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With the rise of new information and communication technologies, advocacy campaigns in development have experienced a resurgence of video as an instrument to enrich outreach efforts and build bridges, to empower marginalised groups and rescue the culture and heritage of indigenous people, and to reach decision-makers – and ultimately change policies and laws. The use of “humanising” elements through film, such as the oral testimonies of individuals, allows practitioners to transport the realities and conditions of specific localities to audiences otherwise unable to experience them directly. The present study examines the mechanisms through which video advocacy reaches audiences, looking specifically at trade-offs and knock-on effects among key stakeholders, based upon the case study of the Our Voices Matter advocacy film. The video features oral testimonies of local women survivors of rape from the Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). It is employed to campaign for justice for women victims of sexual violence and to mobilise social change to alter the role of women in the region. In light of the multifaceted nature of video advocacy use in development, the study utilises a composite of three analysis techniques, employing the collection and critical examination of information both qualitative and quantitative in nature: A content analysis of the case study, examining the narrative and semiotic elements used by the film’s producers, was designed to complement interviews with stakeholders of the campaign. An international survey of women was conducted to shine light on how vulnerable groups across the world relate to the video in question and evaluate the effectiveness of video advocacy. The composite discussion reveals insights into video advocacy conception, strategy, and implementation, with particular emphasis on stakeholder mapping, while underscoring the potential for trade-offs and knock-on effects among stakeholder groups. The case study also provides a theoretical and practical basis for similar communication for development campaigns.

<p>This thesis examines how Seamus Heaney’s <em>North </em>attempts to bear witness to the prolonged political conflict in Ireland known as the Troubles. Drawing upon the intersecting discourses of trauma and testimony as theorized by Cathy Caruth, Shoshana Felman and Dori Laub, it argues that <em>North </em>operates as an experimental enterprise evaluating diverging methods of poetically representing and working through the experience of trauma. Though these methodologies seek to convey the Irish Troubles, neither is wholly effective and both are ultimately eschewed by the poet.</p> <p>My first chapter examines Part I and the invocation of representative models—which are at times historical, imaginative and mythical—in order to render legible the experience of trauma. I suggest that the poem’s invocation of human remains exhumed from Jutland bogs as one such model may not be ethical and then read this representation within a broader sense historiographical writing supplied by Michel de Certeau’s <em>The Writing of History</em>. My second chapter looks at Part II and the poet’s assertion of an autobiographical “I” in order to engage directly with the Troubles. I read this part of the collection primarily as a meditation on the limitations of community and poetry, which undercuts the poet’s attempt to deliver testimony. In my conclusion, I suggest Heaney’s testimonial enterprise may not fulfill its whole potential because of its publication in the midst of the Troubles, which forecloses the possibility of futurity, a criticism which may not hold true for the poet’s later collections.</p> / Master of Arts (MA)

Travail réalisé en cotutelle (Université de Paris IV-La Sorbonne). / Cette étude vise à exposer le rôle méthodologique que Martin Heidegger attribue à la conscience (Gewissen) dans Être et temps et à faire ressortir les implications de son interprétation de « l’appel de la conscience » comme le moyen de produire l’attestation (Bezeugung) de l’existence authentique en tant que possibilité du Dasein (ou être-dans-le-monde). Notre objectif initial est de montrer comment la notion heideggérienne de conscience a évolué avant la publication d’Être et temps en 1927 et d’identifier les sources qui ont contribué à l’interprétation existentiale de la conscience comme « l’appel du souci. » Notre analyse historique révèle notamment que Heidegger n’a jamais décrit la conscience comme un « appel » avant sa lecture du livre Das Gewissen (1925) par Hendrik G. Stoker, un jeune philosophe sud-africain qui a étudié à Cologne sous la direction de Max Scheler. Nous démontrons plus spécifiquement comment l’étude phénoménologique de Stoker—qui décrit la conscience comme « l’appel du devoir (Pflichtruf) » provenant de l’étincelle divine (synteresis) placée dans l’âme de chaque personne par Dieu—a influencé l’élaboration du concept de « l’appel existentiel » chez Heidegger. Mettant l’accent sur le rôle méthodologique de la conscience dans Être et temps, nous soulignons aussi l’importance des liens entre son concept de la conscience et la notion de « l’indication formelle » que Heidegger a mise au cœur de sa « méthode » dans ses cours sur la phénoménologie à Freiburg et Marbourg. Alors que de nombreux commentateurs voient dans « l’appel de la conscience » une notion solipsiste qui demeure impossible en tant qu’expérience, nous proposons un moyen de lever cette difficulté apparente en tentant de faire ressortir ce qui est « indiqué formellement » par la notion même de la conscience (Gewissen) dans Être et temps. Cette approche nous permet d’affirmer que le concept de conscience chez Heidegger renvoie à un phénomène de « témoignage » qui est radicalement différent de la notion traditionnelle de conscientia. Guidé par les principes mêmes de la phénoménologie heideggérienne, nous procédons à une analyse « destructrice » de l’histoire du mot allemand Gewissen qui nous révèle que la signification originelle de ce mot (établie dans le plus ancien livre préservé dans la langue allemande : le Codex Abrogans) était testimonium et non conscientia. À l’origine, Gewissen signifiait en effet « attestation »—ce qui est précisément le rôle assigné à la conscience par Heidegger dans Être et temps. Sur la base de cette découverte, nous proposons une manière de comprendre cette « attestation » comme une expérience possible : l’écoute du « témoignage silencieux » du martyr qui permet à Dasein de reconnaître sa propre possibilité d’authenticité. / This study aims to exhibit the methodological role that Martin Heidegger assigns to conscience (Gewissen) in Being and Time and to reveal the implications of his interpretation of the “call of conscience” as the means of producing the attestation (Bezeugung) of authentic existence as a possibility of Being-in-the-world (or Dasein). We begin by seeking to understand how Heidegger’s notion of conscience evolved prior to the 1927 publication of Being and Time and to identify the sources which contributed to his interpretation of conscience as the “call of care.” Our historical analysis notably reveals that Heidegger never once describes conscience as a “call” before reading Das Gewissen (1925) by Hendrik G. Stoker, a young South African philosopher who studied under Max Scheler’s direction at the University of Cologne. We specifically examine how Stoker’s phenomenological study—which describes conscience as the “call-of-duty” issued to each human being by the divine “spark” (synteresis) placed in his or her soul by God—contributed to shaping Heidegger’s account of the “existential call.” Focusing on the methodological role of conscience in Being and Time, we analyze Heidegger’s major work in light of his early lectures on phenomenology at Freiburg and Marburg. This approach confirms the relation between conscience in Being and Time and the concept of “formal indication” that Heidegger placed at the heart of his evolving “method” of phenomenological investigation. While many commentators have argued that Heidegger’s “call of conscience” is solipsistic and impossible to experience, we propose a way of reconsidering this apparent impasse by examining what Being and Time itself “formally indicates” with regard to conscience. We show that Heidegger’s conscience points to a phenomenon of existential “testimony” which is radically different from the traditional notion of conscientia. Guided by Heidegger’s “formal indication” of conscience, we “destructively” review the history of the German word Gewissen and reveal its original meaning to be “testimonium” not “conscientia.” In recognizing that Gewissen originally meant “attestation,” we show how Heidegger’s existential phenomenon of conscience can be understood as Dasein’s experience of hearing the “silent testimony” of the martyr.

Est-il possible de détruire un homme ? Est-il possible pour un homme de se sentir inhumain au point de se négativer lui-même quand ce sentiment lui devient insupportable ? Il existe des situations extrêmes, des épreuves de vie insoutenables et des expériences honteuses qui remettent en question ce sentiment d’appartenance à l’humanité. Jean, Margaret et Abel questionnent leur place dans la relation à l’autre et au monde face à une maladie qui perturbe leur existence et les confronte à de nombreuses pertes : Perdre sa dignité, perdre un enfant, perdre sa mère et perdre, pour certains, l’ignorance d’un savoir sur sa propre mort. Le cancer, lorsqu’il est mis en place de l’Autre, fonctionne parfois comme une sentence de mort, comme un point de certitude, comme une lettre mortuaire qui se chronicise dans la pensée et qui réorganise la place du sujet dans son rapport à l’Autre et à l’objet. La clinique nous montre ici à quel point le signifiant « cancer » confronte certains patients à une épreuve de réel insoutenable qui se présente dans l’imaginaire, soit sous la forme d’un précipice, d’un vide dans lequel ils peuvent tomber, soit dans le tic-tac d’une bombe à retardement susceptible d’exploser à tout moment. La clinique nous montre aussi qu’il existe des métaphores difficiles à entendre mais qui ne peuvent demeurer dans les limbes de la pensée. Au-delà de la métaphore du cancer comme système concentrationnaire, notre travail consiste à dégager un mode de fonctionnement logique et un positionnement subjectif particuliers.À partir des traversées de la honte, des expériences douloureuses et de cette profonde douleur d’exister que la maladie cancéreuse peut réactiver, nous verrons qu’une trajectoire de vie peut s’inverser. Le concept de « déportation psychique » concerne, selon nous, une inversion temporelle et une réorganisation subjective qui fera dire à celui qui l’éprouve : « Si ce n’est pas aujourd’hui, c’est que je vais mourir demain ». La mort plantée ainsi dans l’horizon d’un regard obscurcit l’histoire de vie du sujet dans une sorte de mélancolisation de son existence et dans la présentification de son « être pour la mort ».Est-il possible de détruire un homme ? « Si c’est un homme » écrit Primo Levi en posant, selon nous, la question ontologique suivante : « Que suis-je donc pour avoir vécu tout cela ? Pour l’autre, pour moi ? Suis-je un sujet ou un objet ? » Il interrogerait ainsi la qualité et la valeur d’un homme lorsqu’il est traversé par la figure du muselmann. À cette question, Pierre Fédida y répond par la nécessité de la ressemblance, Jacques Lacan par la nécessité de la langue. Primo Levi nous le montre dans sa rencontre avec Hurbinek : Pour être un homme, il faut être pris dans la langue ; il est nécessaire soit de parler, soit d’être parlé. Pour le détruire, il faut l’en extraire et faire en sorte qu’il croie qu’il n’est rien que ça, un simple déchet qui fait « tache dans le tableau » de l’humanité. / Is it possible to wreck a human being? Is it possible for a man to feel inhuman enough as to annihilate himself when this feeling overwhelms him? There are situations, extreme ones, unbearable and shameful life experiences that can put someone in doubt of his affiliation to humanity.Jean, Margaret and Abel are questioning their position in their relations to the others and the world when confronted to a disease disrupting their existence and to the losses it involves: lose their dignity, lose a child, lose their mother and, for some of them, lose the ignorance of the knowledge of their own death. When cancer is implemented by the Other, it can operate as a death sentence, as a certitude, as a funeral letter lingering on one’s thought up to the point to reorganize the place of the subject in his relations to the Other and the object. Clinical experience thereby demonstrates how the signifier “cancer” may drive a subject to the unbearable encounter of the Real, represented in the Imaginary in the form of a chasm, an empty space one risks to fall in, or the ticking of a bomb about to explode from minute to minute. Clinical experience also demonstrates that some metaphors are hard to admit but they should not remain in the deep limbs of thought. Beyond the cancer metaphor of a concentration camp, our work consists in bringing out a personal logical way of functioning and a subjective positioning.Through the alleys of shame, painful experiences and pain of living - which cancer disease often reactivates- we see that the path of life can be inverted. For all we are concerned, the concept of “psychical deportation” is about time inversion and a subjective reorganization which makes the suffering person say: “If I don’t die today, it will be for tomorrow”. Death is this way implemented in a subject’s field of view on his life story, darkening it in a sort of melancholisation of his existence and the presentification of his “being-toward-death”.Is it possible to wreck a man? “If this is a man”, we can imagine Primo Levi write as to ask the following hontological question: “Then what am I after enduring all that? What am I for the others as for myself? Am I a subject or an object?” He could have questioned this way the quality and the value of the human being when seeing himself in the muselmann figure. To answer to this hypothetical question, Pierre Fédida would have used the necessity of resemblance while Jacques Lacan the necessity of the language. Primo Levi could have confirmed the above positionings when meeting with Hurbinek : To be a human being, you need to be in the language; it’s necessary whether to speak or to be spoken. To devastate him, you need to extract him from the language and make him believe that he’s only that: a pariah, a piece of trash that “spoils the image ” of humanity.

Cette étude vise à exposer le rôle méthodologique que Martin Heidegger attribue àla conscience (Gewissen) dans Être et temps et à faire ressortir les implications de soninterprétation de « l’appel de la conscience » comme le moyen de produire l’attestation(Bezeugung) de l’existence authentique en tant que possibilité du Dasein (ou être-dans-le-monde). Notre objectif initial est de montrer comment la notion heideggérienne deconscience a évolué avant la publication d’Être et temps en 1927 et d’identifier les sourcesqui ont contribué à l’interprétation existentiale de la conscience comme « l’appel dusouci. » Notre analyse historique révèle notamment que Heidegger n’a jamais décrit laconscience comme un « appel » avant sa lecture du livre Das Gewissen (1925) par HendrikG. Stoker, un jeune philosophe sud-africain qui a étudié à Cologne sous la direction de MaxScheler. Nous démontrons plus spécifiquement comment l’étude phénoménologique deStoker—qui décrit la conscience comme « l’appel du devoir (Pflichtruf) » provenant del’étincelle divine (synteresis) placée dans l’âme de chaque personne par Dieu—a influencél’élaboration du concept de « l’appel existentiel » chez Heidegger. Mettant l’accent sur lerôle méthodologique de la conscience dans Être et temps, nous soulignons aussil’importance des liens entre son concept de la conscience et la notion de « l’indicationformelle » que Heidegger a mise au coeur de sa « méthode » dans ses cours sur laphénoménologie à Freiburg et Marbourg. Alors que de nombreux commentateurs voientdans « l’appel de la conscience » une notion solipsiste qui demeure impossible en tantqu’expérience, nous proposons un moyen de lever cette difficulté apparente en tentant defaire ressortir ce qui est « indiqué formellement » par la notion même de la conscience(Gewissen) dans Être et temps. Cette approche nous permet d’affirmer que le concept deconscience chez Heidegger renvoie à un phénomène de « témoignage » qui estradicalement différent de la notion traditionnelle de conscientia. Guidé par les principes mêmes de la phénoménologie heideggérienne, nous procédons à une analyse« destructrice » de l’histoire du mot allemand Gewissen qui nous révèle que la significationoriginelle de ce mot (établie dans le plus ancien livre préservé dans la langue allemande : leCodex Abrogans) était testimonium et non conscientia. À l’origine, Gewissen signifiait eneffet « attestation »—ce qui est précisément le rôle assigné à la conscience par Heideggerdans Être et temps. Sur la base de cette découverte, nous proposons une manière decomprendre cette « attestation » comme une expérience possible : l’écoute du « témoignagesilencieux » du martyr qui permet à Dasein de reconnaître sa propre possibilitéd’authenticité. / This study aims to exhibit the methodological role that Martin Heidegger assigns toconscience (Gewissen) in Being and Time and to reveal the implications of hisinterpretation of the “call of conscience” as the means of producing the attestation(Bezeugung) of authentic existence as a possibility of Being-in-the-world (or Dasein). Webegin by seeking to understand how Heidegger’s notion of conscience evolved prior to the1927 publication of Being and Time and to identify the sources which contributed to hisinterpretation of conscience as the “call of care.” Our historical analysis notably revealsthat Heidegger never once describes conscience as a “call” before reading Das Gewissen(1925) by Hendrik G. Stoker, a young South African philosopher who studied under MaxScheler’s direction at the University of Cologne. We specifically examine how Stoker’sphenomenological study—which describes conscience as the “call-of-duty” issued to eachhuman being by the divine “spark” (synteresis) placed in his or her soul by God—contributed to shaping Heidegger’s account of the “existential call.” Focusing on themethodological role of conscience in Being and Time, we analyze Heidegger’s major workin light of his early lectures on phenomenology at Freiburg and Marburg. This approachconfirms the relation between conscience in Being and Time and the concept of “formalindication” that Heidegger placed at the heart of his evolving “method” ofphenomenological investigation. While many commentators have argued that Heidegger’s“call of conscience” is solipsistic and impossible to experience, we propose a way ofreconsidering this apparent impasse by examining what Being and Time itself “formallyindicates” with regard to conscience. We show that Heidegger’s conscience points to aphenomenon of existential “testimony” which is radically different from the traditionalnotion of conscientia. Guided by Heidegger’s “formal indication” of conscience, we“destructively” review the history of the German word Gewissen and reveal its originalmeaning to be “testimonium” not “conscientia.” In recognizing that Gewissen originally meant “attestation,” we show how Heidegger’s existential phenomenon of conscience canbe understood as Dasein’s experience of hearing the “silent testimony” of the martyr.

Arnošt Lustig and experience of the Holocaust in light of theory of narration Abstract. Means of implementation Nazi program of exterminating the Jews, which was designed and implemented during the Second World War, had an instrument of realization in a concentration camp, where prisoners not only of died, but there was organized devaluation of their lives. We talk about it as a "model form of government", reasonably elaborate system, in which prisoners should believe, that their life has no meaning, and on the other hand they are exposed to "limit situations", that create pressure on their survival instinct, and thus affect their behavior. From world of ever-present death prisoners brought experience, about which many could not and others needed to talk. However, they meet with an inability to express this experience. There grow up a debate whether the facts are trivializing. The threat of trivializing is seen also in artistic representation. As one of the options for capture the experience of the Holocaust is mentioned concentration on the internal experience of the individual, which can by displayed mainly by art literature, whch is looking for new expressive and formal means to "communicate an incommunicable" trauma. Among the writers of literature, who comes from their own camp experiences is ranked...

One of the problems in eyewitness recognition of offenders is their different ethnicity from the persons identifying them. This has been the subject of several scientific papers worldwide. Although the number of other ethnic groups in the Czech Republic grows, research into this area remains insufficient. Therefore, the present thesis focuses on ethnicity of offenders in the recognition process. Using video footage of an assault with Czech and Vietnamese offenders and subsequent mugshot facial recognition, the present thesis seeks to highlight the problem of a higher number of false identifications with persons having different ethnicity. Based on previous international research, the offenders' ethnicity is expected to have a negative impact on the ability to correctly identify perpetrators in the Czech Republic alike. The research showed a higher rate of false identifications of offenders with foreign nationality, but at the same time, nevertheless, found no relationship between correct identification of perpetrators with our and with foreign ethnicity. Keywords: recognition, eyewitness, testimony of witnesses, offender ethnicity, quantitative research.

[pt] Mecanismos de reputação são utilizados para aumentar a confiança e o desempenho de sociedades virtuais. Diferentes modelos de reputação descentralizados foram propostos baseados em interações entre agentes. Cada agente de software é capaz de avaliar e armazenar as reputações dos agentes com quem eles interagiram e também podem testemunhar a outros agentes sobre tais reputações. As desvantagens principais de tais abordagens quando aplicadas em sistemas multi- agentes abertos e de larga escala são a dificuldade de estabelecer interações repetidas entre os agentes, a inviabilidade, em algumas situações, do processo de busca por testemunhas, o fato de a reputação ser influenciada pelo ponto de vista de um outro agente e o fato de que os agentes podem não estar dispostos a testemunhar colaborando com agentes concorrentes. Esta dissertação propõe um modelo de reputação híbrido, reunindo características de abordagens centralizada e descentralizada para superar tais problemas. As reputações são providas pelos próprios agentes de software mas também por subsistemas centralizados que podem ser facilmente acessados por qualquer agente e podem fornecer reputações seguras baseadas em testemunhos sobre comportamentos indesejados dos agentes, caracterizados pelas violações de normas do sistema. Tais subsistemas centralizados são instâncias do framework proposto, que flexibiliza as fórmulas de cálculo da reputação, o tempo de atualização da mesma e permite criar novos tipos de reputações relacionados a contextos diferentes. / [en] Reputation mechanisms are being used to increase the reliability and performance of virtual societies. Different decentralized reputation models have been proposed based on interactions among agents. Each system agent evaluates and stores the reputations of the agents with whom they have interacted and can also testify to other agents about such reputations. The main disadvantages of such approaches when applied to open large-scale multi-agent systems are the difficulty of establishing strong links between the agents, the sometimes infeasible witness search process, the fact of the reputation is being influenced by the point of view of another agent and the fact that the agents cannot be willing to testify and collaborate with possible competitive agents. In this work we propose a hybrid reputation system with centralized and decentralized characteristics to overcome such problems. The reputations are provided by the system agents themselves but also by centralized subsystems that can be easily reached by any agent and can supply reliable reputations of any agent based on testimonies about undesired agent's behavior, characterized by the violation of system norms. Such centralized subsystems are instances of the proposed framework.