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Régulièrement le droit de la concurrence est perçu comme constituant un frein, un obstacle à toute velléité de mener une politique industrielle. Droit de la concurrence et politique industrielle sont souvent présentés comme étant, par nature ; opposés. Ce travail de doctorat tend à préciser la manière avec laquelle le droit de la concurrence participe de la formation d’un modèle d’industrie compétitive au niveau européen. Il s’agit de dépasser les définitions figées de la politique industrielle renvoyant exclusivement à l’implication étatique et de montrer comment et par quelles applications pratiques le droit de la concurrence permet d’atteindre cet objectif téléologique de compétitivité. Cette vision doit déboucher sur l’identification et l’analyse des deux axes majeurs au travers desquels le droit de la concurrence participe de la démarche dynamique de construction d’un modèle compétitif industriel : son influence sur les contenus et formes des interventions étatiques et son influence sur le comportement et les stratégies des entreprises manufacturières. Pour réaliser une telle ambition un large travail d’analyse des décisions de la Commission et de la jurisprudence de la Cour a dès lors été entrepris. / On a regular basis competition law is seen as an obstacle or a brake to any willingness of pursuing a project of industrial policy. Competition law and industrial policy are often presented as, by their sole nature, opposed. My PHD work tends to precise the way in which competition law participates to the establishment of competitive industrial model at the European scale. It outweighs the congealed definitions of industrial policies exclusively understanding it as deriving from state intervention. It aims at showing how and by which practical ways competition law makes possible to reach the teleological aim of competitiveness.This perspective leads to the identification and the analysis of the two major axis through which competition law participates to the teleological construction of a competitive industrial model : its influence upon the contents and the forms of state intervention and its impact on the actions and strategies of the manufacturing firms. To realize such a project a deep and large analysis of the Commission’s decisions and of the case-law of the Court has been undertaken.

Cette thèse étudie le développement du système financier chinois. Elle dévoile des aspects nouveaux du développement du système financier sur la dernière décennie. Globalement, les résultats montrent que les progrès réalisés vers un système efficient demeurent contrastés. Le premier chapitre montre que le marché obligataire des entreprises non financières est toujours sous influence du gouvernement. Sur la base de cet élément, il est peu probable d’espérer une baisse de la domination du secteur bancaire sur le système financier. Le second chapitre montre que la gouvernance d’entreprise interne reste imparfaite. En analysant les fluctuations des prix des actions au moment de l’annonce d’un changement de P-DG, nous trouvons que le type de propriété de l’entreprise joue une influence majeure sur les conséquences d’une telle décision. Le troisième chapitre révèle que peu de progrès ont été faits en termes de concurrence au sein du secteur bancaire malgré le nombre de nouveaux entrants sur le marché. Cependant, les banques se comportent de façon plus efficiente sur la décennie. Il ne semble pas exister d’arbitrage entre les bénéfices d’une plus grande concurrence et l’efficience du système bancaire en Chine. Le quatrième chapitre montre les effets bénéfiques de la nouvelle réglementation sur les exigences en capital des banques chinoises en termes d’efficience bancaire. Les exigences en capital, en plus de fournir des coussins en capital supplémentaires, apparaissent réduire l’aléa moral entre les actionnaires des banques et leurs créanciers. / This dissertation analyzes the development of the Chinese financial system from different perspectives. It has shed light on the recent advancements of the last decade. Overall, the findings reveal a contrasted picture of the progress achieved towards an efficient system. Chapter 1 has shown that the corporate bond market is still impeded by government influence. Based on this evidence, it is thus very unlikely to expect the banking system to decrease its dominance on the financial system. Chapter 2 also stressed that internal governance mechanisms remain imperfect. By analyzing the market price fluctuations at the time of the announcement of a CEO turnover, we find that ownership type plays a major influence on the expected consequences of such a decision. Chapter 3 revealed that little progress has been made in terms of banking competition despite the increasing number of new entrants in the market. However, banks behaved more efficiently over the decade. No trade-off seems to exist for policy-makers between the benefits of lower banking prices and efficiency of the system. Chapter 4 finally showed the beneficial effects of the capital requirement regulation on bank efficiency in China. Capital requirements, in supplement to provide higher capital buffers, appear to lower moral between banks’ shareholders and debtholders.

Submitted by Maria Fernanda Arreola Croda (fernanda.arreola@gmail.com) on 2014-08-18T13:40:54Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Tese Maria Fernanda Arreola.pdf: 1365605 bytes, checksum: bc44261ba0ee9e9106bd00f16c83014f (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by PAMELA BELTRAN TONSA (pamela.tonsa@fgv.br) on 2014-08-18T13:42:11Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Tese Maria Fernanda Arreola.pdf: 1365605 bytes, checksum: bc44261ba0ee9e9106bd00f16c83014f (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2014-08-18T13:48:38Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Tese Maria Fernanda Arreola.pdf: 1365605 bytes, checksum: bc44261ba0ee9e9106bd00f16c83014f (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-07-28 / This thesis is a collection of three different research projects analyzing the effect of state ownership in the internationalization of Emerging Multinationals (EMNEs). The participation of the state as shareholder is a phenomenon that can bring new light into the governance, management and strategic impact of having states participate as owners in different levels. These studies will allow us to explore, from different perspectives, the extent to which states, while owners, can impact the EMNE. The studies thee contained go from exploring the selection mechanisms for a firm to become the target of state ownership to its effect on the internationalization pace, passing through the revision of the mechanisms available for the state to gain control and access to a firm’s decision making, through changes to its corporate governance. / Esta tese é um compendio de três trabalhos de pesquisa que visam analisar o efeito da participação do estado na estrutura de propriedade das Multinacionais de Países Emergentes (EMNEs). A participação do estado como acionista é um fenómeno que pode trazer novas contribuições no âmbito da governança corporativa, administração da empresa e a tomada de decisões estratégicas. Os estudos aqui inclusos permitem identificar, a partir de momentos, diferentes, até que ponto o estado, na posição de proprietário da EMNE, pode impactar a mesma. Os trabalhos vão desde os mecanismos de escolha de firmas nas quais investir ate o impacto no ritmo de internacionalização das empresas, explicando também os mecanismos que o estado usa para ganhar aceso à tomada de decisões por meio de mudanças na governança corporativa

Submitted by José Marcos Carrera Junior (josemarcoscj@gmail.com) on 2018-07-20T21:26:37Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Tese - Jose Marcos Carrera Junior - Revisao.pdf: 2565078 bytes, checksum: c46da12f2180025e37af6348d41ac639 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Debora Nunes Ferreira (debora.nunes@fgv.br) on 2018-07-26T20:29:37Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Tese - Jose Marcos Carrera Junior - Revisao.pdf: 2565078 bytes, checksum: c46da12f2180025e37af6348d41ac639 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Suzane Guimarães (suzane.guimaraes@fgv.br) on 2018-07-27T12:36:16Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Tese - Jose Marcos Carrera Junior - Revisao.pdf: 2565078 bytes, checksum: c46da12f2180025e37af6348d41ac639 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-07-27T12:36:16Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Tese - Jose Marcos Carrera Junior - Revisao.pdf: 2565078 bytes, checksum: c46da12f2180025e37af6348d41ac639 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-06-21 / State-owned enterprises (SOEs) are a mechanism adopted by emerging countries to fulfill the need for investment in specific areas. Under import substitution industrialization (ISI) policy marked by state intervention in the economy, SOEs and national private companies became protected from foreign competition and enjoyed great market power. However, economic shocks during the 1970s and 1980s, along with the growing inefficiency of these enterprises due to agency problems, led to losses. During the 1990s, Latin-American countries opened their economy and undertook privatization programs. However, since strong national companies may be useful for the State because they control strategic resources, and in order to maintain national sovereignty by preventing the acquisition of SOEs by foreign investors, the Brazilian State kept a minority equity stake in these companies. In addition, the Brazilian State also invested in some companies to make them globally competitive ("national champions"), while also holding minority equity stakes to avoid their acquisition by foreigners. We argue that the government has not abandoned its previous policy of intervention in the economy, instead, it has adapted it to new circumstances. We evaluate the influence of state ownership on the companies’ degree of internationalization and performance. SOEs may perform worse than privately controlled firms because of agency problems, while government as a minority shareholder can assist firms by providing financial and political resources. Analyzing a panel of non-financial listed companies in Brazil between 2002 and 2016, we found that the higher the state ownership by means of pension funds and BNDES, the higher the degree of internationalization measured by the foreign sales to total sales ratio. The degree of internationalization was even higher when the government was the minority shareholder of family-controlled companies. Analyzing the impact of state ownership on firm-level financial performance, we found that firms in which the government was one of the shareholders did not underperform in comparison to privately controlled firms before the Brazilian crisis of 2014- 2016 crisis. However, during the crisis, when government support decreased, we verified that the relation between majority state ownership and financial performance measured by the return on assets (ROA) and Tobin’s Q was negative. Although negative, there was no statistically significant effect of minority state ownership. Our study suggests the need for governmentinvested enterprises to develop skills to perform well when they cannot rely on government assistance. Furthermore, the degree of internationalization did not soften the effects of the crisis on the firm-level financial performance, which may indicate that the domestic institutional environment has a strong influence on the performance of Brazilian companies. / Empresas públicas são um mecanismo adotado por países emergentes para suprir a necessidade de investimento em áreas específicas. Na política de industrialização por substituição de importações marcada pela intervenção do Estado na economia, protegidas da competição estrangeira, empresas públicas e privadas nacionais usufruíam de amplo poder de mercado. Entretanto, choques econômicos das décadas de 70 e 80, associados à crescente ineficiência destas empresas devido a problemas de agência, geraram perdas. Durante a década de 90, os países latino-americanos, abriram sua economia e adotaram programas de privatizações. Empresas nacionais fortes podem ser úteis ao Estado por controlarem recursos estratégicos, e visando manter a soberania nacional, para evitar que as empresas públicas fossem adquiridas por investidores estrangeiros, e para continuar mantendo influência sobre sua gestão, o Estado brasileiro manteve uma participação acionária minoritária. Além disso, o governo brasileiro investiu em algumas empresas para torná-las competitivas globalmente (“campeãs nacionais”), mantendo também participação minoritária para evitar sua aquisição por estrangeiros e manter influência sobre elas. Argumentamos que o governo não abandonou sua política de intervenção na economia, apenas a adaptou à novas circunstâncias. Empresas públicas podem performar pior do que empresas privadas devido a problemas de agência, ao passo que o governo como acionista minoritário pode auxiliar as empresas ao prover recursos financeiros e políticos. Desta forma, avaliamos a influência da propriedade do Estado sobre o grau de internacionalização e desempenho financeiro das empresas. Analisando um painel de companhias não financeiras listadas entre 2002 e 2016, verificamos que quanto maior o nível de participação do governo brasileiro na propriedade, principalmente por meio de fundos de pensão e BNDES, maior o grau de internacionalização medido pela razão entre as vendas no mercado externo e vendas totais. O grau de internacionalização foi ainda maior quando o governo foi o acionista minoritário de empresas controladas por famílias. Ao analisar o impacto da propriedade estatal na performance financeira das empresas, verificamos que embora antes da crise brasileira de 2014-2016 as empresas que tinham o governo como acionista não tiveram um desempenho pior do que empresa privadas, durante a crise, quando o suporte governamental diminuiu, a relação entre participação majoritária do estado e desempenho foi fortemente negativa, ao passo que embora negativo, não houve efeito estatisticamente significativo da participação minoritária, evidenciando a necessidade das empresas investidas pelo governo em criarem competências para performarem bem mesmo sem o apoio estatal. O grau de internacionalização não amenizou os efeitos da crise para as empresas analisadas, o que pode indicar que o ambiente institucional do país de origem tem forte peso no desempenho das empresas.

L’intérêt public imprime aux ports une organisation juridique et institutionnelle spéciale. Les installations portuaires doivent fonctionner sans désemparer et aucun usager ne doit en être privé au-delà des restrictions nécessaires à la satisfaction de tous. À ce titre, elles sont traditionnellement soumises au régime de la domanialité publique et les activités qui s’y déroulent à celui du service public. Les deux régimes étant, par leur essence même, exorbitants, leur application simultanée génère une surprotection préjudiciable à la compétitivité des ports.L’objet de cette étude est de démontrer l’inadaptation de la domanialité publique portuaire, tant du point de vue de sa cohérence générale, que de du point de vue de son impact sur le développement des sites portuaires. L’adoption du CGPPP et les réformes postérieures n’ont pas permis de résoudre le problème de l’hypertrophie du domaine public portuaire, pas plus qu’elles n’ont consacré un régime domanial véritablement adapté.L’émergence du régime des conventions de terminal constitue une évolution majeure, mais insuffisante. S’il favorise un certain partage des risques entre autorités portuaires et opérateurs privés, il n’a, malheureusement, pas résolu le problème de la précarité des occupations domaniales. L’insécurité juridique demeure ; ce qui n’encourage pas l’investissement privé.Face aux contraintes du droit de la concurrence et à la généralisation de la libre circulation des biens et des personnes au sein de l’UE, les modalités de gestion des installations portuaires doivent s’adapter aux enjeux modernes de l’économie de marché. / Public interest gives harbours a specific legal and institutional framework. Harbour facilities must work continuously and stay available to every user, according to the limitations required to satisfy everybody. As such, they are traditionally subject to the state ownership system and their related activities are subject to the public service one. Both systems are exorbitant by nature. Applying them simultaneously triggers off an overprotection detrimental to harbours competitivity.This study aims at showing the harbour state ownership system is unsuitable, both in terms of overall consistency and its impact on the harbour site growth. Adoption of the general code ruling the public ownership and posterior reforms did not allow to resolve the harbour state ownership hypertrophy issue, nor did they establish an ownership system truly appropriate.Appearing harbour terminals contracts constitute a major but still insufficient evolution. If they do allow to share risks between harbour authorities and private operators to some extent, unfortunately they did not resolve the ownership activities precarity issue. Legal insecurity remains, which does not stimulate private investment.Against competition law obligations and the free movement of goods and people spreading within the EU, harbour facilities management terms need to adapt to today’s market economy challenges.

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