Submitted by Renata Lopes (renatasil82@gmail.com) on 2016-06-24T20:40:04Z No. of bitstreams: 1 tarcisiolagelouzada.pdf: 708022 bytes, checksum: fbbd3b353cf77039d3e9c018a44ca513 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Adriana Oliveira (adriana.oliveira@ufjf.edu.br) on 2016-06-28T13:05:02Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 tarcisiolagelouzada.pdf: 708022 bytes, checksum: fbbd3b353cf77039d3e9c018a44ca513 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-06-28T13:05:02Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 tarcisiolagelouzada.pdf: 708022 bytes, checksum: fbbd3b353cf77039d3e9c018a44ca513 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012-03-29 / FAPEMIG - Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de Minas Gerais / O presente trabalho investiga como Merleau-Ponty vê a relação entre Deus e ontologia, tomando como ponto de partida as interpretações feitas por este autor sobre a ontologia moderna e como, a partir da retomada desta tradição, ele se posiciona em relação ao problema de Deus no desenvolvimento de sua compreensão do ser, principalmente na segunda metade de sua obra. Segundo Merleau-Ponty, os filósofos da modernidade, sobretudo aqueles que fazem parte do que ele denomina o “grande racionalismo”, estavam comprometidos com algumas teses da teologia judaico-cristã, o que influenciou profundamente o modo como estes pensadores compreenderam o ser, muitas vezes confundindo-o com Deus. As categorias conceituais decorrentes desta ontologia revelam uma concepção dualista do real, que, de acordo com o filósofo francês, são insuficientes para descrever os fenômenos tal como eles se manifestam. Por isso, Merleau-Ponty insiste na necessidade de superar a ontologia tradicional, e para tanto ele aponta um retorno à ontologia, tendo por objetivo desenvolver uma nova concepção de ser, sem comprometimento com a teologia, e a criação de novas categorias conceituais. Ao avaliar, por fim, a concepção de ser desenvolvida por Merleau-Ponty, entendemos que em muitos aspectos ela se distancia da noção de ser da modernidade, mas, no entanto, o “Ser bruto” descrito por ele irá cumprir alguns dos principais papéis do Deus da ontologia moderna. / The present study investigates how Merleau-Ponty sees the relation between God and ontology from the interpretation done by this author about the modern ontology and how, from the retaking of this tradition, he places himself according to God´s problem in the development of his understanding of the Being, specially in the second moment of his work. According to Merleau-Ponty, the modern philosophers, specially those who take part of something he calls “ the great rationalism”, were involved with some thesis of the Judaeo-Christian theology, that deeply influenced the way these philosophers understood the being, many times, confusing it with God. The conceptual categories resulting from this ontology bring out a dualist conception of the real, that, according to the French philosopher is insufficient to describe the phenomena as they manifest themselves. Therefore, Merleau-Ponty insists about the necessity to overcome the traditional ontology. Because of this he suggests a return to ontology, to develop a new conception of being, without any commitment with theology even with the creation of new conceptual categories. Analysing, in this way, the conception of Being developed by Merleau-Ponty, we can understand that, in may aspects, it is far away from the modern idea of being, however, the primordial Being he describes, will retake some of the main parts of the modern ontology´s God.

Orientador: Paulo Celso Miceli / Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campionas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-21T20:01:35Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Martins_AdiltonLuis_D.pdf: 5243947 bytes, checksum: b6e1c40da217620640b1599cb78896e3 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012 / Resumo: O resumo poderá ser visualizado no texto completo da tese digital / Abstract: The abstract is available with the full electronic document / Doutorado / Historia Cultural / Doutor em História

Orientador: José Oscar de Almeida Marques / Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-20T23:24:04Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Silva_LailaT.Correae_M.pdf: 649829 bytes, checksum: bf737501bf46eebb811b3721472034fe (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012 / Resumo: David Hume, no Tratado da Natureza Humana, livro 1, parte 4, seção 2, "Do ceticismo quanto aos sentidos", pretende explicar a causa de nossa crença na existência do mundo exterior, isto é, a crença em existências contínuas e distintas da mente e da percepção. Ele inicia a seção com a seguinte afirmação: devemos dar nosso assentimento ao princípio referente à existência dos corpos, embora não possamos ter a pretensão de sustentar a sua veracidade por meio de argumentos filosóficos (T 1.4.2.1). Mas, ao final da seção, sua postura diante da crença na existência do mundo exterior muda totalmente, como Hume mesmo diz, em T 1.4.2.56, penúltimo parágrafo: "iniciei este tema com a premissa de que deveria ter uma fé implícita em nossos sentidos, e que essa é a conclusão que extrairia da totalidade de meu raciocínio", contudo, argumenta ele, "sinto-me neste momento possuído pelo sentimento contrário", ou seja, Hume não deposita mais nenhuma confiança nos sentidos, ou antes, imaginação. Por que Hume chega a tal conclusão? Hume argumenta que essas existências contínuas e distintas são ficções da imaginação e, como tais, não merecem nosso assentimento e confiança. Essa situação embaraçosa conduz Hume a um ceticismo radical que, segundo o próprio filósofo, somente pode ser curado por meio do "descuido e desatenção". Mas, como poderíamos interpretar essa declaração de Hume? Minha proposta de interpretação defende que através do conceito humeano de ceticismo mitigado presente no Tratado, livro 1, parte 4, seção 7, "Conclusão deste livro", e na Investigação sobre o Entendimento Humano, seção 12, "Da filosofia acadêmica ou cética", somos capazes de compreendê-la. Nas duas obras mencionadas Hume apresenta o modo de investigação filosófica que é, para ele, o mais adequado, a saber: o método cético. Contudo, o ceticismo de Hume não é o ceticismo radical que impede toda a ação, mas sim um ceticismo mais mitigado que combina consigo uma parcela da "mistura bruta e terrena" (T 1.4.7.14), constituinte da vida comum e afazeres cotidianos / Abstract: David Hume, in the Treatise of Human Nature, book 1, part 4, section 2, "Of scepticism with regard to the senses", wants to explain the cause of our belief in the existence of external world, i.e., the belief in existence continued and distinct of the mind and perception. He begins the section with the following affirmation: we might give our assentiment to the principle regarding the existence of external world, even though we cannot pretend to sustain its veracity through philosophical arguments (T 1.4.2.1). But, at the end of section, Hume's position as regards of the belief of external world changes completely, as Hume says, in T 1.4.2.56: "I begun this subject with premising, that we ought to have an implicit faith in our senses, and that this wou'd be the conclusion, I shou'd draw from the whole of my reasoning", however, he says, "I feel myself at present of quite contrary sentiment", i.e., Hume didn't deposit any more trust in the senses, or first, imagination. Why Hume concluded that? Hume says that these continued and distinct existences are fictions of imagination, and in this way, don't diserve our trust and assentiment. This complicated situation brings Hume to the radical scepticism that, according to himself, can only be cured by "carelessness and in-attention". But how can we interpret Hume's declaration? My proposal is that by means of the humean concept of mitigate scepticism present in the Treatise, book 1, part 4, section 7, and in Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, section 12, we can comprehended Hume's situation. In both books, he presented for us a way of philosophical investigation that is, for him, more adequate: the sceptical method. However, humean scepticism is not the radical one that obstructed all action, instead, more mitigated humean scepticism brings with itself one part of the "gross earthy mixture, as an ingredient" (T 1.4.7.14), that constitutes common life / Mestrado / Filosofia / Mestre em Filosofia

My dissertation focuses on the moral philosophy of Descartes, Pascal, and Spinoza in the context of the revival of Stoicism within the seventeenth century. There are many misinterpretations about early modern ethical theories due to a lack of proper awareness of Stoicism in the early modern period. My project rectifies this by highlighting understated Stoic themes in these early modern texts that offer new clarity to their morality. Although these three philosophers hold very different metaphysical commitments, each embraces a different aspect of Stoicism, letting it influence but not define his work. By addressing the Stoic themes on the morality of these three authors, I also hope to help better capture the intellectual climate of the time by bringing Stoic themes into the foreground. Stoicism is a Hellenistic philosophy that considered the passions a sickness of the intellect and the source of all human suffering; they believed the cure was virtue, which was obtained through replacing irrational passions with rational beliefs. Stoicism had a revival in the Renaissance ushering in a wave of Neostoic authors who play an important role in shaping the intellectual landscape of the following centuries. My first two chapters discuss Descartes, who wrote a “provisional morality” early in his public life, only (as I show) to ignore the subject of ethics until near his death. In my first chapter I argue that, though many present-day scholars misread Descartes’ first ethics as part of his final ethics, this earliest “provisional morality” mimics Neostoic Skeptics such as Montaigne and is provisional because his method of doubt is also provisional. In my second chapter I show that Descartes’ late, and more developed, moral theory attempts to synthesize a variety of ancient, and seemingly contradictory, ethical traditions: Stoicism, Epicureanism, and Aristotelianism. In many ways Descartes embraces Stoic morality, but as a mechanist he does not view passions as an intellectual sickness; rather they are a physiological event, an amoral instrument that can be used to help control one’s irrational desires. I further defend my thesis externally by showing that this is the reading supported by Descartes’ contemporaries including critics such as Leibniz and early Cartesians such as Antoine Le Grand and Pierre-Sylvain Régis My third chapter discusses Pascal, who embraces Stoicism differently. Pascal offers Stoicism as the first tier of a binary ethics: modeled after Augustine’s city of God and city of man, it is an alternative moral code for those who are ignorant of the good and true happiness. Finally, in my fourth chapter, I discuss two common misinterpretations of Spinoza’s ethics: one of them neglects the Stoic influence on his thought while the other embraces it too strongly, portraying him as an unadulterated Stoic. Although there are ways that he is more Stoic than Descartes and Pascal, such as in his panpsychism and monism, this does not extend to his morality. Rather than accepting either of the two readings, I highlight anti- Stoic themes that are also present. I conclude that if the discussion is contained to his morality, Spinoza is no more Stoic than the other Neostoics I discuss in previous chapters.

Orientador: Osmyr Faria Gabbi Junior / Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-07T15:48:59Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Rosim_AlexisDaniel_M.pdf: 446545 bytes, checksum: 8d940c6fa440664cbd1cc606229b1793 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2006 / Resumo: Na presente dissertação procuramos reconstituir os antecedentes teóricos da Critique des fondements de la psychologie, de Georges Politzer, a partir de sua adesão à filosofia kantiana, registrada em seu artigo ¿Introdução¿ como adesão a uma epistemologia de cunho radicalmente não realista. Por outro lado, procuramos mostrar como, partindo da estrutura epistemológica em questão, seu programa para uma psicologia concreta deveu completar-se no anonimato de um antihumanismo teórico. Em outras palavras, a crítica de Politzer à ¿psicologia clássica¿ não se limitaria a refutar pressupostos empiristas como o paralelismo psicofisiológico ou a noção de imagem mental, mas trazia consigo a negação de toda ¿filosofia da consciência¿. De fato, a Critique... sobreviveu na geração do pós-guerra ao destino de seu autor, mas ao preço desta ter ignorado o alcance de seu fundamento crítico. Entendemos que, se a Critique... não consagrava o advento de uma psicologia, finalmente, concreta, não se tratara de uma falta de alcance teórico de seu autor ou de uma conversão ideológica ao stalinismo, em detrimento de sua investigação sobre a psicologia, mas, ao contrário, de certa maneira, antecipava a crítica de Michel Foucault ao ¿sonho antropológico¿ implicado nos projetos fenomenológico e existencialista de reforma da psicologia. Neste sentido, a gravidade de seu manifesto não teria sido completamente decifrada por seus contemporâneos e pela geração que se seguiu: ¿a dissolução do mito da dupla natureza humana¿, anunciada no começo da Critique..., encontrava seu verdadeiro desfecho pela recusa a toda temática em torno do ¿homem¿ tout court, como objeto de uma metapsicologia, de uma redução fenomenológica, de uma análise existencial, etc. Cada um desses discursos tomaria para si a mesma estatua herdada do empirismo, procurando reanimar a Idéia ¿clássica¿, agora, rebaixada e recortada, por uma duplicação empírico-transcendental, à altura da nova figura do homo psichologicus / Abstract: In this dissertation one searches to reconstruct the theoretical antecedents of the Critique des fondements de la psychologie, by Georges Politzer, from its adhesion to the Kantian philosophy, registered in his article ¿Introduction¿ as adhesion to an epistemology of essence radically non-realistic. On the other hand, one searches to show how, departing from this epistemological structure, its program towards a concrete psychology should be complemented in the anonymity of a theoretical anti-humanism. In others words, Politzer's critic to ¿classical psychology¿ wouldn¿t be limited to refusing empirical presuppositions as the parallelism psycho-physiologic or the notion of mental image, but would bring in itself the denial of ¿conscience philosophy¿ in a hole. As a fact, the Critique... survived, in the post-War Generation, to the destiny of its own author, but under the price of ignoring the reach of its critical fundament. One understands that if the Critique... didn¿t materialize the rise of a psychology, finally, concrete, it didn¿t occur due to a lack of theoretical reach of its author or a ideological conversion to Stalinism, in detriment of his investigation over psychology. On the contrary, in a certain way, it anticipated Michel Foucault¿s critic to the ¿anthropological dream¿ implicated in the phenomenological and existentialist projects of reformation of psychology. In this sense, the gravity of its manifest wouldn¿t have been completely deciphered by his contemporary and the following generation: ¿the dissolution of the myth of the double human nature¿ announced at the beginning of the Critique..., found its real end in the denial of all the thematic surrounding the ¿man¿ tout court, as the object of a metapsychology, of a phenomenological reduction, of a existential analysis, etc. Each and all of these speeches would take for itself the statue inherited of empirism, looking for reliving the ¿classical¿ Idea, now lowered and cut out by a duplication empirical-transcendental, of the stature of the new character of homo psichologicus / Mestrado / Mestre em Filosofia

Dans ce présent travail, nous étudions la signification de l’abstrait et du concret dans la physique de Leibniz à l’époque de Mayence (1668–1672 mars). La question la plus profonde pour Leibniz est de savoir dans quelle condition le concept d’action est appliqué au corps. Sa recherche de la physique consiste en deux points : la recherche de la signification spécifique de la substantialité du corps ; celle de l’extension de l’usage de l’action – ce sont les sujets essentiels dans sa théologie –. Ainsi comprise, sa réflexion déployée dans la théorie abstraite montrent que les concepts principaux dans sa théorie du mouvement — la grandeur, la figure et le mouvement— sont analysés selon l’usage propre dans chaque contexte où ils apparaissent. Grâce à cette recherche, Leibniz reçoit le concept du conatus par Hobbes. Ces réflexions préparent le côté abstrait de sa physique. Au cours de ce processus, Leibniz s’intéresse également à la sensibilité de l’être humain. Ce sujet est relié à la fois à la recherche de la nature fondamentale de l’esprit humain et à la phénoménalité du monde corporel. Par cela, Leibniz ouvre la voie pour la recherche du phénomène sensible dans la physique qui constitue le côté concret de sa physique. Avec l'ensemble de ses recherches, Leibniz fonde ses deux premiers traités dans la physique qui se répartissent en une théorie abstraite et une théorie concrète. Pour les intégrer dans la physique, Leibniz emploie le concept d’oeconomia. Ceci montre que le jeune Leibniz cherche à établir une physique qui s’enracine dans sa métaphysique, mais qui est autonome en tant que science. / In this present work, we study the meaning of the abstract and the concrete in Leibniz's physics at the time of Mainz (1668–1672 March). Through his hylomorphism, Leibniz seeks to consider how to apply the concept of action to the body. In this perspective, his search for physics consists of two points: 1/ the search for the specific meaning of the substantiality of the body; 2/ the search for the extension of the use of action – these are essential subjects in his theology –. Thus understood, his reflection in the abstract theory show that the main concepts in his theory of motion - size, figure and movement - sont analysed according to the specific use in each context in which they appear. Thanks to this research, Leibniz receives the concept of the conatus by Hobbes. These reflections prepare the abstract side of his physics. During this process, Leibniz is also interested in the sensitivity of the human being. This subject is related both to the search for the fundamental nature of the human mind and to the phenomenality of the corporeal world. From there, Leibniz opened the way for the search for the sensitive phenomenon in physics, which constitutes the concrete side of his physics. With all this research, Leibniz founded his first two treatises in physics, which are divided into abstract theory and concrete theory. To integrate abstract and concrete into physics, Leibniz uses the concept of oeconomia. This shows that young Leibniz is seeking to establish physics, which is rooted in his metaphysics, but which is autonomous as a science.

This project traces shifts in understandings of causation from the premodern to the early modern period, focusing on one premodern interpretation of causation as representative of the Neoplatonic period, that of Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, and comparing this perspective to several early modern thinkers, especially, Isaac Newton, Rene Descartes, John Locke, Thomas Hobbes, and Francis Bacon. For Dionysius, formal and final causation have metaphysical superiority over efficient and material causation. By contrast, beginning in the early modern period, efficient causation, the sense that describes how an object acquires a particular shape, begins to be seen as metaphysically supreme. The main historical and philosophical reasons for this shift in perceived supremacy are the affirmation of the primary-secondary quality distinction, and the rejection of Forms and teleology. The primary-secondary quality distinction allows for reality to be completely quantified, and thereby renders superfluous qualitative approaches to reality, such as formal causation. Similarly, the rejection of Forms and teleology leaves formal causation meaningless. After this historical overview, the philosophical hypothesis that Dionysius's premodern understanding of causation is more amenable to those who want to avoid nihilism is defended: purely scientific notions of causation have no means for providing whatness, intelligibility, or determinacy to the world in a rationally defensible manner, and thus, when pressed, a purely scientific view of the world is without whatness, intelligibility, and determinacy, which, by definition, leads to nihilism. By contrast, a world with causes other than solely scientific causes, specifically, a world with formal (and final) causation such as Dionysius's, allows for whatness, intelligibility, and determinacy, and thereby escapes nihilism because whatness requires Form, intelligibility requires Form and teleology, and determinacy requires teleology (which, in turn, is a supplement to Form). As argued, science studies the world of becoming, and therefore cannot provide the grounds for the world of being (which belongs to metaphysics); to live in a world of pure becoming without being is to have a nihilistic worldview. The epilogue draws a significant implication from this conclusion: the premodern approach invites a necessary revival of natural philosophy because the world of becoming is wider than modern science acknowledges.

This thesis argues two issues: William James' philosophy was-to a great extent derived from his interaction with the French philosophers, Charles Renouvier, Henri Bergson, Maurice Blondel and Emile Boutroux. Correlative to the fact that these five figures have an intellectual relationship with one another, I also argue that in order to understand James, he must be placed within the context of these relations. These five philosophers, as a group, can be clearly seen and understood in the context of an identifiable movement. Each one was a part of a whole reality with their own slightly different perspectives. However, the context that I present reveals the motivating factors of this movement towards a philosophy of action. This is not to say that there was one defined philosophy of action. Each contributed to the conception of a philosophy of action by their response to the same dilemmas of their time.

No description available.

A presente tese investiga e discute o conceito de crítica literária de Friedrich Schlegel, com o intuito de esclarecer como o crítico, filósofo e filólogo alemão contribuiu para a alteração nos estudos de literatura de sua época ao postular a necessidade de aproximação entre a análise estética e histórica do fenômeno literário, antecipando muitos problemas da crítica contemporânea. Ao utilizar os paradigmas da filosofia da história e da estética para o entendimento dos diversos períodos ou épocas da literatura, e ao reconhecer e aplicar a perspectiva histórica como categoria crítica, Schlegel colaborou para o aparecimento de uma nova era da crítica literária. O contato com a herança do Iluminismo, e com os escritos de Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Friedrich Schiller, Immanuel Kant, Johann Gottfried Herder, Johann Joachim Winckelmann e Johann Wolfgang Goethe, entre outros, influenciou o crítico a desenvolver um novo modus de crítica literária, que levaria em consideração a atividade reflexionante e criativa do espírito crítico. A atividade de Schlegel enquanto crítico e historiador da literatura se caracteriza pela busca constante de aperfeiçoamento infinito, ou utilizando uma de suas expressões favoritas como uma ânsia de infinito [Sehnsuch nach dem Unendlichen], isto é, o ímpeto pela complementação [Diaskeuase] da obra literária através da reflexão crítica e filosófica. As contribuições de Friedrich Schlegel para a alteração do modo como a literatura deve ser compreendida, assim como seu esforço em estabelecer princípios universais para a crítica literária colocam seu nome entre os precursores da crítica literária moderna. / The present thesis investigates and discusses Friedrich Schlegels concept of literary criticism in order to demonstrate how the German critic, philosopher and philologist contributed to a change in the studies of literature of his age and anticipated many problems of contemporary criticism by postulating the necessity of an approximation between the aesthetic and the historical visions of the literary phenomena. Schlegels contribution to the emergence of a new era of literary criticism lies in his usage of both paradigms of the philosophy of history as well as aesthetics for the understanding of different periods of literature and in his recognition and application of history as a critical category. Schlegels contact with the heritage of the Enlightenment, as well as with the writings of Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Friedrich Schiller, Immanuel Kant, Johann Gottfried Herder, Johann Joachim Winckelmann and Johann Wolfgang Goethe, among others, influenced the critic to develop a new modus of literary criticism that takes into consideration both the reflexive and the creative activity of the critical spirit. Inserted in this new scientific paradigm, Schlegels activity as a critic and historian of literature is characterized by his constant search for the infinite perfectibility, or to use one of his favorite expressions a longing for the infinite [Sehnsuch nach dem Unendlichen], and is thus the impetus for the complementation [Diaskeuase] of the literary opus with the philosophical reflection. Friedrich Schlegels contributions to the alterations into the way in which literature is to be understood, as well as his effort to establish universal principles for literary criticism places his name in the ranks of the forerunners of modern literary criticism.