O tema principal do Fédon de Platão é a imortalidade da alma. Meu objetivo nesta tese é apresentar um estudo dos argumentos sobre a imortalidade da alma no Fédon e uma tradução parcial do diálogo. / The main topic of the Platos Phaedo is the immortality of the soul. My aim in this thesis is to present a study of the arguments for immortality of the soul in the Phaedo and a partial translation of the dialogue.

The improvvisatore tradition in Florence Italy during the second half of the quattrocento featured poet-musicians who sang poetry for music (poesia per musica) accompanied by the lira (da braccio). This thesis researches Florentine literati and threads of humanism in relation to poetry written for music. By doing so, philosophical and literary trends are analyzed in relation to the Florentine improvvisatore style: frottola versification forms and divinus furor. Marsilio Ficino’s (1433-1499) direction at the Platonic Academy (founded c. 1463) outside Florence in the hills of Carregi influenced some of the greatest artists and musicians of his time. This thesis focuses on lyric improvisation as a means of connecting mind and body with the universe. In doing so, Ficino’s music-spirit-theory and astrological program are looked at in light of the Platonic sources. The instrument of the improvvisatore, the lira, will be analyzed in relation to affect (ethos) and wellness for mind (soul) and body

[pt] A escatologia de Joseph Ratzinger é o tema principal dessa dissertação. Busca-se através da análise dos escritos escatológicos do autor apresentar parte de suas contribuições aos recorrentes debates sobre a escatologia do século XX. Para isso, foi necessário estudar e apresentar uma panorâmica histórica da escatologia e de seus característicos desdobramentos ao longo dos séculos. Posteriormente se analisou os escritos e as homilias de Ratzinger que se relacionavam diretamente com a doutrina das últimas coisas com destaque para as suas formulações teológicas mais importantes a partir dos tais. Nessas análises, buscou-se focar nos posicionamentos adotados por Ratzinger à medida que suas investigações se intensificavam. Dedicou-se, também ao exame da relação de Ratzinger e o desenvolvimento histórico da matéria com espaço para observação da evolução do seu pensamento. Foram apresentados aspectos distintivos e as contribuições do autor ao debate sobre escatologia. / [en] Joseph Ratzinger s eschatology is the main theme of this dissertation. It seeks through the analysis of the author s eschatological writings to present part of his contributions to the recurring debates on eschatology in the 20th century. To do this, it was necessary to study and present a historical overview of eschatology and its characteristic developments over the centuries. Subsequently, the writings and homilies of Ratzinger that were directly related to the doctrine of the last things were analyzed, with emphasis on his most important theological formulations from these. In these analyses, the focus was on the positions adopted by Ratzinger as his investigations intensified. It was also dedicated to examining the relationship between Ratzinger and the historical development of the subject, with space for observing the evolution of his thought. The author s distinctive aspects and contributions to the debate on eschatology were presented.

This dissertation aims at presenting and discussing the proofs for immortality of the soul in Book I of the Tusculan Disputations by Cicero, a philosophical work written in the form of a dialogue in which why man must not fear death is discussed. Before directly approaching the theme, in the proem to Book I, Cicero presents his conception about philosophy and about the requirement of producing philosophy in Latin. Concerning its subject, the dialogue of Book 1 can be divided into two great parts: the first one consisting of an argumentation favourable to the immortality of the soul, that proves death is something good (18-71), and the second one, consisting of a reservation that death is not only something good, but it cannot be something bad (82-119). In accordance to the main goal of this work and based on several different translations which allowed us to do the work with a philological stance where necessary, and which guided a great part of our investigation through notes and valued suggestions of a secondary bibliography we analysed the first part of Book 1, showing that the argumentation in favour of the immortality of the soul, is according to Cicero, absolute and praiseworthy to the best philosophers. We also noticed that the immortality of the soul had been denied as an axiom of ancient philosophy by Hellenistic thought, such as Stoicism and Epicureanism. Cicero refuses the Stoic views about duration of the souls and despises the Epicurean concept on the proof of the mortality of the soul. There are four proofs of immortality of the soul in Book 1, in which we can find the following discussions: the argument consensus omnium gentium, the soul as warm air, the soul as the principle of movement and the soul as the fifth nature (quinta natura). For this work the last discussions are the most important ones: the discussion of the soul as a principle of movement, from Phaidro by Plato and the discussion of the soul as the fifth nature from the lost dialogues of Aristotle, by means of which, Cicero demonstrates that the soul is eternal and divine, thus, establishing a difference between the nature of the soul and the nature of the body. As it may be seen in the conclusion of this work, the immortality of the soul is restricted to the mind, a part of the soul, provided with reason. Remaining after death of the material body, the soul owns perception and intelligence, as it presents the same nature of god, thus pertaining to the celestial realms. / Esta dissertação tem como objetivo principal apresentar e discutir as provas da imortalidade da alma no Livro I das Discussões Tusculanas, de Cícero, uma obra filosófica escrita em forma de diálogo em que se discute, dentre outras coisas, por que o homem não deve temer a morte. Antes de abordar o tema de forma direta, Cícero apresenta no proêmio ao Livro I sua concepção acerca da filosofia e da necessidade de produzir filosofia em latim. Quanto a seu tema, o diálogo do Livro I pode ser dividido em dois grandes momentos: o primeiro consiste numa argumentação favorável à imortalidade da alma, que prova que a morte é um bem (parágrafos 18 a 71); e o segundo consiste na ressalva de que a morte não apenas é um bem, mas sequer pode ser um mal (parágrafos 82 a 119). Alinhados ao objetivo principal deste trabalho e munidos de diferentes traduções que nos permitiram o trabalho de cunho filológico, quando necessário, e nortearam, pelas notas e indicações de bibliografia secundária, grande parte de nossa pesquisa, analisamos a primeira parte do Livro I, mostrando que, para Cícero, a argumentação em favor da imortalidade da alma é primorosa e digna de filósofos superiores (Platão e Aristóteles). Constatamos, também, que a imortalidade da alma, como uma doutrina da filosofia antiga, havia sido negada pelas correntes helenistas, o estoicismo e o epicurismo. Cícero rejeita o ponto de vista do estoicismo sobre a duração das almas e despreza a prova da mortalidade de Epicuro. Quatro são as provas da imortalidade da alma encontradas no Livro I. Delas constam os seguintes argumentos: consensus omnium gentium, a alma como ar aquecido, a alma como princípio de movimento e a alma como quinta natureza. Para este trabalho, os dois últimos são de maior importância: o argumento da alma como princípio de movimento, extraído do diálogo Fedro, de Platão; e o argumento da alma como quinta natureza, noção retirada dos diálogos perdidos de Aristóteles, já que, com eles, Cícero demonstra que a alma é eterna e divina, estabelecendo uma diferença entre a natureza da alma e a natureza do corpo. Como poderá ser visto na conclusão, a imortalidade da alma restringe-se à mente, parte da alma provida de razão. Permanecendo após a morte do corpo, a alma possui percepção e é dotada de inteligência, tem a mesma natureza de deus e, assim, pertence à região celeste. / Mestre em Filosofia

Ce mémoire a pour but de définir le rôle de l’expérience sensible à l’intérieur de la théorie de la connaissance des dialogues de maturité de Platon, à savoir le Phédon, le Phèdre, le Banquet et la République. Pour atteindre ce but, nous nous questionnons d’abord sur la notion de réminiscence, principalement par l’étude de l’extrait 72-77 du Phédon et des différentes interprétations qu’il est possible d’en donner. Ensuite, nous montrons que les quatre dialogues partagent une structure épistémologique commune, pour finalement nous concentrer sur les différentes fonctions attribuées à l’expérience sensible. L’objectif poursuivi par cette étude est de démontrer qu’en dépit de l’attitude critique de Platon à l’égard des sens et de l’imperfection du monde sensible, il n’en demeure pas moins que la perception joue un rôle épistémologique et pédagogique important : elle fait partie intégrante du processus qui mène à la formation de concepts chez tout un chacun, elle incite le philosophe en devenir à se retourner vers le monde intelligible, et elle permet au philosophe accompli de se remémorer, à chaque instant, les arguments en faveur de l’immortalité de l’âme et de la nécessité de la philosophie. / The purpose of this dissertation is to define the role of sense-experience within the theory of knowledge applied to Plato’s middle dialogues, namely the Phaedo, the Phaedrus, the Symposium and the Republic. To achieve this, we will initially examine the notion of recollection through the study of Phaedo 72-77 and its different interpretations. Then we will establish that the four dialogues share a common epistemology, to finally look at the different functions of sense-experience. The objective of this study is to demonstrate that despite Plato’s critical views regarding the senses and the imperfection of the sensible world, sense-perception nevertheless plays an important epistemological and pedagogical role : it is part of the process that leads to concept formation, it directs the philosopher-to-be towards the intelligible world and it allows the experienced philosopher to remember the arguments in favour of the immortality of the soul and the necessity of philosophy.

Ce mémoire a pour but de définir le rôle de l’expérience sensible à l’intérieur de la théorie de la connaissance des dialogues de maturité de Platon, à savoir le Phédon, le Phèdre, le Banquet et la République. Pour atteindre ce but, nous nous questionnons d’abord sur la notion de réminiscence, principalement par l’étude de l’extrait 72-77 du Phédon et des différentes interprétations qu’il est possible d’en donner. Ensuite, nous montrons que les quatre dialogues partagent une structure épistémologique commune, pour finalement nous concentrer sur les différentes fonctions attribuées à l’expérience sensible. L’objectif poursuivi par cette étude est de démontrer qu’en dépit de l’attitude critique de Platon à l’égard des sens et de l’imperfection du monde sensible, il n’en demeure pas moins que la perception joue un rôle épistémologique et pédagogique important : elle fait partie intégrante du processus qui mène à la formation de concepts chez tout un chacun, elle incite le philosophe en devenir à se retourner vers le monde intelligible, et elle permet au philosophe accompli de se remémorer, à chaque instant, les arguments en faveur de l’immortalité de l’âme et de la nécessité de la philosophie. / The purpose of this dissertation is to define the role of sense-experience within the theory of knowledge applied to Plato’s middle dialogues, namely the Phaedo, the Phaedrus, the Symposium and the Republic. To achieve this, we will initially examine the notion of recollection through the study of Phaedo 72-77 and its different interpretations. Then we will establish that the four dialogues share a common epistemology, to finally look at the different functions of sense-experience. The objective of this study is to demonstrate that despite Plato’s critical views regarding the senses and the imperfection of the sensible world, sense-perception nevertheless plays an important epistemological and pedagogical role : it is part of the process that leads to concept formation, it directs the philosopher-to-be towards the intelligible world and it allows the experienced philosopher to remember the arguments in favour of the immortality of the soul and the necessity of philosophy.

Submitted by Renata Lopes (renatasil82@gmail.com) on 2016-09-29T13:41:58Z No. of bitstreams: 1 monalisamarialauro.pdf: 510424 bytes, checksum: 31284a9c9c1e1159695542b7f038ffe8 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Diamantino Mayra (mayra.diamantino@ufjf.edu.br) on 2016-09-30T13:52:54Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 monalisamarialauro.pdf: 510424 bytes, checksum: 31284a9c9c1e1159695542b7f038ffe8 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-09-30T13:52:54Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 monalisamarialauro.pdf: 510424 bytes, checksum: 31284a9c9c1e1159695542b7f038ffe8 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010-08-18 / FAPEMIG - Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de Minas Gerais / Na presente dissertação, analisa-se o modo peculiar com que Kant apreende o problema da imortalidade da alma em sua filosofia crítica. Neste intuito, prioriza-se um confronto com as provas racional-teóricas presentes no célebre Fédon mendelssohniano, visto que este é uma notável referência na defesa da imortalidade da alma na Aufklärung. Este confronto permite constatar que o argumento da simplicidade da alma de Mendelssohn constitui-se em um paralogismo transcendental, e que sua defesa da incorruptibilidade da alma não se sustenta quando se respeita a condição crítica de uso esquematizado dos conceitos puros do entendimento. Finalmente, a advertência kantiana contra o uso especulativo da razão para além dos limites da experiência possível revela-se como parte de seu empreendimento de fundamentação de uma moralidade autônoma e plenamente ativa na vida humana. Na perspectiva aberta pela lei moral, a permanência da alma resolve-se como um necessário e sólido postulado da razão prática pura. / This thesis analyzes the particular way in which Kant conceives the issue of the soul’s immortality in his critical philosophy. In order to do that, the focus is set on a confrontation with the rational-theoretical proofs present in Mendelssohn’s Phaedon, since this work is a remarkable reference in the defense of the soul’s immortality during the German Aufklärung. This confrontation allows us to verify that Mendelssohn’s argument of the simplicity of the soul constitutes a transcendental paralogism, and his defense of the incorruptibility of the soul fails when measured by the critical condition of a schematized use of the pure concepts of the understanding. Finally, Kant’s caution against the speculative use of reason beyond the limits of possible experience appears as a part of his undertaking of philosophically grounding a morality which is both autonomous and completely active in human life. Following the perspective opened by the moral law, the duration of the soul is explained as a necessary and firm postulate of pure practical reason.