The purpose of this essay is to analyse the problem of the rational justification of value judgments. To a large extent, I have used Taylor's account of the technique of justification (verification, validation, vindication, and rational choice of a way of life), as this is presented in his book, Normative Discourse. To a lesser extent, I have also used Baier's account of the technique of validation, as it is presented in his book, The Moral Point of View. I have attempted to show that it is possible to justify value judgments, despite the logical dichotomy between factual statements and evaluative statements. 'Justification' is taken as proof of correctness: that is, a statement is said to be justified if it is proven to be correct. On Taylor's technique, justification is possible, although only incompletely so. It is possible to prove that a value judgment is the correct one to make from within the perspective provided by a given way of life. Justification cannot be complete since the adoption of the perspective cannot be justified. On Baier's technique of validation, complete justification can be achieved: once it has been shown that an evaluatum meets the criteria in terms of which it was judged, and that these criteria are relevant (valid) for judging that object since the object must meet these criteria in order effectively to realize its purpose, nothing more needs to be shown. Although Baier's account allows for complete justification while Taylor's allows for only incomplete justification, Baier's account cannot be used to replace that of Taylor. They are appropriate in different contexts. While Baier's account of validation is appropriate for judgments of use-value, Taylor's account is appropriate for value judgments other than those of use-value. Accordingly, justification is possible using either technique, although complete justification may be possible only in the context of judgments of use-value. / Thesis / Master of Arts (MA)

Background: The society has changed and become increasingly characterized by technology-facilitated interactions. Companies are starting to make use of self-service. technologies (SSTs), instead of interpersonal encounters during service deliveries. Customers’ usage of SSTs has been examined in previous research. However, previous studies have ignored the fact that different types of SSTs have different factors that influence customer's experience and decision to use them, increasing the relevance of examining one specific SST, namely private SST to achieve more accurate results regarding what specific factors that influences customer decision to use this type of SST. The reason for choosing private SSTs is not only because it is the most recent type of SST, it is also the type of SST that develops continuously with the increased use of the Internet and the World Wide Web. Purpose: The purpose of this research is to identify the most important factors influencing customers to use private SST. Research Questions:- What value judgement influences customers to use private SSTs the most? - What factors influences customers’ value judgements? Methodology: This research takes on a quantitative approach with an explanatory research design. The chosen data collection method is performed through one independent survey. Conclusion: Hedonic and utilitarian value judgements have a positive relationship towards customer's decision to use private SSTs. The utilitarian value judgements have a greater impact on customer's decision to make use of private SSTs, in comparison to the hedonic value judgements. However, hedonic value judgements can still be considered as an important factor in influencing customer's decision to use private SSTs, as the hedonic value judgements still have a relatively strong impact on customer's decision to use private SSTs.

La présente thèse explore l’espace formel de l’enseignement de la musique en Grèce actuelle en tant qu’un espace de confrontation et de négociation de sens autour du musical. L’introduction de la musique traditionnelle au sein de cet espace sert de paradigme à une étude sur « la gestion de l’altérité musicale » à partir d’une enquête ethnographique de terrain (observation participante et entretiens non directifs), qui s’intéresse plus particulièrement aux conditions de cohabitation entre des enseignants-musiciens aux parcours différents, aux conditions donc de cohabitation entre des pratiques d’apprentissage, des discours et des imaginaires qui tantôt s’entrecroisent, tantôt se concurrencent. L’objectif ultime de ce travail est, à cet égard, de mettre en évidence que les façons dont les individus se représentent la musique et tout ce qui s’y rattache, forment un système symbolique qui renvoie à la manière dont ils se définissent eux-mêmes et ils se situent envers les autres. / The present thesis explores the formal space of music education in Greece as an area of confrontation and negotiation of meanings around music. The introduction of Greek traditional music in this educational space serves as a paradigm for a study on “the management of musical otherness”, based on a field survey (participant observation and non-directive interviews) which focuses in particular on the conditions of cohabitation between teachers-musicians with different musical trajectories, thus on the conditions of cohabitation between learning practices, discourses and imaginaries which sometimes intertwine, sometimes they compete with one another. In this regard, the ultimate aim of this work is to bring to light that the ways individuals represent music and everything related to it, form a symbolic system referring to the manner in which they define and situate themselves in relation to others.

af / Suid-Afrika is sedert 27 April 1994 'n materiele regstaat, wat deur beide uitdruklike en 'ongeskrewe' fundamentele waardes onderskraag word. Dit is juis hierdie fundamentele waardes wat 'n blote formele konstitusie (as grondslag van 'n relative democracy) van 'n oppermagtige grondwet (as basis van 'n materiele standard-setting democracy) onderskei. Alhoewel daar 'n lewendige debat oor die toepaslikheid van die talle tradisionele grondwetuitlegmetodes gevoer word, is daar nietemin tans geen oorhoofse waardebaseerde paradigma vir grondwetuitleg nie. Soms wil dit voorkom asof fundamentele grondwetlike waardes net as normatiewe retoriek, in stede van materiele riglyn, by grondwetuitleg gebruik word. Die owerheidsgesag is aan hoer normatiewe regsbeginsels gebonde wat grotendeels in die fundamentele regte-akte (as deel van 'n oppermagtige grondwet) vervat is. Die gewaarborgde fundamentele regte dien derhalwe as konkretisering van beide die regstaat en die demokrasie: die materiele regstaatbegrip is die basis van _die grondwetlike staat. Die materiele regstaat, as geregtigheidstaat, kan dus gesien word as die eindbestemming van die grondwet as lex fundamentalis in die regsorde. 'n Oppermagtige grondwet is egter onlosmaaklik verbind aan die materiele regstaat. Daarom behels grondwetuitleg noodwendig die aktivering van die grondwetlik-gepositiveerde waardes. Hierdie normatiewe regsbeginsels en fundamentele waardes wat in die grondwet as grundnorm van die geregtigheidstaat beliggaam is, moet dan deur 'n onafhanklike regbank gehandhaaf en afgedwing word. In beginsel is grondwetuitleg gemoeid met die identifisering, handhawing en aktivering van die fundamentele waardes wat 'n oppermagtige grondwet onderskraag. Waarde-aktiverende grondwetuitleg is nietemin nie 'n bloudruk waarmee aile praktiese uitlegprobleme opgelos kan word nie, maar 'n oorhoofse waardebaseerde paradigma: 'n dwingende, normatiewe verwysingsraamwerk waarvandaan, waarbinne en waarheen grondwetuitleg op pad is. Die tradisionele grondwetuitlegmetodiek is bloat aanvullende tegnieke wat 'n waarde-aktiverende paradigma van grondwetuitleg ondersteun. Aangesien fundamentele waardes onlosmaaklik deel van die materiele regstaat is, moet grondwetuitleg nie net waardebaseer nie, maar ook waardegerig wees; nie net waardes handhaaf nie, maar ook bevorder en aktiveer; nie net waardes weerspieel nie, maar ook aktief vestig. 86 'n raamwerk vir grondwetuitleg behels die 'animering' en konkretisering van fundamentele waardes, ideale en standaarde wat die materiele regstaat onderle, kortom, waarde-aktiverende grondwetuitleg as vergestalting van die materiele regstaat. / On 27 April1994 South Africa became a constitutional state (Rechtsstaat), underpinned by both express, and 'unwritten' fundamental constitutional values. These values represent the distinction between a formal constitution (ie the basis of a relative democracy), and a supreme constitution (the foundation of a material standard-setting democracy). Although the merits of various methods of constitutional interpretation are hotly debated, no general value-based paradigm for constitutional interpretation has yet been established. At times it seems as if fundamental constitutional values are merely invoked as normative rhetoric during constitutional interpretation, rather than as substantive guidelines. Government institutions are bound by these higher normative legal principles, which in a supreme constitution are articulated primarily in the bill of fundamental rights. The guaranteed fundamental rights are a concretisation of both the constitutional state and democracy: the material law state principle (Rechtsstaatprinzip) as the foundation of the constitutional state. The Rechtsstaat as 'just state' is the ultimate goal of a supreme constitution as lex fundamentalis in the legal order. A supreme constitution is inextricably linked to the Rechtsstaat. As a result, constitutional interpretation inevitably involves animating and activating values positivised within the constitution.These normative legal principles and fundamental values must be maintained and enforced by an independent judiciary. In principle, constitutional interpretation deals with the identification, maintenance and animation of the fundamental values underlying a supreme constitution. Value-activating constitutional interpretation is not a blueprint for resolving all practical interpretive problems, but it is a general value-based paradigm: a peremptory, normative frame of reference from which, within which and towards which all constitutional interpretation should be directed. The traditional methodologies of constitutional interpretation are merely ancillary techniques supporting a value-activating paradigm of constitutional interpretation. Since fundamental values undeniably form part of the Rechtsstaat, constitutional interpretation should not only be value-based, but also values-directed; should not merely uphold the values, but also promote and activate them; should not only reflect the values, but also actively establish them. Such a framework for constitutional interpretation involves the animation and concretisation of the fundamental values, standards and ideals underlying the constitutional state: valueactivating constitutional interpretation as embodiment of the Rechtsstaat. / Law / LL.D. (Law)

This thesis is based on the assumption that the intersection of moral philosophy and practical risk management is a rewarding area to study. In particular, the thesis assumes that concepts, ideas, and methods that are used in moral philosophy can be of great benefit for risk analysis, but also that practices in risk regulation provide a useful testing ground for moral philosophical theories. The thesis consists of an introduction and five articles. Article I is a review article on social and ethical aspects of radiation protection related to nuclear power generation. The paper concludes that four areas of social and ethical issues stand out as central: The first is uncertainty and the influence of value judgments in scientific risk assessments. The second is the distributions of risks and benefits between different individuals, in both space and time. The third is the problem of setting limits when there is no known level of exposure associated with a zero risk. The fourth is related to stakeholder influence and risk communication. Article II discusses ethical issues related to the proposal that doses (or risks) below a certain level should be excluded from the system of radiation protection, without any regard for the number of people exposed. Different arguments for excluding small radiation doses from regulation are examined and a possible solution to the problem of regulating small risks is proposed in the article: Any exclusion of small doses (or risks) from radiation protection ought to be based on a case-by-case basis, with the condition that the expected value of harm remains small. Article III examines what makes one distribution of individual doses better than another distribution. The article introduces a mathematical framework based on preference logic, in which such assessments can be made precisely in terms of comparisons between alternative distributions of individual doses. Principles of radiation protection and from parallel discussions in moral philosophy and welfare economics are defined using this framework and their formal properties analyzed. Article IV argues that the ethical theory of “responsibility-catering prioritarianism” is well positioned to deal with the reasonable requirements in an ethical theory of risk. The article shows how responsibility-catering prioritarianism can be operationalized using a prioritarian social welfare function based on hypothetical utilities. For this purpose, a hypothetical utility measure called ‘responsibility-adjusted utility’ is proposed, which is based on the utility that would normally be expected given circumstances outside of the control of the individual. Article V was written as a response to the Fukushima disaster. Several authors have called the Fukushima disaster a ‘black swan.’ However, the article argues that the hazards of large earthquakes and tsunamis were known before the accident, and introduces and defines the concept of a ‘black elephant,’ as (i) a high-impact event that (ii) lies beyond the realm of regular expectations, but (iii) is ignored despite existing evidence. / QC 20120816

af / Suid-Afrika is sedert 27 April 1994 'n materiele regstaat, wat deur beide uitdruklike en 'ongeskrewe' fundamentele waardes onderskraag word. Dit is juis hierdie fundamentele waardes wat 'n blote formele konstitusie (as grondslag van 'n relative democracy) van 'n oppermagtige grondwet (as basis van 'n materiele standard-setting democracy) onderskei. Alhoewel daar 'n lewendige debat oor die toepaslikheid van die talle tradisionele grondwetuitlegmetodes gevoer word, is daar nietemin tans geen oorhoofse waardebaseerde paradigma vir grondwetuitleg nie. Soms wil dit voorkom asof fundamentele grondwetlike waardes net as normatiewe retoriek, in stede van materiele riglyn, by grondwetuitleg gebruik word. Die owerheidsgesag is aan hoer normatiewe regsbeginsels gebonde wat grotendeels in die fundamentele regte-akte (as deel van 'n oppermagtige grondwet) vervat is. Die gewaarborgde fundamentele regte dien derhalwe as konkretisering van beide die regstaat en die demokrasie: die materiele regstaatbegrip is die basis van _die grondwetlike staat. Die materiele regstaat, as geregtigheidstaat, kan dus gesien word as die eindbestemming van die grondwet as lex fundamentalis in die regsorde. 'n Oppermagtige grondwet is egter onlosmaaklik verbind aan die materiele regstaat. Daarom behels grondwetuitleg noodwendig die aktivering van die grondwetlik-gepositiveerde waardes. Hierdie normatiewe regsbeginsels en fundamentele waardes wat in die grondwet as grundnorm van die geregtigheidstaat beliggaam is, moet dan deur 'n onafhanklike regbank gehandhaaf en afgedwing word. In beginsel is grondwetuitleg gemoeid met die identifisering, handhawing en aktivering van die fundamentele waardes wat 'n oppermagtige grondwet onderskraag. Waarde-aktiverende grondwetuitleg is nietemin nie 'n bloudruk waarmee aile praktiese uitlegprobleme opgelos kan word nie, maar 'n oorhoofse waardebaseerde paradigma: 'n dwingende, normatiewe verwysingsraamwerk waarvandaan, waarbinne en waarheen grondwetuitleg op pad is. Die tradisionele grondwetuitlegmetodiek is bloat aanvullende tegnieke wat 'n waarde-aktiverende paradigma van grondwetuitleg ondersteun. Aangesien fundamentele waardes onlosmaaklik deel van die materiele regstaat is, moet grondwetuitleg nie net waardebaseer nie, maar ook waardegerig wees; nie net waardes handhaaf nie, maar ook bevorder en aktiveer; nie net waardes weerspieel nie, maar ook aktief vestig. 86 'n raamwerk vir grondwetuitleg behels die 'animering' en konkretisering van fundamentele waardes, ideale en standaarde wat die materiele regstaat onderle, kortom, waarde-aktiverende grondwetuitleg as vergestalting van die materiele regstaat. / On 27 April1994 South Africa became a constitutional state (Rechtsstaat), underpinned by both express, and 'unwritten' fundamental constitutional values. These values represent the distinction between a formal constitution (ie the basis of a relative democracy), and a supreme constitution (the foundation of a material standard-setting democracy). Although the merits of various methods of constitutional interpretation are hotly debated, no general value-based paradigm for constitutional interpretation has yet been established. At times it seems as if fundamental constitutional values are merely invoked as normative rhetoric during constitutional interpretation, rather than as substantive guidelines. Government institutions are bound by these higher normative legal principles, which in a supreme constitution are articulated primarily in the bill of fundamental rights. The guaranteed fundamental rights are a concretisation of both the constitutional state and democracy: the material law state principle (Rechtsstaatprinzip) as the foundation of the constitutional state. The Rechtsstaat as 'just state' is the ultimate goal of a supreme constitution as lex fundamentalis in the legal order. A supreme constitution is inextricably linked to the Rechtsstaat. As a result, constitutional interpretation inevitably involves animating and activating values positivised within the constitution.These normative legal principles and fundamental values must be maintained and enforced by an independent judiciary. In principle, constitutional interpretation deals with the identification, maintenance and animation of the fundamental values underlying a supreme constitution. Value-activating constitutional interpretation is not a blueprint for resolving all practical interpretive problems, but it is a general value-based paradigm: a peremptory, normative frame of reference from which, within which and towards which all constitutional interpretation should be directed. The traditional methodologies of constitutional interpretation are merely ancillary techniques supporting a value-activating paradigm of constitutional interpretation. Since fundamental values undeniably form part of the Rechtsstaat, constitutional interpretation should not only be value-based, but also values-directed; should not merely uphold the values, but also promote and activate them; should not only reflect the values, but also actively establish them. Such a framework for constitutional interpretation involves the animation and concretisation of the fundamental values, standards and ideals underlying the constitutional state: valueactivating constitutional interpretation as embodiment of the Rechtsstaat. / Law / LL.D. (Law)