This thesis presents Hegel’s account of abstract ‘understanding’ (Verstand) and asserts that his thought is to be read as primarily presenting a critique of abstract understanding. Verstand involves the methodological supposition of a self-subsistent fundament of what it speaks of, and hence the critique of understanding is the critique of the supposition of self-subsistent fundaments. Grasping his account and reading him in its critical light yields a very different image of Hegel than the caricature of ‘totalizing systems’. The dimension of the Verstandeskritik has been relatively neglected in Hegel-reception and misunderstandings result from trying to ‘understand’ Hegel, by overlooking the topic of ‘understanding’ in his work as critique. Many caricatures result from understanding Hegel as a proponent of what he actually critiques (‘absolute knowing’ is often understood as a mega-understanding). The thesis then addresses the historically influential criticisms raised by his contemporary, F.J.W. Schelling, to give a voice to a Hegel that has been hitherto drowned out by caricatures that began with Schelling.

<p>This sentence is whatever truth is <em>not</em>. The subject of this master’s thesis is the power, influence, and solvability of the liar paradox. This paradox can be constructed through the application of a standard conception of truth and rules of inference are applied to sentences such as the first sentence of this abstract. The liar has been a powerful problem of philosophy for thousands of years, from its ancient origin (examined in Chapter One) to a particularly intensive period in the twentieth century featuring many ingenious but ultimately unsuccessful solutions from brilliant logicians, mathematicians and philosophers (examined in Chapter Two, Chapter Three, and Chapter Four). Most of these solutions were unsuccessful because of a recurring problem known as the liar’s revenge; whatever truth is <em>not</em> includes, as it turns out, not <em>just</em> falsity, but also meaninglessness, ungroundedness, gappyness, and so on. The aim of this master’s thesis is to prove that we should not consign ourselves to the admission that the liar is and always will just be a paradox, and thus unsolvable. Rather, I argue that the liar <em>is</em> solvable; I propose and defend a novel solution which is examined in detail in the latter half of Chapter Two, and throughout Chapter Three. The alternative solution I examine and endorse (in Chapter Four) is not my own, owing its origin and energetic support to Graham Priest. I argue, however, for a more qualified version of Priest’s solution. I show that, even if we accept a very select few true contradictions, it should <em>not</em> be assumed that inconsistency inevitably spreads throughout other sets of sentences used to describe everyday phenomena such as motion, change, and vague predicates in the empirical world.</p> / Master of Arts (MA)

I interpret and defend Kant's criticism of traditional metaphysics and his indirect proof of transcendental idealism in the first Critique's Antinomy of Pure Reason. Throughout my thesis, I focus on the role of the principle "P2" in the Antinomy ("If the conditioned is given, then the whole sum of conditions, and hence the absolutely unconditioned, is given"). I first defend Kant's use of the principle to motivate the proofs of the Thesis and Antithesis arguments in the second antinomy, which concerns composition, and the third antinomy, which concerns causality. I then explain how the role of P2 in the proofs exposes Kant's indirect proof of transcendental idealism to a significant challenge, to which I develop a response. Finally, I pose the question of whether Kant ultimately argues that the unconditioned exists, or whether he argues that it is merely possible that the unconditioned exists. I explore both options and outline avenues for further consideration of this question, which I argue is crucial to understanding Kant's critical project.

In this thesis I present a strong and universally compelling case for the importance of Heidegger’s question, namely, the question of the meaning of being. I show how the being-question has been obscured and forgotten over the past two millennia of western philosophy. I attempt to raise this question again, and elucidate why it is an important one to examine, not only for philosophy as a discipline, but for any human endeavor. My aim is to reach those of you who would normally not come across, or might even dismiss, Heidegger’s work. I hope the arguments I make will convince you, hard though it may be, that reawakening ourselves to the question of being is a task that we must undertake.

To many people love is special, sacred even. Love plays a countless number of roles for a countless number of people. Contemporary ideas about love, however, are more in alignment with the philosophies of Aristotle, and not of Plato. Aristotle held that love could exist as many people see it today – wishing well for others purely for their own sake. But Plato disagreed. Plato claimed that love was a way by which one could better themselves and become wiser. In this thesis, I explain Plato’s theory of love put forth in the Symposium. I also explore the textual evidence for the selfish nature of Plato’s love.

It is widely known that at least three of the major world religions—Christianity, Islam, and (more controversially) Judaism—embrace the theory of bodily resurrection, or an event in which a person or people are brought back to embodied life after death. But is this theory compatible with materialism, or the philosophical doctrine that nothing exists except matter and its movements and modifications? In other words, if my “self” is identical with and nothing more than my body, could my unique and particular “self” come to exist again on Earth after my death? This thesis examines theories of compatibility from ancient times to the present day.

The fact-value distinction has structured and still structures ongoing debates in metaethics, and all of the major positions in the field (expressivism, cognitivist realism, and moral error theory) subscribe to it. In contrast, I claim that the fact-value distinction is a contingent product of our intellectual history and a prime object for questioning. The most forceful reason for rejecting the distinction is that it presupposes a problematic understanding of the subject-object divide whereby one tends to view humans as the sole source of normativity in the world. My dissertation aims to disclose the background against which human ethical praxis is widely seen as a unique and special phenomenon among other phenomena. I show that ethical norms, as delimited by utilitarianism, deontology, virtue ethics, etc., derive from an originary proto-ethical normativity at the heart of the real itself. Every object, human and nonhuman, presents itself as a bottomless series of cues or conditions of appropriateness that determine adequate and inadequate ways of relating to it. That is, objects demand something from other objects if they are to be related to; they condition other objects by soliciting a change in disposition, perception, or sense, and for this reason are sources of normativity in and unto themselves. Ethical norms, or values, are the human expression of the adequacy conditions with which all objects show themselves. In the post-Kantian landscape it is widely thought that human finitude constitutes the origin of ethical norms. Consequently, the world is divided up into morally relevant agents (humans) on one side, and everything else on the other. Adopting a deflationary view of agency, I argue that human-human and human-world relations differ from other relations in degree rather than kind. Thus, instead of a fact-value distinction, value is inextricably bound up with the factual itself. The critical upshot of my project is that traditional subject-oriented ethical theories have served to conceal the real demands of non-human objects (such as animals, plants, microorganisms, and artificially intelligent machines) in favor of specifically human interests. Such theories have also been leveraged frequently in exclusionary practices with respect to different groups within the human community (e.g. women and those of non-European descent) based on arbitrary criteria or principles.

Esta tese tem como objetivo mostrar que a metodologia empregada pela Crítica da razão pura também é um método de natureza transcendental que torna a história da filosofia relevante para a reflexão do passado. Porque, partindo-se do princípio a priori da razão que justifica a sua natureza arquitetônica, quando atrelada a ideia de uma legislação que tem por fundamento uma metafísica, a história da filosofia, concebida do ponto de vista kantiano, pode ser pensada como uma história filosofante da razão. Nossa justificativa para a comprovação dessa hipótese estará pautada na ideia do tribunal da razão como um método para reflexão de uma metafísica que julga o seu passado em função agora da filosofia transcendental. Pois, nessas circunstâncias, se detivermos nossa atenção para o lugar que ocupa o conceito de reflexão transcendental diante do pressuposto que associa o método crítico com a sua atividade legislativa alcançada, veremos que a natureza do sistema arquitetônico da razão justifica essa atividade da reflexão que faz também da história da filosofia um sistema da razão. / This thesis aims to demonstrate that the methodology used by the Critique of Pure Reason is also a method of transcendental nature that makes the history of philosophy relevant to the reflection of the past. Because, starting from the a priori principle of the reason that justifies its architectural nature, when tied to the idea of a legislation that is founded on a metaphysics, the history of philosophy conceived from the Kantian point of view, can be thought as a history philosopher of reason. Our justification for proving this hypothesis will be based on the idea of the tribunal of reason as a method for reflection on a metaphysics that judges its past in function now of transcendental philosophy. For in these circumstances, if we focus our attention on the place of the concept of transcendental reflection in the face of the presupposition that associates the critical method with its legislative activity, we will see that the nature of the architectural system of reason justifies this activity of reflection also from the history of philosophy a system of reason.

Esta tese tem como objeto o processo de institucionalização e profissionalização da Filosofia em Universidades do Nordeste, a partir da análise dos documentos que regulamentam os cursos de graduação em Filosofia no país e das trajetórias dos cursos de Filosofia das seguintes instituições: Universidade Estadual do Ceará UECE, Universidade Federal da Paraíba - UFPB, Universidade Federal da Bahia - UFBA e Universidade Federal de Pernambuco UFPE. O objetivo deste trabalho é compreender a estruturação, a concepção de filosofia e o processo de formação nesses cursos. Foram realizadas visitas às instituições para consulta aos documentos dos cursos (decretos, pareceres, propostas de reformulação, grades curriculares, projetos pedagógicos, artigos, etc.) e realização de entrevistas com coordenadores e professores. Objetivamos problematizar a concepção de formação que se consolidou no Brasil tendo como eixo a história da filosofia; para tanto refletimos sobre a origem da filosofia no Brasil a fim de melhor compreender como é assimilada e resignificada. Em seguida discutimos o processo de profissionalização, ou seja, a formação do filósofo e do professor de filosofia. A compreensão desta problemática conduziu-nos a uma reflexão a respeito do pensamento de Kant, Hegel, Shopenhauer, Nietzsche, Severino, Vaz, Paim, Sousa, Ribeiro, Leopoldo e Silva, Cerqueira, dentre outros. Concluímos que, à medida que se consolida o processo de institucionalização e profissionalização da filosofia, com a tradição historiográfica, há um arrefecimento do discurso de formação do filósofo, que passa a ser substituído pelo discurso da formação do profissional de filosofia, do pesquisador em filosofia, aquele que domina a história da filosofia, é capaz de ler e explicar os clássicos. O profissional que deve se adequar às necessidades do mercado de trabalho. Neste sentido, assume-se de forma subliminar a dificuldade de se formar o filósofo num curso de graduação, evidenciando uma crise no Bacharelado. Na trajetória destes cursos a formação do professor de filosofia não é enfrentada filosoficamente. Entretanto, mesmo que não possamos dizer que esta realidade esteja efetivamente mudando, podemos afirmar que, pelo menos no plano do discurso, materializado nas Diretrizes para a Licenciatura e nos projetos de reformulação dos cursos pesquisados, há a preocupação em defender a indissociabilidade entre a pesquisa e a docência e a necessidade da formação de um professor crítico. Neste sentido, concluímos que já se delineia um espaço de reflexão que poderá suscitar novas formas de se pensar e organizar a docência em Filosofia, embora a formação em Filosofia, tanto do filósofo quanto do professor em Filosofia, ainda precisa ser repensada. / This thesis analyzes the institutionalization and the formation process in undergraduate degrees in philosophy taking place in universities located in the Northeast region of Brazil, through the study of documents which regulate these courses as well as the analysis of the trajectory of the Philosophy courses at the following institutions: Ceará State University UECE, Federal University of the State of Paraíba - UFPB, Federal University of the State of Bahia - UFBA and Federal University of the State of Pernambuco UFPE. The objective of the present research is understanding the structure and concept of philosophy in the graduating process at these Universities. To this end, visits were conducted to the universities above with the objective of consulting course documents (decrees, written decisions, reformulation proposals, course requirements, pedagogical projects, articles, etc) and interviewing coordinators and professors. This work discusses the origin of philosophy in Brazil in order to better understand its assimilation and redefinition, and problem poses the concept of higher education which has consolidated itself in Brazil, taking as an axis the history of philosophy. After that, the learning process of the philosopher and the teacher of philosophy are discussed in the light of Kant, Hagel, Shopenhauer, Nietzche, Severino, Vaz, Paim, Souza, Ribeiro, Leopoldo e Silva, Cerqueira, among others. It became clear that as the processes of institutionalization and academic formation in philosophy solidify, there is a cooling down of the idea which defends the academic formation of philosophers. This position is starting to be substituted by another which defends the formation of professionals in philosophy, or researchers in philosophy, as the individual who is in command of the history of philosophy, and capable of reading and explaining the classics and well adapted to the needs of the marketplace. This change in positions exposes a crisis in the undergraduate courses of philosophy, shown by the need to hide difficulties in the process of graduating philosophers. The learning and teaching processes in theses courses are not undertaken philosophically. Although not being able to clearly state that this reality is in a process of change, it is possible to affirm that at least rhetorically there is change as seen in the document Diretrizes para a Licenciatura and in the projects defending course changes. One can see a move toward defending the need to unite research and pedagogy, and the need to educate critical professors. Finally, it is also clear that a new way of thinking and organizing the pedagogy of philosophy is in process, although the learning and teaching processes in philosophy, be it for the formation of philosophers of teachers of philosophy, still needs to be improved.

Orientador: Alberto Villani / Banca: Roberto Nardi / Banca: Elisabeth Barolli / Banca: Jorge Megid Neto / Banca: Sonia Maria Dion / Resumo: A institucionalização da pesquisa sobre Ensino de Ciências (EC) teve início no Brasil no final da década de 1960 e apenas recentemente, no ano 2000, foi reconhecida como área pela Capes. Durante esse tempo, tivemos a produção de vários trabalhos que buscaram analisar sua história, descrevendo os fatores determinantes de sua constituição e sustentação. Em nossa pesquisa resgatamos alguns desses trabalhos, focando o olhar sobre os aspectos subjetivos que contribuíram para seu desenvolvimento. Elegemos como referências os trabalhos de Nardi (2005) e Villani, Pacca e Freitas (2002), bem como alguns conceitos psicanalíticos desenvolvidos por René Kaes sobre a vida psíquica de grupos e instituições. Esses elementos permitiram interpretar os eventos que marcaram a história da área de EC, considerando que todo grupo se constitui, se organiza e evolui de acordo com a configuração que reveste o sistema de representação de seus membros, da tarefa proposta, do grupo em si mesmo e do contexto social. Após identificarmos os quatro momentos organizadores no desenvolvimento dos vínculos intersubjetivos estabelecidos na instituição - o Momento Originário, o Primeiro, o Segundo e o Terceiro Organizador Grupal - buscamos pelos intermediários que marcaram os intercâmbios, os lugares, as atribuições, a atividade representacional e os afetos. Reconhecemos na História e Filosofia da Ciência (HFC) intermediários fundamentais em cada fase do desenvolvimento da área e buscamos elementos para entender melhos os papéis desempenhados pela HFC na pesquisa, principalmente, suas contribuições para a fundação e sustentação da área. Para obtermos informações com potencial mais subjetivo fizemos entrevistas com pesquisadores da área, cujas produções científicas revelaram aproximação com a HFC. A nossa interpretação avançou quando integramos um novo conceito no suporte... (Resumo completo, clicar acesso eletrônico abaixo) / Abstract: The establishment of research into Science Education began in Brazil in the end of the decade of the 1960's and only recently, in the year 2000, was it recognized as a field by Capes. During this time, many works tried to analyse its history, describing the determinant factors of its constitution and upholding. In our research we look back on some of these works, focusing on subjective aspects that contributed to its development. We chose as reference the works of Nardi (2005) and Villani, Pacca & Freitas (2002), and some other psychoanalytic concepts developed by René Kaes referring to psychic life of group and institutions. These elements allowed us to interpret the events that highlighted the history in the field of Science Education, taking into consideration that any groups is made up of, organizes itself and develops itself according to the configuration that overlays the representation system of its members, of the task proposed, the group itself and the social context. After we were able to identify the four organizational moments in the development of the intersubjective links existing in an institution which are - the arising moment, the first, the second and the third group organizer, we searched for the intermediates that highlighted the interchanges, the places, the attributions, the representational activities and the affection. One can recognize in the History and Philosophy of Science (HPS) the fundamental intermediary in each developing phase of the field and search for elements to better understand the roles played by the HPS in research, especially its contributions to the foundation and establishment in the field. To obtain more potential and subjective information, many researchers in this field were interviewed whose scientific works showed some proximity with the HPS. Our interpretation took a head start when we integrated a new concept to support... (Complete abstract click electronic access below) / Doutor