This thesis aims at furthering our understanding of the constitutional structures and processes of sui generic associations such as the European Union. The thesis argues that the problematical constitutionalisation of the European Union has highlighted the limitations of the political thought that has served as the basis of political associationalism since the Treaty ofWestphalia (1648) and the publication of Thomas Hobbes' Leviathan (1651). These limitations have resulted in the European Union being described, for want of a better expression, as sui generis. The thesis advances the argument that in order to be in a position to understand constitutional relations in a 'non-statal' setting, what is needed is an alternative variant of political thought that is not based in or dependent on the societas canon that originates with Hobbes. One source of such political thought can be located in the work of Johannes Althusius (1557-1638) who, writing in the city of Emden in the Holy Roman Empire in the early 17th Century, described a constitutional structure of a political association that differs in significant features to the centralised state theories of the societas canon. The thesis also argues that the traditional concepts of constitutionalism and political association applied to sui generic constitutionalism are hampered by the inherent weaknesses of modem political and legal vocabulary. Despite being used ad infinitum in the constitutional discussions on the European Union, there is not a precise definition of either the term 'constitution' or treaty' in political or legal theory. Althusius' work avoids this weakness, due to the fact that the centralised state does not enjoy the same position it does in the societas canon, and so the need to classify 'intra' or 'inter' state relationships does not exist to the same degree. While taking the European Union as a workable model of a sui generic association, this thesis does not aim at solving the European Union's constitutional problems or offering a more suitable term to describe its nature. Rather, based on an analysis of Althusius' work, the thesis aims to offer an alternative understanding of the problems that result from the constitutionalisation of sui generic associations.

To the author's knowledge, this is the first systematic study of the concept of enmity in the political philosophy of Thomas Hobbes. Examining this important category does not only elucidate the concept itself, but also provides an opportunity to reconnect fragments of Hobbes's thought that are increasingly being treated as disparate subjects. It is suggested that the notion of enmity can shed further light on related aspects of his political philosophy, including human competitiveness, the roles of fear and trust, the evil of violent death, the status of rebels, and his theory of international relations. In addition, the subject invites a rethinking of Hobbes's place in the history of political thought. It is argued that he was among the first to make enmity a central subject of political philosophy. This seems to be related to Hobbes's break with the traditional notion of natural sociability, as a consequence of which he describes the natural condition of mankind as a war of all against all. Although Hobbes depicts human beings as natural enemies, he holds that enmity does not exclude the possibility of reconciliation; individuals can supposedly overcome their hostility through subjection to a sovereign. These views give rise to a dynamic distinction between public and private enmity, according to which outright hostility can be transformed into private rivalry if human beings renounce their natural right of war. Conversely, subjects become public enemies if they rebel against the sovereign. Hobbes's views on natural enmity and reconciliation also have important implications for his theory of international relations. This thesis particularly highlights the possibility that states can be decomposed and reassembled after a foreign invasion, which precludes wars of annihilation.

<p>The question this essay sets out to answer is what role God plays in Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan, in the book “Of a Christian Common-wealth”, in relationship to humans as moral beings. The question is relevant as the religious aspects of Hobbes’s thinking cannot be ignored, although Hobbes most likely had rather secular and sceptical philosophical views. In order to answer the research question Leviathan’s “Of a Christian Common-wealth” will be compared and contrasted with two contextual works: the canonical theological document of the Anglican Church, the Thirty-Nine Articles (1571), and Presbyterian-Anglican document the Westminster Confession (1648). Also, recent scholarly works on Hobbes and more general reference works will be employed and discussed. Hobbes’s views provide a seemingly unsolvable paradox. On the one hand, God is either portrayed, or becomes by consequence of his sceptical and secular state thinking, a distant God in relationship to moral humans in “Of a Christian Common-wealth”. Also, the freedom humans seem to have in making their own moral decisions, whether based on natural and divine, or positive laws, appears to obscure God’s almightiness. On the other hand, when placing Hobbes in context, Hobbes appears to have espoused Calvinist views, with beliefs in predestination and that God is the cause of everything. Rather paradoxically it not unlikely that Hobbes espoused both the views that appear to obscure the role of God, and his more Calvinistic views.</p>

The question this essay sets out to answer is what role God plays in Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan, in the book “Of a Christian Common-wealth”, in relationship to humans as moral beings. The question is relevant as the religious aspects of Hobbes’s thinking cannot be ignored, although Hobbes most likely had rather secular and sceptical philosophical views. In order to answer the research question Leviathan’s “Of a Christian Common-wealth” will be compared and contrasted with two contextual works: the canonical theological document of the Anglican Church, the Thirty-Nine Articles (1571), and Presbyterian-Anglican document the Westminster Confession (1648). Also, recent scholarly works on Hobbes and more general reference works will be employed and discussed. Hobbes’s views provide a seemingly unsolvable paradox. On the one hand, God is either portrayed, or becomes by consequence of his sceptical and secular state thinking, a distant God in relationship to moral humans in “Of a Christian Common-wealth”. Also, the freedom humans seem to have in making their own moral decisions, whether based on natural and divine, or positive laws, appears to obscure God’s almightiness. On the other hand, when placing Hobbes in context, Hobbes appears to have espoused Calvinist views, with beliefs in predestination and that God is the cause of everything. Rather paradoxically it not unlikely that Hobbes espoused both the views that appear to obscure the role of God, and his more Calvinistic views.

In his defense of negative freedom, Isaiah Berlin&rsquo / s main target is the political voluntarism of enlightenment rationalism which has paved way to totalitarian and authoritarian political regimes of the 20th century which brought the sacrifice of individual freedom. For Berlin, in contrast to Platonic realism of enlightenment rationalism in which there is a substantial belief in reason&rsquo / s capacity for giving us the knowledge of the supreme good, the nominalist foundations of negative freedom can provide us a secure grounding in the justification of the rights over the goods. By declaring the inviolable rights and relying on the principle of neutrality, negative freedom eliminates the risk of political voluntarism stemming from enlightenment rationalism or scientism. Since the 1980s, in Turkey, political and social oppositions to Rousseauian enlightenment of the Turkish state have deployed the epistemic and political tools of negative freedom. This appeal has aimed to open a legitimate space for the language of freedom as non-intervention under which each individual chooses his personal values without the fear of state intervention. In contrast to the interventionist claims of state, negative freedom, it has been believed that, has provided a secure grounding for the rights of individuals. Besides, the meta-ethical thesis of the incommensurability of human goods has also been employed for delegitimizing the substantial belief in the monism of the republican regime which relied on the assumption presenting the republican way of life as the supreme good. This missionary zeal for the re-construction of the republic on the premises of negative freedom has not, however, gone unchallenged. Against such identification of democracy with free-market and value pluralism, the republican front defends the restoration of the foundational ideals of the republic by returning to the substantial understanding of national sovereignty under the formulation of &lsquo / militant democracy&rsquo / . In this study, even though I agree with the nominalist epistemology of negative freedom which manifests a skeptic and agnostic attitude toward the power of reason and the insistence of negative freedom on the necessity of the priority of right, I have demonstrated the reasons behind the failure of negative freedom in justifying the priority of the right over the goods. Actually, my analysis has already displayed that concerning the radical consequences of the thesis of incommensurability, it is doubtful whether negative freedom can provide political conditions even for the cause of peace without the presence of absolute sovereign as suggested in Hobbes&rsquo / s political theory. At this point, I have argued that we should take into consideration the achievements of the ideal of autonomy in grounding the priority of the right over the good. Contrary to Berlin&rsquo / s distorted representation of autonomy, I believe that the critical rationalism of autonomy and its understanding of law will protect us not only from the metaphysics of enlightenment rationalism and scientism, but also from the metaphysics of historicism envisaged by Berlin&rsquo / s version of negative freedom.

This thesis aims to examine the question of freedom in its relation to political authority in social contract theories of Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) and Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778). In order to do that, discussions on human nature, evolution into political association and the foundations of legitimate governments are focused on. As the social contract theories of Hobbes and Rousseau mainly seek for rational justification of political obligation, the primary aim of this thesis is to analyze the nature of political obligation in order to discuss the relation between subject and sovereign in the framework of freedom.

Made available in DSpace on 2015-05-14T12:11:49Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 arquivototal.pdf: 3841252 bytes, checksum: c783faae083a01abb9f2971b41554d1f (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012-07-16 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / This work analizes the rising of the absolutist State, its causes and consequences, as well as its growing in the XVIIth England. We embase this work in the Thomas Hobes's political philosophy. He consideres that the State conception is linked to the might phenomenon. How is possible this conception in Hobbes? What bounds and functions has this might conception? To make explicit this conception, we'll take the historical context in which Hobbes developped your philosophical system. Following, we will analize human nature conception, nature laws, sovereignty and Civil State. / O presente trabalho objetiva analisar o surgimento do Estado absolutista, suas causas e consequências, bem como o seu fortalecimento na Inglaterra do século XVII, tendo por base a filosofia política de Thomas Hobbes, que considera o fenômeno do poder atrelado à sua concepção de Estado. Para isso questiona-se? Como a formulação do Estado é proposta por Hobbes? Quais as funções e os limites desse poder? Para esclarecer estas questões, analisa-se o contexto histórico em que Hobbes desenvolveu seu sistema filosófico, posteriormente, serão analisadas as noções de natureza humana, leis de natureza, soberania e estado civil.

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Cette thèse vise à cerner les raisons historiques, intellectuelles et affectives de l’importance que reçoit le problème de la vulnérabilité individuelle dans la culture politique des sociétés modernes. Il s’agit de tenter de comprendre pourquoi et par le concours de quelles transformations normatives et structurelles nous en sommes venus, comme citoyens, à attendre de l’État qu’il nous protège des affres de l’existence. L’oeuvre philosophique de Thomas Hobbes, fondée sur une anthropologie individualiste où l’homme apparaît mû par deux affects, le désir et la crainte, nous paraît être la première formulation théorique de ce problème de la vulnérabilité, et à ce titre, nous posons qu’elle a été déterminante pour l’institutionnalisation d’une rationalité politique proprement moderne. De manière à saisir quelles ont pu être les conditions de possibilité de la philosophie de Hobbes, de même que son influence sur l’imaginaire politique occidental, il nous faut tenter de comprendre non seulement pourquoi l’affectivité humaine a pu se trouver ainsi posée comme enjeu du gouvernement, mais comment elle est aussi liée, de manière générale, au fonctionnement des institutions sociales, lequel est historiquement contingent. Il en va ainsi d’une interrogation, que nous poursuivrons dans un relevé des principaux concepts à l’aide desquels Sigmund Freud, Norbert Elias, Max Weber et Michel Foucault ont pensé les modalités du façonnement social et historique de la subjectivité, et par le biais de laquelle nous espérons expliquer pourquoi le « type d’homme » sur lequel s’appuie le régime libéral moderne implique le vécu d’une expérience affective marquée par un rapport tendu entre le désir et le sentiment de la vulnérabilité.