Made available in DSpace on 2016-07-27T13:48:27Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ROBSON PEDRO VERAS.pdf: 768979 bytes, checksum: 6c213763a7ad5009a9198f90f3950092 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013-12-19 / A pesquisa Kant e a Religião da Razão procura estabelecer um debate específico em Ciência da Religião, notadamente sobre a Religião da Razão. Para esse propósito será estabelecido uma temática específica em que elementos religiosos podem ser sistematizados e redimensionados para uma conjuntura moral. O texto foi elaborado a partir de uma interpretação que irá ser de recondução a um desdobramento do conceito sobre religião. Desse modo, a experiência religiosa do homem se mostrará como conseqüência de uma dimensão moral construída socialmente. A importância dessa análise é a de percebermos a moral e sua manifestação na religião como desdobramento do Imperativo Categórico. Desse modo, temos aqui uma proposta de demonstração da religião dentro de uma percepção racional, voltada, sobre tudo, para o cumprimento moral, da ação pelo dever e pela virtude. Para o cumprimento dessa tarefa será feita uma análise do arcabouço moral em Kant (1992), (1996) e (2011), em que a tese do autor fundamenta o argumento religioso especificamente. É com esse conjunto de argumentos que entendemos que a confirmação de qualquer hipótese que tenha o filósofo Kant como mediador epistemológico, necessita de certo redimensionamento do autor a práticas modernas. O desafio, por assim dizer, é podermos admitir a ação moral como única possibilidade do dever. Dessa forma, a pesquisa se estrutura em três capítulos: o primeiro capítulo apresenta a religião da razão, dividida, supostamente, em categorias: a Moral, a Razão, o Imperativo Categórico, descrição acerca da Justiça e o Bem e o Mal. No capítulo seguinte é apresentado o processo de recondução da religião ao fundamento da moral. Para o terceiro capítulo mostra a importância da crítica Kantiana sobre a religião para o debate do contexto das Ciências da Religião

The purpose of this study is to examine concepts of freedom and evil, and to clarify their relation in terms of Kant&rsquo / s moral philosophy. In this study, I firstly examine Kant&rsquo / s understanding of freedom and the problems that this understanding leads to. I also discuss how the concept of freedom can be reconciled with the concept of evil expressed in the form of &ldquo / propensity to evil&rdquo / . Additionally, I attempt to show the significance of the notion of evil for Kant&rsquo / s moral theory. Evil is one of the most criticized concepts of Kant&rsquo / s philosophy and it is considered as inconsistent with his earlier thoughts by his contemporaries. Kant claims that the &ldquo / propensity to evil&rdquo / is universal to all of human race, but it does not mean that human beings are actually evil. They become good or evil with their free will (Willk&uuml / r). In this study, I propose that Kant&rsquo / s understanding of evil is a concept that helps to conceive one&rsquo / s own freedom in terms of Kant&rsquo / s morality. I also try to show that in spite of its similarities with the Christian doctrine of &ldquo / original sin&rdquo / , Kant&rsquo / s conception of evil should not be considered as a religious issue / it is a matter of freedom as the extension of his moral theory and his earlier thoughts. Kant&rsquo / s earlier works do not seem to be sufficient for comprehending his moral thoughts. Therefore, it can be proposed that with the introduction of the concept of evil in the Religion within the Limits of Reason, the missing part of Kant&rsquo / s moral theory is completed.

Submitted by Andrea Hayashi (deachan@gmail.com) on 2016-06-22T11:58:24Z No. of bitstreams: 1 dissertacao-rogerio-do-amaral.pdf: 658576 bytes, checksum: 8841f3bae71e1d82d54772760a09e292 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Andrea Hayashi (deachan@gmail.com) on 2016-06-22T11:58:55Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 dissertacao-rogerio-do-amaral.pdf: 658576 bytes, checksum: 8841f3bae71e1d82d54772760a09e292 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-06-22T11:58:55Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 dissertacao-rogerio-do-amaral.pdf: 658576 bytes, checksum: 8841f3bae71e1d82d54772760a09e292 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-11-25 / A partir da consciência do dever, a liberdade humana deve ser entendida, segundo Kant, como condição e fundamento da lei moral. De que modo conciliar, entretanto, a liberdade das ações com a obediência a uma lei? A fim de responder a essa questão, trata-se de distinguir os conceitos kantianos de "liberdade transcendental", "liberdade prática" e "autonomia". Em linhas gerais, a liberdade transcendental depende da solução da Crítica da razão pura à terceira antinomia, operada pela distinção fenômeno/coisa em si, que torna as afirmações sobre a necessidade da natureza e sobre a liberdade da vontade proposições não contraditórias. Por sua vez, a liberdade prática, ainda de acordo com a primeira Crítica, designa aquilo que comumente se entende por livre-arbítrio, pressuposto da responsabilidade moral dos agentes. Quanto ao conceito kantiano de autonomia, ele é tematizado explicitamente, pela primeira vez, na Fundamentação da metafísica dos costumes, e apresenta-se como a terceira dentre as fórmulas principais do imperativo categórico, aquela que ―unifica em si as outras duas‖, isto é, as fórmulas da lei universal e da humanidade. Repensar, a partir de Kant, uma ética do dever, diferentemente de uma ética da virtude, e o problema da liberdade humana exige o estudo desses dois textos, escolhidos como etapas obrigatórias para quaisquer tentativas de reelaboração dessas questões tradicionais em termos contemporâneos. / According to Kant, human freedom is the ground of moral law. In what sense, however, freedom of action agrees with obedience to law? To answer this question it is necessary to distinguish Kant's concepts of "transcendental freedom", "practical freedom" and "autonomy". In the Critique of Pure Reason, transcendental freedom depends on the solution of the third antinomy. The thesis on the freedom of the will and the antithesis on the necessity of nature can be considered as non-contradictory statements by means of the distinction between phenomenon and noumenon. Still according to the first Critique, practical freedom refers to what is commonly meant by free choice, and concerns to the moral responsibility of agents. Finally, as to the Kantian concept of autonomy, it is subject of the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. It consists of the third among the three main formulas of the categorical imperative, and "unites in itself the other two", the formula of universal law and the formula of humanity. Any attempt to understand, in contemporary terms, the problem of human freedom as well as an ethics of duty require the analysis of these Kantian concepts.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-06-02T20:13:08Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 1939.pdf: 474928 bytes, checksum: c158b1f4b0427b40b371b1abeaf36e72 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2000-02-29 / Universidade Federal de Sao Carlos / The aim of this dissertation is to present Schopenhauer's Metaphysics with a view to analysing the categorical imperative, a key concept of kantian morality. Our analysis shall indicate that the reason is merely an instrument of the will, which demands a refusal of the categorical imperative and the recognition of compassion as the cornerstone of morals. / O objetivo desta dissertação é apresentar a Metafísica da Vontade de Schopenhauer, com o intuito de analisar o imperativo categórico, conceito chave da Moral de Kant. Para tanto, demonstramos a tese de que a razão não passa de um instrumento da vontade. O que implica na refutação do imperativo categórico e, no estabelecimento da compaixão como fundamento da moral.

This essay tries to lay the transcendental foundations to a notion of “pure evil”, pure in the Kantian sense of the term, which means to find the necessary conditions for the concept and establish which criteria must be in place for such a concept to be justified. This essay tries to show the importance of thinking evil on its own terms instead as a secondary concept derived from ”the Good”. The prevailing philosophical stance from Platon until Kant has been to treat evil as either privation or unreason; this paper instead seeks to formulate a substantive notion of evil as pure evil, showing how it can be thought in its own right as an independent and self-sufficient concept. From a Kantian perspective it is only practical reason that can ground a moral action or maxim as free and self-determined, therefore a true concept of evil is only possible at level of the moral law i.e. the source of reason itself. Hence this paper argues that pure evil is intimately linked to the functioning of pure reason itself. In contrast to the traditional thinking regarding the issue of evil, I argue that reason is the sole source of pure evil and that no other factors such as pathology, affect or bad faith can account for events or actions that demonstrates the characteristics of pure evil. With help from the groundbreaking work of Kant, Arendt, Lacan and Sade I hope to point towards a new understanding of the concept of evil as a product of reason itself. Hopefully this work manages to show how and why such a perspective is needed and makes clear what we might gain from such an analysis.

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / To Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), moral and religion are bound up in some way, becoming different just by the fact that while moral, the duties are enacted as fundamental principles of every thinking human being, and by the fact that this one must act as a member of an ends universal system; while religion, those duties are seen as commandments of a supreme holy will, so that, the moral laws are the only ones which are in accordance with the idea of a supreme perfection. In the preface to the first edition of the Religion within the Boundaries of mere Reason Kant opens it with a claim moral is self-sufficient. Nevertheless, if morality in no way needs religion whether objectively (as regards willing) or subjectively (as regards capability), but it is self-sufficient; it is asked: why does religion consider the moral law as a commandment of a supreme holy will? Or yet, why is there a correlation between moral and religion? In this sense, its objective is to show how moral can reach its plenitude only in the absolute autonomy within the practice reason, which becomes law to itself as an unconditional and pure duty, and which can, then, indicate an inevitable relation existing between moral and religion. The connection between moral and religion, besides being fundamental and structural information of pure reason, it is the progressive recognition of a universal plan in which, despite all the liberty abuses by men, will reach in the end the highest possible degree of perfection of humankind. / Para Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), moral e religião estão ligadas de modo estreito, diferenciando-se apenas pelo fato de que na moral os deveres são praticados como princípios fundamentais de todo ser racional, e pelo fato de que esse último deve agir como membro de um sistema universal de fins, enquanto que na religião esses deveres são vistos como mandamentos de uma suprema vontade santa, pois que, as leis da moral são as únicas que estão de acordo com a idéia de uma suprema perfeição. No prólogo à primeira edição de A Religião nos Limites da simples razão (1793) Kant o abre com a afirmação de que a moral basta-se a si mesma. No entanto, se a moral de nenhum modo precisa da religião tanto objetivamente (com relação ao querer) quanto subjetivamente (com relação à capacidade) mas basta-se a si mesma; pergunta-se: porque a religião vê a lei moral como mandamento de uma suprema vontade santa? Ou ainda, porque existe uma relação entre moral e religião? Nesse sentido, o objetivo é o de mostrar como a moral atinge a sua plenitude somente na absoluta autonomia da razão prática, a qual se torna lei para si mesma como dever puro e incondicional, e que chegará então a indicar uma inevitável relação existente entre moral e religião. A conexão entre moral e religião, além de ser um dado fundamental e estrutural da razão pura, é o reconhecimento progressivo de um plano universal segundo o qual, a despeito de todos os abusos da liberdade por parte dos homens, alcançará no final o mais alto grau possível de perfeição do gênero humano.

Epistemology in its contemporary post-modern ethos is generally believed to be inseparably hinged upon language. This of course ensures a major paradigm shift in the disciplined human conceptions of reality. It has been stated and is widely acknowledged that the Kantian Noumenal barrier has, in this recent shift, been proved to be looming far closer than it was ever previously considered. This new barrier to the world of ‘objective absolutes’ comprises a barrier of semantics and syntax, and calls for a radical restructuring of all the human sciences. There is surely no discipline in the humanities that can claim immunity to this colossal shift in epistemology, and theology (particularly of the Evangelical variety) is no exception to the rule. The impact of post-modern epistemological assumption upon contemporary Evangelicalism presents to those who adhere to this school’s position, a profound challenge. Conservative Christians, who hold to the propositional universality and the objectivity of biblical truth, find in the post-modern ethos little sympathy and no rational justification granted for their ‘metaphysical objectivity’. A major challenge therefore to Evangelical Christianity at the present time is this: Is there, in the light of the challenge of post-modern epistemology, any reasonable justification for continuing to adhere to the evangelical claim that God has spoken in unchanging propositional terms that are universally valid and binding? It would seem that in this regard many evangelicals are feeling pressured. Evidence of the pressure of this challenge can readily be found either in the growing contemporary evangelical tendency towards advocating a more cooperative attitude to the post-modern ethos, or in the reactionary theology of schools of thought like the Spiritual Warfare Movement. The writings of Clive Staples Lewis (1898 – 1963) have been proven effective in the countering of negative challenges to Christian faith for the past sixty years. Lewis, as an apologist, in the opinion of many intellectual searchers, positively and convincingly countered modernistic objections to faith in his own time. Modernistic assumptions prevailed in the Western world in Lewis’ day that tended to discredit a rational belief in the supernatural. Lewis was widely held to be an effective apostle to counter this modernistic scepticism. It is the conviction of the present writer that C. S. Lewis apologetics can be just as effectively utilised today in addressing post-modern challenges, as it was fifty years ago used to answer the questions raised by modernism. Lewis in all of his Christian writings, reveals an underlying epistemology that I believe (because it is based firmly upon Christian orthodoxy), has stood the test of time. The apologetics of C. S. Lewis may serve to answer post-modern challenges just as rationally as it did modernism. In this thesis, Lewis’ underlying epistemology will be examined. This will comprise the first part of my work. The second part of the thesis deals with the post-modern epistemological challenge to Evangelicalism as a world-view. The final part of this thesis consists of a dialogue between the most common post-modern challenges to evangelical thinking, and rationally compelling answers thereto that are found in Lewis’ writings. / Thesis (PhD)--University of Pretoria, 2007. / Dogmatics and Christian Ethics / Unrestricted

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Submitted by Filipe dos Santos (fsantos@pucsp.br) on 2016-08-04T11:44:43Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Elton Candido Ribeiro.pdf: 777004 bytes, checksum: d5e6945a62798adb4f9002ce36be78ff (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-08-04T11:44:43Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Elton Candido Ribeiro.pdf: 777004 bytes, checksum: d5e6945a62798adb4f9002ce36be78ff (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-03-18 / Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico / This work aims to study the deduction of the categorical imperative in the third section of Kant’s Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals. Undoubtedly, this deduction is an important Kantian attempt to offer a foundation for his a priori ethics. More than two centuries later, there is no consensus among scholars and commentators regarding what is the structure of the argument, as well as its aim and its importance in the Kantian Critical Philosophy. This thesis is structured in three chapters. The first chapter studies the analysis of the concept of “good will” in the first section of Groundwork. The second chapter follow the analysis of the concept of “finite rational agent” in the second section. Lastly, the third chapter studies the deduction of the categorical imperative in the third section of Groundwork. The argument of the deduction is comprised in the following steps: the analytical relationship between liberty and morality; the presupposition of the effectiveness of the liberty of all rational being; the presupposition of the effectiveness of the liberty of the rational-sensitive being; the deduction of the categorical imperative / Este trabalho tem como objetivo estudar a dedução do imperativo categórico na terceira seção da Fundamentação da Metafísica dos Costumes, de Immanuel Kant. Sem dúvida, esta dedução é uma importante tentativa do filósofo de oferecer uma fundamentação para sua ética a priori. Mais de dois séculos depois, ainda não há consenso entre os estudiosos e comentadores sobre a estrutura do argumento, seu objetivo e sua importância na filosofia crítica kantiana. Para lidar com a questão, esta dissertação é estruturada em três capítulos. O primeiro capítulo estuda a análise do conceito de "boa vontade" empreendida na primeira seção da Fundamentação. O segundo capítulo segue a análise do conceito de "agente racional finito", na segunda seção. Finalmente, o terceiro capítulo estuda a dedução do imperativo categórico na terceira seção da Fundamentação. O argumento da dedução é compreendido nos seguintes passos: a relação analítica entre liberdade e moralidade; a pressuposição da efetividade da liberdade de todos os seres racionais; a pressuposição da efetividade da liberdade do ser racional-sensível; a dedução do imperativo categórico

<p>Human reproductive cloning came to the public´s attention when Dolly the sheep was cloned in Scotland in 1997. This news quickly spread around the world causing both excitements at the possibilities of what cloning techniques could offer, as well as apprehension about the ethical, social and legal implications should human reproductive cloning become possible. Many international organisations and governments were concerned about the impact of human reproductive cloning on human health, dignity and human rights. To this day, many institutions have drafted resolutions, protocols and position statements outlining their concerns. This paper outlines some of the major ethical issues surrounding human reproductive cloning and the position towards this novel technique taken by three important international organisations - Council of Europe, World Health Organization, and United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization - expressed in different regulatory frameworks. Proponents of human cloning occasionally point out that cloned humans are already among us in the form of twins - people with identical sets of DNA - so what is the problem? Besides avoiding the fact that natural twins are always siblings, whereas a clone could be the twin of a parent or grandparent, this observation ignores a crucial moral difference: natural twins arrive as rare creations, not as specifically designed products. Instead of being an uncontrolled, self-regulated evolutionary process, creation of man through reproductive cloning are shifting from being natural to a state of instrumentality where parental interests constitutes what is important. This shift will inevitably lead to the child being a means for some other end (parental interests). However, this is not the same as being subdued into genetic determinism, but the point brought forward is the child´s lack of freedom caused by the interests of the parents. In this sense the clone´s genome constitutes a heavy backpack because of our pre-knowledge of its physical building blocks - or in other words its potentiality. Even though the argument of genetic determinism is a weak one, our subconscious"forces"us to create hopes upon the child because of its potentiality. No longer is the evolution the creator with the dices of randomness. A new gambler is in town and this time the dices are equilateral.</p>