This dissertation aims to determine the role of human nature in Hume&#039 / s philosophy. It will examine how moral motivation arises when one takes human nature as the basis of moral philosophyWhat is maintained here is that Hume approaches his rival rationalist philosophers whom he criticised for drawing on metaphysics and rational methods in building the foundation of their ethics. Hume&rsquo / s &ldquo / science of man&rdquo / attempts to isolate the basis of ethics from metaphysical and rational elements. However, this paper demonstrates that in doing so, Hume actually resorts to reason. Further, certain inconsistencies in Hume&rsquo / s argument can only be resolved by recourse to metaphysics. To make this clear I examine how the passions that Hume puts forward as the basis of human nature cause sympathy and build a sense of morality. Since the most basic feature of human nature exists within the concept of &ldquo / being-human&rdquo / , the necessity of metaphysical and ontological explanations will be shown. Hume&rsquo / s position on the goodness or wickedness of human nature is examined. As a result, the purpose of this research is to show that it is not possible to isolate ethics from metaphysical elements by constructing a science based on Newtonian methods.

Traditionally, the central threat to the defensibility of the range of practices and attitudes constitutive of moral criticism has been seen to be posed by the Causal Thesis, the view that all actions have antecedent causes to which they are linked by causal laws of the kind that govern other events in the universe. In such a world, agents lack the sort of underived origination and agency required for the appropriateness of moral criticism. However, Peter Strawson’s “Freedom and Resentment” marks a move away from a metaphysical conception of agency and conditions of the appropriateness of moral criticism. On Strawson’s account, the problem of moral responsibility is centrally a normative problem, a problem about the moral norms that govern interpersonal relationships, and the conditions of appropriateness of the range of attitudes and sentiments occasioned by the agents’ fulfillment or non-fulfillment of these norms. In this dissertation I argue that the success of normative conceptions of conditions of appropriateness of moral criticism is contingent of the amelioration of the tension between two strategies in “Freedom and Resentment.” Naturalist interpretations hold that sentiments and practices constitutive of moral criticism are natural features of human psychological constitution, and therefore neither allow nor require justification. Rationalist interpretation, by contrast, are based on an analysis of conditions under which moral criticism can be justifiably modified or suspended. Both of these strategies, I argue, are false. The naturalistic interpretation is false not because of its inability to offer a plausible account of the conditions of justifiability of reactive attitudes, but rather because of its inability to offer a principled account of the way moral norms are grounded. The rationalistic interpretation, in turn, not only relies on an implausible psychological account of conditions of responsible agency, but puts an unacceptable emphasis on the agent’s intention. A plausible interpretation of the normative strategy requires emphasizing not only the significance of attitudes and feelings, but also the role reasons play in constituting moral norms and justifying moral criticism / Thesis (Ph.D, Philosophy) -- Queen's University, 2010-07-05 16:42:43.601

Mémoire numérisé par la Division de la gestion de documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal

The concept of age has undergone a shift from a non-specific measure of chronological age, to an identification of underlying biological, psychological and functional factors leading to age-related changes over time. Loss of neurons (atrophy) and cognitive decline in healthy aging fit well in to this age paradigm. The aging brain is thought to undergo functional shifts in information processing in response to atrophy, which is conceptualised as a “Compensation Hypothesis” of cognitive aging. Using behavioural (reaction time, variability measures, and accuracy on the n-back task of working memory), structural (stereological cortical volume estimates) and functional (functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging) approaches, this study documents decreased whole brain, prefrontal and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex volumes in older individuals. Further, slower, less accurate, and more variable performance on the n-back task in older participants was accompanied by a posterior-to-anterior shift in processing, confirming the Compensation Hypothesis of cognitive aging. The behavioural data combined with structural and functional findings, suggest an aging brain that neuropsychologically compensates over time by paradoxically placing further processing demands on a structurally compromised dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. This produces adequate but slower, more variable, and less accurate performance compared to younger brains; compensation occurs in age, but is not complete. Decision making research has pointed to the important role of emotion in judgement, and has implicated the orbitofrontal cortex as critical for this processing modality. The structural data in this study showed preferentially less volume in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, but maintained cortical volume in the orbitofrontal cortex with age. Younger individuals took longer and maintained their accuracy with increasing complexity during the n-back task, with older participants decreasing their accuracy but not to the level of chance with increasing task complexity. As such, decision making on the n-back task may have shifted with age from the pure processing power of the structurally compromised dorsolateral prefrontal cortex to increasing reliance on emotionally-guided decision making inputs mediated by the intact orbitofrontal cortex resulting in adequate but not fully compensated performance in older people. These findings are discussed in relation to evolutionary pressures on the human working memory system, Hume’s concepts of reason and the passions, and to the emerging field of neuroeconomics. / Graduate

Originally published as author's dissertation--Munich, 2007. / Includes bibliographical references (p. [245]-252).

Submitted by Maike Costa (maiksebas@gmail.com) on 2017-09-20T13:20:50Z No. of bitstreams: 1 arquivototal.pdf: 1104345 bytes, checksum: 3fee21bdbacbf668eaccd75ad8d20f94 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-09-20T13:20:50Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 arquivototal.pdf: 1104345 bytes, checksum: 3fee21bdbacbf668eaccd75ad8d20f94 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-03-29 / This dissertation has the objective to investigate the moral’s theory of the scottish philosopher David Hume, concerning with the concept of sympathy and what is its function in the humean moral’s philosophy. It analyzes as well the concept of utilitarianism that according to Hume it must be understood like a general criterion of morality, therefore, all human being has a strong link with society and perceives it like a well-being state of humanity. To fulfil the proposed objective, this research was divided into three chapters. In the first one, I present the general aspects of Hume’s philosophy like empiricism, impressions and ideas, causality, freedom and necessity. In the second chapter, I treat the moral and its distintions, if it has its foundation in the reason or in the sensibility, justice like artificial virtue and the passions. Finally, in the third and last chapter, I treat the sympathy and the utilitarianism, and what its relation with the humean moral. / Esta dissertação tem o objetivo de investigar a teoria moral do filósofo escocês David Hume, no que se refere ao conceito de simpatia, e qual seu papel na filosofia moral humeana. Analisa também o conceito de utilitarismo que de acordo com Hume deve ser concebido como um critério geral de moralidade, pois, todo ser humano tem uma forte ligação com a sociedade e a percebe como um bem-estar da humanidade. Para cumprir o objetivo proposto, esta pesquisa, foi dividida em três capítulos. No primeiro, apresento os aspectos gerais da filosofia de Hume como o empirismo, impressões e ideias, a causalidade, liberdade e necessidade. No segundo capítulo, trato da moral e suas distinções, se têm seu fundamento na razão ou na sensibilidade, a justiça como virtude artificial e as paixões. Finalmente, no terceiro e último capítulo trato a simpatia e o utilitarismo, e qual sua relação com a moral humeana.

Trata-se de investigar a posição de Hume no debate travado no século XVIII acerca do problema do gosto. A questão do gosto encontra-se difusa em boa parte da obra do filósofo escocês, mas é no ensaio Do Padrão do Gosto (1757) que Hume se detém no estudo do modo pelo qual os homens elaboram padrões ao fazerem julgamentos estéticos. Neste ensaio - objeto central desta dissertação -, Hume assinala a extrema variedade de gostos que há no mundo e nota que tanto a beleza quanto a deformidade dependem de como cada um as sente. Assim, nada poderia ser dito feio ou belo, imperando o completo relativismo estético. A pesquisa pretende analisar as articulações por meio das quais Hume resolve essa ameaça cética que paira sobre a crítica do gosto. / The following dissertation is an investigation of the position of David Hume concerning the question of taste in the 18th century. The issue of taste is widespread in much of the Scottish philosopher\'s works, but particularly in his essay Of the Standard of Taste (1757) he studies the way in which people elaborate patterns to make aesthetic judgments. In the essay the object of this dissertation Hume notes the great variety of tastes which prevails in the world and he also notes that the concepts of beauty and deformity depend on how each of them is experienced. Therefore, nothing can be said to be ugly or beautiful, according to this aesthetic relativism. This paper will examine the arguments Hume articulates in addressing and resolving the threat this skepticism poses to the notion of taste and to the possibility of art criticism.

Podemos afirmar que o tratamento dado por Hume à relação entre a Divindade e o mal moral no final da seção 8 da Investigação sobre o Entendimento Humano (EHU) tem seu desenvolvimento mais profundo e sofisticado nos Diálogos sobre a Religião Natural. Embora Hume também trate desse tópico na seção 11 da EHU, a ampla e profunda crítica feita às pretensões levantadas pelo argumento do desígnio nos Diálogos oferece um efetivo desdobramento da questão abordada por Hume em EHU 8. O abandono em EHU 8 de uma inquirição mais detalhada do problema acerca da relação entre o mal e a Divindade é compreensível. Com efeito, Hume pretendia ali, entre outras coisas, argumentar em favor de uma instância de destinação dos juízos de responsabilidade moral, a saber, o caráter. Daí ser aceitável a sua afirmação de que não é possível explicar precisamente como a Divindade pode ser a causa mediata de todas as ações dos homens sem ser a autora do pecado e da torpeza moral. Esses são mistérios que a simples razão natural e desassistida não está nem um pouco preparada para enfrentar, e seja qual for o sistema que ela adote, encontrar-se-á envolvida em inextrincáveis dificuldades (EHU 8 § 36). Certamente Hume não resolveu cabalmente essas dificuldades nos Diálogos, mas tentou enfrentá-las na medida em que uma razão desassistida, isto é, sem apoio em dogmas religiosos, pode fazê-lo. A partir desse aspecto da crítica de Hume empreendida nos Diálogos, minha intenção é examinar em que medida o argumento do desígnio se vê comprometido com o reconhecimento do mal no mundo. Para tanto, devo percorrer um longo caminho examinando as duas provas em favor da existência de Deus discutidas nos Diálogos. / It is stated that the treatment given by Hume to the relationship between God and moral evil at the end of section 8 of An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (EHU) has its deeper and more sophisticated development in the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. Although Hume also treats this topic in section 11 of EHU, the wide and deep criticism regarding the assumptions raised by the design argument in Dialogues offers an effective development on the issue examined by Hume in EHU 8. The abandonment, in EHU 8, of a more detailed examination concerning the problem of the relationship between evil and divinity is understandable. Among other things, Hume intended to argue on that section in favour of an instance of destination to judgments of moral responsibility, namely, the character. Thus, it is acceptable his assertion that it is impossible to explain distinctly, how the Deity can be the mediate cause of all the actions of men without being the author of sin and moral turpitude. These are mysteries, which mere natural and unassisted reason is very unfit to handle; and whatever system she embraces, she must find herself involved in inextricable difficulties(8 EHU § 36). Hume certainly did not solve these difficulties in its totality in the Dialogues, but he tried to confront them to the extent that as \"unassisted reason\" can do so, that is, without the support of the religious dogma. From this aspect of Hume\'s criticism undertaken in the Dialogues, my intention is to examine in what extent the design argument is endangered by the recognition of evil in the world. Before that, I must walk a long path examining the two proofs of Gods existence discussed in the Dialogues.

Desde sua primeira obra, David Hume anuncia ao leitor o projeto de constituição de uma ciência da natureza humana. O principal objetivo deste trabalho consiste em examinar os argumentos utilizados por Hume para construir as condições de possibilidade desse saber. / Since his first work David Hume announces his intentions to constitute a science of human nature. The main target of this thesis is to examine the arguments used by Hume to build the conditions of possibility of this field of knowledge.

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / This dissertation aims to investigate the moral theory of David Hume from his empirical method. In order that it is necessary to analyze his critique of rationalism and metaphysics as a method to moral foundation, the presentation of the empirical method as a possible theoretical foundation of morality and expose his moral theory in the context of his philosophical system. It is intended, therefore, to show that in Hume the reason by itself is insufficient to justify the moral, whose realization is possible only within the sensitivity. Similarly, the objective is to demonstrate that, although Hume s philosophy is skeptical concerning the metaphysical precepts and usual rationalist traditions, his understanding about morality is positive and intends to be universal. / A presente dissertação tem como objetivo investigar a teoria moral de David Hume a partir de seu método empírico. Para isso, é necessária a análise de sua crítica ao racionalismo e à metafísica como métodos para a fundamentação moral, a apresentação do método empírico como possibilidade de fundamentação teórica da moral e a exposição de sua teoria moral no contexto de seu sistema filosófico. Pretende-se, portanto, demonstrar por que em Hume a razão por si só é insuficiente para fundamentar a moral, cuja realização somente é possível no âmbito da sensibilidade. De forma semelhante, objetiva-se demonstrar que, embora se encontre em Hume uma filosofia cética em relação aos preceitos metafísicos e à tradição racionalista em geral, sua compreensão da moral é positiva e pretende-se universal