The attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11) caused thousands of deaths, national and global panic, and immediate action by the federal government to protect the borders of the United States of America (USA) from terrorism. In response to these attacks, the United States (U.S.) government enacted laws for law enforcement agencies to protect against terrorist activities. Law enforcement agencies are effective in combating terrorism, but their measures contain a major flaw - the improper use of race in profiling to address national security and public safety concerns. Racial profiling is an ineffective measure for preventing terrorism. There are solutions to correct this flaw through reconstructing training and implementing policies for all law enforcement agencies. The intent of this thesis is to discuss the history and the effectiveness of profiling in U.S. post-9/11 counterterrorism through theoretical research of peer-reviewed journals and articles, relevant laws, and United States Supreme Court cases to offer solutions to the problems racial profiling presents. The discussion will generate a search for new ways law enforcement agencies could conduct daily counterterrorism operations.

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Submitted by Pedro Marques Neto (marquesnetop@gmail.com) on 2018-06-15T16:59:07Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação FGV - Pedro Marques Neto - Depósito Final.pdf: 903571 bytes, checksum: 72ae2bf4560cbdf52da5d6aaade0039b (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Katia Menezes de Souza (katia.menezes@fgv.br) on 2018-06-15T18:30:23Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação FGV - Pedro Marques Neto - Depósito Final.pdf: 903571 bytes, checksum: 72ae2bf4560cbdf52da5d6aaade0039b (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Isabele Garcia (isabele.garcia@fgv.br) on 2018-06-15T21:15:20Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação FGV - Pedro Marques Neto - Depósito Final.pdf: 903571 bytes, checksum: 72ae2bf4560cbdf52da5d6aaade0039b (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-06-15T21:15:20Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação FGV - Pedro Marques Neto - Depósito Final.pdf: 903571 bytes, checksum: 72ae2bf4560cbdf52da5d6aaade0039b (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-05-23 / Esta pesquisa analisa e compara os argumentos empregados pelas supremas cortes de Brasil e Estados Unidos a respeito da constitucionalidade de medidas legislativas que permitem, limitam ou vedam o financiamento privado de campanha eleitoral. A judicialização do tema coloca problemas de duas ordens: (a) determinar quais circunstâncias legitimam a intervenção das supremas cortes na organização do processo político-eleitoral; e (b) estabelecer como as supremas cortes deveriam raciocinar e como elas têm raciocinado ao supervisionarem a organização do sistema democrático. No cerne dessas questões encontram-se os contornos da relação entre jurisdição constitucional e política em termos do papel a ser desempenhado pelo Poder Judiciário no desenho institucional da democracia. Este trabalho sustenta que cortes constitucionais estão legitimadas a intervir na organização da democracia para minimizar danos democráticos causados por desenhos institucionais que promovam a dominação na esfera político-eleitoral, conforme modelo proposto por Yasmin Dawood. O argumento é de que cortes constitucionais devem raciocinar a partir de uma concepção estrutural dos direitos democráticos focada na minimização de danos democráticos, em contraposição a concepções individuais dos direitos democráticos ou concepções estruturais focadas na maximização de bens democráticos. Assim, contrasto a abordagem proposta pelo modelo antidominação com as práticas das supremas cortes de Brasil e Estados Unidos. Enquanto a Suprema Corte dos Estados Unidos raciocina na linha da abordagem proposta pelo modelo de proteção de direitos individuais, sustento que o Supremo Tribunal Federal raciocina na linha da abordagem proposta pelo modelo de maximização de bens democráticos. Argumento que, em ambos os casos, os modelos adotados produzem equívocos nas decisões das cortes sobre a constitucionalidade do financiamento privado de campanhas eleitorais, sugerindo, então, respostas alternativas com base no modelo antidominação, mais deferentes, embora não submissas, às escolhas políticas do Poder Legislativo. / This research analyses and contrasts the arguments employed by the Brazilian and American constitutional courts on the constitutionality of campaign finance regulation. The judicialization of campaign finance disputes poses two issues: (i) first, to determine under which circumstances judicial intervention on the organization of electoral politics is legitimate; (ii) second, to lay down how constitutional courts should reason when - and how they have been reasoning about - they oversee the organization of democratic politics. These issues have at their core the relationship between constitutional jurisdiction and democratic politics in terms of the role displayed by the Judiciary in the (institutional) design of democracy. This research claims that constitutional courts can legitimately intervene in the organization of democracy in order to minimize democratic harms caused by institutional designs that promote domination in the electoral sphere, in accordance with the antidomination model of judicial oversight of democracy proposed by Yasmin Dawood. My argument is that constitutional courts should develop a structural conception of democratic rights focused on the minimization of democratic harms, in contrast with individual conception of such rights or structural conceptions focused on the maximization of democratic goods. Thus, I contrast the antidomination model with the concrete experience of the Brazilian and American constitutional courts. While the Supreme Court of the United States’ approach focuses on the protection of individual rights, I claim that the Supreme Federal Court of Brazil’s approach focuses on the maximization of democratic goods. I claim that both approaches distort the judicial oversight of campaign finance regulation by the Brazilian and the American constitutional courts and so I propose alternative answers based on the antidomination model, according to which courts are more deferential, though not submissive, to the political choices of the legislative body.

Globally, the justice system has set up courts to respond to complaints of a criminal and civil nature. Courts also respond to complaints which require swift relief by way of shortened procedures, in the form of motion proceedings. In all these complaints, courts have to respond in a manner that leaves litigants with a feeling of satisfaction that justice has been done. To the end of ensuring that there is legal certainty, justice systems in all jurisdictions have established a hierarchy of courts, with lower courts being bound by the decisions of higher courts in their jurisdiction. There has been no problem in the application of this principle called stare decisis, or judicial precedent, in disputes of law. However, in disputes of constitutional interpretation, courts have demonstrated a marked shift from observing the rule of judicial precedent. The disregard for this rule manifests itself particularly in the adjudication of cases surrounded by controversy. It is argued herein that constitutional interpretation is no different from legal interpretation, in that the rule of judicial precedent which characterises court decisions in legal disputes, should characterise court decisions in constitutional interpretation disputes. The Constitutional Court of South Africa itself, though it is the highest arbiter in constitutional matters, is bound by its own previous decisions, unless its previous decisions have become manifestly wrong. Three constitutional rights are analysed. The right to life in its three manifestations, namely, the right to life of the unborn child, the right to life of the convicted criminal not to be hanged, and the right of the terminally ill to continue living by receiving medical care at state expense. The other two rights are the right to privacy, and the right to culture. The right to privacy is the right that has been claimed in political controversies. In isolated instances, specifically mentioned herein, the Constitutional Assembly and the drafters of the Constitution have also contributed to the resultant inconsistency in constitutional interpretation. This is especially so with regard to the right to practise one‘s culture. / Constitutional, International & Indigenous Law / LL.D.

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本研究透過公共選擇途徑，檢視行政機關面對主管之行政命令遭大法官會議宣告違憲後的裁量行為，藉此瞭解行政機關面對司法審查的制衡監督，將表現出哪些樣態的裁量模式；並藉由公共選擇途徑關於理性自利人的假設，以「交易」的概念連結行政與法律，以補充兩者過去缺乏交集、各說各話的現象。 本研究追蹤至民國97年底為止判決行政命令違憲的解釋，共66筆。依大法官解釋是否賦予行政機關修改命令的裁量，以及命令是否修改，將66筆解釋分成四大類，並統計修改所費的時間。透過統計分析以及深度訪談，本研究發現：大法官未賦予行政機關修改裁量，雖然確能提高命令修改的比例，但是對於控制行政機關在一定的年限內完成修改卻未有顯著的結果。行政機關雖然原則上會停用違憲法規，但卻不一定願意將新的作法明文化，其間的理由包括節省修正命令的成本，或是爭取更多決策商議的機會等。縱使最後依然完成修正，「依法行政」卻不是其真正的動機；減少組織成本或政策執行成本、增加組織的正當性等才是行政機關決定修改、不修改命令，或是否在期限內完成修訂的真正理由。而大法官解釋對行政機關的制衡力量，也因為大法官作成解釋之後再無有效的監督機制而打了折扣。同時，司法審查與行政之間的制衡關係必須放在整個民主授權結構中進行理解；正因兩者關係並非處於真空環境，授權結構的資訊不對稱、多重委託與多重代理的問題，同樣會發生在司法對行政的監督關係中，因此大法官在結構上就無法完整地扮演制衡、監督行政機關的角色。 基於以上發現，本研究認為司法對行政的制衡，除了司法審查制度本身以外，應當依照行政機關的偏好模式設計監督機制。包括將違憲的命令交由行政院研考會統一管考、監察院可針對行政機關延遲修正命令的行為進行糾正，並要求遭判違憲的行政命令之修正、失效與廢止皆須對外公告，避免行政機關以節省成本為由，讓法規失去扮演政府與人民之間的契約的功能。 / This research intends to answer the question of “how Supreme Court Rulings have impacts on bureaucratic discretion?” As the superior judicial review authority, Supreme Court Rulings are usually thought as an authority which bureaucrats must obey. Is it really the case? In this research, both bureaucrats and Supreme Court are seen as rational actors who have preferences over different outcomes, as the Public Choice theorists usually depict. Author utilizes public choice theory to bridge the gap between the fields of public administration and public law on the issue.. Empirically, this study collects the administrative decrees which were announced unconstitutional by Supreme Court before the end of 2008 in Taiwan. Sixty-six Supreme Court Rulings are found and categorized into four groups by two dimensions: (1) whether the grand judges give the bureaucrats discretion and (2) whether the bureaucrats follow the grand judges’ will to reform the decrees. Both secondary data analysis and in-depth interviews are used in this research to figure out bureaucrats’ preference and the way they respond to the grand judges’ decisions. The statistical result shows that after been announced unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, about 15% of the administrative decrees stay the same. The reasons for this “unresponsiveness” to the Supreme Court Rulings are varied case by case. Basically speaking, bureaucrats take laws as means to fulfill their tasks. They are not motivated to follow the rule of law if there is a requirement to pay an excessive costs to achieve the policy goals. It is interesting to know that judicial review is high on its moral ground but sometimes it is a mechanism without an administrative devises to enforce their rulings. Also, the problems of information asymmetry, multi-principle and multi-agent will also be found in the relationship between Supreme Court and bureaucrats. To sum up, on the one hand, this research has shown that to follow the rule of law is not bureaucrats’ priority. As a result, an administrative mechanism is needed to enforce the Supreme Court Rulings. For example, the Research, Development and Evaluation Commission (RDEC) of Executive Yuan or the Control Yuan can be assigned to do the job. However, on the other hand, the Supreme Court always stands on the side of protecting human rights against government activities, sometimes the rulings might lead to government activities unworkable as we can see from the cases of the Rulings 400 and 440. How to balance the issue of protecting citizen’s rights and governability of the administrative agencies is one of the key problems needed to be solved in order to realize democratic governance in the future.

This dissertation deals with court-executive relations in post-authoritarian Argentina (1983-2006). Specifically, I analyse Supreme Court behaviour in highly sensitive cases to determine whether the tribunal has cooperated with or obstructed the government’s policy preferences in three key policy areas: human rights, economic emergency and pensions. This innovative type of approach – i.e., focusing on a small number of highly sensitive decisions – allows me to concentrate on cases that are genuinely important for the government or, more precisely, for the country’s political administration. There are cases that are significant for the State apparatus but irrelevant for the president (thinking of politicians as self-interested actors). My research uses a rational choice approach to courts, underscoring the strategic nature of judicial behaviour. This vision of judges provides a more accurate account of judicial-executive relations by bringing politics into the study of courts. By focusing exclusively on attitudes and apolitical jurisprudence, other visions take for granted the institutional context. Political stability, for example, cannot be assumed in many developing democracies. My findings indicate that the Argentine Supreme Court has consistently avoided obstructing the president’s policy preferences. Such behaviour is motivated by strategic considerations: judges are risk-averse actors that avoid clashing with the executive. For most of the time, the Supreme Court has operated under unified government, which increases the chances of being punished for anti-government decisions. Two other factors also account for the court’s risk-averse behaviour. First, procedural rules grant the Supreme Court wide discretion over its docket. The tribunal has used such discretion to strategically select the timing of its decisions. Second, recurrent democratic breakdowns have repeatedly led to attacks against the court, such as impeachment, irregular dismissals, and/or enlargements. Third, politicians exert broad control of judicial promotions, allowing them to block the careers of independent, courageous judges that act as a check on political power.

This study analyzes the confirmation hearings discourse of Clarence Thomas and George Bush. Language constructs social reality. The United States has a history of racism and this history manifests itself in our language. The discourse of Clarence Thomas and George Bush created a social reality that equated opposition to Thomas' confirmation with racism using rhetorical strategies that included metaphor and narrative construction.

This investigation is concerned with determining the impact of the United States Supreme Court's Rodriguez decision upon the state and federal courts. The first chapter discusses the background behind the 1973 decision and outlines the basic issues. The second chapter examines the decision's impact upon opinions in the federal courts and concludes that Rodriguez has become a significant precedent. While school finance reform is dormant in the federal tribunals as a result of the decision, the third chapter concludes that reform is still possible in the state courts. However, there has been a deceleration in the rate of cases overturning school funding statutes since 1973. The final chapter examines some of the state legislatures and concludes that statutory reform is not necessarily linked to action in the courts.