An important change wrought by the post-1994 South African Constitutions is the attempt to have South Africa recognised as a democratic and sovereign state in the "family of nations." The new Constitutions make extensive reference to the state's international obligations and represent an endeavour to [re]define the status of international law vis-a-vis national law. Some provisions utilise international law in the interpretation and formulation of national jurisprudence and represent an [albeit not totally successful] endeavour to attain greater harmonisation between international and national law. This is an attempt to systematize the various criticisms levelled against these provisions to date, and to highlight certain interpretational difficulties and problems that present themselves in the process. The distinction between the various terminologies and branches of international law is also taken to task. Lastly, this paper attempts to determine the extent to which international law is applied at national level under the post-1994 constitutions. / Jurisprudence / LL. M.

At the United Nations Conference on International Organization in April 1945 South Africa affirmed the principle of respect for human rights in a Preamble it proposed for inclusion in the Charter of the United Nations. The proposal was approved and the Preamble was accorded binding force. While South Africa participated in the earliest attempts of the United Nations to draft a bill of rights, it abstained on the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights because its municipal legislation was incompatible with some articles. Similarly, South Africa did not become a party to the international human rights instruments the declaration inspired, and avoided an active role in their elaboration. Subsidiary organs of the General Assembly undertook several studies on discrimination in the field of human rights. They provided evidence that racial discrimination in South Africa intensified after the National Party came to power in May 1948 on the platform of apartheid and diverged from global trends in humanitarian law. The gap between the Union and the United Nations widened. At the first General Assembly in 1946, India successfully asked that the treatment of persons of Indian origin in South Africa be inscribed on the agenda. The Indian question was later subsumed in the charge that South Africa's racial policies violated the Charter and in 1952 the General Assembly began to discuss apartheid. South Africa protested that these actions contravened Charter Article 2(7), which prohibited intervention in matters of domestic jurisdiction, and were ultra vires. Criticism of the Union increased in intensity, until in 1960 it culminated in calls for economic and diplomatic sanctions. Research shows that South Africa was the main architect of its growing isolation, since it refused to modify domestic policies that alienated even its potential allies. Moreover, it maintained a low profile in United Nations debates on human rights issues, abstaining on all substantive clauses in the two draft covenants on human rights. These actions were interpreted as lack of interest in global humanitarian affairs. South Africa had little influence on the development of customary international law in the field of human rights but was a catalyst in the evolution of international machinery to protect them. / Jurisprudence / (LL.D)

On October 1, 1990 the Rwandan Patriotic Front launched a war from and with the support of the Republic of Uganda against Rwanda. This war was accompanied by unspeakable violations of International Humanitarian Law. Both conflicting parties violated the basic rules protecting the civilian population in situations of armed conflicts. The United Nations Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of its Charter, passed resolution 955 of November 8, 1994 establishing the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda to prosecute alleged responsible of such violations. This study investigates the background of the ICTR and questions the nature of the conflict that prompted the Security Council to establish another ad hoc international criminal tribunal after the one established for the former Yugoslavia. It further inquires into its jurisprudence and reflects critically on the ICTR's approach to serious violations of IHL under Article 3 Common to the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol II. / Jurisprudence / LL. M. (Law)

Petróleo Brasileiro S.A. / O trabalho expõe a consolidação do direito à verdade pelo Direito Internacional e a complementaridade entre as comissões da verdade e os tribunais, mecanismos de justiça de transição, como a combinação que melhor lhe confere aplicabilidade. Primeiramente, a tese reivindica que a transição e a consolidação democrática devem se dar por meio da prestação de contas com o passado, o que se torna possível na medida em que se promoveram a partir da 2a Guerra Mundial significativas alterações no Direito Internacional, que se afasta do paradigma vesfaliano de soberania. Aborda-se assim o excepcional desenvolvimento do Direito Internacional dos Direitos Humanos, do Direito Internacional Humanitário e do Direito Penal Internacional, centralizados na ideia de responsabilidade. A tese também abrange o desenvolvimento do direito à verdade no seio da Organização das Nações Unidas e dos sistemas regionais de proteção de direitos humanos, tendo alcançado o status de norma imperativa ou peremptória, sendo explorados os obstáculos ao seu exercício como no caso de anistias e outras medidas similiares como a prescrição, a justiça militar e a coisa julgada. Enfrentam-se, ainda, as potencialidades e limites da verdade que resulta de comissões da verdade e dos tribunais, concebida esta como conhecimento sobre os fatos e o reconhecimento da responsabilidade pelo ocorrido. O trabalho aborda temas como a independência e imparcialidade das comissões de verdade, seus poderes e o alcance de suas conclusões e recomendações. Por sua vez, com vistas a identificar as verdades a serem alcançadas pelos tribunais, privilegia-se o processo criminal, por se entender que a sentença penal pressupõe o exercício mais completo do devido processo. A imperatividade do direito à verdade é também demonstrada pela defesa da participação da vítima no processo criminal e da admissão de culpa por parte do acusado -- ambos consagrados pelo Tratado de Roma. Por fim, a tese analisa alguns cenários para a complementaridade entre estes dois mecanismos de justiça de transição, fazendo o estudo dos casos do Chile, Peru, Serra Leoa e Quênia, casos estes permeados pelo Direito Internacional, seja pela influência da jurisdição universal ou pelo impacto da jurisdição internacional. O caso brasileiro, por certo, não se ajusta a nenhum destes cenários. Sua caracterização como um diálogo em aberto, para efeitos deste trabalho, pressupõe que o Brasil encontra-se em um importante momento de decisão sobre a complementaridade entre comissões da verdade e tribunais - a recente aprovação da Comissão Nacional da Verdade deve conviver com o aparente conflito entre a decisão do Supremo Tribunal Federal, que afirmou a constitucionalidade da Lei de Anistia de 1979, e a decisão da Corte Interamericana no caso Araguaia, que entende nulos os dispositivos da lei que obstaculizam o processamento dos responsáveis, ambas no ano de 2010 - com a oportunidade de demonstrar que a passagem do tempo não arrefece as obrigações a que se comprometeu no cenário internacional. / The dissertation exposes the consolidation of the right to truth by international law and the complementarity of truth commissions and tribunals, both transitional justice mechanisms, as the combination that better confers its aplicability. First, the work claims that transition to and consolidation of democracy should provide accountability for past abuses, what became possible by the changes that have impacted international law after the World War II. The exceptional development of international human rights law, international humanitarian law and international criminal law is explored, considered the idea of responsability. The dissertation takes care of the development of the right to truth within the United Nations Organization and the human rights regional systems, and its status of imperative or peremptory norm, as well the obstacles for its exercise in the case of amnesties and other similar measures as statute of limitation, military justice and doble jeopardy (res judicata). The truth that results from truth commissions and tribunais its potentialities and limits are here conceived as knowledge e acknowledgment of what occured. The work also considers aspects as the independence and impartiality of truth commissions, its powers and the reach of its conclusions and recommendations. On the other hand, considering the truth to be obtained by tribunals, the dissertation priviledges the analysis of criminal procedure, in the sense that a criminal veridict implies due process. The imperativity of the right to truth is also demonstrated by the participation of victims in the criminal procedure and the admission of guilty by the accused both celebrated by the Statute of Rome. The dissertation also covers some sceneries of complementarity between truth commissions and tribunals, making use of the case of Chile, Peru, Sierra Leone and Kenya, cases that suffered significant impact by international law, considered the influence of universal jurisdiction or the impact of international jurisdiction. The Brazilian case, at the end, does not fit precisely in any of these sceneries. Its caracterization as an open dialogue assumes that the country has come face to face with the debate of complementarity the recent approval of the National Truth Commission has to live together with the apparent conflict between two decisions held in 2010: the Supreme Court on the constitutionality of the 1979 Amnesty Law and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights on the Araguaia Case that considered null and void the parts of the law that obstacle the criminal persecution of the ones responsible -, and has opportunity to demonstrate that time has not moderated the obligations to which Brasil has compromised with in the international arena.

Petróleo Brasileiro S.A. / O trabalho expõe a consolidação do direito à verdade pelo Direito Internacional e a complementaridade entre as comissões da verdade e os tribunais, mecanismos de justiça de transição, como a combinação que melhor lhe confere aplicabilidade. Primeiramente, a tese reivindica que a transição e a consolidação democrática devem se dar por meio da prestação de contas com o passado, o que se torna possível na medida em que se promoveram a partir da 2a Guerra Mundial significativas alterações no Direito Internacional, que se afasta do paradigma vesfaliano de soberania. Aborda-se assim o excepcional desenvolvimento do Direito Internacional dos Direitos Humanos, do Direito Internacional Humanitário e do Direito Penal Internacional, centralizados na ideia de responsabilidade. A tese também abrange o desenvolvimento do direito à verdade no seio da Organização das Nações Unidas e dos sistemas regionais de proteção de direitos humanos, tendo alcançado o status de norma imperativa ou peremptória, sendo explorados os obstáculos ao seu exercício como no caso de anistias e outras medidas similiares como a prescrição, a justiça militar e a coisa julgada. Enfrentam-se, ainda, as potencialidades e limites da verdade que resulta de comissões da verdade e dos tribunais, concebida esta como conhecimento sobre os fatos e o reconhecimento da responsabilidade pelo ocorrido. O trabalho aborda temas como a independência e imparcialidade das comissões de verdade, seus poderes e o alcance de suas conclusões e recomendações. Por sua vez, com vistas a identificar as verdades a serem alcançadas pelos tribunais, privilegia-se o processo criminal, por se entender que a sentença penal pressupõe o exercício mais completo do devido processo. A imperatividade do direito à verdade é também demonstrada pela defesa da participação da vítima no processo criminal e da admissão de culpa por parte do acusado -- ambos consagrados pelo Tratado de Roma. Por fim, a tese analisa alguns cenários para a complementaridade entre estes dois mecanismos de justiça de transição, fazendo o estudo dos casos do Chile, Peru, Serra Leoa e Quênia, casos estes permeados pelo Direito Internacional, seja pela influência da jurisdição universal ou pelo impacto da jurisdição internacional. O caso brasileiro, por certo, não se ajusta a nenhum destes cenários. Sua caracterização como um diálogo em aberto, para efeitos deste trabalho, pressupõe que o Brasil encontra-se em um importante momento de decisão sobre a complementaridade entre comissões da verdade e tribunais - a recente aprovação da Comissão Nacional da Verdade deve conviver com o aparente conflito entre a decisão do Supremo Tribunal Federal, que afirmou a constitucionalidade da Lei de Anistia de 1979, e a decisão da Corte Interamericana no caso Araguaia, que entende nulos os dispositivos da lei que obstaculizam o processamento dos responsáveis, ambas no ano de 2010 - com a oportunidade de demonstrar que a passagem do tempo não arrefece as obrigações a que se comprometeu no cenário internacional. / The dissertation exposes the consolidation of the right to truth by international law and the complementarity of truth commissions and tribunals, both transitional justice mechanisms, as the combination that better confers its aplicability. First, the work claims that transition to and consolidation of democracy should provide accountability for past abuses, what became possible by the changes that have impacted international law after the World War II. The exceptional development of international human rights law, international humanitarian law and international criminal law is explored, considered the idea of responsability. The dissertation takes care of the development of the right to truth within the United Nations Organization and the human rights regional systems, and its status of imperative or peremptory norm, as well the obstacles for its exercise in the case of amnesties and other similar measures as statute of limitation, military justice and doble jeopardy (res judicata). The truth that results from truth commissions and tribunais its potentialities and limits are here conceived as knowledge e acknowledgment of what occured. The work also considers aspects as the independence and impartiality of truth commissions, its powers and the reach of its conclusions and recommendations. On the other hand, considering the truth to be obtained by tribunals, the dissertation priviledges the analysis of criminal procedure, in the sense that a criminal veridict implies due process. The imperativity of the right to truth is also demonstrated by the participation of victims in the criminal procedure and the admission of guilty by the accused both celebrated by the Statute of Rome. The dissertation also covers some sceneries of complementarity between truth commissions and tribunals, making use of the case of Chile, Peru, Sierra Leone and Kenya, cases that suffered significant impact by international law, considered the influence of universal jurisdiction or the impact of international jurisdiction. The Brazilian case, at the end, does not fit precisely in any of these sceneries. Its caracterization as an open dialogue assumes that the country has come face to face with the debate of complementarity the recent approval of the National Truth Commission has to live together with the apparent conflict between two decisions held in 2010: the Supreme Court on the constitutionality of the 1979 Amnesty Law and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights on the Araguaia Case that considered null and void the parts of the law that obstacle the criminal persecution of the ones responsible -, and has opportunity to demonstrate that time has not moderated the obligations to which Brasil has compromised with in the international arena.

L’échec de l’impérativité du droit international pénal et la fragilité de la justice pénale internationale qui en résulte ne dépendent pas du choix normatif d’un modèle de juridiction, ad hoc ou conventionnel, mais simplement des défaillances et des réticences des États à l’égard de la norme choisie. Ce constat d’évidence trouve sa confirmation dans le processus de mise en place et de fonctionnement de la Cour pénale internationale, fâcheusement contournée à faire prévaloir sur la lutte contre l’impunité une lutte pour la « justiciabilité » des auteurs des crimes les plus graves qui heurtent la conscience de l’Humanité : crimes contre l’humanité, crime de génocide, crimes de guerre, crime d’agression. L’obstacle qu’elle doit essentiellement surmonter est en effet que sa compétence peut être délibérément mise en échec à tout moment, directement ou indirectement, par tout État avant tout soucieux de sa propre souveraineté, qu’il soit ou non partie au Statut de Rome. L’observation des stratégies étatiques montre d’une part que la faculté de renoncer à l’exercice de sa propre compétence répressive se traduit par une négation de l’impérativité des engagements souscrits auparavant, certains Etats se désolidarisent de la répression dont ils se sont désistés. D’autre part, et à l’inverse, l’exercice légitime de sa compétence répressive par un Etat peut très facilement lui permettre de glisser vers une obstruction chronique de la juridiction internationale, voire ou déni du droit impératif qui la régit. En l’absence d’une réelle reconnaissance de la juridiction internationale, les conséquences de telles attitudes sont d’une ampleur qui dépasse l’imagination. Seul un comportement coopératif et constructif, affranchi des compromis égoïstes et opportunistes des États, pourrait parer au risque actuel d’une érosion progressive de l’architecture punitive partagée mise en place par les États eux-mêmes lors de la création de la Cour pénale internationale et ainsi de garantir que soient punis à coup sûr les auteurs de crimes insupportables. / The failure to make international criminal law imperative and the resulting fragility of international criminal justice should not be understood as the consequence of a normative choice toward a jurisdictional model, be it ad hoc or conventional. Rather, it derives from the State's weaknesses and reluctance to abide by the chosen norm. This is clearly confirmed by the very way the International Criminal Court was implemented, functions and is being sadly circumvented. Instead of bolstering the fight against impunity, it focuses on the fight for the “justiciability” of the perpetrators of the most serious crimes, resulting in subsequent negative effects on Humanity’s consciousness: crimes against humanity, crime of genocide, war crimes and crime of aggression. Owing to the fact that a State's primary concern is its own sovereignty, the biggest obstacle the Court has to overcome remains that at any moment, directly or indirectly, its competence can be intentionally overruled by any State, signatory or not of the Treaty of Rome. Observing State strategies shows that relinquishing one’s repressive authority is generally seen through a negation of formerly made commitments: some States dissociate from the repression monopoly they disclaim. Conversely, the legitimate exercise of a State’s repressive authority can easily result in regular obstruction of international jurisdiction, and even the refusal of the imperative law that governs it. Without any genuine recognition of international jurisdiction, such attitudes have undeniable serious consequences that far outreach the imagination. The only solution is cooperative and constructive behavior, free of opportunistic and selfish compromises of States. This behavior could protect against the current risk of the progressive erosion regarding shared punitive organization which States themselves implemented through the creation of the International Criminal Court. The result would guarantee the punishment of perpetrators of unbearable crimes.

The thesis analyses the legality of the use of drones in warfare based on the examination of three specific case studies. Firstly the use of armed drones in Afghanistan 2001 and 2002, then Pakistan drone strikes ongoing since 2004 and lastly the Yemen case study. A developed legal framework is used to assess the legality of the use of drones. Furthermore, it briefly touches upon the aspects of morality and ethics of the use of the unmanned aerial vehicles in combat.

The development of joint criminal enterprise at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has been controversial since the doctrine was first created in 1997. For the judgments rendered by the ICTY to be perceived as legitimate, the doctrines used to bring charges against defendants must also be perceived as legitimate. The purpose of my thesis is to study the application of joint criminal enterprise at the ICTY and examine how the doctrine has influenced the length of sentences given. I find that joint criminal enterprise may be influencing longer sentences and the three categories of joint criminal enterprise are being used differently on defendants of different power levels. By empirically analyzing the patterns developing at the ICTY, I can see how joint criminal enterprise is influencing sentencing and the fairness of trials.

Cette étude s’intéresse aux enjeux éthiques de l’advocacy et de la défense des droits comme composante de l’humanitaire d’urgence. Les violences sexuelles sont devenues des instruments de guerre, utilisées à des fins politiques et militaires. Les plaidoyers qui sont habituellement une fonction des organisations humanitaires des droits de l’homme intègrent les interventions humanitaires d’urgence. Le recours à l’advocacy dans le milieu humanitaire expose les missions humanitaires à des tensions et dilemmes éthiques notamment en ce qui concerne l’accès aux victimes et la défense de leurs droits, le principe d’humanité et le principe de neutralité. L’advocacy représente également un danger pour l’image apolitique des organisations humanitaires et ébranle la confiance des États belligérants aux conflits. Face à ces dangers que présente l’advocacy, la question se pose sur les raisons qui peuvent justifier une partie advocacy dans les interventions humanitaires dans le cas des violences sexuelles utilisées à des fins politiques. A partir d’une méthode décrite comme un essai interdisciplinaire et critique de théorie du droit, notre argumentation et nos preuves sont structurées afin de justifier l’hypothèse selon laquelle le silence face au non-respect de la dignité humaine et des droits des victimes est contraire aux valeurs universelles et à l’esprit d’humanité qui sont la raison d’être des actions humanitaires, que cela renforce également l’État de non-droit et l’impunité des auteurs des crimes, mais en même temps cela accentue la stigmatisation des victimes. En effet, le silence des organismes humanitaires qui sont témoins des violations des droits fondamentaux, perpétue la culture du silence qui accompagne habituellement les actes de violence sexuelle et ne permet pas de restaurer la paix ni de prévenir que cela ne revienne dans le futur. La collecte des données pour étayer cette hypothèse s’effectue à partir d’une recherche documentaire analysée de manière critique, réflexive et interdisciplinaire. Le caractère oscillatoire de l’essai, entre les différentes disciplines, a fait ressortir que sur le plan moral, le silence complice est contraire à l’esprit de l’humanitaire. L’advocacy est une interprétation du principe d’humanité qui est l’essence de l’assistance humanitaire. La prise en charge des victimes par les organisations humanitaires ne saurait se limiter, de ce fait, à la médecine humanitaire d’urgence. En même temps, l’obligation de réserve et de confidentialité est également contraire au principe de « first do not harm ». Soigner et soutenir les victimes nécessite que l’action humanitaire soit étendue aux protections de la vie humaine dans un sens holistique et aussi aux défenses des droits des victimes. Sur le plan juridique, l’analyse des paradigmes concernant l’humanitaire démontre que les mécanismes juridiques mis en place pour protéger les personnes, en temps de conflit, sont en grande partie tributaires des organisations humanitaires et de leurs rôles en tant que « gardiens » du droit international. Le plaidoyer et la défense des droits sont devenus des obligations légales implicites des organisations humanitaires pour prévenir la résurgence des violations des règles de droit dans le futur mais également dans le but de réprimer les auteurs des crimes. / This study looks at the ethical issues of advocacy and rights-based approaches to emergency humanitarian work. Sexual violence has become an instrument of war, used for political and military purposes. Advocacy, which is usually a function of humanitarian human rights organizations, is becoming part of emergency humanitarian response. The use of advocacy in humanitarian settings exposes humanitarian missions to ethical tensions and dilemmas, particularly with regard to access to victims and the defense of their rights, the principle of humanity and the principle of neutrality. Advocacy also represents a danger to the apolitical image of humanitarian organizations and therefore undermines the confidence of belligerent states in conflicts. In view of these dangers of advocacy, the question arises as to what reasons might justify advocacy in humanitarian interventions in the case of politically motivated sexual violence. From a method described as an interdisciplinary and critical essay of legal theory, our argument and evidence will be structured to justify the hypothesis that silence in the face of non-respect for human dignity and the rights of victims is contrary to the universal values and spirit of humanity that are the raison d'être of humanitarian actions, that it also reinforces the state of lawlessness and impunity of perpetrators, but at the same time it accentuates the stigmatization of victims. In fact, the silence of humanitarian organizations that witness violations of fundamental rights perpetuates the culture of silence that usually accompanies acts of sexual violence and does not help to restore peace or prevent it from happening again in the future. The collection of data to support this hypothesis is based on a documentary research that is critically analyzed, reflexive and interdisciplinary. The oscillating nature of the essay, across disciplines, made it clear that morally, complicit silence is contrary to the spirit of humanitarianism. Advocacy is an interpretation of the principle of humanity that is the essence of humanitarian assistance. The care of victims by humanitarian organizations cannot therefore be limited to emergency humanitarian medicine. At the same time, the obligation of reserve and confidentiality is also contrary to the "first do not harm" principle. Caring for and supporting victims requires that humanitarian action be extended to the protection of human life in a holistic sense and also to the defense of victims' rights. From a legal perspective, the analysis of humanitarian paradigms demonstrates that the legal mechanisms put in place to protect people in times of conflict are largely dependent on humanitarian organizations and their roles as "gatekeepers" of international law. Advocacy has become a legal obligation of humanitarian organizations as a preventive measure against future violations of the rule of law, but also as a repressive measure against perpetrators.

Depuis la fin du vingtième siècle, l’attention de la communauté internationale s’est portée sur l’utilisation de l’enfant soldat dans les conflits armés. La prolifération d’armes légères, la pauvreté et la multiplication des conflits armés non internationaux sont autant de facteurs à l’origine du phénomène. De nombreux instruments de protection des droits de l’enfant prévoient l’interdiction du recrutement et de l’utilisation d’enfants soldats dans les hostilités. Malgré les lacunes normatives qui s’en dégagent, notamment à propos de l’âge de recrutement de l’enfant soldat, d’importants efforts ont été fournis par la communauté internationale. Ces efforts vont être complétés grâce à la Cour pénale internationale, en particulier avec l’affaire Thomas Lubanga, première personne à être poursuivie devant la Cour, et sur le seul chef d’accusation de crime de guerre consistant à procéder à l’enrôlement ou la conscription d’enfants de moins de quinze ans, et à utiliser ces derniers en vue de les faire participer activement à des hostilités. Ce premier verdict historique institue une jurisprudence inédite et fondatrice en matière de crimes de guerre pour enrôlement et utilisation d’enfants soldats, dont l’héritage pourra faciliter d’autres poursuites sur le plan national. Si l’enfant soldat apparaît comme une victime, il est aussi acteur aux hostilités. Bien souvent, lorsque l’on parle du phénomène d’enfants soldats, un amalgame est opéré entre deux antonymes : victime et bourreau. Comment le droit international appréhende-t-il la responsabilité pénale de l’enfant soldat ? Assiste-t-on à la généralisation d’un statut ou à un « dénominateur commun » ? / Since the end of the 20th century, the eyes of the international community have been focused on the utilization of child soldier in armed conflicts. The proliferation of small arms and light weapons, of poverty, and especially of non international armed conflicts, are crucial factors underlying the phenomenon. Numerous rights of the child protection instruments plan the ban on recruiting and using children as soldiers in hostilities. Despite the normative gaps that emerge, regarding in particular the hiring age of the child soldier, important efforts have been provided by the whole international community. These efforts are going to be completed by the International Criminal Court, in particular with the Thomas Lubanga case, first person brought before the Court, under the unique charge of war crime, namely enlisting or conscripting children under the age of fifteen years, and using them to participate actively in hostilities. This first historical verdict sets up a novel and founding case law regarding war crimes of enlistment and use of child soldiers, which legacy may make other proceedings easier on a national level. If the child soldier appears as a victim, he is also a player in hostilities. When dealing with the child soldier phenomenon, a confusion is quite often made between two antonyms : victim and executioner. How does the international law treat the criminal liability of the child soldier ? Are we witnessing the generalization of a status or, at least, a common denominator ?