La thèse centrale de cette recherche consiste à étudier la façon dont les Histoires d'Hérodote, en s'érigeant comme symbole de la pensée présocratique, révèlent une conception politique de la connaissance où les différents modes de la pensée archaïque peuvent trouver une espèce d'architexte qui fournit une méthode particulière de lecture et d'analyse. La manière dont l'historien organise, critique et donne la priorité à l'information met en évidence une conception politique de la connaissance, parce qu'il est toujours dans une position de médiation, il intervient et agit comme arbitre et juge des discours. Cette lutte ou bataille discursive est en définitive un symbole des forces politiques inhérentes à la pensée archaïque. Une des hypothèses centrales ayant guidé cette recherche est la proposition selon laquelle une analogie peut être établie entre le rôle du peuple par rapport au type de gouvernement de sa pólis et le rôle de l'auditoire ou le destinataire d'un récit. Ainsi, l'analyse des textes « présocratiques » peut être réalisée dans le but de pouvoir y tracer une politique du discours déterminée. Le travail est divisé en trois chapitres. Les deux premiers visent à légitimer la proposition qui est développée dans le dernier et qui constitue la thèse à proprement parler. Pour ériger Hérodote en symbole des présocratiques (chapitre 3), il est nécessaire de définir sa position interstitielle tant en amont (Homère, chapitre 1) qu'en aval (Platon et Aristote, chapitre 2), car les présocratiques sont également des interstices entre les corpus homérique et platonicien-aristotélicien. / The central thesis of this research is to examine how the Histories of Herodotus, acting as a symbol of Presocratic thought, display a political conception of kwowledge in which the various archaic modes of thought may find a sort of architext that offers a peculiar reading and analysis method. The Histories bring into stage the clash of discourses, the confrontation between them, representing the battle for discursive legitimation. The way the historian organizes, criticizes and sets a hierarchy for the information reveals a political conception of knowledge, because he invariably places himself as a mediator interceding and acting as an arbitrator and judge of discourses. This struggle or discursive battle is definitely a symbol of the political forces that are immanent to the archaic thought. A fundamental hypothesis guiding this research is that an analogy can be drawn between the role played by the people of a city as a function of their form of government and the role of the auditorium or addressee of a discourse. As such, the analysis of the Presocratic texts may be performed under the perspective that it is possible to trace in them a defined politics of discourse. This research comprises three chapters. To raise Herodotus into a Presocratic symbol (Chapter 3), it is necessary to define his interstitial stance with respect to the past (Homer = chapter 1) and the future (Plato- Aristotle = chapter 2). Several terms have been studied and through their forms of articulation in oppositions, associations or mere concomitances, an attempt has been made to determine how they work.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-25T19:20:12Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Gabriela Bal.pdf: 1502665 bytes, checksum: 5df7721487fa5bde58d28dc7baca8e04 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010-10-27 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / This Doctoral Dissertation seeks to find the No-Where , starting and finishing point whence the Neoplatonic philosophers - Plotinus, Iamblichus and Damascius - wrote, when faced with the Ineffable Presence of That One which attracts us with Its Silence and Who, instead of silencing, becomes loquacious indicators of that which hides behind that which is said and that which no language is able to contemplate without betraying itself. We will start by investigating, in Part I, Plotinus Cataphatic and Apophatic languages (Chapters One and Two, respectively) from the exegesis of Plato s Parmenides, especially its first hypotheses. Departing from Plotinus One we will analyze the enigmatic aspect of mystical language until we understand, with Plotinus, that it is just another manner for seeing that which those who contemplate the highest and whose mystical language alludes to, through grammar resources, such as the adverbs of place and superlatives, embodied through the language of Love, whose breach opens cracks through which we communicate something that is possible by means of images, metaphors and analogies, until we are forced to use the so called negative, apophatic or aphairetic language. Plato s Parmenides, as a turning point, united at a distance - the perspectives of our interlocutors weaving thus, in an invisible woof, the same we supposed existed from the very beginning, but whose name we did not know, but which revealed itself to us in a simple and instantaneous manner, because it was there, present, in each one of them, its own way. In Part II of this work, we will work the language of Transcendence. The very specific way each one of them developed a personal philosophical corpus departing from the hypotheses of Plato s Parmenides reveals that very thing that the dialog intends to arouse: the ascetic course both of the disciple (for Plotinus) and of the pilgrim (for Iamblichus). In its limit, the aporia brings about, in Damascius discourse (Chapter Three), an inversion, by means of which language twist and turns itself until it becomes utterly exausted when, leaving everything that had been aggregated to thought, we find ourselves all alone, faced with our nothingness. With nothing left, before the abyss, in this instant , hurled forward because we still had not found the No-Where , we meet Iamblichus (Chapter Four), which presents us with the chance of returning, no more by means of our own efforts, but, inspired by the Caldaic Oracles, through Teurgy as complement to Philosophy and not in opposition to it, having reached the limit to which the latter had led us, in the dialog with Plato s Parmenides, it promotes a shift in Plato s Parmenidean paradigm, revealing that which it was supposed to give birth to, and which was beforehand veiled, and which is up to the instant to reveal / Esta tese de doutorado busca encontrar o Não-lugar , ponto de partida e de chegada a partir do qual escreveram os filósofos neoplatônicos Plotino, Jâmblico e Damáscio, ao se depararem com a Presença Inefável Daquele que nos atrai com o seu Silêncio e que, ao invés de se calarem, tornam-se loquazes indicadores do que se esconde por trás do que é dito e que linguagem alguma consegue contemplar sem trair a si própria. Começaremos por investigar, na primeira parte deste estudo, a linguagem catafática e apofática de Plotino (1º e 2º Capítulos, respectivamente) a partir da exegese do Parmênides de Platão, especialmente a primeira hipótese. A partir do Um de Plotino vislumbraremos o aspecto enigmático da linguagem mística até entendermos, com Plotino, tratar-se de outra maneira de ver aquela de quem contempla o mais alto e que a linguagem mística alude através de recursos gramaticais, tais como os advérbios de lugar e superlativos, e que se concretizam através da linguagem do Amor, cuja brecha abre fendas por meio das quais nos comunicamos, o que é possível por meio de imagens, metáforas e analogias até sermos forçados a utilizar a linguagem negativa, apofática e afairética. O Parmênides de Platão, como um divisor de águas, aproximou - à distância - as perspectivas de nossos interlocutores tecendo uma trama invisível, a mesma que vislumbrávamos existir desde o início, mas que desconhecíamos o nome, que veio a se revelar a nós de modo simples e instantâneo, porque estava ali presente, em cada um deles, à sua maneira. Na segunda parte deste estudo trabalharemos a linguagem da Transcendência. A maneira muito particular como cada um deles desenvolveu um corpo filosófico próprio, a partir das hipóteses do Parmênides, revela aquilo mesmo que o diálogo pretende suscitar: o percurso ascético tanto do discípulo (para Plotino) quanto do peregrino (para Jâmblico). Em seu limite, a aporia realiza, no discurso de Damáscio (3º capítulo), uma inversão, por meio da qual a linguagem se contorce e inverte até a mais completa exaustão quando, abandonando tudo o que havíamos agregado ao pensar, nos encontramos sós e diante de nosso nada. Sem mais nada, diante do abismo, neste instante , arremeçados adiante porque ainda não havíamos encontrado o Não-lugar encontramos Jâmblico (4º capítulo), que nos brinda com a possibilidade de retorno, não mais através de nossos esforços, mas, inspirado pelos Oráculos Caldáicos, na teurgia como complemento da filosofia e não em oposição à mesma, tendo ido até o extremo em que esta pode nos conduzir, no diálogo com o Parmênides de Platão, promove uma mudança do paradigma parmenideano de Platão, revelando aquilo que lhe coube trazer à luz e que estava antes encoberto, o que só o instante pode revelar

摘要 本篇論文的討論起點來自柏拉圖如何面對靈魂能夠認知真理的這個可能性。柏拉圖設立那與變動的感覺現象完全分離的「不變動的『相』」作為知識得以成立的條件，這個歷史緣由可從亞里士多德的記載當中知道：一方面，柏拉圖認同克拉梯樓斯與赫拉克利圖學派所主張的感覺現象的永遠流動、無一停留，並因此認為絕不可能有關於感覺現象的知識，然而，另一方面，那致力於倫理事物研究的蘇格拉底則堅持必定有那可被定義的知識對象得以被思考與認知；由於受到這兩方所堅持的信念，柏拉圖則在為了拯救現象並使思考與知識得以可能的情況下，他設立了那必須與變動的感覺現象完全分離的相來作為感覺現象之所以如此存在的原因，並在透過那分有相的感覺現象當中，靈魂得以思考並回憶起關於相的知識，而由此拯救現象並保全靈魂得以思考且獲得知識的可能性。 然而，柏拉圖的分離相論卻有可能引發諸多困難，這主要可由《巴曼尼德斯篇》裡的少年蘇格拉底所遭遇到的三個困境所表現出來：○1少年蘇格拉底對於是否有卑下者的相的存在，顯得猶疑不定；○2由於無法回答相與現象之間到底是如何分有，以致於分有成為不可能；○3更進一步地，正是由於相與現象彼此的完全分離，以致於原本肩負拯救現象這使命的相，到頭來卻反而根本無法拯救現象，而且也面臨無法為人所知的這個最大困境。 這三個困境其實正是柏拉圖真理之路---愛智者如何能擁有那與現象完全分離的相的知識？---所蘊含的兩個一體兩面的論題：第一，思考與知識的可能性如何成立？也就是，相如何拯救現象？第二，愛智者要以什麼樣的方法才能正確地獲得相的知識以成為真正的哲學家？關於第一個論題，筆者認為，柏拉圖在《巴曼尼德斯篇》第二部分的八組推論當中提出一種具有數特徵的存有論，這個存有論綿密、細緻地論說《蒂邁歐篇》裡的宇宙生成論以及「未成書研究」裡的原理論，在這當中，相拯救現象的可能性乃在於---神以其意願與叡智將相形塑於這個數存有的世界並因此使那些在場域裡生滅變化的現象獲得一致性，如此，神的意願（i.e.善）乃作為相得以拯救現象的最具統馭力的原因與原理；關於第二個論題，那能使少年蘇格拉底獲得真理以成為哲學家的訓練，正是那以合理論說所掌握的相為對象的訓練，筆者認為，柏拉圖在這個訓練當中，試圖透過假設法的運用，使得愛智者能緊守在對「是」（i.e.相）的追求上，並得以在一步步的往上探求當中，在最後能以最終的決定性原因---善---來束縛住所有的相，如此，當愛智者能在「善」的指導下以合理論說來正確地指出每個相的真實本質時，這個愛智者也就成為真正的哲學家。 在這樣的解決方式當中，柏拉圖證成了靈魂能夠認知真理的可能性，為自己的真理之路尋得一個合理的立足點。柏拉圖在這當中所奮力搏鬥的，主要並不是亞里士多德在《物理學以後諸篇》A 6.987a33-b10所提及的這些哲學家，而是歷史上的這位伊利亞哲學家---巴曼尼德斯：柏拉圖分離相論的核心來自巴曼尼德斯其毫無生滅變動的「完滿的是」，然而，柏拉圖拯救現象以及保全思考與知識的可能性的這個企圖，卻又是必須對巴曼尼德斯的「完滿的是」提出批判。而在柏拉圖藉由這兩個假設與八組推論來與巴曼尼德斯奮力搏鬥當中，柏拉圖所完成的不僅僅只是解決分離相論所可能引來的困境，而更是走上一條不同於巴曼尼德斯的真理之路，因為現象的拯救是柏拉圖所主要異於巴曼尼德斯的地方，而那使得現象得以被相所拯救的最具統馭力的原因與原理乃在於---宇宙父親的意願與叡智，而這乃作為柏拉圖自己的真理之路的最終磐石。 關鍵詞：相論，分離，分有，善，假設法，柏拉圖，巴曼尼德斯，〈未成書研究〉，《巴曼尼德斯篇》，《蒂邁歐篇》。 / Abstract The aim of this thesis is to show that how Plato might deal with the possibility for soul of knowing the truth. The historical reason for Plato positing the invariable Forms, which are totally apart from the variable sensible things, is remarked by Aristotle that: on the one hand, having been agreed with Cratylus and the Heracllitean doctrines that all sensible things are always in a state of flux and that no science of them exists, yet on the other hand, taking into account the Socrates’ efforts to find general definitions of ethical terms, Plato, having been inspired by both views, thinks that there must be some invariable things, i.e. Forms, which are totally apart from the variable sensible things and could only be thought with logos（or reasonable account）, as the causes of the sensible things. Therefore, the soul could recollect and think of Forms by perceiving these sensible things, which participate in the corresponding Forms. Hence, Plato saves the phenomena and secures the possibility for soul of thinking and knowing the truth by his theory of Forms. However, there might be many problems that arisen from Plato’s theory of Forms. These problems are shown mainly by the three perplexities, which are encountered by the young Socrates in the Parmenides. First, the young Socrates is undecided about whether the base things could have their Forms, second, having been unable to solve the problem of the sharing between the sensible things and Forms, the young Socrates finally has to accept the impossibility of sharing, third, further, just owing to this totally separation that is between the sensible things and Forms, Forms finally could not save the phenomena and could not be known by anyone. Actually, the three perplexities are the two topics of Plato’s way of truth, which is that how the lover of wisdom could know the Forms that are totally separate from the sensible things. The first topic is that, in what way the possibility of thinking and acquiring knowledge could be secured. That is, how the phenomena could be saved by Forms? The second topic is that, in what way the lover of wisdom could acquire the truth and becomes the real philosopher. As for the first, I think that Plato claims a kind of ontology, which has numerical character, in the second part of the Parmenides. This ontology provides deliberately the cosmogony of the Timaeus and the theory of the Principles in the Unwritten Doctrines that could justify the possibility of the phenomena that are saved by Forms. This possibility lies in the god’s nous and will, i.e. the world that has numerical character is fashioned by the god with Forms as model, and then the becoming phenomena that cling to the receptacle are saved and intelligible. Therefore, the god’s will is the supremely valid cause and principle of this possibility. As for the second, this exercise that can make the young Socrates as a real philosopher if he takes it into practice is the training, which takes Forms as its objects and be practiced in hypothetical method. I think the reason for Plato of using the hypothetical method is that this hypothetical method can make the lover of wisdom to cling to Forms when he is putting this exercise into practice, and in this upward process systematically, finally, he can fasten all the Forms with the final cause, i.e. the good. Therefore, when the lover of wisdom could show the real essence of each Form with reasonable account under the guidance of the good, he at that time is a real philosopher. Under this solution, Plato justifies the possibility for soul of knowing the truth, and makes his way of truth possible. In this fighting, those with whom Plato fights are not those philosophers that are remarked by Aristotle in Metaphysics A 6.987a33-b10, but the philosopher of Elea, Parmenides. On the one hand, the key point of Plato’s theory of Forms is coming from Parmenides’ concept of Being, which is ungenerated and imperishable, yet on the other hand, the attempt for the possibility of saving the phenomena and for soul to know the truth is urging Plato to put Parmenides’ claim to the question. Then what Plato has done in this fighting, which mainly occurs in the second part of the Parmenides, is that as he is solving these perplexities, he at the same time is stepping upon another way of truth, which is different from Parmenides. In this fighting, saving phenomena is the main difference between Plato and Parmenides. The god’s nous and will is the supremely valid cause and principle of the saved phenomena and this most supreme cause is the coping-stone for Plato’s way of truth. Keywords: Plato’s theory of Forms, separate, participate, the good, the hypothetical method, Plato, Parmenides, the Unwritten Doctrines, the Parmenides, the Timaeus.

本論文以異作為分離相論的轉折這點為主軸，逐段解釋一些相關的段落來看異之相在晚期相論中的作用，主要涉及的對話錄是《哲人篇》與《巴門尼德斯篇》。 本論文的架構是從《巴門尼德斯篇》第一部分開始，看分離相論所會導致的問題，再從第二部分的回應中看到分離以外，假定諸相相互結合作為另外一種可能，以及在第五組假設中所顯現的異之相所具有的存有學上的重要性。而通種論中最高種間彼此的關係、在《哲人篇》中所引入的二分法以及篇中所連帶解決的問題則在二到五章中呈現。並於第五章節總結了異在《哲人篇》及通種論中的地位及作用。首先是異在《哲人篇》中達到了指出有一種虛假的言說存在的目的；並且異的存在解釋了諸相的基本結構，最高種的劃分必也是依據這種基礎，它們必分有「是」而是，分有異而得以相區別，而諸種屬必相連結構成那諸多被區別出的種或類；回返至《哲人篇》前半部和最後一部分所使用的分解法，此方法亦是立基於通種論和異的結構上。通過一個整體的連結能夠有一個包含其下所有類的最高種，其得以作為一個劃分的起點，而類差作為劃分的依據也因同異的存在而是可能的。 / The aim of this thesis is to show how the idea of difference works in Plato’s late theory of Ideas, and it is chiefly concerned with Plato’s Parmenides and Sophist. The theme of the first part of Parmenides is what will be caused by Chorismos, and of the second part might show another possibility from the Chorismos, that is, the communion of genera. And then the fifth hypotheses of the second part of Parmenides might show the importance of the idea of difference in Plato’s late ontology. In Sophist, since the theory of communion of genera might solve the problem of Chorismos, and the idea of difference as one of the greatest genera of the communion of genera, which might be the most important one, I deal with it and the relations between the fives greatest genera. There are also the problems that be solved by the idea of difference in Sophist, and which brings a new method (dialectics) of Plato’s late dialogues, for defining all of them clearly, I analysis those concerned paragraphs.

édition critique du commentaire au Parménide de l'humaniste Marsile Ficin, avec traduction française annotée et introduction / Doctorat en philosophie et lettres, Orientation histoire des religions / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

This bachelor thesis engages in a quest to understand the concepts of necessity and grace in Simone Weils thinking. The question in play, in which many more questions lie hidden, reads as follows: How does Weil understand the operations of grace in relation to the ”blind necessity” of the natural world, and what are the philosophical implications of this concept of grace? What are, for instance, given her understanding of the world as God’s creation, the metaphysical grounds for a basic human activitiy such as thinking or reflexion? A reading of Simone Weils works on necessity, grace, affliction and attention is contrasted with her thoughts on science, method and truth. The concept of necessity is compared to the one of Spinoza, especially on the subject of how the good or the just relates to the true and the necessary: it shows there are interesting similarities and illuminating differences between the two philosophers’ lines of thought. Here, the concept of attention becomes central to the image: the idea of a cultivated mode of reception of the world and of the Other. Attention is analogously understood as a method of prayer and a cultivated ethical attitude towards other human beings – and an ideal scientific state of mind. In the final chapter of the analytic part of the composition, Weils concept of grace is investigated in regard to concepts of thinking and understanding. Here, Leibniz idea of the divine world and the divine mind plays a concise but important role on the matter of a tentative metaphysical grounding of thinking as such – how this can be thought and how it reflects and deepens Simone Weils metaphysics, especially her understanding of the highest states of insight into the nature of the world as partly a work of divine grace. In the last chapter Walter Benjamins vision of the coming philosophy as a consolidation between Immanuel Kants transcendental philosophy and religious experience – and religious thought – show the way for further investigation into the field, a field that the thesis has outlined at the same time as it has attempted to answer some specific questions that seems to be the most urgent ones.

Da sempre si è ritenuto che Parmenide affermasse l'unità dell'Essere. Nel corso del '900 si è però iniziato a dubitare di tale attributo. Nella prima parte della tesi ho analizzato le varie interpretazioni critiche che sono state date a tal proposito e ho cercato di mostrare come, col tempo, si sia sempre più abbandonata l'idea di un monismo assoluto per abbracciare l'idea di un'unità che fosse in rapporto con i molti. Questa revisione si è spesso accompagnata ad una rivalutazione della fisica Parmenidea esposta nella seconda parte del Poema. In particolar modo mi sono concentrato sulle letture di metà '900 (Verdenius, Calogero, Untersteiner), predicazioni (Kahn, Mourelatos, Curd) e fisiche più recenti (Ruggiu, Casertano, Cerri, Palmer). Nella seconda parte della tesi ho invece analizzato i frammenti in cui i vari storici della filosofia hanno intravisto la possibilità di argomentazioni pro o contro determinate concezioni di monismo. Mi sono dedicato quindi all'analisi critica del frammento 4 e del frammento 8 (versi 4, 5-6, 12-13, 22-25, 36-37, 38, 53-54). In questa analisi ho cercato di portare elementi a sostegno della teoria da me sostenuta per cui Parmenide affermerebbe l'uni-molteplicità, cioè che il soggetto parmenideo è il Cosmo, la Realtà intera, il Tutto che ingloba dentro di sé il molteplice sensibile. La tesi si chiude con un'appendice dedicata ai riferimenti platonici sul tema dell'unità in Parmenide. / It has always been believed that Parmenides affirmed the unity of Being. During the 20th century, however, some scholars began to doubt this attribute. In the first part of the thesis I analyzed the various critical interpretations that have been given in this regard and I tried to show how, over time, the idea of ​​an absolute monism was increasingly abandoned to embrace the idea of ​​a unity that was in relationship with the many. This revision was often accompanied by a re-evaluation of the Parmenidea physics exposed in the second part of the Poem. In particular, I focused on the mid-1900s readings (Verdenius, Calogero, Untersteiner), predicational interpretations (Kahn, Mourelatos, Curd) and more recent physics readings (Ruggiu, Casertano, Cerri, Palmer). In the second part of the thesis I have analyzed the fragments in which the various historians of philosophy have seen the possibility of arguments for or against certain conceptions of monism. Then I made a critical analysis of the fragments 4 and 8 (verses 4, 5-6, 12-13, 22-25, 36-37, 38, 53-54). In this analysis I have tried to bring elements to support the theory supported by me for which Parmenides would affirm the uni-totality, i.e. that the Parmenides poem's subject is the Cosmos, the whole Reality, the Whole that incorporates the sensitive manifold. The thesis terminates with an appendix dedicated to the Platonic references on the theme of unity in Parmenides.