justice. Any clear definitions of what the public’s sense of justice is, how it is expressed and how it can be read are however absent from these referrals. In this thesis the use of referrals to the public’s sense of justice as a legitimizing ground for penal legislation is problematized from an empirical perspective. Paper I points out the substantial variation found in the public’s view on what constitutes appropriate sentences. According to Paper II society’s reactions to crime are expected to fulfill different, and often contradictory, objectives simultaneously. Paper III also points to the assumption that views on what constitutes appropriate sentences are based on deliberations where different dimensions of society’s reaction are weighed against each other. The public’s sense of justice, thus, consists of diverse, variable and complex opinions. Referrals to it as a legitimizing ground for changes in penal legislation becomes a matter of choice between whose and which opinion it is that should be emphasized. For this choice to be perceived as legitimate it should not be made without at the same time motivating it. If crime policy is to be both knowledge-based and fitted to the public’s sense of justice the public must be given the opportunity to develop an informed and well-grounded sense of justice. Especially since, compared to other political matters, crime policy and its consequences are something that only a small portion of the public comes into direct contact with. The suggestion is that the public criminal policy debate is framed so that it matches the complexity of the public’s sense of justice itself. / <p>At the time of the doctoral defense, the following papers were unpublished and had a status as follows: Paper 2: Accepted. Paper 3: Accepted.</p>

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Ce mémoire cherche à porter au jour les présupposés normatifs substantiels de la théorie de la justice comme équité (TJÉ) de John Rawls. Plus précisément, il tente de déduire puis de définir ses présupposés éthiques, c’est-à-dire ce qu’elle tient implicitement pour être des biens constitutifs de la justice. En supposant l’existence d’éléments normatifs se rapportant à la question du bien en amont des normes du juste, cette proposition de recherche contredit en elle-même le trait essentiel du déontologisme procédural rawlsien, soit la primauté du juste (right) sur le bien. Nous suivons en cela Paul Ricœur et réitérons sa thèse du primat de l’éthique, entendue comme visées à propos du bien, sur la morale, comprise comme normes à visées universelles définissant des obligations. Selon cette thèse, toute norme morale s’ancre nécessairement dans un sens éthique qui la précède ou, pour le dire dans les mots de Rawls, dans un sens de la justice. Nous tentons en premier lieu de démontrer que deux présupposés éthiques, en tant qu’idéaux non thématisés, règlent pourtant de bout en bout toute la modélisation théorique de la TJÉ. On pourrait ainsi dire qu’ils sont les points fixes normatifs les plus élémentaires du sens de la justice opérant l’équilibre réfléchi. Il s’agit des présupposés de l’autodétermination des personnes et de la réciprocité symétrique. Ensuite, à l’aide de ce que Ricœur nommait sa « petite éthique », laquelle se trouve en dialogue explicite avec Rawls, nous nous efforçons de préciser les visées originaires à propos du bien donnant force de norme à chacun des deux présupposés éthiques. Une fois la particularité du sens de la justice à l’origine de la TJÉ ainsi exposée et précisée, il sera possible de prendre la mesure des impasses théoriques et pratiques auxquelles se bute forcément une théorie politique dont l’ambition de fonder la légitimité politique sur l’entente mutuelle s’autorise de la prétention à éviter les questions controversées à propos du bien. / This thesis seeks to bring to light the substantial normative presuppositions of the theory of justice as equity (TJE) of John Rawls. More precisely, it tries to deduce and define its ethical presuppositions, that is to say what it implicitly considers to be constitutive goods of justice. In assuming the existence of normative elements that pertain to the question of the good prior to the norms of justice, this research proposal in itself questions the essential feature of Rawlsian procedural deontologism, namely the primacy of the right over the good. In this regard we follow Paul Ricœur, as we reiterate his thesis on the primacy of ethics, understood as ends relatives to the good, on morality, understood as universal norms defining obligations. According to this thesis, any moral norm is necessarily anchored in an ethical aim that precedes it or, to put it in Rawls' words, in a sense of justice. We first attempt to demonstrate that two ethical presuppositions, as non-thematized ideals, nevertheless govern from end to end all the theoretical ordering of the TJE. We could thus say that they are the most elementary normative fixed points of the sense of justice operating the reflective equilibrium. These are the assumptions of self-determination of people and symmetrical reciprocity. Then, using what Ricœur called his "petite éthique", which is in explicit dialogue with Rawls, we attempt to specify the original aims of the good which give normative potency to each of the two ethical presuppositions. Once the particularity of the sense of justice at the origin of the TJE is thus exposed and clarified, it will be possible to recognize the theoretical and practical shortcomings that a political theory that claims to avoid controversial questions about the good in order to justify the possibility of reaching mutual understanding will inevitably encounter.

La Guinée, depuis son accession à l’indépendance en 1958, a été dirigée par des régimes autoritaires successifs et a traversé des périodes marquées par de graves victimisations dont les plus remarquables se sont produites entre 1958 et 1984, sous le règne d’Ahmed Sékou Touré, puis dernièrement en 2009, sous le règne du Capitaine Moussa Dadis Camara. Ces crimes contre l’humanité ont eu des impacts directs et indirects sur la vie des victimes, leurs familles, et proches. Ils ont causé des milliers de morts, provoqué l’exil d’innombrables individus et occasionné le viol de centaines de femmes (Human Rights Watch, 2011). Bien que l’État guinéen ait entrepris de nombreuses actions visant ostentatoirement à faire justice aux victimes de ces faits, ces dernières demeurent insatisfaites et persistent dans leur quête de justice. Ceci nous conduit à des questionnements : qu’est-ce que la justice pour les victimes de crimes contre l’humanité en Guinée ? Comment les victimes arrivent-elles à ce sentiment de justice ? Dans cette thèse, nous explorons le sentiment de justice de 31 victimes de crimes contre l’humanité commis en Guinée. Plus précisément, nous utilisons, comme cadre théorique la théorie de la justice pour examiner les perceptions et expériences de victimes par rapport à la justice afin de promouvoir la réconciliation et la paix durable. Les résultats indiquent que la justice a plusieurs dimensions, à savoir la justice distributive, la justice procédurale et la justice interactionnelle. Bien que la justice distributive (punition et réparation) soit évoquée plus rapidement dans le discours des victimes, la justice procédurale (neutralité des autorités, constance, etc.) et la justice interactionnelle (respect, information, etc.) ont toutes aussi leur importance aux yeux des victimes. Il existe plusieurs similarités entre les deux groupes de victimes étudiés, entre celles de 1958-1984 et celles de 2009, quant aux violences commises, à leurs conséquences et à la définition de la justice. Mais, ces deux groupes diffèrent sous plusieurs autres coutures, notamment par rapport aux types de violences, à la durée de la commission des crimes, à la méthode utilisée pour les commettre, à l’interchangeabilité des rôles victimes-bourreaux, à la durée des conséquences des crimes et à l’importance des éléments compris dans la définition de la justice. Certains éléments de la définition de la justice seraient plus importants que d’autres pour chaque groupe de victimes compte tenu du temps passé depuis la commission des crimes, du décès de la plupart des bourreaux, et de l’interchangeabilité des rôles bourreaux victimes. Cela dit, la justice dans son ensemble est une condition à la réconciliation. Toutefois, le manque de justice vécue par les victimes remet en question la réconciliation en Guinée. / Since its independence in 1958, Guinea has been ruled by authoritarian regimes that caused many victims of serious violations, the most notable dating from 1958 to 1984 under the reign of Ahmed Sékou Touré and recently in 2009 under the reign of Moussa Dadis Camara. The crimes against humanity in Guinea had direct and indirect impacts on the lives of the victims, their families, and their loved ones. They have left thousands of dead, they resulted in the exile of countless individuals and the rape and abuse of hundreds of women (Human Rights Watch, 2011). While some efforts have been made to address this violence, victims nevertheless persist in their demand for justice. This raises many questions: what is justice for the victims of crimes against humanity in Guinea? How do victims come to the sense of justice? In this paper, we explore the perceptions of justice of 31 victims of crimes against humanity in Guinea. More specifically, we use justice as a theoretical framework to examine perceptions and experiences of victims in relation to justice in order to promote reconciliation and lasting peace. The results indicate that justice has several dimensions, namely distributive justice, procedural justice and interactional justice. Although distributive justice (punishment and reparation) comes more quickly in victims’ discourse, procedural justice (neutrality of authorities, constancy, etc.) and interactional justice (respect, information, etc.) are equally important in the eyes of the victims. There are several similarities between the two groups of victims (1958–1984 and 2009) as regards the violence committed, their consequences, and the definition of justice. However, there are differences as well, particularly regarding the types of violence, the duration of the crimes, the method used to commit the crimes, the interchangeability of victim-offender roles, the duration of the consequences of crimes and the importance of the elements included in the definition of justice. Some elements included in the definition of justice would be more important than others for each group of victims given the time that has passed since the commission of crimes, the death of most perpetrators, and the interchangeability of victims perpetrators’ roles. That said, justice as a whole is a condition for reconciliation. However, the lack of justice experienced by the victims calls into question reconciliation in Guinea.