This dissertation collects five papers that discuss potential consequences of the defeasibility of knowledge. Chapters 1, 2, 3, and 5 provide arguments for a number of important epistemological consequences of the defeasibility of knowledge. Chapter 4 discusses consequences that others have claimed the defeasibility of knowledge to have. Chapter 1 argues that closure principles for knowledge are in tension with the defeasibility of knowledge. Chapter 2 argues that one of Williamson's famous arguments against the KK principle relies in a problematic way on a closure principle that is incompatible with defeat. Chapter 3 argues that a view on which knowledge just is belief safe from error is in tension the defeasibility of knowledge. Chapter 4 discusses two arguments to the effect that defeat by higher-order evidence sometimes involves the violation of rational ideals or rules of rational belief formation. As part of a response to an objection to contextualism about 'know', Chapter 5 investigates a number of social epistemological consequences of the defeasibility of knowledge.

Submitted by RENAN LUCAS DUTRA URBAN null (renanurban@hotmail.com) on 2018-02-21T14:54:14Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Renan Lucas Dutra Urban.pdf: 1172351 bytes, checksum: eabb61466e41dd2220c06c30c872f009 (MD5) / Submitted by RENAN LUCAS DUTRA URBAN null (renanurban@hotmail.com) on 2018-02-22T19:46:16Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Renan Lucas Dutra Urban.pdf: 1172351 bytes, checksum: eabb61466e41dd2220c06c30c872f009 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Andreia Beatriz Pereira null (andreia.beatriz@franca.unesp.br) on 2018-02-26T18:12:46Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Urban_RLD_me.fran.pdf: 1172351 bytes, checksum: eabb61466e41dd2220c06c30c872f009 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-02-26T18:12:46Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Urban_RLD_me.fran.pdf: 1172351 bytes, checksum: eabb61466e41dd2220c06c30c872f009 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-12-18 / O objeto do trabalho é a derrotabilidade das regras jurídicas. O objetivo geral é analisar a possibilidade de que uma regra seja derrotada, isto é, seja superada por um princípio que com ela colide. É possível que uma regra seja derrotada e continue existindo como uma regra? Uma colisão entre uma regra e um princípio pode ser solucionada por meio da aplicação de uma cláusula de exceção, decorrente desse princípio? Para responder a essas questões, foram concebidos quatro objetivos específicos, cada um deles correspondente a um capítulo. O primeiro é apresentar o marco teórico do trabalho: a distinção estrutural entre regras e princípios, proposta por Robert Alexy. O segundo é examinar a forma pela qual devem ser solucionados, tipicamente, os conflitos que ocorrem entre, de um lado, as regras, definidas como mandamentos definitivos, e, de outro, os princípios, definidos como mandamentos de otimização. O terceiro é delimitar o conceito de derrotabilidade das generalizações e, especificamente, de derrotabilidade das regras jurídicas. E o quarto é discutir sob quais condições uma colisão entre uma regra e um princípio pode ser solucionada por meio da aplicação deste em detrimento da aplicação daquela. A principal tese defendida consiste na seguinte: é possível que uma regra, desproporcional num caso concreto, seja derrotada e, mesmo assim, tenha seu caráter definitivo preservado. Quando os órgãos julgadores levam em consideração os fatores institucionais e procedimentais relativos a certos princípios formais – como, por exemplo, os da competência decisória do legislador democraticamente legitimado, da segurança jurídica e da eficiência decisória –, as ocasiões de derrota das regras não implicam a perda do caráter definitivo dessas normas, ou a aquisição, por elas, de um caráter prima facie. Uma regra, quando subótima, sobreinclusiva ou derrotável, continua sendo uma regra quando oferece alguma resistência à sua superação por um princípio que com ela colide; e, desde que essa resistência seja levada a sério pelos tomadores de decisão, uma regra, quando derrotada, continua sendo uma regra, a despeito da introdução, em seu suporte fático, de uma exceção, derivada de um princípio colidente. / The topic of this dissertation is the defeasibility of legal rules. The general objective is to analyze the possibility that a rule is defeated or overcome by a colliding principle. Can a rule still be a rule when it is defeated? Can a collision between a rule and a principle be solved by applying an exception clause, derived from this principle? In order to answer these questions, four specific objectives were designed, each corresponding to a chapter. The first is to introduce the theoretical framework of this research: the structural distinction between rules and principles, proposed by Robert Alexy. The second is to examine how conflicts between rules, defined as definitive requirements, and principles, defined as optimization requirements, should be typically resolved. The third is to delimit the concept of defeasibility of generalizations and, specifically, of defeasibility of legal rules. The fourth is to discuss under what conditions a collision between a rule and a principle can be solved by applying the principle. The main thesis is as follows: it is possible that a rule, disproportional in a concrete case, is defeated and, nevertheless, has its definitive character preserved. Rules do not lose their definitive character or assume a prima facie character if, in the cases in which they are defeated, institutional factors relating to certain formal principles – such as those of the democratically legitimated legislature, legal certainty, and efficiency – are taken into account. A rule, when suboptimal, over-inclusive or defeasible, is still a rule when it offers some resistance to its overcoming by a colliding principle; and insofar as this resistance is taken seriously by decision-makers, a rule, when defeated, is still a rule, despite the introduction, in its factual predicate, of an exception derived from a colliding principle.

Cette thèse s'intéresse aux rapports entre la règle et l'exception dans le domaine juridique. On assiste ces dernières années à un débat croissant en théorie du droit sur la « défaisabilité » et sur la question de savoir si cette dernière est un trait essentiel du droit. Cet essai se donne pour but d'évaluer les diverses positions de ce débat tant pour elles-mêmes qu'à la lumière de leurs présupposés conceptuels et théoriques. De fait, le terme « défaisabilité » est ambigu, et la plus grande partie de ce travail est dédiée à clarifier ce concept davantage qu'à en proposer une théorie originale. En effet, on trouve typiquement deux sortes de théories de la « défaisabilité du droit ». D'un côté on a des théories qui font de la défaisabilité un attribut du raisonnement juridique. Elle désigne alors le rôle que les exceptions jouent au sein du raisonnement. Ce rôle est de nous permettre d'effectuer des inférences par défaut dans les cas normaux sans avoir à établirt qu'aucune des exceptions n'est présente. De l'autre côté, on a des théories qui discutent de la défaisabilité comme d'un attribut des règles juridiques. Dire d'une règle qu'elle est défaisable, c'est dire qu'elle est sujette à des exceptions non spécifiées (ni spécifiables) à l'avance. Non seulement ces exceptions viennent bloquer l'inférence, comme c'est le cas dans les théories du premier type, mais elles provoquent la défaite de la règle. Les règles juridiques sont-elles ainsi défaisables ? Naturellement, la réponse à cette question n'est pas affaire d'enquête empirique ; elle dépend des présupposée conceptuels et théoriques que l'on a au sujet de la fonction des règles et de la nature du droit. / In this dissertation, I purport to study the relations between rules and exceptions in the legal domain. There has been an ongoing debate in legal theory on whether defeasibility is an intrinsic feature of law. This essay purports to assess the various claims made within this debate, both on their face and in the light of their conceptual or theoretical background. In fact, « defeasibility » is an ambiguous term. Most of this work is devoted to clarifying this concept, rather than proposing an original theory of it. Indeed, there are typically two sorts of claims that « law is defeasible » which are to be found in the literature. On the one hand, defeasibility is discussed as an attribute of legal reasoning. It refers to the way exceptions « behave ». They allow us to draw default inferences in normal cases, without having to ascertain that no exceptions are present. On the other hand, defeasibility is discussed as an attribute of legal rules. The defeasibility of a rule amounts to its being subject to exceptions not specified (nor specifiable) in advance. Not only those exceptions defeat the inference from the rule – as in the first account – but they defeat the rule itself. Are legal rules defeasible ? Obviously, answering this question is not a matter or empirical inquiry ; it depends on one's conceptual and theoretical commitments about the function of rules ans the nature of law.

This thesis will revisit the debate between moral particularists and moral generalists in the field of meta-ethics. The general aim of this project will be to come to a better understanding of the status and role of moral principles in a reasons-holistic moral landscape. The specific aim will be to develop a viable position within the particularism-generalism debate that will combine elements from both theories. My central argument will be threefold: (a) I will argue that, in a reasons-holistic moral landscape, exceptionless moral principles are not sufficient to ground the possibility of moral thought and judgement; (b) that the possibility of moral thought and judgement depends in part on a determinate set of exceptionless moral principles and an indeterminate set of defeasible moral principles; and (c) that moral principles are insufficient to codify all or most moral truths in finite and manageable terms. My position therefore is a modified version of Principled Particularism. In this thesis, despite defending a version of particularism, I will not shy away from employing generalist terminology or from accepting certain generalist assumptions. Furthermore, unlike some particularists, I will stress the necessity and utility of moral principles. This thesis will also incorporate research about moral thought and judgement from the fields of moral psychology, cognitive science, and neuroscience.

The validity and efficacy of the labor contract as well as cases of nullity and defeasibility import an analysis of scopes of the supplementary application of Civil Code taking into account the peculiarities of Labor Law. Labor contract, while legal business has as regulatory framework to the regulations of Civil Code but it is necessary to determine, in each case, whether to apply fully this normative body, or modulate its supplemental application, or simply conclude that it doesn’t result compatible its regulation due to the special nature of labor relations. Specifically, this issue will be analyzed from cases of nullity and defeasibility of the labor contract. / La validez y eficacia del contrato de trabajo así como los supuestos de nulidad y anulabilidad importan un análisis de los alcances de la aplicación supletoria del Código Civil teniendo en cuenta las peculiaridades del Derecho del Trabajo. El contrato de trabajo, en tanto negocio jurídico, tiene como marco de regulación a las disposiciones del Código Civil pero es necesario apreciar, en cada caso, si corresponde aplicar plenamente este cuerpo normativo, o modular su aplicación supletoria, o simplemente concluir que no resulta compatible su regulación por la naturaleza especial de las relaciones laborales. Especialmente, este tema será analizado a partir de los supuestos de nulidad y anulabilidad del contrato de trabajo

[pt] Esta tese tem por objeto o estudo interdisciplinar da aplicação de regras jurídicas. A pesquisa é dividida em duas partes. Na Parte I, o objetivo é conhecer a relação ou postura psicológica que as autoridades decisórias mantêm com regras por meio de um construto sociopsicológico aqui chamado de atitude em relação às regras. Também se busca investigar se essa atitude se relaciona com o processo de excetuar regras nas experiências recalcitrantes, com traços de personalidade do modelo dos Cinco Grandes Fatores, e com variáveis sociodemográficas. Após seguir o procedimento de construção de instrumentos psicológicos, procedeu-se à busca de evidências de validade da Escala de Atitudes em Relação às Regras (EARR) contendo 29 itens. O instrumento completo contendo itens sociodemográficos, a EARR, a Escala Reduzida de Descritores dos Cinco Grandes Fatores de Personalidade, e casos concretos a serem julgados pelos participantes, foi submetido a uma amostra diversa de 347 profissionais do direito ligados ao sistema de justiça e de bacharéis em direito. Os resultados encontrados fornecem evidências iniciais de validade interna do construto hipotético atitude em relação às regras, acessado e medido pela EARR com 12 itens e alpha de Cronbach de 0,89. Também foram encontradas evidências de validade externa em correlações com o traço de personalidade abertura à experiência, com diversas emoções e sentimentos autopercebidos, com variáveis sociodemográficas (ex.: local de residência e área de atuação profissional do participante) bem como com as médias dos julgamentos nos itens 2 e 3 dos casos concretos apresentados aos participantes, justificando a interpretação de que a relação ou postura psicológica das autoridades decisórias com as regras pode ser concebida como uma atitude. A atitude em relação às regras também se correlacionou da maneira esperada com as respostas nos casos concretos, ressalvada a situação nº 1 do caso concreto nº 1, na qual o construto parece ter transbordado seu espaço de atuação esperado. A Parte II foi motivada por este achado e teve por objetivo buscar uma explicação teórica, além de organizar os achados teóricos e empíricos em um modelo abrangente de tomada de decisão jurídica. Para tanto, foram examinados diversos tópicos relacionados às exceções no campo do direito: conceito, diferenciação entre exceções predicativas e o processo de excetuar normas, os elementos desse processo, com destaque para o juízo de normalidade, e os resultados possíveis (mudança do sentido da norma vs. derrotabilidade). A partir dessas distinções formulou-se a hipótese de que o achado empírico que motivou o prosseguimento da pesquisa é parcialmente explicado pelo juízo de normalidade acerca do funcionamento do direito, que pode iniciar o processo de excetuar normas. Por fim, o acervo teórico e empírico é organizado em um modelo abrangente de tomada de decisão jurídica, que abarca a um só tempo a normalidade e anormalidade, os casos rotineiros e os casos incomuns, os casos fáceis e os casos difíceis. A Conclusão organiza as ideias centrais da tese, resume seus principais achados e revê as principais implicações para a Psicologia, para a Teoria do Direito e para a Psicologia Social do Trabalho e das Organizações. / [en] This dissertation aims at the interdisciplinary study of legal rules as applied by legal authorities. The research is divided in two parts. Part I’s objective is to understand the psychological relationship between decision-making authorities and rules through a sociopsychological construct dubbed attitude towards rules, as well as its possible relations with the process of creating exceptions to rules in recalcitrant experiences, with personality traits from the Big Five Factors model, and with sociodemographic variables. After following the procedure for constructing the psychological tests, we proceeded to search for evidence of validity of the Attitude Towards Rules Scale (ATRS) containing 29 items. The complete instrument containing sociodemographic items, the ATRS, the Brazilian Short Form Scale of Descriptors of the Five Personality Factors, and hypothetical cases to be judged by the participants, was submitted to a diverse sample of 347 lawyers from Justice System or Law School graduates. The results provide evidence for the internal validity of the sociopsychological construct attitude towards rules, measured by the ATRS with 12 items (Cronbach s alpha = 0.89). Evidence for external validity was also found in correlations with the personality trait openness to experience, with various emotions and self-perceived feelings, with sociodemographic variables (e.g., place of residence and domain of professional activity of the subject) as well as with the averages for the subjects’ judgments in items 2 and 3 of the hypothetical cases presented, allowing for a justified interpretative statement such that the psychological relationship between decision-making authorities and rules could be conceived as an attitude. Attitude towards rules also correlated in the expected way with the responses in concrete cases, except in one case, in which the construct seems to have surpassed its expected conceptual boundaries. Part II was motivated by this finding and aimed to seek a theoretical explanation, in addition to organizing the theoretical and empirical findings into a comprehensive model of legal decision-making. To this end, several topics related to legal exceptions were examined: its concept, the difference between predicative exceptions and the process of excepting norms, the elements of this process, with emphasis on normality judgments, and the possible results (meaning change vs. defeasibility). From these distinctions, it was hypothesized that the empirical finding that motivated the continuation of the research is partially explained by normality judgments on the functioning of the Law, which may initiate the process of excepting norms. Finally, the theoretical and empirical collection is organized into a comprehensive model of legal decision-making, which encompasses both normality and abnormality, routine cases and unusual cases, easy cases, and hard cases. The Conclusion organizes the central ideas of this dissertation, summarizes its main findings and reviews the main implications for Psychology, for Legal Theory, and for Industrial and Organizational Psychology.

This essay examines and juxtaposes Mario Jori’s and Frederick Schauer’s ideas on legal formalism. Although developed independently of each other, these ideas show remarkable similarities: both focus on the notion of norm or rule as a tool for clarifying the notion of legal formalism; both defend legal formalism from the criticisms routinely moved against it. The author maintains that Jori’s and Schauer’s theories may contribute to shed light on (and criticize) the controversial notion of defeasibility of legal rules; they may also contribute to scale down, from a legal-theoretical point of view, the novelties of contemporary constitutional orders; finally, it may help to better understand their working machinery. / In questo saggio vengono esaminate e messe a confronto le idee di Mario Jori e di Frederick Schauer in tema di formalismo giuridico. Pur essendo state elaborate l’una indipendentemente dall’altra, presentano notevoli somiglianze, perché entrambe usano la nozione di norma o regola come punto focale per chiarire la nozione di formalismo giuridico, e perché entrambe difendono quest’ultimo dalle critiche usualmente rivolte ad esso. L’autrice ritiene che l’esame delle idee dei due autori possa contribuire a chiarire (e criticare) la controversa nozione di defeasibility delle norme giuridiche e possa altresì, in via generale, contribuire a ridimensionare, dal punto di vista teorico-giuridico, le novità del diritto degli odierni Stati costituzionali, oltre che a comprenderne meglio i meccanismi di funzionamento. / En este trabajo se examina y compara las ideas de Mario Jori y de Frederick Schauer en relación con el formalismo jurídico. A pesar de haber sido desarrolladas de forma independiente unas de las otras, dichas ideas presentan notables semejanzas ya que ambos autores utilizan el concepto de una norma o regla como punto focal para aclarar la noción de formalismo jurídico, y porque ambos lo defienden de las críticas que usualmente se le dirigen. La autora considera que el examen de las ideas de los dos autores puede contribuir a aclarar (y criticar) la controvertida noción de defeasibility (derrotabilidad) de las normas jurídicas y, de modo general, también a redimensionar, desde el punto de vista teórico-jurídico, las novedades que presentan los derechos de los modernos Estados constitucionales, y comprender mejor los mecanismos de su funcionamiento.