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This research studies the theology of those Wahhabis who have now named themselves Salafis. For the purpose of the study, they are referred to as the ‘Wahhabis-self-named-Salafis’ (WSNS). The thesis starts with the observation that the WSNS are usually studied from a political perspective, much less frequently a theological one. Recent research has identified that the theological background of all the different factions of the WSNS is one and the same. This is true for the WSNS who advocate a peaceful way to achieve their goals, as well as those who do not. This thesis aims to explore some of the theological issues that unify these factions. This research demonstrates that, because the WSNS are opposed to the very concept of interpretation of the Qur’an and the hadith, especially when these texts deal with important theological issues such as the Attributes of God, they have developed a vision of Islamic history which is entirely different from the one which had traditionally been accepted by most Muslim scholars and Western academics. They have redefined the notion of Sunnism as it has been known, mostly basing themselves on this single issue. This thesis shows that the WSNS deny the existence of any interpretation ever made by a recognised member of the Salaf (i.e. the Muslims of the first three generations). In contrast, the Sunnis who do not claim to be Salafis, but who nonetheless consider themselves as treading the path of the Salaf (called in the thesis: ‘Sunnis-not-claiming-to-be-Salafis’) are of the view that they did allow interpretation. The WSNS therefore consider that the Ash‘ari scholars (from the main Sunni theological school) had a corrupted creed concerning God. This leads the followers of the WSNS, from across the spectrum of the different factions, to consider that most of the Islamic scholars from the past had actually failed to understand the proper Tawhid, or Oneness of God, which is tantamount to considering them all as misguided, with the notable exception of Ibn Taymiyya and his students, and Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab and his students. The research argues that, by favouring the non-violent factions of the WSNS simply because they are officially opposed to terrorism and suicide bombings, current counter-terrorism strategies are allowing the gradual replacement of the core of the notion of Sunnism to go ahead, thereby fuelling future chaos and confusion in the Muslim community. This thesis highlights the longer term implications of these strategies for the Muslim community and the world at large.

The thesis examines two of the arguably most contentious strands within contemporary Islam – Salafism and Islamism – in the British context from 1965 to the contemporary period. Its central argument is that by using their (multi-directional) connections, modern Muslim sects in Britain fashioned a distinct ‘Western Muslim’ consciousness, which has gradually altered their relationship with the ‘Muslim world’ at large. Rather than generating remittances to send ‘back home’, to Muslim-majority countries – Britain, and the West more broadly, came to be seen as another important Muslim space in need of resources, institutions, and unique paradigms for understanding and practicing Islam. Put differently, scholars, activists and intellectuals began carving out a self-conscious Western form of Islam, and in this process have begun to subvert their peripheral status vis-à-vis the heartlands of the Muslim world. The thesis charts the emergence of this ‘Western Muslim’ consciousness beginning from the late 1960s to the present. It demonstrates that this was neither a linear process of severing ties with Muslim-majority countries, nor one of wholly adopting Western cultural codes or modes of faith. Rather Salafis and Islamists rooted Islam in Britain, but on their own terms. It opens with a re-examination of the religious lives of the first generation pioneer migrants that arrived in the post-War period from South Asia, who were involved with either the Ahl-e-Hadith or the Jamaat-e-Islami. It examines how each faction established their mosques and organisations in the British context, making complex and sophisticated adaptions in their thoughts and practice while negotiating their changed setting. It suggests that the sharp generational divide – where the first were primarily seen in ethnic terms and the second adopted a global religious identity – has hitherto dominated accounts of Muslims in Britain, and needs to be critiqued and revised. From their inception, the struggle to recreate an ‘authentic’ Islam was pivotal in both movements. Purging Islam from adulterations and perceiving themselves as part of the global ummah were sentiments that were present, to a certain degree, in the first-generation. This is not to say that there were no generational differences, but that these differences were more fluid than has been suggested. The thesis also explores the reasons underpinning the resurgence of ‘traditional’ religious figures at the expense of ‘intellectuals’. However, in the context of individualisation, new media and the democratisation of religion, this raises important questions as to how ‘traditional’ religious authority is being transformed and adapted. It analyses the seemingly contradictory elements of the desire to wholeheartedly follow ‘authentic’ religious figures on the one hand, and still actively rationalise and determine which interpretation of Islam they ultimately follow on the other. With the advent of cyberspace, it also examines the changing contours of the ‘community’ and the relationship between offline and online networks. It argues that the internet has accelerated the development of like-minded or ideological transnational networks that span online and offline spaces. These networks increasingly take precedence over geographically close ‘communities’ decentralising, but not devaluing, the masjid.

This thesis aims to contribute to the existing gap in the research of religion in international relations by applying the theory of elite instrumentalism to the proxy conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran. The analysis was able to demonstrate that the elites of both states have instrumentalized religion by utilizing concepts of Islamic rulership to legitimize their rule and justify their political actions. Iran has utilized the Shia Twelver concept of “Guardianship of the Jurist”, advocated by Ayatollah Khomeini during the Iranian revolution, to give Islamic jurists the same function as holy figures in Shia Islam. Saudi elites have legitimized their rule with the Wahhabi interpretation of Sunni Islam and the concept of “Head of the community”, which deems it sinful for subjects to oppose their Muslim ruler. By analysing fatwas, speeches, narratives and ideas being pushed by the elites of the countries, this study confirms that state elites have used religion to mobilize groups in the civil wars occurring in Yemen and Syria. Elites of both states have attempted to discredit each other to be able to expand their influence in the region and to assert their dominance by presenting themselves as rulers with the God-given right to rule.

The religious school of thought that is involved in the control of Saudi Arabia is called Wahhabism and is a form of Islam that is usually accused by outsiders of being misogynist. This paper will deal with the founder of this alignment of Islam, Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, and his view of women in marriage. Another movement which in turn goes to work to lift the women's rights is Islamic feminists. Two branches of Islam who belief that Islam is the only right path to take for issues surrounding gender and life. In this essay, I will compare their respective interpretations of three points which concern the role of women in marriage; men's right to polygamy, men's higher status than the woman and the men's right to beat his wife. The purpose of this paper is to ask two different interpretations of the same issues, with the same verses in the Quran against each other to see how they resemble or differ from each other to try to contribute for a greater understanding of the interpretative pluralism in Islam. The paper concludes that these two movements are looking at the three points with different eyes and in different ways as they are originated from two different contexts and have different purposes when their interpreting the verses from the Quran.

Au Sénégal, l’essentiel de la population musulmane est affilié au soufisme. Quatre principales confréries soufi, dont la tajaniyya, la mouridiyya, la qadiriyya et la layiniyya, organisent la vie islamique et définissent, en partie, l’identité du musulman sénégalais. Mais, depuis la fin des années 1970, des sénégalais revendiquent d’autres façons d’être musulman hors du soufisme et de ces confréries tout en restant sunnites (il existe une petite minorité de chiites). Ils se constituent en associations et mouvements islamiques très dynamiques. Leur rigorisme les mène à catégoriser les croyances et pratiques d’islam au Sénégal en orthodoxes (les leurs) et hétérodoxes (celles des soufi). Ainsi, ils se coupent de toute filiation confrérique soufi, critiquent des croyances et pratiques soufi et affichent leur différence par des codes vestimentaires, des pratiques islamiques, des comportements sociaux, etc. Ces logiques religieuses et identitaires les font appeler d’abord « arabisants » (par opposition aux sortants de l’école français, européenne) puis « ibadou », en référence au nom choisi, pour leurs membres, par les fondateurs de l’association Jama’atou Ibadou Rahmane (JIR).Dans cette thèse, nous avons essayé de montrer en quoi les « ibadou du Sénégal » nous renseignent sur les croyances et pratiques actuelles d’islam puis en quoi ils rendent compte des crises de l’islam dans ce contexte de globalisation marqué, depuis le 11 septembre 2001, par la médiatisation de l’islamisme radical et du terrorisme. / This doctoral dissertation investigates, and aims at highlighting, the ways in which the «ibadou of Senegal» account for the current Islamic practices and beliefs in Senegal and how they cope with the predicaments of Islam in the context of a globalizing world, mainstreamed ideas of radical Islam and terrorism, of which 11th of September 2001 has been a historical landmark. In Senegal, the majority of the Muslim population is affiliated to Sufism. Four main Sufi groups, namely the tajaniyya, the mouridiyya, the qadirriya and the layiniyya, organize the Islamic life and define the identity of the Muslim population in the country. However, since the late 1970s, some Senegalese people pursued other ways of practicing their religion, outside of Sufism while remaining Sunnis (with a minority of Chia Muslims). They organize themselves in communities with highly dynamic Islamic movements. Their religious rigorism mas made them categorize their Islamic faith and practices as Orthodox, and that of others as Heterodox (The Sufi Muslims). Furthermore, with an outright different dress code, they segregate themselves from the Sufi group by criticizing their beliefs and practices and promoting Islamic practices and social conduct of their own. They were, first, called “Arabist” by training and by their very religious and identity logics, (in opposition to those affiliated with the French schooling system) then now are known as « ibadou », in reference to Jama’atou Ibadou Rahmane, a name chosen for the members, but by the founders, of the Association.

Wahhabi interpretation of Islam, which came to Bosnia and Herzegovina with the arrival of foreign fighters and humanitarian organizations from Islamic countries during the war between 1992 and 1995, developed a conflicting relationship with the local Islamic tradition. Diploma thesis The position of the Islamic Community of Bosnia and Herzegovina to Wahhabism between 1992 and 2016 uses a critical analysis of primary sources to explain development of the position of the official religious institution of Bosnian Muslims, the Islamic Community, to Wahhabism and its supporters since their arrival to the present. This paper shows that although the Islamic Community often seemed ambivalent in its approach, it took a negative stance to the alien religious tradition from the outset and even though its activities were inconsistent, the Islamic Community contributed to preventing the spread of Wahhabism in the country. Furthermore, we show that the position of the Islamic Community was rather determined by political needs than by religious incentives.

Pendant des décennies, le Sénégal a gardé dans l’imaginaire académique et international sa vielle image d’un pays exclusivement confrérique où le marabout exercerait un pouvoir de taille sur le disciple. Depuis quelques années, toutefois, les observateurs ont pu constater une évolution de la pratique religieuse au Sénégal due à l’arrivée de nouveaux courants réformistes tels que le wahhabisme. La rencontre entre ce dernier et les confréries soufies a fait naitre un débat doctrinal et un choc des idéologies. Dans ce choc, la Tijāniyya est la confrérie qui a été la plus attaquée. L’objet de notre thèse est d’analyser ce conflit idéologique entre le wahhabisme et la Tijāniyya au sud du Sahara, le Sénégal étant notre terrain de complexification. Notre analyse tente de répondre aux questions suivantes : quels sont les points de divergence entre les deux courants ? Comment les savants wahhabites et tijānīs abordent-ils ces points de divergence ? Comment les désaccords idéologiques se manifestent-ils dans la littérature que nous étudions ? Quelles sont les stratégies des protagonistes des deux mouvements pour avoir une plus grande influence au sud du Sahara de manière générale et plus précisément au Sénégal ? / During decades, the international academic sphere has portrayed Senegal as a country exclusively sectarian in which the marabou would have some authority on his disciples. However, over the past few years researchers noticed an evolution of the religious practices in Senegal due to the arrival of new reformist currents such as Wahhabism. As a matter of fact the encounter between Wahhabism and the sufi brotherhoods triggered a doctrinal debate and an ideological shock. In this clash, the Tijāniyya is the first target of the criticisms. Therefore, the purpose of this thesis is to analyse this ideological conflict between Wahabism and the Tijāniyya in the South of the Sahara, focussing on Senegal. This work will answer the following questions: what are the main sticking points between the two ideological trends? How do the wahhabist and tijānī scholars tackle those issues? To what extent do those ideological disagreements appear in the literature under study? What are the strategies used by the figures of those two groups to expand their power in the sub-Saharan areas, and more specifically in Senegal?

Cette recherche est de traiter la relation tendue et les interactions de différents niveaux entre l’Iran et l’Arabie saoudite. En effet, l’étude s’interroge sur les causes de cette liaison rigide depuis l’arrivée au pouvoir de Mollahs chiites en Iran en 1979, et les différentes perspectives de l’Islam mises en œuvre selon les deux États théocratiques. Ces deux puissances régionales et majeures dans le monde arabo-musulman essaient chacune à sa manière de propager son idéologie dans le monde islamique et même au-delà. Cependant, l’arrivée de Mohamed ben Salman en Arabie saoudite dont l’ascension politique, en tant que prince héritier, a mené à des offensives tous azimuts contre l’Iran, mais aussi contre certains alliés. In fine, dans les circonstances actuelles, il est difficile d’avoir une entente entre les deux pays. La confiance est absente et l’interprétation différente de la religion complique la relation entre l’Iran imamite et l’Arabie saoudite wahhabite. / This research is to address the strained relationship and interactions of different levels between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Indeed, the study questions the causes of this rigid bond since the Shiite Mullahs came to power in Iran in 1979, and the different perspectives of Islam being implemented by the two theocratic states. These two regional and major powers in the Arab-Muslim world are each trying in their own way to propagate their ideology in the Islamic world and even beyond. However, the arrival of Mohamed bin Salman in Saudi Arabia whose political rise as crown prince has led to all-out offensives against Iran, but also against certain allies. Ultimately, under the current circumstances, it is difficult to reach an understanding between the two countries. Confidence is lacking and the different interpretation of religion complicates the relationship between Imamate Iran and Wahhabi Saudi Arabia.

This thesis deals with the topic of the current Wahhabi movement in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The aim of this thesis is to assess the size of the movement, its ties with militant Islamist groups, financing, relations with the majority of the Bosnian society and the extent of potential security threat posed by the Bosnian Wahhabis. Due to the prevailing view of most sources dealing with the topic through the prism of security studies, the analysis focuses apart from security segment on political and economic areas. The study set independent, intermediate and dependent variables in order to verify an assumption that the influence and the scope of Wahhabi movement in Bosnia and Herzegovina is on a wane, and despite the presence of several thousand of Wahhabis, it neither poses a significant threat to social order nor development of the country. The findings indicate that financial involvement of foreign Islamic actors in the Bosnian Wahhabi movement is limited. Political instability together with socio-economic difficulties of certain groups of the Bosnian society do no lead to the growth of the Wahhabi community, however, they belong among factors which can potentially contribute to an increase of Islamic radicalisation in the country.