Private military companies have rapidly filled in many operational force capacities that national militaries now longer have the capabilities to fill natively. As such, PMCs have expanded their rosters as well as their services provided to fill in many roles, and have carried out many such roles such as logistics management, personal and site security, and some inherently state functions such as training indigenous security forces and interrogation of prisoners. This rise has impacted national militaries in many facets of their operations and abstract professional bases. The ability of the PMC to carry out operations at the same standard as regular soldiers but with higher pay has impacted how the regular soldier views their own place in the professional national military, and creates problems for the establishment as a whole. This thesis will discuss the Iraq War as a case study and the impact of PMCs on the war, as well as introduce the Huntingtonian theories of soldier professionalism and corporateness, and will also employ a critical Marxist perspective to analyse the role and impact of PMCs in the modern military convention and in civil-military relations.

A subject of this diploma thesis is a role of private military companies (PMCs) in security sector reform (SSR) in Iraq in a period from 2003 to 2011. The first chapter of the thesis focuses on goals and process of post-conflict SSR from a theoretical point of view because of an involvement of PMCs in post-conflict reconstruction which was taking place in Iraq. Part of the theoretical chapter is a SSR and steps which is the SSR process composed of. The second chapter concentrates on definitions and typologies of PMCs. This part of the thesis makes a distinction between mercenaries and private military contractors and PMCs themselves. Last but not least the second chapter encompasses discussion about a role of PMCs in a process of SSR in post-conflict countries. The third chapter is dedicated to a historical development of cooperation between PMCs and the US; it analyses roots of the US dependence on services provided by PMCs. A case study of Iraq elaborates on a role of PMCs in a process of Iraqi security reform. Aim of this chapter is to define advantages and disadvantages of usage of services provided by PMCs. By taking into account disadvantages employment of PMCs represents, steps that could help to avoid those in the future are suggested.

yes / The 1990s witnessed a change in the way wars were fought as the amount of available weaponry increased and the types of actors engaged in warfare multiplied. The opening up of the international arms trade, in particular with new buyers and more channels of supply, has raised concerns about who purchases weapons and for what use. Afeature of this changing nature of conflict has been the continuing, if not growing, presence of mercenaries and the emergence of private companies contracted to provide military and security services. These range from logistical support and training to advice and procurement of arms and on-the-ground intervention. This briefing highlights how the activities of mercenaries and private military and security companies can contribute to small arms proliferation and misuse and examines steps the international community can take at the UN Small Arms Conference and elsewhere to effectively combat mercenarism and regulate the activities of private military and security companies. The role played by these companies relates not only to provisions contained in the contracts they sign with their clients to provide large amounts of weaponry, but also how the military and security services and training that they provide contributes to the demand for weapons in the regions where they operate. There are a number of ways in which mercenaries and private military and security companies are involved in small arms proliferation. These include: l Arms brokering and transportation activities l Violations of UN arms embargoes l Impact on human rights and humanitarian law l Driving demand for small arms Various measures already exist to ban the activities of mercenaries and regulate some of the activities of private military and security companies either through national legislation or international agreements. However, there is concern these efforts are neither comprehensive nor accepted widely enough to effectively control the activities of mercenaries and private military and security companies.

La notion de participation directe aux hostilités n’a jamais été définie de manière précise au regard du droit international humanitaire. Cette ambiguïté a conduit à des interprétations divergentes du concept d’hostilités et des critères juridiques utilisés pour définir une participation directe par opposition à une participation indirecte (effort de guerre).D’ailleurs, les conflits contemporains posent de nouveaux défis quant à la définition et la mise en oeuvre de la notion de la participation directe aux hostilités. Les moyens de guerre de haute technicité (l’attaque de réseaux informatiques) et l’externalisation des forces armées (sociétés militaire privées), illustrent l’imbrication croissante des activités civiles et militaires et la difficulté à identifier précisément qui participe directement aux hostilités et quelles sont les mesures à prendre pour protéger ceux qui n’y participent pas directement. / The notion of direct participation in hostilities has never been precisely defined in international humanitarian law. This ambiguity has led to differing interpretations of the concept of hostilities and legal criteria imply a distinction from direct participation in hostilities as opposed indirect participation (war effort).Indeed, contemporary conflicts have given rise to further challenges in terms of defining and implementing the notion of direct participation in hostilities. The use of high-tech warfare (computer network attack), privatization of the armed forces (private military company), among others, illustrate the increased intermingling of civilian and military activities which make it difficult to determine who is taking a direct part in hostilities and what measures should be taken to protect those who are not directly participating.

Avant les Conventions de Genève de 1949, seuls les conflits armés internationaux étaient réglementés par le droit de la guerre. Ce dernier ne pouvait s’appliquer dans les guerres civiles qu’après la reconnaissance des forces rebelles comme partie belligérante. Or, depuis la Seconde guerre mondiale on a assisté à une multiplication des conflits armés non internationaux. Mais les Conventions de Genève de 1949 leur ont consacré seulement l’article 3 commun ; puis le Protocole II additionnel de 1977 est venu le compléter. Ces deux textes comportent de nombreuses lacunes, notamment l’absence de définition des « combattants » et des « civils », rendant ainsi difficile le respect du principe de distinction pourtant essentiel à la protection des populations civiles. Ces dispositions ne réglementent pas non plus les moyens et méthodes de guerre. Outre les lacunes normatives, il y a des problèmes matériels qui compliquent la mise en œuvre efficace des règles pertinentes. Il s’agit notamment de la participation des populations civiles aux hostilités, y compris les enfants-Soldats et les mercenaires. L’absence du statut de combattant dans les conflits armés non internationaux apparaît comme le problème principal compromettant l’efficacité du DIH. Celle-Ci ne contribue-T-Elle pas au non respect de ce droit par les groupes armés ? Faudrait-Il conférer ce statut à ces derniers en vue de les amener à appliquer le droit international humanitaire ou envisager d’autres moyens ? Lesquels ? / Before the Geneva Conventions of 1949, only the international armed conflicts were regulated by the law of the war. This last one could apply in the civil wars only after the recognition of the rebel forces as belligerent party. Now, since the Second World War we attended an increase in non-International armed conflicts. But the Geneva Conventions of 1949 dedicated them only the common article 3; then the additional Protocol II of 1977 came to complete it. These two texts contain numerous gaps, in particular the absence of definition of the "combatants" and the "civilians", making so difficult the respect for the principle of distinction nevertheless essential for the protection of the civil populations. These rules do not regulate either the means and the war methods. Besides the normative gaps, there are material problems which complicate the effective implementation of the relevant rules. It is in particular about the participation of the civil populations in the hostilities, including the children-Soldiers and the mercenaries. The absence of combatant's status in the non-International armed conflicts appears as the main problem compromising the efficiency of the international humanitarian law. Does not this one contribute to the non compliance with this law by the armed groups? Would it be necessary to confer this status to these last ones to bring them to apply the international humanitarian law or to envisage the other means? Which one?

Les guerres d’Irak et d’Afghanistan ont vu la réapparition massive de sociétés de mercenariat d’un nouveau genre.Le mercenariat occidental est ainsi passé en moins de vingt ans de structures artisanales, arrimées à la politiquepost-coloniale des grandes puissances, à un stade professionnel et industriel tendant à une transnationalisationcroissante de ses activités. Des bavures de la célèbre Blackwater à l’implication d’employés de CACI dans lescandale de la torture au sein de la prison d’Abu Grahib, en passant par les activités de la tentaculaire Aegis, lessociétés militaires privées, omniprésentes sur le champ de bataille, ont rythmé et marqué le récit de ces guerresmajeures du début du XXIe siècle. Fait crucial : c’est la première fois dans l’histoire des opérations militairesaméricaines qu’on assiste à un basculement de la démographie des forces en faveur du secteur privé. Produit del’économie de guerre permanente et ramifications expéditionnaires du complexe militaro-industriel, ces sociétésreprésentent un changement d’expression de la puissance militaire étatsunienne sans précédent. Cettemercenarisation de l’american way of war est désormais une tendance structurelle de la politique étrangère del’Empire et pourrait bien révolutionner à terme le visage même de la guerre. Cette thèse trace le récit historique deces armées privées, décrit les conditions politiques qui ont permis à ce nouveau marché de la guerre d’émerger etse propose d’analyser la portée sociopolitique de ce phénomène de mondialisation de la violence privée quant à laquestion de l’Etat. Cette question du retour du mercenariat à grande échelle dans la politique étrangère des Etats-Unis permet non seulement de former une hypothèse aiguë sur le déclin de la puissance militaire américaine maisaussi sur les évolutions de l’identité sociohistorique du monopole de la violence étatique. / Iraq and Afghanistan Wars have seen a massive return of mercenary companies of a new genre. The Westernmercenaries have transformed in less than twenty years from craft structures, linked to the post-colonial politics ofgreat powers, to a professional and industrial stage that tends to a growing transnationalization of their activities.From the blunders of the famous Blackwater to the involvement of CACI’s employees in the torture scandal inAbu Ghraib prison, through the activities of the sprawling Aegis, private military companies, everywhere on thebattlefield, have marked and labeled the story of these major wars of the early twenty-first Century. Crucial fact:this is the first time in the history of U.S. military operations that we are witnessing a shift in the demographics offorces in favor of the private sector. Product of the permanent war economy and overseas branches of themilitary-industrial complex, these companies represent an unprecedented change in expression of U.S. militarypower. This mercenarization of the American way of war is now a structural trend of the foreign policy of theEmpire and could eventually revolutionize the face of the war. This thesis traces the history of these privatearmies, described the political conditions that led to the birth of this new market of war, and analyzes the scope ofthis sociopolitical phenomenon of globalization of private violence. This return of mercenaries on a large scale inthe foreign policy of the United States not only help to form a decisive hypothesis on the decline of Americanmilitary power but also on the socio-historical changes of the identity of the State monopoly of violence.