The aim of this thesis is to analyse and problematize the concept of culture and its changes during the 1960s. By examining articles out of the periodical Ord&Bild 1962-1972, I show how an aesthetically marked concept, closely related to the concept of art, changes into an anthropological perspective where attention is drawn to the social, economical, political and ideological aspects. This change is viewed in relation to the works of three prominent cultural theorists from the 1960s: Raymond Williams, Marshall McLuhan and Herbert Marcuse. The change that the concept of culture undergoes can be illuminated in several ways. Epistemologically questions of art, its objectivity and relation to reality, are replaced by questions of the function of art and of its role as reproducing ideas and norms of a bourgeois society. Economical and social aspects are used as critical factors in discussing the role and conception of culture, a perspective that gives the discussion a political and ideological edge. Another related track of change is that attention is brought to the relationship between culture as norms and values and culture as art, also known as “high culture”. This means that the idea of an universal culture is criticized for its excluding tendencies. By the end of the decade, the concept of culture has lost its universal meaning and is, among other things, used to endorse and emphasize a specific identity. Culture is key concept in a critical discussion about society and is also seen as a way of changing this society. Culture can then be viewed as a “concept of struggle”. The change that the concept of culture goes through is related to changes in the society as a whole, as well as to underlying ideas and visions about the society. The change must not be understood as a consequence of the political escalation during the 1960s, but is to be seen as a development parallel to this radicalization of society.

La plupart des lectures contemporaines des Essais ignore la pensée morale de Montaigne. Ici, je maintiens que Montaigne épouse ‘une éthique de la modestie’ en même temps qu’il rejette toute éthique normative. En particulier, je cherche à aborder comment Montaigne suggère que nous connaissons la vertu et agissons si deux individus ne partagent pas le même perspective et on ne peut pas être le même sujet éthique deux fois. Je vais commencer par discuter la position épistémique de Montaigne par rapport aux universels pour illustrer comment Montaigne met en question l’universalité des lois éthiques et un bien connu a priori comme certains nominalistes et comment la notion de la contingence qui accompagne cette attitude a des implications pour le sujet. Ensuite, je vais explorer comment Montaigne partage et part des penseurs anciens, surtout les sceptiques, afin de façonner une méthode empirique qui a son point de départ dans l’individu. En fouillant sa méthode, qui a son modèle dans le chapitre « De l’expérience », je vais démontrer comment cet aspect de la pensée de Montaigne empêche sa morale de succomber au nihilisme, parce qu’il affirme qu’il reste des phénomènes qu’on peut connaître à posteriori. Je voudrais montrer comment la méthode des Essais aide les individus à exercer leur jugement pratique et former leur intention face aux circonstances changeantes indépendamment des croyances. English Translation : [Most contemporary readings of the Essays ignore Montaigne’s moral thought. In this paper, I assert that Montaigne espouses ‘a modest ethics’ at the same time that he rejects all normative ethical systems. Specifically, I seek to address how Montaigne suggests that we can know virtue and act if no two individuals share the same epistemological position and an individual can never be the same ethical subject twice. I will argue that Montaigne denies human knowledge of metaphysical universals and in this regard resembles medieval nominalists, who held that humans only know individuals and particular instances a posteriori. I will demonstrate that Montaigne’s epistemological modesty influences his ethical position, as he repudiates our capacity to identify an a priori good or a télos to which we should all strive. Because I think that this negative aspect of the Essays does not lead to moral nihilism, I will explore how Montaigne draws and departs from classical thinkers, specifically the Skeptics, in order to fashion an empirical method with the individual ethical subject at its center. I will show how the study of experience outlined in the Essays helps the moral subject to make practical judgments and form intentions with regard to particular circumstances, independently of belief.]

I denna uppsats undersöks laga skifte i Rengsjö socken och vilka konflikter som uppstod i samband med skiftesförrättningarna under åren 1847 till 1874. En kategorisering av olika konflikter har gjorts och med studier av laga skiftesprotokollen har konflikterna identifierats samt uppställda hypoteser och frågor bearbetats och besvarats. Den primära källan är således laga skiftesprotokoll som arkiverats hos Lantmäteriet och till den tidigare forskning som omnämns hör bland annat Ronny Petterssons studie om laga skifte i Halland, Anders Franzéns studie över laga skifte i Småland samt Britt Liljewalls teorier om kontinuitet och förändring som drivkrafter. Forskningen kring laga skifte är tämligen omfattande men gäller i huvudsak de södra delarna av vårt land. Denna studie avser en mindre socken i landskapaet Hälsingland.

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The organized and controlled form of collecting consumption taxes and toll from the import and export trade goes back to the 17th century in Sweden. The customs administration and procedure were regulated by royal announcements, and the majority of the documents found in the customs archives represent thus records stipulated by such notifications. The customs archives can be used for research on several levels; the announcements reflect currents within both the domestic and foreign politics, while the account lists for financial statistics portray the extent of the trade. The various lists of compilation can be further used to follow for instance the development of different units of measurement, the expansion of tax rates, the value of trade goods or the changes in monetary units or systems. The diaries, architectural plans of the customs offices and maps of the toll areas place the customs officials and their work within the local scenery. The thesis focuses on archives deriving from customs located at harbors and on the Swedish-Norwegian border in the county of Dalarna. Examples of documents originating from the collection of agricultural tariffs have been included, as well as cases from a tariff court (accisrätt). These selected archives cover both the different kinds and levels of customs administration found in Sweden from the 17 the century and onward. This is a one year master’s thesis in Archival Science.

The purpose of this essay is to try and bring clarity to the question, what is Chick Lit and which factors make it so popular. My thesis  endeavors to explain that it is not only the promise of light entertainment that draws the reader, but also the possibility that in an easy way they can read about existential questions such as self-development  and life -choices. As well as mapping out Chick Lit´s specific characteristics, followed by previous research on the subject and the litterateur’s history, I have found it interesting to discuss the female characters, their personalities and life choice’s against a backdrop of existentialistic philosophy. In my research of this form of literateur I have discovered that chick lit often deals with existential universal problems, and that in order to be entertaining these books must contain a serious element.

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This dissertation tracks a series of literary interventions into scientific debates of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, showing how the realist novel generated new techniques of description in response to pressing philosophical problems about agency, materiality, and embodiment. In close conversation with developments in the sciences, writers such as George Eliot, Thomas Hardy, and Olive Schreiner portrayed human agency as contiguous with rather than opposed to the pulsations of the physical world. The human, for these authors, was not a privileged or even an autonomous entity but a node in a web of interactive and co-constitutive materialities. Focused on works of English fiction published between 1870-1920, I argue that the historical convergence of a British materialist science and a vitalistic Continental natural philosophy led to the rise of a dynamic realism attentive to material forces productive of “character.” Through the literary figure of character and the novelistic practice of description, I show, turn-of-the-century realists explored what it meant to be an embodied subject, how qualities in organisms emerge and develop, and the relationship between nature and culture more broadly.

Gegen die Unumgänglichkeit des philosophiehistorischen Wissens sich zu stellen, haben verschiedene Denker unternommen, andere wollen die Umgangsformen der Philosophiegeschichte reformieren und neue Modelle des (historischen) Umgangs einführen. Gilles Deleuze nun scheint beides zu versuchen, indem er dem philosophiehistorischen Wissen als Philosoph jede Evidenz bestreitet und es zugleich als Philosophiehistoriker in einer neuen Umgangsweise aufhebt. Seine Philosophie ist offenbar verträglich mit einer Rede über andere Philosophien, ja scheint sie sogar zu fördern, wenn man so die Tatsache interpretieren will, daß Ddeuze eine ganze Reihe von Büchern zu einzelnen Denkern veröffentlicht hat. Wie diese Beziehung von Philosophie und Philosophiegeschichte bei ihm aussieht, ist bisher nicht untersucht. Zum paradoxen Unterfangen von Gilles Deleuze, Philosophiegeschichte zu treiben und sie zugleich zu unterlaufen, die folgenden Überlegungen, deren vorläufiger Charakter daran zu erkennen ist, daß sie sich an verstreuten expliziten Äußerungen orientieren.

Daß Cousin heute weitgehend vergessen ist, liegt eben daran, daß sein Tun und Wirken als Philosoph eng mit der Bildungspolitik seiner Zeit verwoben ist. Daß unsere Lehrbücher der Philosophiegeschichte ihn lediglich anführen als einen, der das Studium der Philosophiegeschichte gefördert habe, ist ein dialektischer Rückschlag der von Cousin selbst ins Werk gesetzten Historisierung, denn Cousin hat schnell das Prestige des „großen\" Philosophen verloren, das - nach seinen eigenen Vorstellungen - Unvergeßlichkeit garantiert. Vermeren zeigt überzeugend, daß es einen Weg gibt, diesem Vergessen mit Erkenntnisgewinn entgegenzusteuern, eben auf dem Weg einer Intellektuellengeschichte.