This study looks at conceptual explanations given in a reform-oriented mathematics class for preservice secondary mathematics teachers and extends Toulmin's argumentation framework to account for some of the complexities of the explanations given by these students. This study explains the complexities that arose in applying Toulmin's framework to explanations and extends the framework by accounting for the features of conceptual explanations. The complexities of these explanations are that they are made up of multiple arguments that build on each other to reach a final conclusion and that they are also dependant upon the social aspects of the class in which they are situated. Recognizing that some statements have dual purposes in the explanation and that there are varying levels of justification used in the explanations helped to account for the first complexity of explanations. The classification of class conventions helps to account for the social influences on explanations. This study differs from other studies that use Toulmin's framework to analyze formal proofs or to identify taken-as-shared understanding in a classroom. This study instead focuses on using the framework to analyze the components of explanations and to provide insight into the structure of conceptually oriented explanations. This study contributes to the existing research by extending Toulmin's argumentation framework to account for how social influences help determine the appropriate components of an explanation.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Boston University / PLEASE NOTE: Boston University Libraries did not receive an Authorization To Manage form for this thesis or dissertation. It is therefore not openly accessible, though it may be available by request. If you are the author or principal advisor of this work and would like to request open access for it, please contact us at open-help@bu.edu. Thank you. / Brightman defines reason as the ideal function of experience that brings the disparate elements given in experience into inclusive, systematic harmony. Lewis defines reason as consistency in attitude and in prepared manner of response to the situations in which the doer finds himself. Both thinkers agree that reason can be used to make true value judgments and good value choices, despite some differences in their analysis of valuation. Brightman holds that value-claims, or what is thought to be good, must be tested by norms which are themselves principles for the coherent organization of such claims. Lewis also speaks of valuations as value-claims, but adds that goodness is an objective quality of objects given in experience that no criticism can wholly remove. For Brightman, a rational value-choice is one that contributes to the organization of all value-claims in an internally harmonious pattern that ultimately involves fruitful interaction with other persons and with the total environment of the individual. But Lewis holds that value-choices will be rational (or right) when they conform with rules of consistent doing and such choices will be intelligible (or good) when they include an appraisal of the value potentialities of the objective situation in which the doer finds himself. Despite initial differences in value analysis, both thinkers agree that the summum bonum is a life of consistently chosen and coherently organized valuations which all persons ought to choose. Their common view of the good life seems open to two objections: (a) one may prefer intrinsic values other than the ideal of coherently chosen values without moral disapprobation; and (b) the use of "ought" can mean either what is fitting or what is a duty to do in a situation, and these two meanings do not always coincide as they suggest. Brightman and Lewis hold that the content of moral rightness consists of what is both objectively good and in conformity with the principle of universalization. This view is open to the objections that: (a) it makes duty consist of whatever is thought to be objectively good, rather than 11hat is objectively right; (b) it makes it impossible to settle a conflict between duties, where such a conflict is not about some good end but is about which alternative course of action is morally right; and (c) being under a specific obligation seems a different kind of experience from valuing something. Toulmin is concerned with establishing the validity of the use of argument in ethical disputes so that "good" or sufficient reasons can be found to terminate such disputes. The "good reasons" approach essentially consists of the derivation of criteria for evaluation from a given field of discourse in which arguments first arise. Toulmin found only two ways in which ethical arguments can be terminated. First, an argument about the rightness of an act can be terminated if the act in question is found to conform with the moral code of the community. Secondly, an argument about the goodness of a moral rule can be terminated by asking if the rule in question contributes to the fecundity of the community. Two criticisms have been made of the ideal utilitarian context in which Toulmin discusses ethical reasoning: (a) the use of the principle of fecundity to terminate arguments about moral rules functions as a definition of goodness and rightness and as such is open to the objections made against utilitarianism--objections that Toulmin does not consider; and (b) his dismissal of the deontological point of view as "primitive" is not entailed by the "good reasons" approach to ethics and so the deontologist may find good reasons for rejecting utilitarianism. / 2999-01-01

Tras el análisis de las principales teorías de la argumentación contemporáneas, se desarrollan concepciones alternativas de las dimensiones lógica, dialéctica y retórica de la argumentación de cara a la elaboración de una teoría normativa capaz de integrarlas. / After the analysis of the main current theories of argumentation, I develop alternative conceptions of the logical, dialectical and rhetorical dimensions of argumentation towards the elaboration of a normative theory of argumentation able to integrate them.

Paul Grice's conversational implicature is a widely studied and commonly accepted theory in the field of linguistics, and Stephen Toulmin's model of argument is perhaps even more widely studied and accepted in the field of argument. I was struck by the great similarities between the two theories, particularly the leap of logic both are dependent upon, and surprised by the fact that it didn't seem that anyone had explored the similarities. In this thesis, I explore the similarities of the processes, of Grices's implicature and Toulmin's model of argument, and how looking at the two together increases the understanding of both.

In 1958 Stephen E. Toulmin wrote of inadequacies of formal logic and proposed a new field-dependent approach to the analysis of arguments. Despite a generally negative response to his proposal from formal logicians, Toulmin's model for the laying out of arguments for analysis was subsequently appropriated by several speech communication textbook writers. In some textbooks, the Toulmin model has become successor to the syllogism as the paradigm of logical argument. Yet, perhaps due to their seemingly uncritical acceptance of Toulmin's approach there appears to be serious disagreement and confusion among speech communication professionals about the nature and applications of the Toulmin model. Towards a resolution of this problem, this study provides a descriptive analysis and assessment of the history of the Toulmin model and its proposed applications to speech communication.

<p>In this thesis I deal with the issue of relativism that threatens Toulmin’s field- dependency thesis (i.e. the claim that the standards of argument appraisal depend on the argument field in which the argument occurs). After offering partial interpretation of the concept of “argument fields” and elucidating the concept of field-dependence, I argue that Toulmin’s field-dependency thesis does result in an unacceptably strong relativism.</p> / Master of Arts (MA)

This Master’s thesis has the politics of museum in focus, as a subordinate governmental cultural policy, as a continuation of cultural reform in a time when legislation were to take place in Sweden. The aim of the study is to map out claims from museums and their responsible authorities in response to the governmental bill Ny Museipolitik. The study deem the subject area of politics of museums as a organizational field. By using the Toulmin model of argumentation several hundred claims about the works of museums and the effects on society were founds. The result could be arranged in eight different themes. In the analysis of the claims both unifying and disrupting tendencies could be observed. The themes presented in the result are: a new legislation, a new administrative authority, handling the collection, cooperation, fundings, museums and society, quality assurance and research at the museum and a round up theme called other.      One conclusion showed that the different levels of authorities in particular produced diversified needs and challenges. Some findings point out how the field are contested concerning legitimacy. There is also conclusion indicated by the claims that showed how several isomorphic tendencies were apparent. Legislation are considered to heighten the state of affairs and the increased level of ambition are welcomed. A very apparent conclusion is that a much needed reform, according to the comment letters, is that governmental grants are increased and secured over time.

No description available.

The purpose of this study is to investigate a contemporary model of argument analysis and pass judgment on the value of employing the Toulmin model in the analysis of complex arguments. This study investigates the nature of the model in its working relationship to variou arguments chosen for analysis, and form this process conclusions are drawn as to the model’s value and workability

[pt] A distinção entre argumentar a partir de regra, e argumentar quando não há regra, é retomada para elucidar alguns aspectos da atividade justificatória no âmbito legal. A referida distinção encontrou em Rawls um porta-voz que realçou de modo incisivo sua importância para a prática legal. Antes dele, porém, Hume, Mill, Ryle e Toulmin, entre outros, já haviam tecido considerações relevantes ao tema. A distinção serve de motivação para dividir o campo da argumentação prática, particularmente da argumentação jurídica, em duas classes, a saber, argumentos de primeira e de segunda ordem. Nos argumentos de segunda ordem, uma regra atua na forma descrita no modelo de Toulmin. Nos argumentos de primeira ordem, caracterizados pela ausência de regra, procede-se mediante ponderação de razões, substanciadas em princípios gerais, valores morais, interesses políticos, programas econômicos, considerações religiosas e pretensões corporativas. Alguns exemplos ilustram a distinção. Argumenta-se que a base lógica dessa distinção assenta-se no conceito de regra como razão excludente, no sentido estabelecido por Joseph Raz. / [en] The distinction between justify a conclusion from rule and justify it when no rule is resumed to elucidate some aspects of legal activity. This distinction found in Rawls a spokesman that incisively pointed out its importance for the legal practice. Before him, however, Hume (A Treatise of Human Nature), Mill (A System of Logic), Ryle (The Concept of Mind) and Toulmin (The Uses of Argument), among others, had already made relevant considerations to the topic. The distinction serves as motivation to split the field of argumentation practice, particularly of the legal argument, into two classes, namely, arguments of first and second order. In the arguments of second order, a rule operates in the manner described in the Toulmin model, in the arguments of the first order, characterized by the absence of rule, by weighting of reasons, substantiated on general principles, moral values, political interests, religious considerations and corporate claims. Some examples illustrate the distinction. It is argued that the logical basis of this distinction is based on the concept of rule as exclusionary reason, within the meaning established by Joseph Raz.