Trata-se de investigar a autoridade civil como fruto de convenção e artifício, bem como a sua relação com o estabelecimento da lei e do comércio no pensamento de Hume. A influência recíproca entre o artifício político e estes dois elementos é abordada como produtora de liberdade, que diz Hume no ensaio Da origem do governo ser a \"perfeição da sociedade civil\". A ideia, assim, é expor como a autoridade, inicialmente arbitrária, concorre não apenas para a superação de problemas de cooperação e escassez, como também se mostra passível de uma ordenação geradora de regularidade, liberdade e florescimento humano. / This is an investigation of political authority as a product of convention and artifice, as well as of its relation with the establishment of law and commerce in the thought of Hume. The reciprocal influence between the political artifice and these two elements is addressed as productive of regularity and liberty, which Hume describes in the essay Of the Origin of Government as being the perfection of civil society. Thus, the idea is to show how authority, initially arbitrary, concurs not only in the overcoming of cooperation and scarcity problems, but also reveals itself as liable to an order generative of liberty and human flourishing.

[pt] O objetivo geral deste trabalho é propor uma interpretação das teorias causal e dos valores (moral e estético) de David Hume, que designo por quasi-realismo cético. Neste sentido, procuro justificar um confronto das análises elaboradas na literatura secundário sobre o filósofo – que têm estado sistemática e declaradamente apartadas. Para cumprir este objetivo, começo por apresentar de forma introdutória algumas pressuposições importantes para este trabalho (capítulo 1). Depois, procuro destacar e desenvolver algumas componentes das teorias causal e dos valores (moral e estético) de Hume que são determinantes para a discussão, subdividindo-as em componentes que designo por metafísica, epistémica e semântica (capítulos 2 e 3). Por último, procuro justificar a posição que assumo em relação a cada um destes aspetos considerados, compondo, assim, o conjunto de componentes do designado quasi-realismo cético – essencialmente inspirado na contribuição de Angela Coventry (por sua vez, inspirada no quasirealismo de Simon Blackburn), ao mesmo tempo que lhe acrescenta um elemento cético (capítulo 4). / [en] The general aim of this work is to propose an interpretation of David Hume s theories of causality and values (moral and aesthetic), which I call sceptical quasi-realism. In this respect, I try to confront several analysis developed in secondary litterature about the philosopher – which have been sistematically and openly separated. To achieve this aim, I begin by introducing some presuppositions which are important for the purposes of this work (chapter 1). Then, I try to identify and develop some determinant features of Hume s theory of causality and values (moral and aesthetic) for the discussion, subdivided in features which I call metaphysic, epistemic and semantic (chapters 2 and 3). Finally, I attempt to justify the interpretation regarding each of this considered features, composing the set of features of what I call sceptical quasi-realism – mainly inspired in Angela Coventrys contributions (which, in turn, is inspired in Simon Blackburns quasi-realism), adding a sceptical element to it (chapter 4).

The 'prevalence of the calm passions over the violent' is Hume's general formula for both virtue and happiness. I argue in this dissertation that Hume's detailed account of the causes and effects of the relative calmness and strength of motivating passions in Treatise 2.3 is a main goal of Hume's project in the Treatise, Books I and II, and the reason why he published them together in 1739 as a "compleat chain of reasoning by themselves." However, despite widespread recognition of the general importance of this doctrine to Hume's 'science of man', no adequate attempt has been made to investigate those sections of Treatise 2.3 which bear directly on a deeper understanding of the causes of this 'prevalence of the calm passions'. Such attention is particularly warranted because, as I argue, these sections of the Treatise constitute Hume's attempt at an 'anatomy' of deliberation which accounts for the principles of human nature by which we successfully regulate our conduct and remain constant in pursuit of our long-term greater good. However, these sections also give rise to interpretative challenges that threaten the coherence of this central doctrine. Accordingly, my aim in this dissertation is to analyze Hume's anatomy of deliberation and of the prevalence of calm passions in Treatise 2.3 and to work through the interpretative difficulties it poses. I present a novel resolution of these interpretative problems which calls attention to the importance both of Hume's Treatise, Book I account of causal belief and of his neglected account of the influence of the passions on the imagination and understanding for his theory of motivation. I demonstrate that it is only when we attend to these key features of Hume's account of human nature that we can appreciate the coherent Humean theory of prudential motivation that emerges from Treatise 2.3.

In A Treatise of Human Nature, David Hume argues that moral judgments are the product of sentiment. The mechanism of sympathy allows individuals to enter into a common point of view in order to produce judgments that are truly moral, and not merely self-interested. Hume argues that the common point of view is the standard that moral judgments are subjected to. I argue that the common point of view is an inadequate standard for distinguishing between proper and improper moral judgments. The common point of view is inadequate because it is subjective and unreflective. In The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Adam Smith offers an account of moral judgment that has an adequate standard for distinguishing between proper and improper moral judgments. Smith avoids the problems with Hume’s account due to his distinction between partial and impartial spectators and the role that self-command plays in his theory of moral judgment.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Cambridge, 1991.

Au sein de ce mémoire, nous analysons la contribution du théologien, scientifique et philosophe Joseph Priestley (1733-1804) aux débats des Lumières anglaises portant sur la question de la liberté humaine et sur le déterminisme. Nous procédons à l’exposition de l’ensemble des textes dans lesquels Priestley développe son nécessitarisme, notamment «The Doctrine of Philosophical Necessity Illustrated» (1777), et de ceux dans lesquels il répond aux critiques formulées par ses contemporains à l’égard de sa doctrine. Nous présentons et analysons les principaux arguments employés par Priestley pour inférer la vérité du nécessitarisme (et, du même coup, la fausseté de la doctrine du libre arbitre). Les arguments que nous identifions sont formulés à partir (1) de la considération des relations causales, (2) de la compréhension priestleyenne du fonctionnement de la volonté, (3) du matérialisme et (4) de la doctrine de la prescience divine. Nous expliquons qu’une compréhension adéquate du discours nécessitariste de Priestley requiert une compréhension de son effort d’importer, en philosophie morale, la méthodologie employée dans ses travaux de philosophie naturelle, et qui est fortement inspirée par les «regulae philosophandi» de Newton, dont il admire la fécondité. L’importance du rôle joué par l’associationnisme de David Hartley et par la théorie de la matière-force de Roger Boscovich dans l’élaboration du nécessitarisme priestleyen est aussi soulignée. Tout au long de notre étude, les particularités de la pensée de Priestley sont mises en évidence à l’aide de comparaisons faites principalement avec les écrits de David Hume, David Hartley, Richard Price et Thomas Reid.

The thesis argues that two ways in which we can consider empathy’s role in ethics are fundamentally flawed because they fail to take into account the myriad ways in which empathy can be affected and influenced by our motivations. I apply what I call ‘the motivation objection’ to these two views. This has three aspects: (1) reliability: because empathy can be affected and influenced by our motivations, empathizing does not always lead to the right results; (2) function: because it can be affected and influenced by our motivations, empathy is not sufficient for various functions; (3) circularity: because it can be affected and influenced by our motivations, empathy cannot be used to define or explain certain aspects of morality in a non-circular way. The two ways of considering empathy’s role in ethics are what I call constitutive views, according to which empathy in some way constitutes, or is the foundation for, morality, and instrumental views, according to which empathy is of instrumental value in morality. I apply the motivation objection to three constitutive views, two historical and one contemporary, each of which is a sentimentalist theory of morality with empathy (or sympathy, in the case of the historical theories) at its heart. These are the sentimentalist moral theories of David Hume, Adam Smith and Michael Slote. I then apply the motivation objection to instrumental views of empathy’s role in ethics, before defending one particular instrumental view, according to which empathy can play a positive role in morality when integrated with virtue, and the virtue of compassion in particular.

My aim in this thesis is to demonstrate that common interpretations of Kant’s theory of respect do not account for the motivation a subject feels to follow the moral law. A large number of interpreters focus on Kant’s early ethical works—such as the Grounding and the Critique of Practical Reason—to justify how the moral law alone motivates a subject to act rightly. However, by the time he published Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, Kant had discovered the problem of radical evil—the fact that people tend to feel more motivated by the inclinations than by the moral law. Kant’s solution to this challenge comes in the form of moral education: the contingent practices of historical institutions (factors that are extraneous to the moral law) are required to learn respect for the law. By the end of the Religion, it will be asked whether duty for duty’s sake is ever achieved.

Although many historians assert the unity of the Enlightenment, their histories essentially belie this notion. Consequently, Enlightenment history is confused and meaningless, urging the reader to believe that diversity is similarity and faction is unity. Fundamental among the common denominators of these various interpretations, however, are the scientific method and empirical observation, as introduced by Newton. These, historians acclaim as the turning point when mankind escaped the ignorance of superstition and the oppression of the church, and embarked upon the modern secular age. The Enlightenment, however, founders immediately upon its own standards of empiricism and demonstrable philosophical tenets, with the exception of David Hume. As the most consistent and fearless empiricist of the era, Hume's is by far the most "legitimate" philosophy of the Enlightenment, but it starkly contrasts the rhetoric and ideology of the philosophe community, and, therefore, defies attempts by historians to incorporate it into the traditional Enlightenment picture. Hume, then, exposes the Enlightenment dilemma: either the Enlightenment is not empirical, but rather the new Age of Faith Carl Becker proclaimed it, or Enlightenment philosophy is that of Hume. This study presents the historical characterization of major Enlightenment themes, such as method, reason, religion, morality, and politics, then juxtaposes this picture with the particulars (data) that contradict or seriously qualify it. As a result, much superficial analysis, wishful thinking, even proselytizing is demonstrated in the traditional Enlightenment characterization, especially with regard to the widely heralded liberal and progressive legacy of the era. In contrast, Hume's conclusions, based on the method of Newton-the essence of "enlightened" philosophy, are presented, revealing the authoritarian character (and legacy) of the Enlightenment as well as the utility and relevance of its method when honestly and rigorously applied. Through David Hume, the twentieth century can truly acquire what the Enlightenment promised—an understanding of human nature and a genuinely secular society.

[pt] Esta dissertação discute, a partir de uma leitura dos trabalhos de Adam Smith em história intelectual e ética, a visão deste filósofo escocês do século XVIII sobre a natureza da atividade humana. Sugere-se que esta filosofia seja profundamente marcada por uma consciência aguda da imperfeição e finitude humanas. Intenta-se, porém, mostrar que o pensamento de Smith é também um esforço de reconciliação com esta imperfeição essencial. Toda a reflexão smithiana está voltada para a tarefa de demonstrar de que maneira é possível ao homem, a despeito de suas limitações, manter uma existência regular e harmoniosa e avançar do ponto de vista cognitivo, moral e material. De acordo com a visão de Smith, o espírito humano é mobilizado por um impulso espontâneo e desinteressado para a realização de ordem, harmonia e beleza nas diferentes esferas de sua atividade. No entanto, embora o espírito tenda naturalmente à regularidade, uma situação absolutamente simétrica nunca se realiza, em função da própria imperfeição do Homem. E é certo que assim seja, pois uma tal situação não seria nem mesmo suportável por criaturas humanas. O primeiro capítulo tem seu foco analítico em um texto de juventude de Smith, The History of Astronomy, pondo-o em diálogo com o pensamento de David Hume. Discute-se de que maneira Smith, assumindo a teoria da imaginação de Hume, se insere também no projeto humeano de uma ciência da natureza humana. O segundo capítulo envolve uma discussão da obra de Smith em ética, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, e de seu conceito central, a simpatia. / [en] This dissertation deals with Adam Smith`s view on the nature of human activity, proposing an interpretation of this eighteenth century Scottish philosopher`s works on intellectual history and ethics. It is suggested that his philosophy is marked by a keen awareness of human imperfection and finitude. It demonstrates that Adam Smith`s thought is also, however, an effort of reconciliation with this essential imperfection. Smith`s reflection is directed to the task of showing how it would be possible for mankind, notwithstanding its limitations, to maintain a regular and harmonious existence and to advance from a cognitive, moral and material point of view. According to Adam Smith`s view, the human spirit is moved by a spontaneous and disinterested impulse to the realization of order, harmony and beauty in the different spheres of its activity. Nonetheless, although the spirit is naturally order- seeking, an absolutely symmetrical situation is never actualized because of the very imperfection of mankind. Such a situation wouldn`t even be bearable to human creatures. The first chapter has its analytical focus on an early text from Adam Smith`s called The History of Astronomy, and puts it into dialogue with the thought of David Hume. The subject here is how Smith, adopting Hume`s theory of imagination, partakes in the Humean project of a science of human nature. The second chapter discusses Adam Smith`s work on ethics, The Theory of the Moral Sentiments, and its central concept, sympathy.