The current dissertation is the result of an investigation about the principle of the autonomy of the will. According to Immanuel Kant, the autonomy is the foundation of all morality of the human actions. The autonomy consists in the presentation of the reason for herself of a moral law valid for the will of all rational beings. The moral law is going against the actions that are practiced by selfishness, since she possesses the form of an universal legislation that is expressed in the categorical imperative of the reason. The heteronomy of the will is the principle contrary to the autonomy. Starting from the determination of your will for the moral law the man becomes conscious of your freedom. Consequently, the freedom is what turns possible to the man your self-determination for the moral action. / A presente dissertação é o resultado de uma investigação acerca do princípio da autonomia da vontade. Segundo Immanuel Kant, a autonomia é o fundamento de toda a moralidade das ações humanas. A autonomia consiste na apresentação da razão para si mesma de uma lei moral que é válida para a vontade de todos os seres racionais. A lei moral vai contra as ações que são praticadas por egoísmo, já que ela possui a forma de uma legislação universal que é expressa no imperativo categórico da razão. A heteronomia da vontade é o princípio contrário à autonomia. A partir da determinação de sua vontade pela lei moral o homem torna-se consciente de sua liberdade. Por conseguinte, a liberdade é o que torna possível ao homem sua autodeterminação para a ação moral.

Esta tese tem o objetivo de investigar o estatuto dos princípios fundamentais do direito, apresentados por Kant na Doutrina do direito, parte constitutiva da obra Metafísica dos costumes, a fim de mostrar como Kant fundamenta a sua teoria do direito racional. A questão fundamental no que concerne à teoria do direito de Kant, e que há muitos anos suscita o debate entre os intérpretes, diz respeito à possibilidade ou não do direito encontrar os fundamentos de seus conceitos e princípios fundamentais na teoria moral elaborada por ele na Fundamentação da metafísica dos costumes e na Crítica da razão prática. Recentemente pode-se observar um crescente número de estudiosos que afirmam a independência da Doutrina do direito da teoria moral kantiana e, consequentemente, a independência dos princípios a priori do direito do imperativo moral. Contrariamente a essa posição, esta tese procura mostrar que Kant fundamenta o direito em sua teoria moral - o direito pressupõe a teoria moral e seu princípio fundamental, o imperativo moral, - e que essa é a única maneira de interpretarmos a Doutrina do direito se não quisermos fazer afirmações que entrem em contradição com o pensamento do próprio autor. A tese que afirma a fundamentação moral do direito se baseia em duas afirmações, que encontram respaldo nos textos de Kant. São elas: a) as leis jurídicas são uma espécie de leis morais, cujo princípio último é o imperativo categórico – os princípios a priori do direito derivam do princípio supremo da moral; b) o uso da coerção externa para obrigar outrem a cumprir um dever jurídico é moralmente justificável, o que significa que esse tipo de constrangimento imposto ao arbítrio é autorizado por uma lei moral. A tese tem, enfim, o objetivo de reconstruir os argumentos de Kant para mostrar que buscar na sua filosofia moral os fundamentos da teoria do direito está totalmente de acordo com seus textos e com o seu pensamento sistemático. / This thesis aims to investigate the nature of fundamental principles of Right, presented by Kant in the Doctrine of Right, a constituent part of the work Metaphysic of Morals, in order to show how Kant grounded his theory of rational Right. The fundamental question regarding the Kant‟s theory of Right, and that for many years raises debate among interpreters, concerns the possibility or not of the Right to find the foundations of its concepts and principles in moral theory elaborated by him in the Groundwork the Metaphysics of Morals and Critique of Practical Reason. Recently one can observe a growing number of scholars who assert the independence of the Doctrine of Right of Kantian moral theory and accordingly the independence of a priori principles of Right of moral imperative. Contrary to this position, this thesis aims to show that Kant bases the Right on his moral theory - the Right presuppose the moral theory and its fundamental principle, the moral imperative - and that is the only way to interpret the doctrine of Right if not want to make statements that come into conflict with the author's own thought. The thesis argues that the moral foundation of Right rests on two assertions that are supported in the writings of Kant. They are: a) juridical laws are a kind of moral law whose ultimate principle is the Categorical imperative - the a priori principles of Right derived from the supreme principle of morality; b) the use of external coercion to compel another to fulfill a duty legal is morally justifiable, meaning that this type of constraint imposed on the choice is authorized by a moral law. In short, the thesis has the objective of reconstructing Kant's arguments to show that find in his moral philosophy the foundations of the theory of Right is fully consistent with his writings and his systematic thinking.

In my diploma thesis entitled Implementing the Gold Rule of Morality in Crisis Planning for Population Protection, I will try to draw on the ideas and conclusions of my bachelor thesis, in which I investigated whether members of the Integrated System Can use the golden rule of morality in an emergency. I have come to the conclusion that the members of the individual components of the integrated rescue system are guided by the valid legislation and orders of the commander of the intervention. Nevertheless, they would welcome in certain situations the possibility of deciding according to the golden rule of morality, which briefly tells us: "I do not want to do the other to you." Translated into situations in the event of an extraordinary event may mean deciding in tedious situations so, as if you were the Rescued and not the savior. The aim of my thesis is to find out whether it is possible to implement this idea in the crisis plans themselves and, above all, whether the intervening members of the integrated rescue system themselves would use this rule in certain situations. The association of two seemingly incompatible worlds seems at first glance absurd, but research and interviews with individual members of the integrated system have convinced me that the philosophical questions and the name of Imanuel Kant can very closely mingle with the world of extraordinary events and the salvation of Human lives, health and property of the population. I would very much like to work with this bachelor thesis together with my previous bachelor thesis, tried to create a unified whole as an idea that can motivate us to think whether it is necessary to change the current state of legislation or whether the legislation itself is set as a form of golden rule of morality .

Made available in DSpace on 2014-06-11T19:26:20Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 2009-08-14Bitstream added on 2014-06-13T18:54:37Z : No. of bitstreams: 1 fernandes_pc_me_mar.pdf: 1018807 bytes, checksum: 2fa60ffc2a8ffd6260c0442166e72aa3 (MD5) / Este trabalho tem por objetivo apresentar alguns conceitos chave da filosofia prática de Kant, especialmente respeito e autonomia, bem como o caminho percorrido pelo filósofo para formulação de uma possibilidade para a liberdade prática. Esse percurso será investigado principalmente junto de duas obras, a saber, Fundamentação da metafísica dos costumes e Crítica da razão prática. Nelas Kant apresenta o respeito como um sentimento que é produzido pela consciência da lei moral, a única lei capaz de mostrar a liberdade como autonomia da vontade. Ao lado do respeito Kant apresenta um outro sentimento prático, a saber, a humilhação. Defenderei a tese de que ambos os conceitos, respeito e humilhação funcionam como duas forças do ânimo que são exercidas pela vontade diante da lei. A análise dos mesmos dar-se-á como sendo duas forças do ânimo descobertas por Kant em analogia com o conceito de força física da mecânica newtoniana, e em conformidade com o próprio conceito kantiano de analogia / This work aims to present some key concepts of the practical philosophy of Kant, especially respect and autonomy, and the path traveled by the philosopher to formulate a possibility for the practical freedon. This kantian`s path will be investigated mainly from two of most important works, namely, the Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals and Critique of practical reason. In this works Kant introduced the respect as a practical feeling that is produced by the consciousness of moral law, the only one able to show practical freedom as autonomy of the will. Beside the respect Kant presents another practical feeling, namely, the humiliation. Both concepts operate as two forces of the spirits that are exercised by the will face the law. The analysis of the feelings of respect and humiliation as two forces of the will be presented in analogy with the concept of physical force, obtained by the philosopher from Newtonian`s mechanics and in according to kantian`s concept of analogy

Orientador: Ubirajara Rancan de Azevedo Marques / Banca: Oswaldo Giacóia Júnior / Banca: Aylton Barbieri Durão / Resumo: Este trabalho tem por objetivo apresentar alguns conceitos chave da filosofia prática de Kant, especialmente respeito e autonomia, bem como o caminho percorrido pelo filósofo para formulação de uma possibilidade para a liberdade prática. Esse percurso será investigado principalmente junto de duas obras, a saber, Fundamentação da metafísica dos costumes e Crítica da razão prática. Nelas Kant apresenta o respeito como um sentimento que é produzido pela consciência da lei moral, a única lei capaz de mostrar a liberdade como autonomia da vontade. Ao lado do respeito Kant apresenta um outro sentimento prático, a saber, a humilhação. Defenderei a tese de que ambos os conceitos, respeito e humilhação funcionam como duas forças do ânimo que são exercidas pela vontade diante da lei. A análise dos mesmos dar-se-á como sendo duas forças do ânimo descobertas por Kant em analogia com o conceito de força física da mecânica newtoniana, e em conformidade com o próprio conceito kantiano de analogia / Abstract: This work aims to present some key concepts of the practical philosophy of Kant, especially respect and autonomy, and the path traveled by the philosopher to formulate a possibility for the practical freedon. This kantian's path will be investigated mainly from two of most important works, namely, the Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals and Critique of practical reason. In this works Kant introduced the respect as a practical feeling that is produced by the consciousness of moral law, the only one able to show practical freedom as autonomy of the will. Beside the respect Kant presents another practical feeling, namely, the humiliation. Both concepts operate as two forces of the spirits that are exercised by the will face the law. The analysis of the feelings of respect and humiliation as two forces of the will be presented in analogy with the concept of physical force, obtained by the philosopher from Newtonian's mechanics and in according to kantian's concept of analogy / Mestre

Made available in DSpace on 2014-12-17T15:12:08Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 LeonardoOF.pdf: 276582 bytes, checksum: 768fd2746104b3cfbe6b12f0f04cdbba (MD5) Previous issue date: 2007-10-25 / A fundamenta??o metaf?sica do direito a que nos propomos a esclarecer na filosofia de Kant assume n?o somente uma an?lise de temas jur?dicos. Temos uma quest?o filos?fica de fundo a tratar: a justi?a ? poss?vel? Tal indaga??o n?o ? o tema do texto, mas o que est? pressuposto. A an?lise kantiana, de certo modo, assume metafisicamente a possibilidade da justi?a a partir do conceito de liberdade. Mas, com base na liberdade, demonstra a possibilidade da justi?a na ?tica e no direito. A disserta??o ? composta por tr?s cap?tulos. No primeiro cap?tulo, partindo da reconstru??o inicial do conceito de liberdade na Cr?tica da Raz?o Pura, descrevemos a constru??o do conceito cosmol?gico de liberdade transcendental a partir do terceiro conflito antin?mico e de sua solu??o na Dial?tica Transcendental. Feito isso, descrevemos o conceito de liberdade no cap?tulo do C?non da Raz?o Pura e discutimos o problema de como compatibilizar liberdade transcendental e liberdade pr?tica. No segundo cap?tulo, fazemos uma an?lise da distin??o entre a legisla??o moral e a legisla??o jur?dica das a??es humanas partindo da an?lise da liberdade pr?tica interna (moral) e distinguindo-a da liberdade pr?tica externa (ou jur?dica). Nesse contexto, desenvolvemos os pressupostos de uma metaf?sica do direito, tomando como ponto de partida o conceito de liberdade e o imperativo categ?rico como princ?pio da autonomia da vontade, base normativa para a lei universal do direito. No terceiro cap?tulo, a partir da rela??o entre ?tica e direito, reconstru?mos o conceito de Direito e esclarecemos o fundamento da legitimidade da coer??o a partir do princ?pio normativo de coexist?ncia das liberdades individuais. Analisamos tamb?m os aspectos fundamentais do direito que derivam deste princ?pio, tal como os conceitos de Contrato Origin?rio, Estado, Lei, Coer??o,bem como a proposta kantiana de uma paz universal com base numa legisla??o internacional. No fim, discutimos o aspecto metaf?sico presente no fundamento do Direito

Esta tese tem o objetivo de investigar o estatuto dos princípios fundamentais do direito, apresentados por Kant na Doutrina do direito, parte constitutiva da obra Metafísica dos costumes, a fim de mostrar como Kant fundamenta a sua teoria do direito racional. A questão fundamental no que concerne à teoria do direito de Kant, e que há muitos anos suscita o debate entre os intérpretes, diz respeito à possibilidade ou não do direito encontrar os fundamentos de seus conceitos e princípios fundamentais na teoria moral elaborada por ele na Fundamentação da metafísica dos costumes e na Crítica da razão prática. Recentemente pode-se observar um crescente número de estudiosos que afirmam a independência da Doutrina do direito da teoria moral kantiana e, consequentemente, a independência dos princípios a priori do direito do imperativo moral. Contrariamente a essa posição, esta tese procura mostrar que Kant fundamenta o direito em sua teoria moral - o direito pressupõe a teoria moral e seu princípio fundamental, o imperativo moral, - e que essa é a única maneira de interpretarmos a Doutrina do direito se não quisermos fazer afirmações que entrem em contradição com o pensamento do próprio autor. A tese que afirma a fundamentação moral do direito se baseia em duas afirmações, que encontram respaldo nos textos de Kant. São elas: a) as leis jurídicas são uma espécie de leis morais, cujo princípio último é o imperativo categórico – os princípios a priori do direito derivam do princípio supremo da moral; b) o uso da coerção externa para obrigar outrem a cumprir um dever jurídico é moralmente justificável, o que significa que esse tipo de constrangimento imposto ao arbítrio é autorizado por uma lei moral. A tese tem, enfim, o objetivo de reconstruir os argumentos de Kant para mostrar que buscar na sua filosofia moral os fundamentos da teoria do direito está totalmente de acordo com seus textos e com o seu pensamento sistemático. / This thesis aims to investigate the nature of fundamental principles of Right, presented by Kant in the Doctrine of Right, a constituent part of the work Metaphysic of Morals, in order to show how Kant grounded his theory of rational Right. The fundamental question regarding the Kant‟s theory of Right, and that for many years raises debate among interpreters, concerns the possibility or not of the Right to find the foundations of its concepts and principles in moral theory elaborated by him in the Groundwork the Metaphysics of Morals and Critique of Practical Reason. Recently one can observe a growing number of scholars who assert the independence of the Doctrine of Right of Kantian moral theory and accordingly the independence of a priori principles of Right of moral imperative. Contrary to this position, this thesis aims to show that Kant bases the Right on his moral theory - the Right presuppose the moral theory and its fundamental principle, the moral imperative - and that is the only way to interpret the doctrine of Right if not want to make statements that come into conflict with the author's own thought. The thesis argues that the moral foundation of Right rests on two assertions that are supported in the writings of Kant. They are: a) juridical laws are a kind of moral law whose ultimate principle is the Categorical imperative - the a priori principles of Right derived from the supreme principle of morality; b) the use of external coercion to compel another to fulfill a duty legal is morally justifiable, meaning that this type of constraint imposed on the choice is authorized by a moral law. In short, the thesis has the objective of reconstructing Kant's arguments to show that find in his moral philosophy the foundations of the theory of Right is fully consistent with his writings and his systematic thinking.

La réflexion morale de Theodor Adorno est manifestement traversée par une tension : l’exigence paradoxale d’enraciner pleinement la morale à la fois dans les impulsions les plus vives et dans la raison la plus lucide. Plus qu’une excentricité parmi d’autres de la figure de proue de l’École de Francfort, le présent mémoire donne à penser que ce problème pourrait être une des principales charnières de son éthique. L’objectif de ma recherche est de dégager une voie pour articuler conjointement, «sans sacrifice aucun», ces deux exigences. Pour ce faire, je tenterai d’étayer l’hypothèse suivante : l’analyse du problème de la liberté et de la non-liberté que développe le premier des trois «modèles» de Dialectique négative permet de comprendre à la fois le lien et l’écart entre la dimension impulsive et rationnelle de l’éthique d’Adorno. L’argument qui sera déployé se penchera d’abord sur le problème de la non-liberté et son incarnation à travers le phénomène concret de l’antisémitisme ainsi que de la peur et de la rage animale dans lesquelles il s’enracine, pour ensuite examiner la conception adornienne de la liberté dans ses deux dimensions de «pleine conscience théorique» et «d’impulsion spontanée», et pour finalement tenter d’apprécier la portée plus générale pour la compréhension de l’éthique d’Adorno de cette interprétation du problème de la liberté en tentant de comprendre sur cette base son «nouvel impératif catégorique». / Throughout Theodor Adorno’s moral thought runs a paradoxical demand : that morality should be fully rooted in both the liveliest impulses and the keenest reasonings. More than a quirk among Adorno’s many, this essay suggests that this problem plays a pivotal role in his ethics. The current research seeks to develop a strategy to conjointly articulate these two demands. To this end, I will try to expound the following hypothesis : the analysis of the problem of freedom and unfreedom set forth by the first of the ‘models’ in Negative Dialectics enables making sense of both the bond and the disparity between the impulsive and rational constituents of adornian ethics. This study will first focus on the problem of unfreedom and its embodiment in the concrete phenomena of anti-Semitism as well as the animal fear and rage that it builds upon. It will then go on to examine Adorno’s conception of freedom in its two facets : «full theoretical consciousness» and «spontaneous impulse». It will finally try to ascertain the more general relevance of this interpretation of the problem of freedom for making sense of Adorno’s ethics, by trying to make sense on that basis of his «new categorical imperative».

La révolution de 1789 fit émerger, face à une société jusqu’alors conçue comme une entité, un nouvel individu désireux d’affirmer sa singularité. À la morale chrétienne qui se réfère à Dieu, les philosophes du XVIIIe siècle, et plus particulièrement Kant, ont voulu substituer une morale où l’homme serait, selon le mot de Protagoras, mesure de toutes choses. Cependant, l’individu devait encore se conformer à ce que Kant nomme l’impératif catégorique, et supporter une adhésion forcée à des valeurs communes. La morale a été progressivement ressentie comme autoritaire et illégitime ; certains ont voulu ne voir en elle que les valeurs d’une société bourgeoise. Les années 1960 donnèrent donc naissance à une morale individuelle, qui a pris le nom d’éthique. Ces bouleversements n’ont pas été sans répercussions profondes sur le droit des personnes et de la famille. Aussi les bonnes moeurs ont-elles disparu du droit de la famille pour laisser la place en droit des personnes à la dignité humaine : à la conception d’un droit-modèle succéda celle d’un droit-principe. La notion de dignité ne fut consacrée dans le Code civil français que fort tardivement, ce qui explique l’absence de consensus concernant sa définition. On peut regretter qu’une telle fragilité ait pu entraîner la dilution de ce principe, voire sa transformation en un droit subjectif ; elle n’oppose alors qu’une faible résistance à l’avènement de l’autonomie personnelle, construite en porte-à-faux par la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme sur l’article 8 et le consentement de l’individu. Dans cette sphère européenne, l’individu a gagné le droit d’opérer des choix sur son corps, quelque dangereux qu’ils soient, et peut-être même la liberté de renoncer au bénéfice des droits énoncés dans la Convention. Il apparaît donc essentiel de redéfinir la dignité, rempart contre la réification de l’être humain, autour des concepts de liberté et d’égalité. Dès lors, d’une logique néfaste de concurrence entre la dignité et l’autonomie, pourra renaître un véritable rapport de complémentarité et de hiérarchie / After the French revolution, in front of a holist society hitherto, the willingness of a new individual to affirm his singularity did emerge. Whilst the Christian morality referred to God, the XVIIIth century philosophers, especially Kant, wanted to substitute a morality where, according to the words of Protagoras, man would be the measure of anythings. The individual, however, still had to conform to what Kant names the categorical imperative, and to support for shared values. The morality became gradually felt as authoritative and illegitimate, the middle-class values. The 60’s let rise an individual morality, which took the name of ethics. These upheavals were not without major effects on law of persons and family law. Boni mores disappeared therefore from family law to give way to human dignity in law of persons: to the conception of a model law that of a principle law did succeed. The concept of dignity was only tardily devoted in the Civil code: that could explain the absence of consensus concerning its definition. One can consider it regrettable that such a fragility could involve the dilution of this principle, and even its transformation into a subjective right; it does not oppose whereas a low resistance to the advent of personal autonomy, awkwardly built by the European Court of the human rights on the article 8 and the individual consent. The individual gained the right to operate choices on his body, however dangerous they are, and perhaps even freedom to give up the benefit of rights stated in the Convention. It thus appears essential to redefine dignity, a rampart against the reification of human being,around the concepts of freedom and equality. Consequently, from a harmful logic of competition between dignity and autonomy, a true relation of complementarity and hierarchy between these two concepts will be able to reappear.

Today the conception of human rights is an idea that preserves its intransitive, inalienable and indivisible quality with a cross-cultural reference. The idea of human rights, entering our lives from the 18th century onwards, has gained a worldwide recognition through the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The idea occupies place both at the level of rules and principles as a project and at the level of our daily problem solutions, modifications and the daily course of our lives as a pragmatics. The political framework provides the idea of human rights such a justification that it constitutes a significant part of our decisions, thoughts and actions. On the other hand, the grounds of the idea has been questioned as a part of the Enlightenment project since it was first articulated and especially in recent decades certain radical criticisms originating from Nietzche&rsquo / s thought became prevalent. The thesis questions this easy alliance between Nietzsche and radical attacks to human rights thought. In the first chapter, I first provided a brief historical overview of the idea of human rights. Then, I had a closer look towards the principles of universality, equality, autonomy and is-ought distinction with special reference to Kantian formulations of these concepts and in the second chapter, I elaborate Nietzsche&rsquo / s perception of these same principles and our understanding of conventional morality in general, to reach an articulated answer to the question: Would Nietzsche be categorically against human rights? I conclude that his philosophical attitude to these four principles differ from each other. In this context the thesis regards Nietzschean informal structures over the Kantian formal ones as complementary for a full grasp of the idea of human rights by offering a connection of the transitionality between Kant and Nietzsche.