There is general consensus that mercenarism is and should remain prohibited. The difficulty that has arisen is firstly one of defining the exact nature of mercenarism, and more specifically what actions constitute mercenary actions. A further difficulty arises in that much of the legislation intended to outlaw mercenarism is impacting on the legal activity of private military and security contractors, who fall short of the definitional requirements of mercenarism. The two groups being so closely linked that they are often mistakenly conflated . There is currently a need to develop a response to the private military security industry, which is better suited to effectively regulate their activities, whilst also effectively criminalising the activities of those who actions amount to mercenarism. The dissertation therefore sets about analysing how these two distinct sectors: mercenaries and private military security companies, are regulated at an international and domestic level. It then uses the lessons learnt from these regulator attempts, and the various policy considerations which countries have to make, to propose a way forward in creating an effective regulatory system for mercenaries and private military companies at an international and domestic level. / Thesis (LL.M.)-University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, 2013.

The commercialisation of military services has increased in importance since the end of the Cold War. Commercial Military Service Providers (CMSPs) have found increased respectability and worked in states on every continent. Writing on CMSPs has similarly increased. Several high profile incidents have come under intense scrutiny, and has led to some portions of the literature demonising their use. However, there are still conceptual and theoretical issues which have been under explored. This thesis contributes to the literature which has sought to address this theoretical lacuna. Historical Sociology and comparative analysis are employed to analyse the implications of CMSP use on the state. A modified version of the Ideological, Economic, Military and Political (IEMP) model developed by Michael Mann, is used to theorise the impact of commercial security providers on existing sources of power within the state, and the relationship between them. The thesis uses two case studies which are representative of the use of CMSPs during this time period. The Sierra Leone Civil War and the invasion and reconstruction of Iraq since 2003. It will be argued that CMSPs alter the balance between power structures within the state, positively and negatively affecting the power of the state. The short term use of CMSPs has proven to be useful and of increasing importance; especially when military weakness is an urgent problem. However, although there has been no example of CMSPs intentionally threatening state stability, they can also subvert the power of the state. CMSPs, particularly when used for an extended period, have undermined the relationship between the sources of power, undermining political stability. Most significantly they weakened the state by undermining the strength it gains from its embeddedness in society.

Since the early 1990s the use of private military companies (PMCs) has proliferated. Especially the United States are increasingly turning to private contractors to perform military tasks. Privatization advocates claim that PMCs work cheaper than the military. In addition to that, PMCs give the cover of plausible deniability that regular troops lack. But the fact that legislative control or public debate are missing raises the question of accountability and underlines the need for legal means to control and regulate PMCs and their operations.

The rise of the Private Military Industry has been cemented in modern global political reality, but where next will this multi-billion dollar industry go and what form will it take after the market boom of Iraq? Post-Colonial Africa is considered the birthplace of the modern mercenary and historically features prominently as a testament to the potential for immoral privately sponsored military activities within unstable states. Moreover, it is a rich market that the Private Military Industry is increasingly turning its attention to, albeit focussing on support functions for now, but a massive industry with a competitive and poorly regulated market environment will invariably begin to explore different avenues as competition grows. With market diversification grows the ethical risk of abuse. At the same time, peacekeeping efforts across the continent are hampered by numerous factors, not least of all a chronic lack of trained personnel. Could the legal and political legitimacy, not to mention the sustainable market environment sought by the PMI potentially exist in multilaterally sanctioned, privatised peacekeeping and peace support operations in Africa? Can the ethical challenges of mercenarism be suspended or even bypassed for the sake of expedient intervention in potential genocides, or be perhaps pragmatically accepted as an inevitable development that should be embraced rather than condemned, for strategic security reasons? Can the ethical condemnation of the proposed means of peace support be overridden by the potential ends generated by such a move? Is the world ready for privatised peacekeepers? This dissertation explores the ethical background to the privatisation of military operations and how these foreign policy trends and social perceptions of control of force impact on the notion of privatised peacekeeping, particularly in the context of operations in Africa. It investigates the philosophical implications of privatised peacekeeping by way of a constrained pragmatic form of consequentialist evaluation that warns against reckless expediency. Ultimately, this dissertation offers a more philosophically suitable argument to justify and control this seemingly inevitable next step in the trend of privatisation of force. / Thesis (M.A.)-University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 2008.

This master thesis analyses impact of private military companies on the monopoly on legitimate violence. It examines the influence of private military companies on this monopoly in case of the United States and Iraq during the war in Iraq. The united States are in a position of a sending state that has had a long tradition of using these companies. On the other hand Iraq can be seen as a weak state and one could presume that the use of private military companies has a negative impact on its monopoly on violence. Just to validate the negative or positive impact of these companies a state and size of the militaries as main means of violence, and a capability to enforce law on a state's territory is analyzed.

Peut-on confier au secteur privé des activités relevant du coeur del’Etat, autrement dit « régaliennes » ? Le ministère de la défense,ainsi que ceux de la justice et de l’intérieur, pratiquent déjàl’externalisation de certaines fonctions auparavant dévolues à desfonctionnaires ou des militaires. Or, la défense nationale est un« service public constitutionnel », et de ce fait ne peut être déléguée àune personne privée. Toutefois, le Conseil Constitutionnel a autoriséd’en concéder, par contrat, des fonctions « détachables ». Cecontexte implique de déterminer le périmètre externalisable, end’autres termes le « coeur de métier régalien », qui n’est définidans aucun texte législatif ou réglementaire. En dehors de certainscas particuliers jugés, la décision reste à l’appréciation du ministre,dans le cadre de l’objectif recherché : économies budgétaires,meilleure efficacité de l’outil. Ce processus d’externalisationprocède d’une vision nouvelle de l’action de l’Etat, qui conserve lacapacité de décision dans ses domaines régaliens mais peut enconfier la mise en oeuvre à des opérateurs privés, procédant d’unevision libérale de l’action de l’Etat.Après avoir étudié les fondements de la politique d’externalisation(Partie I), en abordant en premier lieu le besoin et le contexte(Titre I), puis la détermination du périmètre externalisable (TitreII) et ses possibilités d’extension (Titre III), nous aborderons lapréparation et la conduite de l’externalisation (Partie II), quiconcerne avant tout la préparation matérielle de l’externalisation(Titre I), puis la conduite du projet d’externalisation (Titre II), enabordant le volet social de la démarche (Titre III). / How can private sector manage activitiesusually recognized as part of the State’s heart, in other words3“kingly”? The Ministry of defense, as well as the Ministries forJustice and of Interior, already outsources several functions,previously dedicated to Civil servants or militaries. Nevertheless,national defense is a constitutional public service, which shouldnot be delegated to any private person. However, theConstitutional Supreme Court admitted to delegate, by contract,“detachable” functions. Thus, the “outsourcable” perimeter, the“kingly core business” should be determined, as no legaldocument defines it. Except some already judged specific cases,the minister is liable to decide alone, thanks to his objectives:budget sparing, better efficiency. The outsourcing process showsout a new vision of State’s action, which keeps decision capacitybut may delegate action to private operators, in a liberal point ofview of the State’s public activities.After having studied the outsourcing policy’s foundation (part I),we’ll first examine the requirement and the context (title I), thenthe outsourcable perimeter’s determination (title II) and itsextension possibilities (title III), we’ll then take care ofoutsourcing’s preparation and conduct (part II), which firstconcerns physical preparation (title I), then outsourcing project’sconduct (title II), approaching the process’ social part (title III).

La participation de personnes privées à des opérations militaires n’est pas récente et s’est longtemps illustrée par le phénomène des mercenaires, mais elle a pris beaucoup d’ampleur depuis les années 1990 et le recours à des sociétés militaires privées. Ces sociétés se voient confier des tâches qui ne sont pas directement liées au cœur de métier des armées étatiques, mais certaines d’entre elles peuvent concerner des prestations armées. Le recours à des personnes privées dans le cadre d’opérations militaires soulève de nombreuses difficultés juridiques. Il est en effet essentiel de déterminer le droit qui est applicable à ces personnes, qu’elles soient qualifiées de mercenaires ou qu’il s’agisse d’employés de sociétés militaires privées. La définition de leur statut est quant à elle fondamentale afin d’examiner la possibilité de retenir leur responsabilité en cas de nécessité. La question de la responsabilité des sociétés militaires privées elles-mêmes est également posée, tout comme celle, primordiale, de la responsabilité des États qui emploient de telles sociétés. / Private persons whether individuals or legal entities have always taken part in military operations and the best and most famous example was the one of mercenaries. But, since the 1990’s, this participation has been renewed by the increasing activity of the private military companies. These companies have contracts for various tasks and some of them are directly linked to armed missions. The participation of private entities in military operations raises a lot of legal questions. It is necessary to as certain the law which will apply to them, whether they are mercenaries or employees of private military companies. The definition of their status is also crucial in order to determine the liability for their acts. Several fundamental questions arise not only as far the liability of these companies is concerned but also, and perhaps even more, as far as the liability of States employing these companies is concerned.

Sedan kalla krigets slut har en ny typ av aktör dykt upp i internationella konflikter och krig världen över. Denna aktör är privata företag som i dagsläget erbjuder allt från supplementär logistik till att helt ersätta nationella arméer. Utgångspunkten i denna uppsats är att ta reda på vilka faktorer som har skapat en marknad för dessa företag generellt, samt vilka av dessa faktorer som kan förklara framväxten i Sverige specifikt. I uppsatsen undersöks befintlig forskning kring vad som drivit utvecklingen. Därefter kommer befintlig teori att prövas som förklaringsmodell för expansionen i Sverige. Den befintliga teorin som prövats på Sverige består av sju faktorer beskrivandes politiska och samhälleliga förutsättningar vilka förklarar expansionen. Av dessa återfinns samtliga i Sverige, men genom en analys av deras respektive giltighet i svensk kontext uppstår en mer nyanserad bild, där endast fyra av faktorerna är relevanta som förklaringar. Dessa är en transformation av försvarets fokus och organisation, en politisk trend av privatisering samt ett överflöd av militärt utbildad personal utan sysselsättning. Av dessa är den förstnämnda den starkaste katalysatorn medan den sistnämnda endast i viss mån påverkar den redan pågående expansionen. / Since the end of the Cold War a new phenomenon has shown in international conflict and war, worldwide. This phenomenon is the private companies nowadays offering supplementary logistics, armed troops to the front and everything in between. This essay aims to identify which factors that have contributed to the creating of a market for these companies in general, and which of these that can explain the growth of Swedish companies in particular. In the essay previous research on the topic of privatization of security are examined and thereafter applied onSwedenin order to examine to what extent it can be used to explain the changes inSweden. The existent theory applied onSwedenconsists of seven factors, describing political and social basis, which explain the expansion. All of these are found in Sweden, however, through a further analysis of their individual relevance, a more nuanced result can be seen, whereas only four out of seven are relevant as explanations. These are a transformation in defence focus and organization, a political trend of privatization and a flood of trained unemployed military personnel. The first one of these is the strongest catalyst for expansion while the latter only to a certain degree reinforces the already ongoing process.

Submitted by ANA KARLA PEREIRA RODRIGUES (anakarla_@hotmail.com) on 2017-09-29T13:49:28Z No. of bitstreams: 1 arquivototal.pdf: 1490911 bytes, checksum: 8dfe7fdde29c102ab866fdfcd65627d0 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-09-29T13:49:28Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 arquivototal.pdf: 1490911 bytes, checksum: 8dfe7fdde29c102ab866fdfcd65627d0 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-05-02 / Hiring private armies or private security forces for a specific action, in favor of governments, corporations or civil society organizations – as opposed to the public formalities of war declaration between States with broad national goals –, generated one of the most relevant contemporary global markets. Yugoslavia, Colombia, Somalia, Nigeria, Ukraine, Iraq and the Levant: every insecure stage, after the end of the Cold War, counted on private military and security companies (PMSCs) for supporting roles or for staying at the backstage. Considering this innovative commercial aspect of today’s conflicts, this work counts on such non-State actors as protagonists, and its theme is the regulation of PMSCs. The problem that the dissertation examines is the insertion of the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers (ICoC) – launched in 2010, as part of the Swiss Initiative – in the multilevel governance of such a market, based especially on the works of Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann and Gunther Teubner on constitutionalism beyond the State. Through documental research and inductive methods, the text points out the main issues on the market for force and discusses the inapplicability or insufficiency of treaties that discipline trade, such as GATS, or conflict, such as the Geneva Conventions; besides, it sheds light on the current debate about a binding instrument at the United Nations and explains soft law initiatives, like the Montreux Document. Finally, it reads the ICoC and examines its advantages and limitations, with reference to reviewed literature. The research, therefore, aims at presenting the possibilities of regulating actors in need of hard law, based on theoretical contributions that reclaim the “constitutionalization of markets”. Keywords: Privatization of international security. Multilevel regulation. / A contratação de exércitos privados ou de forças de segurança para uma atuação pontual e específica, em favor de Governos, de corporações ou de entidades da sociedade civil – em oposição às públicas formalidades da declaração de guerra entre Estados com propósitos nacionais amplos –, gestou um dos mais relevantes mercados globais contemporâneos. Iugoslávia, Colômbia, Somália, Nigéria, Ucrânia, Iraque e Levante: todos os palcos de insegurança, após o fim da Guerra Fria, contaram com empresas militares privadas ou empresas de segurança internacional (ESIs) nos bastidores ou como coadjuvantes. Considerando essa inovadora faceta comercial dos conflitos hodiernos, o presente trabalho tem esses atores não-estatais como protagonistas, e seu tema é a regulação de ESIs. A dissertação problematiza a inserção do Código Internacional de Conduta Para Provedores de Serviços de Segurança Privada (ICoC) – lançado, em 2010, no contexto da Iniciativa Suíça – na governança multinível desse mercado, baseando-se especialmente nos trabalhos de Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann e Gunther Teubner sobre constitucionalismo além do Estado. Com pesquisa documental e com método indutivo, o texto aponta os principais problemas do mercado da força e discute a inaplicabilidade ou a insuficiência dos tratados que disciplinam o comércio, como o GATS, ou o conflito, como as Convenções de Genebra; explica, ainda, a situação atual do debate de um instrumento vinculante na ONU e as iniciativas de “soft law”, como o Documento de Montreux. Enfim, apresenta uma leitura do ICoC e examina seus trunfos e limitações, fazendo referência à literatura revisada. A pesquisa, afinal, visa a discutir as possibilidades de regulação de atores que carecem de “hard law”, a partir de aportes teóricos que reclamam a “constitucionalização de mercados”.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-29T13:48:38Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Tomaz Oliveira Paoliello.pdf: 1540683 bytes, checksum: 283bc319d3885231736edd7e0a174897 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-02-29 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / Private military and security companies (PMSC) is a new actor that has attracted great attention in the debates within the International Relations discipline. Through the study of a particular north-american company, DynCorp, we seek to investigate the nature of these actors in the great process of globalization. The literature on PMSC usually presents the idea that the emergence of such players has occurred through spontaneous supply and demand forces. The hypothesis that assist this idea is that the states are moving away from the new wars. Here this hypothesis is challenged and replaced by another. The State, particularly the US, has adapted its engagement in capacity in conflicts by engaging the PMSC, and stimulating the growth of a private security market. DynCorp is part of this movement. We investigate the relationship of co-constitution, in which companies and state are organized to develop the new "market for force", and the birth of PMSC as actors of a hybrid nature, associated with the transformation of the neoliberal state. The study of DynCorp unfolds in three dimensions: its corporate face, as a transnational company associated with market principles; a fighting face, as one of the new actors on the stage of contemporary conflicts; and as a constituent part of a foreign policy apparatus, associated with their only customer, the United States government / As empresas militares e de segurança privada (PMSC) são um novo ator que tem despertado grande atenção nos debates dentro da disciplina Relações Internacionais. Através do estudo de uma companhia especificamente, a norteamericana DynCorp, procuramos investigar qual a natureza desse ator dentro do grande processo de globalização. A literatura sobre as PMSC geralmente apresenta a ideia de que o aparecimento de tais atores tenha ocorrido através de forças de oferta e demanda espontâneas e circunstanciais. A hipótese auxiliar dessa ideia, que os Estados estejam se afastando das novas guerras, é aqui desafiada e substituída por outra. O Estado, particularmente os EUA, se adaptou em sua capacidade de engajamento em conflitos através da contratação das PMSC, e estimulou o crescimento de um mercado de segurança privada. A empresa Dyncorp faz parte desse movimento. Investigaremos a relação de co-constituição, na qual empresas e Estado se articulam para desenvolver o novo mercado da força , e o nascimento das PMSC como atores de natureza híbrida, associados às transformações do Estado neoliberal. O estudo da DynCorp se desdobra em três dimensões: sua face empresarial, como companhia transnacional associada às lógicas de mercado; uma face combatente, um dos novos atores nos palcos de conflitos contemporâneos; e como parte constituinte de um aparato de política externa, associado a seu cliente único, o governo dos Estados Unidos