Ce n’est guère le mouvement jeune-hégélien qui vient immédiatement à l’espritlorsque sont évoqués les noms de Bakounine, d'Engels, de Marx ou même deStirner. Le premier et le dernier sont généralement associés à l’anarchisme,les deux autres, plus indubitablement encore, au marxisme. L'histoire de cespersonnages et le devenir de leurs œuvres n'ont pu que faire de l'ombre à leurappartenance commune et concomitante, trente ans avant que ne se cristallisentlesdits courants politiques, à ce qui a parfois été apparenté à une écolephilosophiqueLa présente thèse propose une lecture immanente, laquelle ne s'efforce pasmoins de restituer un contexte, des principaux écrits rédigés par ces auteursentre 1842 et 1843. La pensée de chacun d'entre eux est présentée dans sesinterrogations et ses enjeux propres, en s'intéressant aux emprunts et auxinnovations conceptuelles réalisées pour y répondre et tout en maintenantd’incessants aller-retours avec le champ problématique relatif au mouvementdans lequel elle prend corps et s’introduit.Il ne s'agit pas, par là, de procéder à une simple mise au point en matièred'histoire des idées. L'un des intérêts majeurs des textes abordés réside dansce qu'ils nous disent, dans une perspective post-hégélienne, de la philosophie.Les descriptions du présent que l'on trouve dans ces textes concordent, eneffet, quant à l'impossibilité d'établir l'unité du rationnel et de l'effectif.Tout reste encore à faire pour qui ne renonce pas à la réalisation de laliberté dans l'histoire. À suivre Hegel, pourtant, la philosophie doit secontenter de décrire ledit procès ou ses résultats. Doit-on se résoudre à ceque la philosophie ne puisse concourir à un destin dont elle a donné la clé ?N'est-il pas possible de la renouveler ? Et comment ? S'agit-il plutôt d'ensortir et d'imaginer d'autres formes d'intervention théoriques et pratiques ?Et qu'en est-il alors de ce qui reste de philosophique ? / The names of Bakunin, Engels, Marx, or Stirner are hardly ever associated withthe Young Hegelian movement. Bakunin and Stirner are generally associated withanarchism and Marx and Engels with marxism. Their lives and the fate of theirworks could do no more than obliterate the mutual and concomitant contributionsof these authors to what has sometimes been described as a philosophicalschool. This participation, in any case, occured thirty years before thecristallisation of the aforesaid political movements.This research proposes an immanent, and at the same time contextual, reading ofthe main texts written by these authors between 1842 and 1843. The theories ofeach of them are presented in accordance with their own questions and issues,focusing on the conceptual borrowings and innovations realised as aconsequence. They are expounded through a perpetual to and fro between theproblematic field related to the movement from which they were born and inwhich they participated.Nevertheless this study cannot be reduced to a mere contribution to the historyof ideas. One of the key interests of the analysed texts lies in what they tellus, from a post-hegelian perspective, about philosophy. When they describetheir epoch, they all conclude that there is no identity of the rational andthe real. There is still much to do for those who do not abandon the idea of therealisation of freedom in history. However, according to Hegel, philosophy canonly describe the process or the results of this realisation. Cannot philosophycontribute to the destiny it revealed? And if not, is it possible to renewphilosophy? How? Would an exit from philosophy be preferable? Other forms oftheoretical and practical intervention could be invented. But then, what aboutthe "philosophical" that remains?

Max Stirner has historically been charged with nihilism, narcissism, and nominalism. Yet there exists another Stirner—a Stirner attentive and responsive to the intricate uncertainty of existence. I argue that we can find in his destructive an-archism a spirited celebration of creativity and experimentation; in his wild anti-humanism, a gentle sympathy for the human life; in his aggressive atheism, an unwavering clemency for the heathen. Stirner’s vagabond ontology, egoist ethics, and insurrectionary politics culminate in a singular, joyful affirmation: there are other ways of being.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Open University. BLDSC no. DX210426.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-06-02T19:39:38Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 5560.pdf: 732444 bytes, checksum: abc5dfdef80cff3f321e4c201bc6761e (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013-09-04 / This study aims to problematize, based on a bibliographic study of the German philosopher Max Stirner, the modern paradigm on education, more precisely on the practical of subjectification that compose this paradigm and the possibilities of singularity, as a resistance method to this process. For this purpose, the current study aim to revisit the debate conducted by the author in his book The Ego and his Own, in which the modern subjectivity is presented as a result of a process that started in the antique times and the rise of christianity, pointing to the appearance of a specific type of rationality and morality, constitutive parts of that subjectivity. Moreover, the discussion turns to the characteristics that education acquires in Liberalism, pointing to a better understanding of the liberal education as a process constructing subjectivities, in which the modern rationality and morality occupy a central role to internalize and naturalize domination and governance used nowadays. Finally, we discuss the possibilities presented by the author to construct other relationships socially and pedagogically, besides the ones of subordination that define education in current times. / Este trabalho visa problematizar, por meio de um estudo bibliográfico da obra do filósofo alemão Max Stirner, o paradigma moderno que envolve a educação, mais precisamente sobre as práticas de subjetivação que constituem esse paradigma e as possibilidades de singularização como resistência a esse processo. Para isso a pesquisa retoma, num primeiro momento, o debate feito pelo autor no livro O Único e a sua propriedade, em que a constituição da subjetividade moderna é apresentada como resultado de um processo que remete à antiguidade e a ascensão do cristianismo, apontando para o surgimento de um determinado tipo de racionalidade e de moralidade que emergem como parte constitutiva dessa subjetividade. Em seguida, a discussão se volta para as características que a educação toma na modernidade, sobretudo no liberalismo, apontando para um entendimento da educação liberal como um processo de fabricação de subjetividades em que a racionalidade e a moralidade modernas ocupam um papel central na tarefa de internalização e naturalização das práticas de dominação e de governo. Ao final são abordadas as possibilidades apresentadas pelo autor para outras relações no âmbito social e da pedagogia que não as de sujeição que definem a educação na modernidade.

Some contemporary anarchist scholarship has rejected the Enlightenment-inspired reliance on reason that was supposedly central to classical anarchist thought and expanded the anarchist critique to address issues ignored by their classical predecessors. In making reason the object of critique, some contemporary anarchists expanded the anarchist framework to include critiques of domination residing outside the traditional power centers of the state, the capitalist firm, and the church thereby shedding light on the authoritarian tendencies inherent in the intellect itself. Though contemporary anarchist scholarship has sought to apply this anti-authoritarian ethos to the realms of epistemology and ontology (by employing Michel Foucault’s analysis of power and other postfoundational thinkers), their own framework of analysis is glaringly susceptible to what Habermas called a “performative contradiction.” In questioning the authority of aspects of even our own intellect (and the epistemological and ontological presuppositions that accompany it) we call into question even the authority of our own argumentation. I answer this “contradiction” by interrogating two intellectual traditions. Firstly, I question a key postfoundational anarchist premise. Namely, I assess whether an understanding of classical anarchist thinkers as quintessential children of the Enlightenment is justified. Secondly, I offer an alternative path to reconciliation between the anti-authoritarian values of the anarchists and the anti-metaphysical values of the postfoundationalists (that I think mirrors anarchist anti-authoritarian concerns) by suggesting we are better served to think of an anti-authoritarianism of the intellect by employing three key twentieth century thinkers: Richard Rorty, Paul Feyerabend, and Ludwig Wittgenstein. I do so while anchoring Rorty’s, Feyerabend’s, and Wittgenstein’s philosophies in the 19th century anti-metaphysical thought of Friedrich Nietzsche and the philosophical anarchism of Max Stirner.

Die tema van hierdie verhandeling is 'n vergelykende studie van die kategorie enkeling by Soren Kierkegaard en Max Stirner met die doel om punte van ooreenkoms en basiese verskille uit te wys. Daar word gepoog om deur 'n analise van begrippe wat binne die kategorie van die enkeling val, nuwe lig te werp op die twee denkers se filosofie. Hierdie probleemstelling bring mee dat daar gedurig vergelykend gewerk word, maar dat die uiteensetting ook beperk word tot daardie basiese begrippe wat die vergelyking duidelik na vore bring. So word in hoofsaak dan die volgende behandel: Die probleem van denke en syn soos dit by die twee denkers voorkom, word ondersoek. Beide Kierkegaard en Stirner stel die eksisterende enkeling as die sentrale begrip in die soeke na 'n relasie tussen denke en syn. Belangrike verwante eksistensiebegrippe kom voorts onder bespreking; die stel van die self en selfkeuse, selfbewussyn, moontlikheid en wording, eksistensie, essensie, reele en ideele syn. By die ontleding van hierdie begrippe word duidelik aangedui hoe verskillend die antwoorde was wat Kierkegaard en Stirner gegee het in die lig van die filosofiese probleme van hulle tyd. Wanneer Kierkegaard die enkeling stel as eindig-oneindig word die moontlikheid meteen gestel vir 'n relasie van die enkeling tot God, terwyl Stirner die enkeling slegs as oneindig sien. Die begrippe "sprong" en "oomblik" gee die sleutel tot die verstaan van Kierkegaard se filosofie en stel meteen ook die moontlikheid dat 'tiie enkeling voor God" kan staan. Stirner en Kierkegaard se beskouing van "gees" is wyd ui teenlopend en illustreer duidelik Stirner se negatiewe denke en Kierkegaard se positiewe siening. Kierkegaard stel die begrip subjektiwiteit as antwoord op die vraag na die waarheid, terwyl Stirner ook van hierdie prinsipe uitgaan, maar 'n heel ander resultaat bereik. Kierkegaard stel die moontlikheid van 'n etiese lewe waarin die enkeling hoër as die universele is. Be ide Stirner en Kierkegaard trek te velde teen die moraliteit van hulle tyd, maar op heel verskillende wyse - dit blyk veral uit die inhoud wat hul gee aan begrippe soos "vryheid" en "massa". Kortliks word aangedui hoe Kierkegaard se filosofie uitloop op die finale stadium van religieusiteit deur die stel van begrippe soos sonde, skuld, angs ens. Stirner verwerp alle vorme van godsdiens as blote verbeeldingsvlugte. Die resultaat van die studie is dat hoewel daar enkele ernstige besware ingebring kan word teen Kierkegaard se siening van die "enkeling", hy nogtans 'n baie belangrike bydrae tot die filosofie lewer. Die positiewe van sy siening lê juis daarin dat die "enkeling" oop is vir 'n relasie tot die jy en veral die U. Stirner se beskouing loop uit op 'n volslae skeptisisme en is volledig onvrugbaar. Stirner en Kierkegaard se uiteindelike siening van die "enkeling" is wyd uiteenlopend en die basiese verskil kan reeds aangetoon word in die gebruik van die terme "Einzige" en "Einzelne"; Kierkegaard se "enkeling" is uniek en enig op 'n heel ander wyse dan Stirner se "enkeling". / Dissertation (MA)--University of Pretoria, 1971. / gm2014 / Anthropology and Archaeology / unrestricted

The main objective of this thesis is to examine conscientious objection to military service as a case of resistance to modern power in relation with the possibilities of &ldquo / self&rdquo / . In this context, Max Stirner&rsquo / s theory of &ldquo / ego&rdquo / and Michel Foucault&rsquo / s conceptualisations of modern power and modern subject are critically analyzed. In accordance with the relation between conscientious objection and the possibilities of self, Foucault&rsquo / s theories of &ldquo / power over life&rdquo / and &ldquo / ethics of care of self&rdquo / are discussed by examining disciplinary power and bio-power in relation with militarized society characterized by universal male conscription. On the other hand, Stirner&rsquo / s theory of &ldquo / the union of egoists&rdquo / and his conceptualization of &ldquo / Ownness&rdquo / is employed in order to investigate the possibilities of constituting an autonomous self. This study reveals that the act of conscientious objection overlaps objector&rsquo / s endeavour of creating an autonomous self. It is argued that following Stirnerian and Foucauldian conceptualisations of &ldquo / self&rdquo / , the objector, by refusing external power over his/her will in militarized society, indeed, engages in a struggle to constitute his/her own definition of self and his/her way of life.

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