Submitted by Luciana Ferreira (lucgeral@gmail.com) on 2016-08-10T13:28:10Z No. of bitstreams: 2 Dissertação - Alex Diniz Lopes - 2016.pdf: 1300568 bytes, checksum: 19dd93da23247e7073a1283ade4c3e7a (MD5) license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Luciana Ferreira (lucgeral@gmail.com) on 2016-08-10T13:34:22Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 2 Dissertação - Alex Diniz Lopes - 2016.pdf: 1300568 bytes, checksum: 19dd93da23247e7073a1283ade4c3e7a (MD5) license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-08-10T13:34:22Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 Dissertação - Alex Diniz Lopes - 2016.pdf: 1300568 bytes, checksum: 19dd93da23247e7073a1283ade4c3e7a (MD5) license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-04-20 / The National Bank for Economic and Social Development (BNDES) and one of the world's development banks and the main instrument of Federal Government long term investment and Financing in almost all the segments of the Brazilian economy. Last doze years, one of the main features of national economic policy was the increase in bank acting, of increasing loans and their greater participation in the Brazilian economy. While some of the resources have been directed one other state entities, the largest share of expenditures, was destined to private companies, in the form of fusions operations or support for investment Projects, most of the time, with interest rates subsidized. In list of companies that were more benefited by the Bank loans include contumacious donors of election campaigns. The possible political influence over the decisions of the BNDES is a very important aspect, in that it is a federal public company, its resources come mainly from public funds as FAT and the National Treasury, originating mainly in the taxes paid by citizens and businesses. This study analyzed the relationship between the financing of election campaigns and the BNDES credit operations. In order to understand the dynamics between the elections and the state of the credit policy we used the regression method with panel data, using quantitative information on: a) provision of election campaigns accounts available in the electronic site of Election-TSE Superior Court; and b) List of direct and indirect operations not automatic BNDES, available on the Site of the National Bank for Economic and Social Development. The results showed that the donations campaign designed to related parties the president of the republic positively influence the BNDES loans and, on the other hand, the donations the opposition parties have the opposite effect. In this same vein, it was found also evidence that there is a positive relationship between the victory of candidate recipient of donations, especially for the post of federal deputy, and access to BNDES credit. / O Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social (BNDES) é um dos maiores bancos de desenvolvimento do mundo e o principal instrumento do Governo Federal para o financiamento de longo prazo e investimento em diversos segmentos da economia brasileira. Nos últimos doze anos, uma das principais características da política econômica nacional foi o aumento da atuação do banco, com volumes de empréstimos crescentes e sua maior participação na economia brasileira. Embora parte dos recursos tenha-se dirigido a outros entes estatais, a maior fatia dos dispêndios, foi destinada a empresas privadas, seja em forma de operações de fusões e aquisições ou apoio a projetos de investimento, na maioria das vezes, com taxas de juros subsidiadas. Na lista das empresas que mais foram beneficiadas por empréstimos do banco figuram doadoras contumazes de campanhas eleitorais. A possível influência política sobre as decisões do BNDES é um aspecto bastante relevante, na medida em que se trata de uma empresa pública federal, cujos recursos provêm, essencialmente, de fundos públicos como o Fundo de Amparo ao Trabalhador e do Tesouro Nacional, ou seja, com origem principalmente, nos tributos pagos pelo cidadão e empresas. O presente trabalho analisou a relação existente entre o financiamento de campanhas eleitorais e as operações de crédito do BNDES. Com o objetivo de entender a dinâmica existente entre as eleições e a política de crédito da estatal empregou-se o método de regressão com dados em painel, utilizando informações quantitativas relativas à: a) prestação de contas de campanhas eleitorais, disponíveis no sitio eletrônico do Tribunal Superior Eleitoral-TSE; e b) Lista de operações diretas e indiretas não automáticas do BNDES, disponível no Sitio do Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social. Os resultados demonstraram que as doações de campanha eleitoral destinadas a partidos coligados ao do presidente da república influenciam positivamente o montante dos empréstimos do BNDES, e que, por outro lado, as doações realizadas a partidos não coligados ao presidente, têm o efeito contrário. Nesta mesma linha, encontrou-se, também, evidências de que existe relação positiva entre a vitória do candidato destinatário das doações, notadamente para o cargo de deputado federal, e o acesso ao crédito do BNDES.

[pt] Uma preocupação comum em várias democracias é reduzir a influência do poder econômico sobre o processo eleitoral. Por exemplo, desde o Electoral Reform Act de 1971, os EUA limitaram as contribuições declaradas (hard money) que um candidato pode receber. Ainda assim, doações não reguladas para campanhas políticas (soft money) permitiram que os gastos das campanhas americanas continuassem a crescer. Será então que restrições a doações apenas estimulam contribuições veladas? Este trabalho modela os incentivos para contribuições políticas, mostrando que, sob restrições a doações, contribuições abertas visam a modificar plataformas enquanto que as veladas visam a influenciar o resultado da eleição. Esta separação de objetivos faz com que mais restrições a contribuições abertas reduzam incentivos para contribuições veladas. Leis que restringem doações para campanhas, portanto, devem reduzir a importância do poder econômico no processo político. / [en] Reducing the influence of economic power on the electoral process is a common concern in most democracies. In the United States, for example, the Electoral Reform Act of 1971 limits the declared donations (hard money) a candidate may receive. Still, non-regulated donations to political campaigns (soft money) have allowed campaign spending to continue to grow. Would such limits to donations do nothing but stimulate covert contributions? This paper models the incentives for campaign contributions.We show that, under legal restrictions to hard money, open contributions aspect policies, while covert contributions influence the electoral outcome. By separating objectives, more restrictions to open contributions dampen incentives to covert contributions. As such, these restrictions should reduce the economic influence on the political process.

The influence of corporate money in politics is one of the most studied topics in political science in the U.S., although not so much so in recent democracies. Using new and public data from Brazilian elections, this dissertation investigates the process of institutional change that culminated in a 2015 decision by the Brazilian Supreme Court to ban corporate donations as a legal source of financing to politicians and parties. The episode exemplifies the worldwide tendency of judicialization of politics and fits the pattern of change identified by the literature as a critical juncture, understood as a relatively short period of time in which there is a heightened probability that agents' choices will affect the outcome of interest. Under exceptional circumstances of political and economic crisis, actors not institutionally in charge of law making set in motion a process of legislative change whose final outcome was not a faithful reflection of their preferences, but was deeply influenced by contingent elements. Public support in a context of severe revelations of corruption schemes explain how the Supreme Court was able to rule against the immediate interest of politicians and how the latter, having adjusted to find additional sources of money, were unwilling to reinstate corporate donation as a legal means of campaign financing. Having confirmed in Chapter two that incumbency is associated in Brazil with a negative effect on the electoral performance of office holders while the use of corporate money by candidates is legal, the dissertation examines the effects of the Supreme Court decision on municipal elections held after it came into effect. We investigate whether removing this important source of funding for both incumbents and challengers swings the balance in favor of office holders in both majority and proportional elections held in 2016. We find evidence that the ban on corporate donations favored incumbent mayors, suggesting that the historic decision, instead of levelling the playing field between incumbents and challengers, in reality helped office holders to win an additional term. It was not immediately visible due to the particular conditions in which the 2016 elections took place, when voters were particularly angry at incumbents due to the widespread news of corruption involving party officials. These findings indicate that, despite its intention to make Brazilian elections more competitive and open, the historic Supreme Court decision might have had the exact opposite effect, helping perpetuate in power politicians already in office.

O propósito desta dissertação consiste em verificar quais seriam as consequências das conexões políticas estabelecidas por algumas empresas de capital aberto no Brasil no que se refere a seu desempenho e acesso a crédito concedido pelo BNDES. O conceito de conexão política é amplo, mas as empresas de capital aberto que fizeram parte da amostra utilizada no trabalho buscam se aproximar do governo de duas maneiras: (i) inserindo em seu conselho de administração membros que atuem (ou que já atuaram) no governo, visando estabelecer um ponto de contato com o Estado, ou ainda, (ii) realizando doações às campanhas políticas brasileiras. Para realizar a análise proposta, utilizaram-se dados do conselho de administração das empresas listadas na BM&F Bovespa no período de 2010 a 2013, informações sobre doações de pessoas jurídicas às campanhas políticas realizadas em 2002, 2006 e 2010, juntamente com outros dados extraídos das demonstrações financeiras das companhias contempladas na amostra. Os testes de regressão múltipla com dados em painel não revelaram significância estatística entre as variáveis de estudo e os indicadores de desempenho e de acesso a crédito concedido pelo BNDES. Embora não conclusivos, os resultados apresentados acrescentam à literatura das conexões políticas motivando a realização de trabalhos futuros que objetivem testar outras hipóteses capazes de explicar quais são os motivos que levam as empresas no Brasil a estabelecerem conexões com o Estado. / The purpose of this dissertation consists in verifying the consequences of political connections established by some Brazilian public companies with respect to their performance and access to credit granted by the BNDES. The concept of political connection is broad, but the public companies used in our sample aim to approach themselves to the government by two means: (i) electing a member of the board of directors that works, or has a history in working in the government, or (ii) donating money to political campaigns. In order to accomplish this analysis, we collected data of the board of directors from public companies listed on the BM&F Bovespa during the period of 2010 to 2013, information on political donations made by companies in Brazil along the years of 2002, 2006 and 2010, as well as data extracted from the sample companies\' financial statements. The multiple regression tests ran with panel data showed no statistical relation between the main variables and the performance indicator or the variable that measures company\'s access to loans provided by BNDES. Although inconclusive, the presented results add to the literature motivating further studies that can test other hypotheses able to explain the reasons that induce companies to establish political connections.

O propósito desta dissertação consiste em verificar quais seriam as consequências das conexões políticas estabelecidas por algumas empresas de capital aberto no Brasil no que se refere a seu desempenho e acesso a crédito concedido pelo BNDES. O conceito de conexão política é amplo, mas as empresas de capital aberto que fizeram parte da amostra utilizada no trabalho buscam se aproximar do governo de duas maneiras: (i) inserindo em seu conselho de administração membros que atuem (ou que já atuaram) no governo, visando estabelecer um ponto de contato com o Estado, ou ainda, (ii) realizando doações às campanhas políticas brasileiras. Para realizar a análise proposta, utilizaram-se dados do conselho de administração das empresas listadas na BM&F Bovespa no período de 2010 a 2013, informações sobre doações de pessoas jurídicas às campanhas políticas realizadas em 2002, 2006 e 2010, juntamente com outros dados extraídos das demonstrações financeiras das companhias contempladas na amostra. Os testes de regressão múltipla com dados em painel não revelaram significância estatística entre as variáveis de estudo e os indicadores de desempenho e de acesso a crédito concedido pelo BNDES. Embora não conclusivos, os resultados apresentados acrescentam à literatura das conexões políticas motivando a realização de trabalhos futuros que objetivem testar outras hipóteses capazes de explicar quais são os motivos que levam as empresas no Brasil a estabelecerem conexões com o Estado. / The purpose of this dissertation consists in verifying the consequences of political connections established by some Brazilian public companies with respect to their performance and access to credit granted by the BNDES. The concept of political connection is broad, but the public companies used in our sample aim to approach themselves to the government by two means: (i) electing a member of the board of directors that works, or has a history in working in the government, or (ii) donating money to political campaigns. In order to accomplish this analysis, we collected data of the board of directors from public companies listed on the BM&F Bovespa during the period of 2010 to 2013, information on political donations made by companies in Brazil along the years of 2002, 2006 and 2010, as well as data extracted from the sample companies\' financial statements. The multiple regression tests ran with panel data showed no statistical relation between the main variables and the performance indicator or the variable that measures company\'s access to loans provided by BNDES. Although inconclusive, the presented results add to the literature motivating further studies that can test other hypotheses able to explain the reasons that induce companies to establish political connections.

In this research, I analyze the effects of candidate nomination rules and campaign financing rules on elite recruitment into the national legislatures of Germany and the United States. This dissertation is both theory-driven and constitutes exploratory research, too. While the effects of electoral rules are frequently studied in political science, the emphasis is thereby on electoral rules that are set post-election. My focus, in contrast, is on electoral rules that have an effect prior to the election. Furthermore, my dissertation is comparative by design. The research question is twofold. Do electoral rules have an effect on elite recruitment, and does it matter? To answer these question, I create a large-N original data set, in which I code the behavior and recruitment paths and patterns of members of the American House of Representatives and the German Bundestag. Furthermore, I include interviews with members of the said two national legislatures. Both the statistical analyses and the interviews provide affirmative evidence for my working hypothesis that differences in electoral rules lead to a different type of elite recruitment. To that end, I use the active-politician concept, through which I dichotomously distinguish the economic behavior of politicians. Thanks to the exploratory nature of my research, I also discover the phenomenon of differential valence of local and state political office for entrance into national office in comparative perspective. By statistically identifying this hitherto unknown paradox, as well as evidencing the effects of electoral rules, I show that besides ideology and culture, institutional rules are key in shaping the ruling elite. The way institutional rules are set up, in particular electoral rules, does not only affect how the electorate will vote and how seats will be distributed, but it will also affect what type of people will end up in elected office.

Dentro do tema mais amplo do financiamento político, os objetivos desta tese são explicar o surgimento, a disseminação e os efeitos do financiamento público de partidos e campanhas eleitorais. Um dos principais achados desta tese é a constatação de que o modelo de financiamento político varia em função do sistema eleitoral. Em países com sistemas majoritários há uma tendência à adoção de financiamento exclusivamente privado; por outro lado, é possível dizer que o financiamento público é uma característica dos países com sistemas proporcionais, tamanha a sua predominância nesses países no início do século XXI. Além disso, o tipo de financiamento público também varia de acordo com o sistema eleitoral: em sistemas proporcionais é mais presente um tipo de financiamento público que utiliza critérios alocativos baseados no tempo passado, que tende a propiciar uma perpetuação do status quo ante partidário. Em sistemas majoritários, ao contrário, quando existe financiamento público, geralmente são utilizados critérios alocativos baseados no tempo presente, cujo efeito sobre a competição eleitoral é menos pronunciado. Esses achados sustentam a hipótese de que o financiamento público é adotado em sistemas proporcionais como instrumento de restrição do mercado eleitoral em benefício dos partidos mais estabelecidos. / Within the ample theme of political finance, this dissertation aims to explain the emergence, dissemination and the effects of public or state financing of political parties and campaigns. One of the main findings of this dissertation is that models of political financing vary according to electoral systems. In majoritarian system countries there is a tendency towards the adoption of a purely private model of political financing, whereas it can be said that public financing is a feature of proportional system countries given its prevalence in such countries in early 21st century. Furthermore, types of public financing also vary according to electoral systems: proportional countries tend to utilize allocation criteria on the basis of a previous moment, leading to a perpetuation of the party system status quo ante. When there is public financing in majoritarian countries, the allocation criteria are usually based on present time, which has a less pronounced effect on electoral competition. These findings support the hypothesis that public financing is adopted in proportional countries as an instrument to achieve a restrictive effect on the electoral market, benefiting more established parties.

This diploma thesis focuses on the topic of financing of political parties and political movements in the Czech Republic, which is still neglected and insufficiently regulated in our country. In the practical part, the focus is on the financing and monitoring of the election campaigns for the regional council elections 2016. It primarily deals with the evaluation of the transparency of candidates and their campaigns. The election campaigns of the political movement ANO 2011 and the political party ČSSD are analyzed in detail in this thesis with an emphasis on the analysis of transparent accounts of the two candidates. The mandatory establishment of transparent accounts and expenditure ceilings for campaigns, in force since January 2017, are a very positive move towards a transparent political environment. Combined with control mechanisms and a system of sanctions, they form the basis for building a more transparent Czech political scene and they are the cause for further reforms and widening of rules in the system of political party and movement financing in the Czech Republic.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:24:05Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dirceu Fernandes dos Santos Junior.pdf: 1165353 bytes, checksum: 891a5ea3d739c7453c793fcaf38aac7a (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-12-08 / This work aims to discuss the relationship between ethics and the financing of elections in Brazil. In this sense, Ethics and Justice must go together, first as a minimum behavioral instruments and guiding in electoral matters, adapting to the existing social realities in our country, and increasingly to legal rules, and seek mechanisms and measures aimed at achieving social benefits. Thus, marked on Ethics, we demonstrate that the welfare state should be the promoter of Fundamental Rights and Political and Social Rights using philosophical justice approaches to the achievement of this goal, the median, proportionality actions, equality and just measure. Ethics and justice in politics, should be regarded as critical mechanisms for funding of election campaigns promoted unequal participation in relation to capital contributions exclusive source in directing political action for the coming to power. At stake is our political participation, when assessed by exclusion of equality since popular sovereignty only exists for political equality and electoral competitiveness equitably. Actions inconsistent with the ethics, not guided by social justice, dictated by donors to election campaigns with several other goals of social development as a whole, tend to political isolation and consequent failure of the electoral system. Political articulations and future benefits of certain economic groups, classes or political parties and their candidates, fighting for very different self-interest of the collective interests are promoted through mechanisms rejected by ethics, by the principles of equality and electoral legislation . This time, working on the basis of legal ethics, law and justice, we will complete the work to the promotion of positive actions, which indicate thoughts of philosophers entitled pointing out the evils of single interference of economic power in the elections / A presente dissertação tem por objetivo discutir a relação entre a Ética e o financiamento das eleições no Brasil. Nesse sentido, a Ética e a Justiça, devem caminhar juntas, inicialmente como instrumentos comportamentais mínimos e orientadores em questões eleitorais, adequando-se às realidades sociais existentes em nosso país, e vez mais às regras legais, e buscar mecanismos e ações tendentes ao atingimento de benefícios sociais. Dessa forma, balizados na Ética, demonstraremos que o Estado social deverá ser o promotor de Direitos Fundamentais e de Direitos Políticos e Sociais utilizando-se de abordagens jus filosóficas para o atingimento desse fim, da mediana, da proporcionalidade de ações, da igualdade e da justa medida. A Ética e a Justiça na política, devem ser observadas como mecanismos críticos a financiamentos de campanhas eleitorais promovidas em desigualdade de participação no que refere-se a aportes de capital como fonte exclusiva no direcionamento de ações políticas para a chegada ao poder. Está em jogo a nossa participação política, quando avaliada por exclusão da igualdade vez que a soberania popular somente existe pela igualdade política e pela competitividade eleitoral de forma equitativa. Ações não condizentes com a Ética, não pautadas em justiça social, ditadas por financiadores de campanhas eleitorais com objetivos outros diversos do desenvolvimento social como um todo, tenderão ao isolamento político e consequente fracasso do sistema eleitoral. Articulações políticas e vantagens futuras de determinados blocos econômicos, de classes ou de partidos políticos e seus respectivos candidatos, que lutam por interesses próprios bem diversos dos interesses coletivos, são promovidas por meio de mecanismos rejeitados pela Ética, por princípios de igualdade e pela legislação eleitoral. Dessa feita, trabalhando com as bases da Ética jurídica, do Direito e da Justiça, completaremos o trabalho com a promoção de ações positivas, onde indicaremos pensamentos de jus filósofos pontuando os malefícios da ingerência única do Poder Econômico nas eleições

Lobbying should be strictly regulated – that is the major finding of this thesis. The thesis presents many reasons to enact stricter regulations. The principle one being that, as lightly regulated as it is, lobbying is corroding democracy in both Canada and the United States. The thesis opens with a deep investigation of how lobbying works in both countries. There are examples taken from the literature, as well as original qualitative interviews of Canadian lobbyists, former politicians, and officials. Together, these make it clear that there is an intimate relationship between lobbying and campaign financing. The link between the two is sufficiently tight that lobbying and campaign financing should be considered mirrors of each other for the purposes of regulatory design and constitutional jurisprudence. They both have large impacts on government decision-making. Left lightly regulated, lobbying and campaign financing erode the processes of democracy, damage policy-making, and feed an inequality spiral into plutocracy. These have become major challenges of our time. The thesis examines the lobbying regulations currently in place. It finds the regulatory systems of both countries wanting. Since stricter regulation is required to protect democracy and equality, the thesis considers what constitutional constraints, if any, would stand in the way. This, primarily, is a study of how proposed stronger lobbying regulations would interact with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 2 (free expression and association rights) and s. 3 (democratic rights). The principal findings are that legislation which restricted lobbying as proposed would probably be upheld by the Canadian court, but struck down by the American court, due to differences in their constitutional jurisprudence. The thesis contends that robust lobbying regulations would align with Canadian Charter values, provide benefits to democracy, improve government decision-making, increase equality, and create more room for citizen voices. The thesis concludes with a set of proposed principles for lobbying reform and an evaluation of two specific reforms: limits on business lobbying and funding for citizen groups. Although the thesis focuses on Canadian and American lobbying regulations, its lessons are broadly applicable to any jurisdiction that is considering regulating lobbying.