PhDr. Tomáš Kunca The Humanist Virtuoso: Beginnings, Idea and Illustration of Hume's experimental philosophical anthropology in Treatise of Human Nature UK FHS, Praha 2013 Thesis introduces a concept of "The Humanist Virtuoso" as distinctive feature reflecting Hume's effort to introduce an idea of experimental philosophical anthropology based on study of human nature and manifested in his A Treatise of Human Nature. Concept is justified by three steps, through analysis of the beginnings of Hume's philosophy, explication of his "science of man" idea in Treatise and illustration of this idea in action, as appears in analysis of passions (Book 2). The beginnings of Hume's way to experimental philosophical anthropology are explained thorough interpretation of historical facts connected with his early study at College of Edinburgh. First meetings with culture of science ( both British Christian tradition of experimental philosophy and Newtonian mathematical philosophy) are considered as particularly important. Detailed analysis of pre-Treatise letters (the Letter to Physician and to Michael Ramsey) is provided to make explicit the beginnings of his "science of man" idea, turn to study of human nature. Castration of Treatise is observed and discussed via analysis of his letter to Home (1737). The second...

PhDr. Tomáš Kunca The Humanist Virtuoso: Beginnings, Idea and Illustration of Hume's experimental philosophical anthropology in Treatise of Human Nature UK FHS, Praha 2013 Thesis introduces a concept of "The Humanist Virtuoso" as distinctive feature reflecting Hume's effort to introduce an idea of experimental philosophical anthropology based on study of human nature and manifested in his A Treatise of Human Nature. Concept is justified by three steps, through analysis of the beginnings of Hume's philosophy, explication of his "science of man" idea in Treatise and illustration of this idea in action, as appears in analysis of passions (Book 2). The beginnings of Hume's way to experimental philosophical anthropology are explained thorough interpretation of historical facts connected with his early study at College of Edinburgh. First meetings with culture of science ( both British Christian tradition of experimental philosophy and Newtonian mathematical philosophy) are considered as particularly important. Detailed analysis of pre-Treatise letters (the Letter to Physician and to Michael Ramsey) is provided to make explicit the beginnings of his "science of man" idea, turn to study of human nature. Castration of Treatise is observed and discussed via analysis of his letter to Home (1737). The second...

No description available.

Cette présentation examinera le degré de certitude qui peut être atteint dans le domaine scientifique. Le paradigme scientifique est composé de deux extrêmes; causalité et déterminisme d'un côté et probabilité et indéterminisme de l'autre. En faisant appel aux notions de Hume de la ressemblance et la contiguïté, on peut rejeter la causalité ou le hasard objectif comme étant sans fondement et non empirique. Le problème de l'induction et le sophisme du parieur proviennent d’une même source cognitif / heuristique. Hume décrit ces tendances mentales dans ses essais « Of Probability » et « Of the Idea of Necessary Connexion ». Une discussion sur la conception de la probabilité de Hume ainsi que d'autres interprétations de probabilité sera nécessaire. Même si la science glorifie et idéalise la causalité, la probabilité peut être comprise comme étant tout aussi cohérente. Une attitude probabiliste, même si elle est également non empirique, pourrait être plus avantageuse que le vieux paradigme de la causalité. / This presentation examines the degree of certainty which can be attained in science. The scientific paradigm is composed of two extremes; causality and determinism on one end and probability and indeterminism on the other. By appealing to Hume’s notions of resemblance and contiguity, we can dismiss any claim of objective causality or chance as being ungrounded for lack of an empirical basis. The problem of induction as well as the gambler’s fallacy stem from the same cognitive/heuristic source. Hume describes these mental tendencies in his essays ‘Of Probability’ and ‘Of the Idea of Necessary Connexion’. This will necessitate a discussion of Hume’s notion of probability, as well as other interpretations of probability. While science has glorified and romanticized causality, probability can be understood as being just as consistent. While a probabilistic stance is as non-empirical as a causal stance, it will be remarked that we may benefit from a paradigmatic switch to probabilism.

Cette présentation examinera le degré de certitude qui peut être atteint dans le domaine scientifique. Le paradigme scientifique est composé de deux extrêmes; causalité et déterminisme d'un côté et probabilité et indéterminisme de l'autre. En faisant appel aux notions de Hume de la ressemblance et la contiguïté, on peut rejeter la causalité ou le hasard objectif comme étant sans fondement et non empirique. Le problème de l'induction et le sophisme du parieur proviennent d’une même source cognitif / heuristique. Hume décrit ces tendances mentales dans ses essais « Of Probability » et « Of the Idea of Necessary Connexion ». Une discussion sur la conception de la probabilité de Hume ainsi que d'autres interprétations de probabilité sera nécessaire. Même si la science glorifie et idéalise la causalité, la probabilité peut être comprise comme étant tout aussi cohérente. Une attitude probabiliste, même si elle est également non empirique, pourrait être plus avantageuse que le vieux paradigme de la causalité. / This presentation examines the degree of certainty which can be attained in science. The scientific paradigm is composed of two extremes; causality and determinism on one end and probability and indeterminism on the other. By appealing to Hume’s notions of resemblance and contiguity, we can dismiss any claim of objective causality or chance as being ungrounded for lack of an empirical basis. The problem of induction as well as the gambler’s fallacy stem from the same cognitive/heuristic source. Hume describes these mental tendencies in his essays ‘Of Probability’ and ‘Of the Idea of Necessary Connexion’. This will necessitate a discussion of Hume’s notion of probability, as well as other interpretations of probability. While science has glorified and romanticized causality, probability can be understood as being just as consistent. While a probabilistic stance is as non-empirical as a causal stance, it will be remarked that we may benefit from a paradigmatic switch to probabilism.

[pt] Esta dissertação tem por objetivo apresentar os resultados da pesquisa de mestrado em que se procurou evidenciar algumas características da relação de David Hume com a indução. Segundo a interpretação corrente, Hume é o responsável por mostrar que nossa razão não é capaz de justificar qualquer um de nossos raciocínios indutivos. O problema de Hume também se caracteriza por ser um problema acerca da racionalidade da ciência, pois se seu método principal, a indução, não pode receber suporte racional, parece lícito afirmar que o resultado de uma inferência indutiva é irracional. A fim de delinear o campo exato em que se insere a crítica humeana, este texto irá mostrar como Hume apresenta suas teorias acerca do raciocínio causal em seu Tratado da natureza humana, traçar as características exatas do raciocínio causal de Hume e confrontá-las com as formas de interpretação presentes em alguns de seus principais comentadores. Procuramos tornar claras as falhas apresentadas nestas interpretações. Em seguida trataremos de discutir algumas das mais celebradas interpretações da filosofia de Hume, centrando nossa análise nos textos de Mackie, Beauchamp e Mappes. O capítulo final tem por objetivo mostrar as características racionais que podem ser atribuídas aos raciocínios causais humeanos, salientando o caráter particular de suas inferências. Finalizando, mostraremos como a origem do princípio da cópia pode ser um exemplo do uso de inferências indutivas por parte de Hume, o que nos leva a considerações heterodoxas a respeito de sua visão a respeito da racionalidade. / [en] The aim of this work is to present the results of my master´s degree research, which tried to show some of the characteristics of David Hume´s approach to induction. According to the standard interpretation, Hume is responsible for showing that our reason is not able to justify any of our inductive reasonings. Hume´s problem also characterizes itself by being a problem about the rationality of science, for, since his main method, induction, cannot receive a rational foundation, it seems licit to assert that the result of any inductive inference is irrational. In order to precisely describe the Humean criticism I am going to show how Hume presents his theories concerning causal reasoning in this A Treatise of Human Nature, define the exact characteristics of causal reasoning according to him, and compare this analysis to those by some of his main critics. We shall try to bring to light the proposed inadequacy of the latter. Next we will discuss some of the most celebrated interpretations of Hume´s philosophy, specially those by of Mackie, Beauchamp and Mappes. The final chapter aims at showing the rational characteristics that can be assigned to Humean causal reasoning emphasizing the particular character of his inferences. Finally, we show how the origin of the copy principle can be an instance of the use of inductive inferences by Hume, which allows us to risk some heterodox hypotheses concerning his view of rationality.

La sympathie comme principe par lequel une idée se convertit en impression n’est pas la seule espèce de sympathie employée par David Hume dans ses ouvrages. Le terme «sympathie» possédait des sens variés dans le langage courant au XVIIIème siècle, et il arrive que le philosophe écossais se serve du terme «sympathie» dans l’un ou l’autre de ces sens. C’est ainsi que, outre son concept philosophique, Hume se sert du terme «sympathie» suivant cinq autres sens. L’identification des différentes sortes de sympathie présentes dans les ouvrages de Hume a permis de mieux comprendre ce qu’il en était de la nature de son concept philosophique de sympathie. Ainsi, on a pu comprendre quels rapports la sympathie entretenait avec un autre principe de production d’affections mentionné à l’occasion par Hume : la contagion. Ainsi, on a également pu comprendre quels rapports la sympathie entretenait avec d’autres éléments de la philosophie humienne, tels que les esprits animaux, leurs mouvements et les émotions. Les analyses ont démontré, par ailleurs, que les esprits animaux et leurs mouvements jouaient un rôle de premier plan dans la théorie humienne des passions et que le principe de la sympathie, au final, désignait l’augmentation de l’agitation des esprits animaux. C’est ainsi que la sympathie entendue comme principe par lequel une idée était convertie en impression désignait un mécanisme physiologique chez Hume. Les analyses ont également démontré que les impressions que Hume nommait «émotions» désignaient plus particulièrement le mouvement des esprits animaux. Qu’ainsi, l’on devait considérer qu’il y avait dans la taxonomie du philosophe écossais non seulement des perceptions de l’entendement humain (idées, passions, sentiments, etc.) mais également des perceptions du corps humain (émotions) et que celles-ci étaient en correspondance étroite avec celles-là. On peut ainsi faire l’hypothèse qu’il y a dans la philosophie humienne des éléments susceptibles de fonder une théorie de l’union entre l’âme et le corps. La considération de la sympathie comme un principe physiologique d’agitation des esprits animaux permet que l’on jette un regard nouveau sur la façon dont David Hume concevait la nature humaine. / Sympathy, as a principle by which an idea is converted into an impression, is not the only kind of sympathy that David Hume employs in his works. Hume refers to several of the multiple distinct meanings that the term afforded in 18th century vernacular. The thesis argue that in the end the Scottish philosopher uses the word “sympathy” with five different meanings, besides his own philosophical concept. Identifying these meanings as they appear throughout Hume’s body of work provided a greater understanding of the nature of his own philosophical concept of sympathy. This brought to light the relationship between sympathy and another affection-producing principle that Hume occasionally mentions: contagion. Similarly, this granted insight into the interplay between sympathy and other elements in Hume’s philosophy, especially the animal spirits, their movements, and emotions. Indeed, this analysis has uncovered the key role that animal spirits and their movements play in Hume’s theory of passions, observing that his principle of sympathy merely describes an increase in the agitation of animal spirits. Consequently, sympathy as a principle of conversion of an idea into an impression describes what is in fact in Hume’s thinking a physiological mechanism. Further, this investigation has shown that those impressions which Hume calls “emotions” specifically refer to the movement of animal spirits. Therefore, we must recognize that Hume’s taxonomy not only includes perceptions in human understanding (ideas, passions, sentiments, etc.), but also integrates perceptions in the human body (emotions), and that they are closely correlated. This leads to the hypothesis that there are in Hume’s philosophical works enough elements to delineate a theory of the relationship between body and mind (or soul). Understanding sympathy as a physiological mechanism involving the agitation of animal spirits offers a new outlook on David Hume's conception of human nature.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-25T19:21:07Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertacao Gilberto Cabral da Silva.pdf: 1528100 bytes, checksum: 1cb9f67fd62cfb84861765c173eda720 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2005-08-26 / Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico / This Work intends an epistemological approach of David Hume s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion by French philosopher Clément Rosset s category of tragic philosophy . We propose a new interpretative possibility of Hume s thought in the Dialogues, different form the naturalism and beyond the simple skepticism . The concept of tragic philosophy allows one to think the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion as a work of tragic philosophy, in which the concept of nature is completely dissolved by the skeptic arguments. / Esta dissertação pretende uma abordagem epistemológica dos Diálogos sobre a Religião Natural de David Hume por meio da categoria de filosofia trágica , trabalhada pelo filósofo francês Clément Rosset. Propomos uma nova possibilidade interpretativa do pensamento de David Hume, diferente do naturalismo e além do simples ceticismo. O conceito de filosofia trágica permite pensar os Diálogos sobre a Religião Natural como uma obra de filosofia trágica, na qual é efetuada, através dos argumentos céticos, a completa dissolução do conceito de natureza .

This essay focus on Jean-Jacques Rousseau and David Hume and how they in their writings describe the doctrine of the original sin, and what they replace it with. The theoretical framework this essay work form, is Peter. L Bergers theories concerning society and religion as a social construction, were religious systems purpose is to establish order and previewed a meaning for people. From a history point of view religious system and institutions have had a significant role in establish system that will provide people with explanations about the world. In the eighteenth century, during the period in Europe often named as the enlightenment a new sort of criticism took place against religion. My study shows that in the part of Rousseau’s work Émile that goes under the name The Savoy priest's confession the doctrine of the original sin, is replaced with a faith in the human nature. Doctrines such as the original sin is for Rousseau something that is formed by humans in society, and has nothing to do with God. In the second part of Hume’s work Dialogues concerning natural religion, the dialogue shifts and focus on more moral concepts of religion, and also the question of evil, sin etc. Hume’s work presents three solutions instead of one.

This thesis examines the representation of social conditions and historical events in Isabel Allende's first novel from a moral perspective. Using David Hume's moral theory, we explore Allende's judgement of the causes of the 1973 Chilean coup d'etat based on her representation of both the event itself and the social conditions surrounding it. The thematic focus of this study is on issues of affectivity and violence in the novel. This thesis is written in Spanish.