People interact with each other rationally and irrationally. Standard economic theories assume that people act rationally, yet, behavioral economic theories indicate that sometimes people act irrationally because of the specific situation, their character, and many other factors. Culture plays a role in shaping people’s preferences, values, personalities, norms, and beliefs. That being the case, it is important to shed some light on the effect of different types of cultures on people’s decision-making behavior, in order to better understand human nature with regard to economic decisions. The ultimate goal of this thesis is to define how people from various cultures behave differently while making economic decisions, and to provide a better understanding for the motives behind people’s preferences towards decision-making. The first and second chapters of this thesis consider studies in experimental economics about the effect of introducing effort to the ultimatum game. The first chapter provides evidence that people’s decisions are driven by either hierarchy or property rights by comparing the results of three different cultures. The second chapter shows the impact of proposers’ effort in the ultimatum game, in which, culturally driven phenomenon impact on the proposers’ behavior. The third chapter investigates the impact of the Islam religion on experimental studies with regard to decision making and it shows that religious beliefs play an important role in shaping people’s preferences.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-03-15T19:40:17Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Gabriel Gaudencio do Rego.pdf: 1139897 bytes, checksum: b56f45681ad1b3adb1fbebc620c7562a (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-08-11 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / Games are useful tools to simulate social interactions of cooperation or competition and can be applied in conjunction with behavioral and electrophysiological techniques, such as Event Related Potentials (ERP) analysis. The Ultimatum Game (UG) is a well-studied game which can be used to investigate how individuals react to injustice. An initial value is divided between a proponent, who suggests a division rate of this value, and a respondent, who may accept or reject it. If the respondent accepts, both players gain the proposed value, and if he or she rejects, they gain nothing. The behavioral and electrophysiological results have demonstrated typical reactions in the game. The Medial Frontal Negativity (MFN), a component associated with the automatic processing of negative social feedback, and the P300, associated with attention and memory process, are two components commonly observed during UG. While the interaction between volunteers and proponents with typical development is well described, the interaction between volunteers and proponents with Down syndrome is still unknown. This research aimed to investigate differences in the behavioral data, MFN and P300 in participants playing the UG with a typical proposer and Down proposer. 32 subjects participated in the experiment. Scales of social desirability, moral identity, self-esteem and an implicit association test about Down syndrome were applied. The results showed similar behavioral patterns among proponents and previous data described in the literature. Regarding ERPs, the MFN was not detected and there was greater amplitude of P200 component for proposals of the Down. There was also greater amplitude of P300 for fair proposals of the typical proponent compared to the fair proposals of the Down, and of these two compared to unfair proposals of both. The amplitude of the P300 for proposals of typical was negatively correlated with self-esteem scores. Together, the results suggest that the presence of a player with Down syndrome might influence the perception and expectation of the participants about the game, and this effect could be extended to the interaction with the typical proponent. The absence of MFN suggests that participants do not perceived the unfair proposals as a social negative outcome and P300 suggests that the interaction with the typical proposer was more relevant to the participants. Moreover, this relevance was modulated due to personal characteristics of self-esteem. Further studies are suggested in this area to confirm the hypotheses suggested in the present research. / Os jogos simulam situações sociais relativamente simples de cooperação ou competição e podem ser aplicados conjuntamente às técnicas de pesquisa comportamentais e eletrofisiológicas como a análise de potenciais relacionados a eventos (ERP). Um jogo muito estudado é o Ultimatum Game (UG), que pode ser utilizado para investigar como indivíduos reagem à injustiça. Um valor inicial é dividido entre um propositor, que sugere uma divisão do valor, e um respondente que pode aceitar ou rejeitar. Caso este aceite os dois ganham o valor proposto, caso rejeite ninguém ganha. Os resultados comportamentais e eletrofisiológicos têm demonstrado reações comuns no jogo. Os ERPs mais comuns é o MFN, associado ao processamento automático de feedbacks sociais negativos, e o P300, associado a processos atencionais e de memorização. Enquanto a interação entre sujeitos de pesquisa com propositores de desenvolvimento típico já é bem conhecida, o efeito desta interação com propositores com síndrome de Down ainda é desconhecido. O presente buscou investigar diferenças no padrão comportamental, de MFN e P300 em participantes jogando UG com propositor típico e com Down. 32 sujeitos participaram do experimento. Foram aplicadas escalas de desejabilidade social, identidade moral, de autoestima e um teste de atitudes implícitas frente às pessoas com Down. Os resultados demonstraram padrões comportamentais semelhantes entres os propositores e a literatura. Quanto aos ERPs, o MFN não foi detectado e houve presença de componente P200 para propostas de Down. Houve também maior amplitude de P300 para propostas justas do típico em comparação as justas do Down e destes dois em comparação às propostas injustas de ambos. A amplitude do P300 para propostas do típico apresentaram correlação negativa com escalas de autoestima. Os resultados sugerem que a presença de um jogador com síndrome de Down influenciou a percepção e expectativa dos participantes quanto ao jogo, e que este efeito pode ter se estendido para a interação com o propositor típico. A ausência de MFN sugere que não houve processamento das propostas injustas como respostas sociais negativas e o P300 sugere que a interação com o propositor foi de maior relevância para os participantes. Além disto, esta relevância foi modulada em razão de características pessoais de autoestima. São sugeridos novos estudos no tema para confirmar as hipóteses aqui apresentadas.

Tomadas de decisões intertemporais envolvem escolhas entre opções, cujas consequências ocorrem em diferentes intervalos. Os tomadores de decisões tendem a preferir recompensas menores e mais cedo sobre recompensas maiores e tardias, refletindo em descontos de resultados atrasados. Dentre os vários fatores motivacionais, que podem influenciar nas Escolhas Intertemporais, pode ser considerado o papel moral como relevante. O modelo do Jogo do Ultimato é usado, especialmente, para examinar a interferência das ações éticas sobre o comportamento econômico. Entende-se a rejeição de uma oferta baixa nesse jogo como uma punição altruísta, aplicada como estratégia de recuperar uma cooperação justa. Os fatores psicológicos que motivam essa \"punição altruísta\" não são totalmente compreendidos. Para alguns, a punição altruísta é um ato ético de aplicação da norma de justiça, que requer autocontrole, enquanto outros afirmam que é um ato impulsivo, dirigido principalmente pela emoção. Nosso objetivo foi avaliar se a punição altruísta de participantes apontados no contexto do Jogo do Ultimato tem relação com o autocontrole nas distribuições de Escolhas Intertemporais. Um total de 100 participantes realizou o procedimento, individualmente. O software PAJUEI usado contém uma série de 27 ofertas no formato do Jogo do Ultimato e 130 séries de Escolhas Intertemporais. No Jogo do Ultimato, foram ofertados nove níveis de porcentagens entre 3-50% de três recompensas fixas (R$50,00; 100,00 e 150,00), em que o participante tinha duas opções de resposta: aceitar ou recusar. Na fase seguinte das Escolhas Intertemporais, foram apresentadas duas opções: uma de tempo de recebimento imediato e menor valor monetário e a outra com um tempo de recebimento tardio e maior valor monetário. Foram empregados cinco diferentes atrasos de recebimento vinculados a duas recompensas fixas (R$500,00 e 100.000,00); cada recompensa imediata variou em 13 valores entre 5% e 95% do valor fixo tardio. As punições altruístas foram determinadas pela taxa de rejeição das ofertas do Jogo do Ultimato. A partir das decisões feitas nas Escolhas Intertemporais, foram determinados os descontos temporais e categorizados os grupos com baixas, médias e altas escolhas imediatas. Descobrimos que os indivíduos que esperaram por recompensas maiores também rejeitaram ofertas menores, mesmo que positivas, por uma percepção de injustas. Esses indícios indicam que os participantes do estudo exerceram a punição altruísta em resposta à falta de cooperação, como uma reação de autocontrole. / Temporal decision making are choices between options which the consequences occur at different intervals. Decision makers tend to prefer smaller and earlier rewards over larger and later rewards, discounting on later results. Among the several motivational factors that may influence the delay-discounting task, the moral role can be considered relevant. The Ultimatum Game model is especially used to examine the interference of ethical actions on economic behavior. The rejection of a low offer in this game is known as an altruistic punishment, applied as a strategy to recover a fair cooperation. The psychological factors that motivate this \"altruistic punishment\" are not fully understood. For some, altruistic punishment is the ethical act of applying the rule of justice, which requires self-control. On the other hand, others claim that it is an impulsive act, driven primarily by emotion. Our objective was to evaluate if the altruistic punishment of participants pointed out in the context of the ultimatum game is related to the self-control in the distributions of the delay-discounting task. A total of 100 participants performed the procedure individually. The PAJUEI software contains a series of 27 offers in the format of the Ultimatum Game and 130 series of the delay-discounting task. In the Ultimatum Game, nine levels of percentages were offered between 3-50% of three fixed rewards (R $ 50,00, 100,00 and 150,00), in which the participant had two options to choose from: to accept or to refuse. At the next phase of the the delay-discounting task, two options were presented: one of immediate receiving time and smaller monetary value and the other with a late receiving time and greater monetary value. Five different collection delays were applied to two fixed rewards (R$ 500,00 and 100.000,00); each immediate reward varied in 13 values between 5% and 95% of the late fixed value. The altruistic punishments were determined by the rejection rate of the Ultimatum Game offerings. From the decisions made at the delay-discounting task, the temporary discounts were determined and the groups with low, medium and high immediate choices were categorized. We found that individuals who waited for larger rewards also rejected smaller offers, five positive ones, due to a perception of unfairness. These findings indicate that the studied participants exercised altruistic punishment in response to a lack of cooperation, such as a reaction to self-control.

Vilken bör vara den centrala sociala normen? Reciprocitet - ömsesidiga relationer till bådas fördel - jämförs med två andra alternativ: altruism och integritet. Altruism - från självuppoffring i nya testamentet och i mycken ideologi till agentneutralitet i modern filosofi - är den etik som oftast förespråkas. Integritetsetik drivs av mer fåtaliga förespråkare som en övergripande filosofi, men har ett omfattande stöd vad gäller individuella liberala rättigheter. Författaren penetrerar argumenten för och mot dessa tre alternativ. • Backas en etik upp med incitament blir den inte altruistisk - men kan en etik få tillräcklig effekt utan incitament?• Vore det bättre att förespråka en mindre ambitiös, men mer realistisk moral?• Finns det något tankemässigt fel i etisk egoism?• Altruistisk etik kanske inte skall ses som riktlinjer för eget handlande, utan försök att få andra att vara oegennyttiga och själv bli förmånstagare?• Kan en irrationell etik paradoxalt nog prestera rationella resultat?Den empiriska delen av denna avhandling undersöker sambandet mellan etiska åsikter och faktiskt beteende. Med ekonomiska spel som hjälpmedel penetreras korrelationen mellan försökspersonernas etiska uppfattningar och deras agerande i tre olika spel; ultimatumspel, diktatorspel och ultimatumspel med förhandling. Etiska ställningstaganden i skilda frågor visar sig vara korrelerade enligt den modell som kopplar ihop olika specifika åsikter till mönster. Försökspersoner klassas först i de tre etiska grupperna och sedan undersöks om det finns signifikanta skillnader i beteendet mellan grupperna. Det visar sig vara fallet, så ett första konstaterande är att etik inte endast är retorik. Den reciproka gruppen ställer signifikant högre krav för att delta i ett samarbete. När ett spelbeslut är en fråga om generositet finns signifikanta positiva samband med altruistiska värderingar. / <p>Diss. (sammanfattning) Stockholm : Handelshögskolan, 2002</p>

1. Introduction This dissertation consists of six chapters that span a very diverse set of topics. Yet, it has two unifying themes, economics and biology, that tie it together. The first four chapters present the principal findings from a project that was initiated jointly with David Cesarini and Magnus Johannesson, and that applies the twin method from behavioral genetics to economics. The last two chapters instead use a simple regression framework and evidence from biological anthropology to investigate recent claims regarding the effects of child bearing and past slave trades. 2. Genes and economics There is a small, but rapidly growing, literature studying the genetic and environmental origins of economic behavior and outcomes (Bowles et al., 2005; Beauchamp et al., 2011). Until recently, this literature focused exclusively on outcomes, and in particular income. In chapters 1-4 we instead focus on economic behavior and decision-making. Previous behavioral genetic work outside the domains of economics has changed the way that we think about a number of behavioral traits. In this literature it is typically found that i) variation is heritable ii) genetic factors are more important than family environment iii) a large fraction of variation cannot be explained by neither genes nor family environment (Turkheimer, 2000; Plomin et al., 2009). However, compared to many other disciplines, and psychology in particular, economics is lagging behind. In fact, as recently as 2009 the leading text book in behavioral genetics described economics as "still essentially untouched by genetic research" (Plomin et al., 2009, p. 353). Hopefully, the chapters in this dissertation can help to improve on this somewhat unsatisfactory state of the art. Chapters 1 and 2 study economic decision-making in the laboratory using the twin method. More specifically, we study the ultimatum and dictator games alongside risky gambles, using same-sex twin pairs as our subject pool. Given a few additional assumptions, the fact that identical twins have, in expectation, a twice as high coefficient of genetic relatedness as fraternal twins implies that we can study the genetic and environmental contributions to variation in behavior by studying twin correlations in observed choices. Chapters 3 and 4 apply the same method to actual portfolio choices associated with a far-reaching pension reform, as well as to a set of standard behavioral anomalies. Taken together, these four chapters provide strong evidence in favor of the hypothesis that genes influence economic decision-making. Thus, economic behavior does not appear to be much different from other types of behavior. 3. Economics and history The last two chapters of the dissertation turn to the past, rather than genes, in an effort to evaluate recent findings regarding two important welfare outcomes. In chapter 5 we investigate Nunn’s (2008) claim that past slave trades had a negative impact on current economic performance in Africa. By extending the sample period back in time we demonstrate that this relationship was not significant in 1960. In addition, by applying Nunn’s method to an episode of large scale slave raiding in Italy, we demonstrate that there exists a similar negative relationship across Italian regions, although it becomes insignificant when geographical controls are included. Intriguingly, going back to 1960, the coefficient on slave raids for Italy also has a similar time trend to that for Africa. Taking these facts, and our reading of the historical and anthropological literature, which is much different from that of Nunn, into account we do not find much support for the hypothesis that the African slave trades had a negative impact on current economic performance. Finally, chapter 6 investigates the large and negative relationship between giving birth to a son, rather than a daughter, and maternal longevity that was documented in a Sami hunter-gatherer population from Finland (Helle et al., 2002). Using a substantially larger sample of pre-industrial Swedish Sami we find no evidence in favor of such a relationship. 4. Brasklapp Five of the chapters in this dissertation (Ch. 1-4 &amp; 6) are slightly altered versions of previously published papers (Wallace et al., 2007; Cesarini et al., 2009 a, b; 2010; 2011). Unfortunately, the fact that earlier versions of the chapters were prepared as separate articles for five different journals means that they can at times appear both repetitive, and in terms of notation and formatting, somewhat inconsistent. I apologize to the reader for these inconveniences. / <p>Diss. Stockholm :  Stockholm School of Economics, 2011. Introduction together with 6 papers</p>

This thesis consists of four independent papers. The first two papers use experimental methods to study pro-social behaviors. The other two use theoretical methods to investigate questions about belief formation. The first paper “Communication: Content or Relationship?” investigates the effect on communication on generosity in a dictator game. In the basic experiment (the control), subjects in one room are dictators and subjects in another room are recipients. The subjects are anonymous to each other throughout the whole experiment. Each dictator gets to allocate a sum of 100 SEK between herself and an unknown recipient in the other room. In the first treatment we allow each recipient to send a free-form message to his dictator counterpart, before the dictator makes her allocation decision. In order to separate the effect of the content of the communication, from the relationship-building effect of communication, we carry out a third treatment, where we take the messages from the previous treatment and give each of them to a dictator in this new treatment. The dictators are informed that the recipients who wrote the messages are not the recipients they will have the opportunity to send money to. We find that this still increases donation compared to the baseline but not as much as in the other treatment. This suggests that both the impersonal content of the communication and the relationship effect matters for donations. The second paper, “Limbic justice – Amygdala Drives Rejection in the Ultimatum Game”, is about the neurological basis for the tendency to punish norm violators in the Ultimatum Game. In the Ultimatum Game, a proposer proposes a way to divide a fixed sum of money. The responder accepts or rejects the proposal. If the proposal is accepted the proposed split is realized and if the proposal is rejected both subjects gets zero. Subjects were randomly allocated to receive either the benzodiazepine oxazepam or a placebo substance, and then played the Ultimatum Game in the responder role, while lying in and fMRI camera. Rejection rate is significantly lower in the treatment group than in the control group. Moreover a mygdala was relatively more activated in the placebo group than in the oxazepam group for unfair offers. This is mirrored by differences in activation in the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) and right ACC. Our findings suggest that the automatic and emotional response to unfairness, or norm violations, are driven by amygdala and that balancing of such automatic behavioral responses is associated with parts of the prefrontal cortex. The conflict of motives is monitored by the ACC. In order to decide what strategy to choose, a player needs to form beliefs about what other players will do. This requires the player to have a model of how other people form beliefs – what psychologists call a theory of mind. In the third paper “Evolution of Theories of Mind” I study the evolution of players’ models of how other players think. When people play a game for the first time, their behavior is often well predicted by the level-k, and related models. According to this model, people think in a limited number of steps, when they form beliefs about other peoples' behavior. Moreover, people differ with respect to how they form beliefs. The heterogeneity is represented by a set of cognitive types {0,1,2,...}, such that type 0 randomizes uniformly and type k&gt;0 plays a k times iterated best response to this. Empirically one finds that most experimental subjects behave as if they are of type 1 or 2, and individuals of type 3 and above are very rare. When people play the same game more than once, they may use their experience to predict how others will behave. Fictitious play is a prominent model of learning, according to which all individuals believe that the future will be like the past, and best respond to the average of past play. I define a model of heterogeneous fictitious play, according to which there is a hierarchy of types {1,2,...}, such that type k plays a k time iterated best response to the average of past play. The level-k and fictitious play models, implicitly assume that players lack specific information about the cognitive types of their opponents. I extend these models to allow for the possibility that types are partially observed. I study evolution of types in a number of games separately. In contrast to most of the literature on evolution and learning, I also study the evolution of types across different games. I show that an evolutionary process, based on payoffs earned in different games, both with and without partial observability, can lead to a polymorphic population where relatively unsophisticated types survive, often resulting in initial behavior that does not correspond to a Nash equilibrium. Two important mechanisms behind these results are the following: (i) There are games, such as the Hawk-Dove game, where there is an advantage of not thinking and behaving like others, since choosing the same action as the opponent yields an inefficient outcome. This mechanism is at work even if types are not observed. (ii) If types are partially observed then there are Social dilemmas where lower types may have a commitment advantage; lower types may be able to commit to strategies that result in more efficient payoffs. The importance of categorical reasoning in human cognition is well-established in psychology and cognitive science, and one of the most important functions of categorization is to facilitate prediction. Prediction on the basis of categorical reasoning is relevant when one has to predict the value of a variable on the basis of one's previous experience with similar situations, but where the past experience does not include any situation that was identical to the present situation in all relevant aspects. In such situations one can classify the situation as belonging to some category, and use the past experiences in that category to make a prediction about the current situation. In the fourth paper, “Optimal Categorization”, I provide a model of categorizations that are optimal in the sense that they minimize prediction error. From an evolutionary perspective we would expect humans to have developed categories that generate predictions which induce behavior that maximize fitness, and it seems reasonable to assume that fitness is generally increasing in how accurate the predictions are. In the model a subject starts out with a categorization that she has learnt or inherited early in life. The categorization divides the space of objects into categories. In the beginning of each period, the subject observes a two-dimensional object in one dimension, and wants to predict the object’s value in the other dimension. She has a data base of objects that were observed in both dimensions in the past. The subject determines what category the new object belongs to on the basis of observation of its first dimension. She predicts that its value in the second dimension will be equal to the average value among the past observations in the corresponding category. At the end of each period the second dimension is observed, and the observation is stored in the data base. The main result is that the optimal number of categories is determined by a trade-off between (a) decreasing the size of categories in order to enhance category homogeneity, and (b) increasing the size of categories in order to enhance category sample size. In other words, the advantage of fine grained categorizations is that objects in a category are similar to each other. The advantage of coarse categorizations is that a prediction about a category is based on a large number of observations, thereby reducing the risk of over-fitting. Comparative statics reveal how the optimal categorization depends on the number of observations as well as on the frequency of objects with different properties. The set-up does not presume the existence of an objectively true categorization “out there”. The optimal categorization is a framework we impose on our environment in order to predict it. / <p>Diss. Stockholm : Handelshögskolan, 2010. Sammanfattning jämte 4 uppsatser.</p>

Diss. (sammanfattning) Stockholm : Handelshögsk., 2002. / Härtill 4 uppsatser.

Contexto: O Transtorno Bipolar (TB) freqüentemente está associado a um curso crônico e altamente incapacitante, com comprometimento das funções cognitivas e sociais. O prejuízo funcional no TB pode estar associado a um prejuízo nos processos de tomada de decisão. Ainda que o déficit cognitivo esteja bem documentado no TB, a avaliação de funções cognitivas específicas como a tomada de decisão econômica e a punição altruística ainda não foram bem estudadas. Nesse contexto, o Jogo do Ultimato (JU) é um teste único na avaliação da cognição social por compreender a avaliação da punição altruística, a qual é um importante mecanismo de adaptação social, funcional e do comportamento econômico. Objetivos: Avaliar o padrão de respostas ao JU e o comportamento de punição altruística em uma amostra de pacientes com TB e em controles sadios, além dos fatores clínicos e sociodemográficos associados aos diferentes padrões de resposta ao jogo. Métodos: Vinte e oito pacientes com diagnóstico de TB, eutímicos, e vinte e oito controles saudáveis foram avaliados utilizando o JU em um estudo comparativo. Todos os participantes do estudo fizeram o papel de respondedores no JU, recebendo ofertas injustas previamente estabelecidas. Os sintomas depressivos e maníacos foram avaliados através da Escala de Avaliação da Depressão de Hamilton de 17 itens (HAMD) e da Escala de Avaliação de Mania de Young (YMRS), respectivamente, devendo ser igual ou menor que 8 pontos. A história de traumas na infância foi avaliada pelo Questionário de Traumas na Infância (CTQ), e a impulsividade foi avaliada pela Escala de Impulsividade de Barratt (BIS). Resultados: Não houve diferença significativa na idade e no gênero entre os grupos. A taxa de rejeição das ofertas injustas do JU foi diferente entre pacientes e controles (53% nos pacientes e 28% nos controles). A história de traumas na infância estava relacionada à maior aceitação de ofertas injustas em pacientes (p=0,038), mas não em controles (p=0,691). Com o objetivo de avaliar a interação entre os dois grupos, o padrão de resposta no JU e a história de traumas na infância, uma análise log-linear foi realizada, mostrando uma interação estatisticamente significativa entre as três variáveis (p=0,038). Conclusão: As maiores taxas de rejeição ao JU indicam maior uso do mecanismo de punição altruística no TB, quando comparado aos controles. Por outro lado, a coexistência de TB com trauma na infância está associado a um menor uso do comportamento de punição altruística em comparação ao TB sem trauma na infância. , A flexibilidade de uso da punição altruística parece ser um importante mecanismo adaptativo segundo estudos prévios em população saudável. Dessa forma, os resultados sugerem que tanto o maior uso da punição altruística (maior taxa de rejeição no JU) no TB quanto a inibição de seu uso, que parece associado ao trauma, podem explicar em parte a dificuldade de adaptação social destes pacientes e seu comportamento econômico. / Introduction: Bipolar Disorder is frequently associated to cronic and disabling course, with impairment of social and cognitive functions. Functional impairment can be related to decision-making process impairment. Although cognitive deficits in Bipolar Disorder are well documented, assessment of specific cognitive functions such as economic decision making and altruistic punishment have not been well studied. In this context, the Ultimatum Game is a unique test in the study of social cognition by the assessment of altruistic punishment, which is an important mechanism of social adaptation, functioning and economic behavior. Objective: To compare Ultimatum Game responses and the altruistic punishment behavior between individuals with Bipolar Disorder and healthy controls and assess its associated factors. Methods: Twenty-eight euthymic Bipolar Disorder patients and an equal number of healthy controls were evaluated using the Ultimatum Game paradigm in a comparative design study. The entire sample acted as responders in the Ultimatum Game, receiving previously fixed unfair offers. Depressive and manic symptoms were determined by Hamilton Depression Rating Scale - 17 items and the Young Mania Rating Scale, respectively, and they must be 8 points or lesser. A childhood trauma history was recorded using Childhood Trauma Questionnaire, and impulsivity was evaluated by the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale. Results: There were no significant differences in age and gender between groups. The rate of rejection of unfair offers in Ultimatum Game was significantly different between groups (53% in Bipolar Disorder patients and 28% in healthy controls). History of childhood trauma was correlated with unfair offer acceptance in Bipolar Disorder (p=0.038), but not in controls (p=0.691). In order to explore the interaction between the two groups, the pattern of response in Ultimatum Game and the history of childhood trauma, a log linear analysis was carried out and showed a statistically significant interaction (p=0.038). Conclusion: The highest rates of Ultimatum Game rejections indicate greater use of altruistic punishment mechanism in Bipolar Disorder compared to controls. Besides, childhood trauma in Bipolar Disorder is associated with greater acceptance of the Ultimatum Game offers, indicating less use of altruistic punishment in comparison with Bipolar Disorder patients without childhood trauma. The appropriate use of altruistic punishment seems to be an important social adaptive mechanism, as previously reported by non-clinical population studies. Thus, results suggest that both the greater use of altruistic punishment (higher rate of Ultimatum Game rejections) in Bipolar Disorder and the inhibition of its use, which seems related to trauma, may explain in part difficulties in social adaptation and economic behavior of these patients.

Contexto: O Transtorno Bipolar (TB) freqüentemente está associado a um curso crônico e altamente incapacitante, com comprometimento das funções cognitivas e sociais. O prejuízo funcional no TB pode estar associado a um prejuízo nos processos de tomada de decisão. Ainda que o déficit cognitivo esteja bem documentado no TB, a avaliação de funções cognitivas específicas como a tomada de decisão econômica e a punição altruística ainda não foram bem estudadas. Nesse contexto, o Jogo do Ultimato (JU) é um teste único na avaliação da cognição social por compreender a avaliação da punição altruística, a qual é um importante mecanismo de adaptação social, funcional e do comportamento econômico. Objetivos: Avaliar o padrão de respostas ao JU e o comportamento de punição altruística em uma amostra de pacientes com TB e em controles sadios, além dos fatores clínicos e sociodemográficos associados aos diferentes padrões de resposta ao jogo. Métodos: Vinte e oito pacientes com diagnóstico de TB, eutímicos, e vinte e oito controles saudáveis foram avaliados utilizando o JU em um estudo comparativo. Todos os participantes do estudo fizeram o papel de respondedores no JU, recebendo ofertas injustas previamente estabelecidas. Os sintomas depressivos e maníacos foram avaliados através da Escala de Avaliação da Depressão de Hamilton de 17 itens (HAMD) e da Escala de Avaliação de Mania de Young (YMRS), respectivamente, devendo ser igual ou menor que 8 pontos. A história de traumas na infância foi avaliada pelo Questionário de Traumas na Infância (CTQ), e a impulsividade foi avaliada pela Escala de Impulsividade de Barratt (BIS). Resultados: Não houve diferença significativa na idade e no gênero entre os grupos. A taxa de rejeição das ofertas injustas do JU foi diferente entre pacientes e controles (53% nos pacientes e 28% nos controles). A história de traumas na infância estava relacionada à maior aceitação de ofertas injustas em pacientes (p=0,038), mas não em controles (p=0,691). Com o objetivo de avaliar a interação entre os dois grupos, o padrão de resposta no JU e a história de traumas na infância, uma análise log-linear foi realizada, mostrando uma interação estatisticamente significativa entre as três variáveis (p=0,038). Conclusão: As maiores taxas de rejeição ao JU indicam maior uso do mecanismo de punição altruística no TB, quando comparado aos controles. Por outro lado, a coexistência de TB com trauma na infância está associado a um menor uso do comportamento de punição altruística em comparação ao TB sem trauma na infância. , A flexibilidade de uso da punição altruística parece ser um importante mecanismo adaptativo segundo estudos prévios em população saudável. Dessa forma, os resultados sugerem que tanto o maior uso da punição altruística (maior taxa de rejeição no JU) no TB quanto a inibição de seu uso, que parece associado ao trauma, podem explicar em parte a dificuldade de adaptação social destes pacientes e seu comportamento econômico. / Introduction: Bipolar Disorder is frequently associated to cronic and disabling course, with impairment of social and cognitive functions. Functional impairment can be related to decision-making process impairment. Although cognitive deficits in Bipolar Disorder are well documented, assessment of specific cognitive functions such as economic decision making and altruistic punishment have not been well studied. In this context, the Ultimatum Game is a unique test in the study of social cognition by the assessment of altruistic punishment, which is an important mechanism of social adaptation, functioning and economic behavior. Objective: To compare Ultimatum Game responses and the altruistic punishment behavior between individuals with Bipolar Disorder and healthy controls and assess its associated factors. Methods: Twenty-eight euthymic Bipolar Disorder patients and an equal number of healthy controls were evaluated using the Ultimatum Game paradigm in a comparative design study. The entire sample acted as responders in the Ultimatum Game, receiving previously fixed unfair offers. Depressive and manic symptoms were determined by Hamilton Depression Rating Scale - 17 items and the Young Mania Rating Scale, respectively, and they must be 8 points or lesser. A childhood trauma history was recorded using Childhood Trauma Questionnaire, and impulsivity was evaluated by the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale. Results: There were no significant differences in age and gender between groups. The rate of rejection of unfair offers in Ultimatum Game was significantly different between groups (53% in Bipolar Disorder patients and 28% in healthy controls). History of childhood trauma was correlated with unfair offer acceptance in Bipolar Disorder (p=0.038), but not in controls (p=0.691). In order to explore the interaction between the two groups, the pattern of response in Ultimatum Game and the history of childhood trauma, a log linear analysis was carried out and showed a statistically significant interaction (p=0.038). Conclusion: The highest rates of Ultimatum Game rejections indicate greater use of altruistic punishment mechanism in Bipolar Disorder compared to controls. Besides, childhood trauma in Bipolar Disorder is associated with greater acceptance of the Ultimatum Game offers, indicating less use of altruistic punishment in comparison with Bipolar Disorder patients without childhood trauma. The appropriate use of altruistic punishment seems to be an important social adaptive mechanism, as previously reported by non-clinical population studies. Thus, results suggest that both the greater use of altruistic punishment (higher rate of Ultimatum Game rejections) in Bipolar Disorder and the inhibition of its use, which seems related to trauma, may explain in part difficulties in social adaptation and economic behavior of these patients.

Contexto: O Transtorno Bipolar (TB) freqüentemente está associado a um curso crônico e altamente incapacitante, com comprometimento das funções cognitivas e sociais. O prejuízo funcional no TB pode estar associado a um prejuízo nos processos de tomada de decisão. Ainda que o déficit cognitivo esteja bem documentado no TB, a avaliação de funções cognitivas específicas como a tomada de decisão econômica e a punição altruística ainda não foram bem estudadas. Nesse contexto, o Jogo do Ultimato (JU) é um teste único na avaliação da cognição social por compreender a avaliação da punição altruística, a qual é um importante mecanismo de adaptação social, funcional e do comportamento econômico. Objetivos: Avaliar o padrão de respostas ao JU e o comportamento de punição altruística em uma amostra de pacientes com TB e em controles sadios, além dos fatores clínicos e sociodemográficos associados aos diferentes padrões de resposta ao jogo. Métodos: Vinte e oito pacientes com diagnóstico de TB, eutímicos, e vinte e oito controles saudáveis foram avaliados utilizando o JU em um estudo comparativo. Todos os participantes do estudo fizeram o papel de respondedores no JU, recebendo ofertas injustas previamente estabelecidas. Os sintomas depressivos e maníacos foram avaliados através da Escala de Avaliação da Depressão de Hamilton de 17 itens (HAMD) e da Escala de Avaliação de Mania de Young (YMRS), respectivamente, devendo ser igual ou menor que 8 pontos. A história de traumas na infância foi avaliada pelo Questionário de Traumas na Infância (CTQ), e a impulsividade foi avaliada pela Escala de Impulsividade de Barratt (BIS). Resultados: Não houve diferença significativa na idade e no gênero entre os grupos. A taxa de rejeição das ofertas injustas do JU foi diferente entre pacientes e controles (53% nos pacientes e 28% nos controles). A história de traumas na infância estava relacionada à maior aceitação de ofertas injustas em pacientes (p=0,038), mas não em controles (p=0,691). Com o objetivo de avaliar a interação entre os dois grupos, o padrão de resposta no JU e a história de traumas na infância, uma análise log-linear foi realizada, mostrando uma interação estatisticamente significativa entre as três variáveis (p=0,038). Conclusão: As maiores taxas de rejeição ao JU indicam maior uso do mecanismo de punição altruística no TB, quando comparado aos controles. Por outro lado, a coexistência de TB com trauma na infância está associado a um menor uso do comportamento de punição altruística em comparação ao TB sem trauma na infância. , A flexibilidade de uso da punição altruística parece ser um importante mecanismo adaptativo segundo estudos prévios em população saudável. Dessa forma, os resultados sugerem que tanto o maior uso da punição altruística (maior taxa de rejeição no JU) no TB quanto a inibição de seu uso, que parece associado ao trauma, podem explicar em parte a dificuldade de adaptação social destes pacientes e seu comportamento econômico. / Introduction: Bipolar Disorder is frequently associated to cronic and disabling course, with impairment of social and cognitive functions. Functional impairment can be related to decision-making process impairment. Although cognitive deficits in Bipolar Disorder are well documented, assessment of specific cognitive functions such as economic decision making and altruistic punishment have not been well studied. In this context, the Ultimatum Game is a unique test in the study of social cognition by the assessment of altruistic punishment, which is an important mechanism of social adaptation, functioning and economic behavior. Objective: To compare Ultimatum Game responses and the altruistic punishment behavior between individuals with Bipolar Disorder and healthy controls and assess its associated factors. Methods: Twenty-eight euthymic Bipolar Disorder patients and an equal number of healthy controls were evaluated using the Ultimatum Game paradigm in a comparative design study. The entire sample acted as responders in the Ultimatum Game, receiving previously fixed unfair offers. Depressive and manic symptoms were determined by Hamilton Depression Rating Scale - 17 items and the Young Mania Rating Scale, respectively, and they must be 8 points or lesser. A childhood trauma history was recorded using Childhood Trauma Questionnaire, and impulsivity was evaluated by the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale. Results: There were no significant differences in age and gender between groups. The rate of rejection of unfair offers in Ultimatum Game was significantly different between groups (53% in Bipolar Disorder patients and 28% in healthy controls). History of childhood trauma was correlated with unfair offer acceptance in Bipolar Disorder (p=0.038), but not in controls (p=0.691). In order to explore the interaction between the two groups, the pattern of response in Ultimatum Game and the history of childhood trauma, a log linear analysis was carried out and showed a statistically significant interaction (p=0.038). Conclusion: The highest rates of Ultimatum Game rejections indicate greater use of altruistic punishment mechanism in Bipolar Disorder compared to controls. Besides, childhood trauma in Bipolar Disorder is associated with greater acceptance of the Ultimatum Game offers, indicating less use of altruistic punishment in comparison with Bipolar Disorder patients without childhood trauma. The appropriate use of altruistic punishment seems to be an important social adaptive mechanism, as previously reported by non-clinical population studies. Thus, results suggest that both the greater use of altruistic punishment (higher rate of Ultimatum Game rejections) in Bipolar Disorder and the inhibition of its use, which seems related to trauma, may explain in part difficulties in social adaptation and economic behavior of these patients.