A thought experiment by Avicenna known as the Flying man presents a hypothetical man in the air who is not aware of the existence of his body but simultaneously is aware of himself. A common objection to the Flying Man accuses Avicenna of committing an epistemic and logical fallacy known as the Masked Man. This paper analyses the two most recent interpretations of the Flying Man thought experiment, where each interpretation attempts to understand the main argument which Avicenna poses through the thought experiment.  On one hand, I will examine Peter Adamson and Fedor Benevich’s interpretation, which rejects previous criticisms of the Flying Man with an emphasis on Avicenna’s philosophy of essences. I will, on the other hand, present Jari Kaukua’s interpretation; a response to Adamson and Benevich’s interpretation with two closely related objections. The last section of this paper discusses and evaluates the scholars’ debated points and offers a more charitable interpretation of the Flying Man through my suggestive indicative method.

Jeremy Bentham’s panopticon is a theoretical prison that was developed in 1787 as a way to punish and reform people convicted of crime. It involved a circular building with a central guard tower, from which an omnipresent and omniscient warden would constantly surveille the inmates who were kept in solitary confinement. Although the prison was never physically constructed, elements of the panopticon are present in many aspects of our social structure and power systems. This paper explores Bentham’s original work, the post-modern responses to it, and present day manifestations of the panopticon through a bioethics lens in order to develop a metaphorical tool that can be used examine and explain how power is systematized and functionalized by those who control it, the effects on those who are subject to it, and how the systems are exploited to the point of dysfunction. / Urban Bioethics

The purpose of this study was to contribute to the science education literature by describing how thought experiments vary in terms of the nature, purpose of use and reasoning resources behind during the solution of conceptual physics problems. Three groups of participants were selected according to the level of participants&rsquo / physics knowledge- low, medium, and high level groups- in order to capture the variation. Methodology of phenomenographic research was adapted for this study. Think aloud and retrospective questioning strategies were used throughout the individually conducted problem solving sessions. The analysis of data showed that thought experiments were frequently used cognitive tools for all level of participants while working on the problems. Four different thought experiment structures were observed which were categorized as limiting case, extreme case, simple case, and familiar case. It was also observed that participants conducted thought experiments for different purposes such as prediction, proof, and explanation. The reasoning resources running behind the thought experiment processes were classified in terms of observed facts, intuitive principles, and scientific concepts. The results of the analysis suggested that, thought experiments used as a creative reasoning instrument for theory formation or hypothesis testing by scientists can also be used by students during the inquiry processes as well as problem solving in instructional settings. It was also argued that, instructional practices can be developed according to the outcomes of thought experiments, which illuminate thinking processes of students and displays hidden or missing components of their reasoning.

This thesis considers how Kleist and Hoffmann’s fiction might be considered as responding to the perceived shortcomings of enlightenment. The two writers, despite the barriers of literary categorisations, have a striking affinity in their sense that notions of truth and knowledge are intertwined with social and political agendas, rather than forming part of some natural teleology. The thesis breaks new ground in viewing the texts within a more expansive discourse context as literary interventions within a broad, cross-society engagement with enlightenment, in its various streams and factions. The texts studied, I argue, represent thought experiments, not merely reflecting and re-articulating the influences of literary peers and historically significant events, but instead testing the real-world application of key enlightenment ideas. The driving force for this thesis is the need to locate their work more rigorously in relation to enlightenment thought of their time than has previously been attempted. This is not so much a question of retrieving past influences, as one of viewing their work as being in dialogue with contemporary thought. Moving away from attempts using Kleist’s letters to theorise the relation between Kleist and Kant, this investigation instead turns to aspects of Kant’s philosophy to illuminate the texts. Hoffmann’s relationship to enlightenment, too, is explored beyond the prism of Romanticism. Taking a more comparative approach than previous work on the two writers, I identify not only thematic commonalities, but also a parallel aesthetic, in which multiple narratives coexist and where ‘truth’ is manufactured by the dominance of one particular narrative. The notion of 'MÃ1⁄4ndigkeit', central to Kant’s famous definition of 'Aufklärung' offers a useful guiding concept for the investigation and captures the emancipatory promise of self-realisation and the positive trajectory of human progress at the heart of the miscellany of moral and political theories and philosophies collectively known as ‘enlightenment’. The latter refers not to the historical period, but rather to a process of intellectual emancipation and an assemblage of ideals and values. As an intellectual movement, enlightenment was not, as is often assumed, monolithic, but encompasses conflicting notions of reason, freedom, and how its goals were to be achieved. Not only are the certainty and consequences of this intellectual emancipation evaluated in the texts, but I have also identified a radical questioning of the paradigms of thought which condition our understanding of narratives. Both Kleist and Hoffmann’s texts are narratively complex, often with shifts in focalisation, jumps in time, occasionally, figures whose identity changes leave the reader uncertain whether they are dealing with more than one character, and depictions of events which resist clarification through conventional understandings of time, space and causality. This project seeks to reconcile these ‘blind spots’ with a broader critique of enlightenment, in which absolute knowledge is shown to be illusory and truth simply reflective of constellations of power. The spatiotemporal and causal frameworks foundational to rational understanding and used to make sense of the world are revealed to be inadequate.

The normative moral code is considered to be such that it applies universally to all or at least to all who can understand and govern their behavior by it. All or almost all common folk think of and use their own moral codes as them being normative in that for example there simply seem to them to exist “oughts” that apply to all and that there simply, straightforwardly are “things” that are right and wrong, good and bad. Gert Bernard and Gert Joshua have written an article on the topic of defining morality, with the title of “The Definition of Morality”. The authors suggest that the terms ‘normative morality’ refer to a code of conduct that, given some specified conditions, would be put forward by all rational persons. The authors take this formulation as entailing true and important definitional features of what normative morality is, although the authors think of this basic definition, conception as not being complete and that some additional feature hence is lacking but that any such candidate addendum to the definitional basic schema that they surveyed within the article seemed to be controversial, contested. Normative morality seems apt to investigate by creating thought-experiments wherein the participants are for example, envisioned choosing to endorse, put forward or act in accordance with a moral code. Within this large investigative project into normative morality with the help of thought-experiments it seemed to me that there was an under-representation of thought-experiments exhibiting some worthwhile and relevant features and I felt that it was a warranted project to create a thought-experiment which concurrently exhibited these features. Such an experiment could be thought of as an unusual “puzzle-piece” which could be valuable in contributing to furthering the completion of the “puzzle”, i.e. what normative morality is and its moral code. These three features were: i) a high degree of aptness for investigating a major part of or the complete normative moral code and ii) a high degree of freedom pertaining to the participants, e.g. their actions, thoughts etc., as well as iii) a high degree of confidence or warrant concerning what the participants would do, think, feel etc. within the thought-experiment. A thought-experiment, the Normative Moral Codes Workshop (NMCW) was hence created, which was aimed at investigating normative morality and its code and which exhibited these features. It is a thought-experiment mimicking an actual empirical study wherein the participants are given the task to together put forward the moral code for them, that would apply to them and that would cover a major or complete part of what they consider their moral codes to entail. The participants employed within my run of the NMCW thought-experiment were all currently living adult persons who I knew well. The core or main aim of this essay was to investigate whether it would or would not be the case that most or all participants within my run of the thought-experiment the NMCW would decide to put forward the code together with the chosen formulation of the thesis being, that it would not be the case that most or all participants would put forward the code within my run of the NMCW thought-experiment. Part of the core aim was also to elucidate why the thesis was supported or not supported as well as how strong the support was for the outcome of the experiment, i.e. the outcome of a code being put forward or not. The essay also has some minor aims which radiate out from the core aim (see below). As the thought-experimenter, I then reported on the events that I envisioned as happening within my run the NMCW thought-experiment as my selected participants grappled with the task and their decision to put or not put forward the code together that would apply to them. The finding was that the thesis was supported and that the support was robust in that I could identify several reasons the participants had against putting forward the code and I found very little in terms of reasons among the participants for putting forward the code. The essay also had some minor aims to selectively discuss a few further relevant and interesting issues radiating out from the core aim. These minor aims revolved around discussing some selected salient features of the NMCW including how they could relate to the outcome. One such selected salient feature was the feature of the employed participant sample of my run of the NMCW. I for example, discussed the potential extension of it not being the case that most or all participants would decide to put forward the code, if the participant sample would have been modified but still employed currently living5adults and I ended up being of the opinion that pertaining to most potential samples a similar outcome as the one envisioned within my run of the NMCW would be expected. I also wanted to discuss some further selected salient features of the NMCW within the context of addressing whether the NMCW, given its features ought to be considered an unsound, inapt experiment for investigating normative morality, given Gert’s and Gert’s conception of normative morality, since if this was the case the outcome of the experiment ought to be disregarded, given no weight. Although, I did find potential targets for criticism of the NMCW experimental design I did not find any reasons strong enough to disqualify the NMCW experiment as an experiment inapt, unsound for investigating normative morality, given the features of normative morality entailed within the suggested basic definition provided by Gert and Gert. Finally, I also aimed to selectively discuss some aspects of what it could mean pertaining to the conception of normative morality, according to Gert and Gert, that the thesis was supported. For example, given one interpretation the outcome could be taken to provide support for the non-existence of a normative moral code, but given another be taken to mean that addenda has to be identified and added to the basic conception of normative morality and that such addenda would be such that they would disqualify the NMCW (and its outcome) as a sound and apt thought-experiment to be employed in investigating normative morality. I also attempted to briefly illustrate how the NMCW thought-experiment could be used as a substratum facilitating the identification and clarification of such potential addenda to the basic conception of normative morality, suggested by Gert and Gert, and I also suggest some potential candidate features of the NMCW that further potential specifications added to the basic conception of morality ought to be able to disqualify, exclude as acceptable features of experiments aimed at investigating normative morality. In this way, an unusual, under-represented kind of thought-experiment, “puzzle-piece” when it comes to the large investigative project of employing experiments in order to acquire further insight into normative morality, i.e. “the puzzle”, can regardless of whether it seems to fit or does not seem to fit the “puzzle”, still be employed in such a way as to potentially provide further insight into “the puzzle”. This since even when a “puzzle-piece” does not seem to fit the “puzzle”, “seeing” and understanding how and why could provide us with information about the “puzzle”. / Den normativa moraliska koden anses vara sådan att den gäller universellt för alla eller åtminstone för alla som kan förstå den och reglera sitt beteende i enlighet med den. Alla eller nästan alla vanliga människor tänker och använder sig av sina moraliska koder som om dessa koder vore normativa, normerande genom att det t. ex. för dem helt enkelt verkar finnas ”måsten” som gäller alla och att det ”rakt upp och ner” verkar finnas ”saker” som helt enkelt är rätt och fel, gott och ont. Gert Bernard och Gert Joshua har skrivit en artikel kring ämnet hur man kan definiera moralen med titeln “The Definition of Morality” (sv. ”Moralens Definition”). Författarna föreslår att termen ’normativ moral’ (eller den ’normativa moralen’ i bestämd form) gäller en kod som reglerar hur man bör uppföra sig som givet vissa specificerade förhållanden är sådan att alla rationella personer skulle omfamna och förespråka den. Författarna anser att denna formulering innehåller viktiga och sanna egenskaper hos definitionen kring vad normativ moral är, även om författarna anser att denna basala, grundläggande definition, konception inte är fullständig och att därför vissa ytterligare definitions egenskaper, specifikationer saknas men att alla granskade kandidat-tillägg till denna basala definition som undersöktes inom artikeln verkade vara kontroversiella, enligt författarna. Normativ moral verkar lämplig för att undersökas genom att skapa tankeexperiment inom vilka deltagarna tex kan föreställas stödja, lägga fram eller agera i enlighet med en moralisk kod. Inom detta stora undersökande projekt av normativ moral med hjälp av tankeexperiment så verkade det enligt mig som om det fanns en under-representation av tankeexperiment som uppvisade vissa värdefulla och relevanta egenskaper och jag ansåg att det var ett rättfärdigat projekt att skapa ett tankeexperiment som uppvisade dessa värdefulla och relevanta egenskaper. Ett dylikt experiment kunde anses vara en ovanlig ”pusselbit” som kunde vara ett värdefullt bidrag till slutförandet av ”pusslet”, dvs vad normativ moral är och dess kod. De tre under-representerade egenskaperna var i) en hög grad av lämplighet för att undersöka en stor del av den normativa moraliska koden6eller den kompletta koden och ii) en hög grad av deltagarfrihet, exempelvis avseende deltagarnas handlingar, tankar osv samt iii) en hög grad av förtroende eller rättfärdigande avseende vad deltagarna skulle göra, tänka, känna osv inom tankeexperimentet. Tankeexperimentet, den Normativa Moraliska Kods Workshoppen (NMKW) skapades därför med målsättningen att undersöka den normativa moralen, dess kod samt att experimentet då skulle uppvisa de ovan nämnda egenskaperna. Det är ett tankeexperiment som liknar, ”speglar” en riktig empirisk studie inom vilka deltagarna ges uppgiften att tillsammans stödja och lägga fram den moraliska kod som skulle gälla för dem, reglera deras uppförande och som till en stor del eller fullständigt skulle täcka, innehålla det som de ansåg att deras moraliska koder innehöll. Deltagarna som användes inom min körning av tankeexperimentet var alla nu levande vuxna person som jag ansåg att jag kände väl. Kärn- eller huvudmålsättningen med uppsatsen var att undersöka huruvida det skulle eller inte skulle vara fallet att de flesta eller alla deltagare inom min körning av NMKW tankeexperimentet skulle bestämma sig för att tillsammans lägga fram och stödja en kod, med den valda formuleringen för tesen enligt, det skulle inte vara fallet att de flesta eller alla deltagare skulle lägga fram och stödja koden inom min körning av NMKW experimentet. Som en del av kärnmålsättningen var det att utreda varför tesen var eller inte var stödd samt utreda hur starkt stödet var för utfallet av experimentet, dvs utfallet att en kod lades fram eller inte lades fram. Uppsatsen har även mindre eller bi-målsättningar som strålar ut från uppsatsens huvudmålsättning (se nedan). I min roll som tanke-experimenteraren så rapporterade jag sedan kring vilka händelser som jag föreställde mig, som jag ”såg” uppträda inom tanke-experimentet NMKW då mina valda deltagare tog sig an uppgiften som de ombads att utföra, dvs att tillsammans lägga fram och stödja den kod som skulle komma att gälla dom själva, att appliceras på dom själva. Fyndet var att tesen stöddes och att detta stöd var robust eftersom jag kunde identifiera flera skäl hos deltagarna mot att lägga fram koden medan jag fann mycket litet i form av skäl hos deltagarna för att lägga fram koden. Uppsatsen hade även en del mindre målsättningar att selektivt diskutera några ytterligare relevanta och intressanta spörsmål som strålade ut från uppsatsens huvud-målsättning. Dessa mindre målsättningar kretsade kring att diskutera vissa valda tydliga, centrala egenskaper hos NMKW experimentet samt hur dessa kunde tänkas vara relaterade till experimentets utfall. En sådan egenskap vara den specifika deltagargruppen som användes vid min körning av experimentet. Jag diskuterade till exempel, den potentiella extensionen av utfallet att det inte var fallet att de flesta eller alla deltagare valde att lägga fram koden, ifall deltagargruppen modifierades men fortfarande bestod enbart av nu levande vuxna människor och min värdering var att ett liknande utfall, som vid min körningen av NMKW, verkade troligt för de flesta potentiella grupper av deltagare. Jag ville också diskutera vissa valda tydliga, centrala egenskaper hos NMKW experimentet inom kontexten kring huruvida NMKW experimentet givet dessa egenskaper, borde anses vara ett osunt, olämpligt experiment för att undersöka den normativa moralen, givet Gerts och Gerts konception av denna. Detta, eftersom om detta vore fallet så borde utfallet av experimentet förkastas och inte ges någon vikt. Trots att jag hittade potentiella saker att kritisera hos den experimentella designen hos NMKW så hittade jag inte några tillräckligt starka skäl för att diskvalificera NMKW experimentet som ett olämpligt, osunt experiment för att undersöka den normativa moralen, givet den normativa moralens egenskaper beskrivna, täckta inom Gerts och Gerts föreslagna basala, grundläggande definition av denna. Slutligen så ville jag även selektivt diskutera vissa aspekter kring vad det kunde betyda för konceptionen av den normativa moralen, enligt Gert och Gert, att tesen stöddes. Exempelvis, så givet en tolkning så kunde utfallet ses som ett stöd för icke-existensen hos den normativa moraliska koden, medan givet en annan tolkning så kunde utfallet anses betyda att ytterligare addenda till den basala definitionen av den normativa moralen måste identifieras och adderas till definitionen och att dylika addenda skulle komma att vara sådana att de skulle diskvalificera NMKW experimentet och dess utfall som ett sunt och lämpligt experiment att användas för att studera den normativa moralen, nu med dess extenderade specifikation. Jag försökte sedan att illustrera hur NMKW tankeexperimentet kunde användas som ett substrat för att underlätta identifieringen och förtydligandet av dylika potentiella tillägg till den basala konceptionen av den normativa moralen enligt Gerts och Gerts förslag, och jag föreslog även vissa potentiella kandidat egenskaper hos NMKW experimentet som dylika ytterligare tillägg till den basala konceptionen borde kunna diskvalificera, exkludera som acceptabla egenskaper hos experiment designade för att undersöka den7normativa moralen. På detta sätt så kan en ovanlig, underrepresenterad typ av tankeexperiment, ”pusselbit” när det gäller det stora undersökningsprojektet som använder sig av experiment för att erhålla ytterligare insikter inom den normative moralen, dvs ”pusslet”, oberoende om det verkar passa eller inte passa in i ”pusslet”, ändå användas på ett sådant sätt så att det potentiellt kan leda till ytterligare insikter kring ”pusslet”. Detta eftersom även när en ”pusselbit” inte verkar passa in i ”pusslet” så kan ”seendet”, förtydligandet och förståelsen kring hur och varför, ändå potentiellt förse oss med information om ”pusslet”.

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Det här är en vetenskapsteoretisk uppsats med problemformuleringen hur kan vi förstå nytänkande, mänskligt resonerande och vetenskaplig utveckling ur ett retorikvetenskapligt perspektiv? Arbetet sker utifrån temat det nya, som i ny förståelse av tillvaron. Jag motiverar retorikens relevans i uppsatsen genom att definiera retoriken som en lära om och förmågan att förstå tillvaron. Retorikvetenskapens plats och relevans för problemformuleringen tydliggörs genom att visa hur retoriken kan förstås i relation till några kända och betydelsefulla fysiska teorier och tankar från Einstein och Galileo. Jag inleder min studie med Gärdenfors kognitionsforskning och Castoriadis förståelse av skapandet av nya idéer. Därefter använder jag begreppen inventio, topos och metafor för att vidare ta mig an problemformuleringen. Slutligen visar jag hur vi genom doxologin kan söka nå bortom en förståelse av kunskap och vetande som antingen absolut objektiv eller subjektiv. Vad jag når2fram till och visar i uppsatsen är att retorikvetenskapen visar att all förståelse om tillvaron går genom människan själv, vilket innebär att människan har en roll i den vetenskapliga förändringen. Retorikvetenskapen kan ge oss hjälpmedel att se att underliggande argumentativa strukturer och andra försanthållanden reglerar eller formar det sätt på vilket vi tänker och funderar i olika frågor och därigenom hur desamma kan reglera och forma den vetenskapliga praktiken och teorin. / This is an epistemological thesis dealing with the question how can we understand innovating thinking, human reasoning, and scientific development from a rhetorical perspective? The underlying theme in the thesis is the new, as in new understanding of our world and existence. I motivate the rhetorical relevance in the thesis by defining rhetoric as a science of and the ability of understanding our world and existence. The relevance of rhetoric and its place towards the thesis’ question is clarified by showing how rhetoric could be understood in relation to some known and significant physical theories and ideas by Einstein and Galileo. I begin my study with Gärdenfors’ research of cognitive science and Castoriadis’ understanding of creation of new ideas. After that I use the concepts inventio, topos, and metaphor to further take on the question. Finally, I show how we by the use of doxology can go beyond an understanding of science and knowledge as either totally objective or totally subjective. My conclusion is that rhetoric shows that all understanding of our world and existence go through man himself, which means that humans have a significant role in the scientific development. Rhetoric can give us tools helping us see that underlying argumentative structures and other ideas we hold as true regulate and shape our thinking and understanding, and thereby how the same can regulate and shape the scientific practice and theory.

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Science fiction is particularly apt as bioethical thought experiment. In considering the theories of James R. Brown, John D. Norton and Marco Buzzoni, I suggest that mental-modeling theories afford the best explanation for what thought experiments can do. I propose a version of mental modeling that has the flexible modalities of experience found in Nancy J. Nersessian's account, combined with Nenad Miš?evi?'s compelling vision of how existing knowledge is used to create mental models, and Tamar Gendler's use of schemas to understand ethical thought experiments. Bioethics makes use of thought experiments' capacity to move from abstraction to discrete instances. Sometimes thought experiments will be better, and sometimes real cases will be unavailable. Given the cognitive advantages that access to mental models provides, thought experiments will be of use in the field of bioethics. To identify literature that is thought-experimental I look to Geordie McComb's family resemblance theory, and consider accounts of literary thought experiments by Noel Carroll and Edward Davenport. Extended narratives will in some cases be more useful for ethical understanding than philosophical thought experiments. Science fiction has this same advantage: as ethical narrative it is detailed and humanized. In addition the specula-tive nature of science fiction lends itself to the exploration of new and emerging sciences and technologies including those in the field of bioethics.

Dans cette thèse en psychologie morale, je m’intéresse au rôle de l’imagination dans la perception morale. Je soutiens que l’imagination y a une fonction épistémique dans la mesure où – en s’accompagnant ou non d’émotions – elle nous révèle des normes, des valeurs ou des vertus morales qui seraient autrement passées inaperçues. En simulant des croyances et des perceptions, l’imagination nous permet d’accéder à ces caractéristiques d’une situation moralement pertinentes, mais perceptuellement non saillantes. J’identifie trois modes de « perception morale imaginative » : 1) la prise de perspective qui consiste à endosser le point de vue d’autrui, 2) le cadrage imaginatif qui désigne le fait de voir un élément d’une situation comme autre qu’il n’est et, 3) la comparaison imaginative qui, grâce à la pensée contrefactuelle, éclaire le monde actuel à partir d’un monde possible imaginé. Chacun de ces modes contribue à enrichir notre connaissance morale, et partant, à améliorer notre délibération morale. J’appuie ma démonstration sur des travaux récents en philosophie de la psychologie, en psychologie cognitive et sociale, en neuropsychologie et, bien évidemment, en psychologie morale. / My thesis focuses on the role of imagination for moral perception. I argue that imagination – whether accompanied by emotion or not - has an epistemic role inasmuch as it can reveal moral norms, values, and virtues that might otherwise go un-noticed. On the simulationist account, belief-like imaginings and perception-like imaginings give us access to the morally relevant but perceptually non-salient features of a situation. I identify three types of “imaginative moral perception”: 1) the perspective taking that consists of putting yourself in someone else’s shoes; 2) the imaginative framing, which refers to seeing an element of a situation as something else; 3) the imaginative comparison, which sheds light on the actual world by using counterfactuals thinking that give us access to a possible world. Each of these types of moral perception contributes to enhancing our moral knowledge hence to improving our moral deliberation. My argument appeals to recent contributions from the fields of philosophy of psychology, cognitive and social psychology, neuropsychology and, of course, moral psychology.