Wissen, Wissenssammlungen und Wissensordnungen haben sich im Laufe der Jahre verändert, ebenso wie die Wissensproduktion, die Schaffung neuen Wissens, die Wissenschaft selbst. Der Baum des Wissens, arbor porphyriana oder auch arbor scientiae war seit der Antike eine gültige Metapher und das Klassifikationsschema für die Struktur des Wissens, die epistemologische Ordnung. So lehnte auch Denis Diderot die Ordnung seiner berühmten Enzyklopädie an die Baumstruktur des Wissens von Francis Bacon an. (...)

A philosophic account of quantum physics. The thesis is divided into two parts. Part I is dedicated to laying the groundwork of quantum physics, and explaining some of the primary difficulties. Subjects of interest will include the principle of locality, the quantum uncertainty principle, and Einstein's criterion for reality. Quantum dilemmas discussed include the double-slit experiment, observations of spin and polarization, EPR, and Bell's theorem. The first part will argue that mathematical-physical descriptions of the world fall short of explaining the experimental observations of quantum phenomenon. The problem, as will be argued, is framework of the physical descriptive schema. Part I includes in-depth discussions of mathematical principles. Part II will discuss the Copenhagen interpretation as put forth by its founders. The Copenhagen interpretation will be expressed as a paradox: The classical physical language cannot describe quantum phenomenon completely and with certainty, yet this language is the only possible method of articulating the physical world. The paradox of Copenhagen will segway into Kant's critique of metaphysics. Kant's understanding of causality, things-in-themselves, and a priori synthetic metaphysics. The thesis will end with a conclusion of the quantum paradox by juxtaposing anti-materialist Martin Heidegger with quantum founder Werner Heisenberg. Our conclusion will be primarily a discussion of how we understand the world, and specifically how our understanding of the world creates potential for truth.

Ce mémoire se veut un examen épistémologique de la thèse psychoévolutionniste de Leda Cosmides et John Tooby, principalement en ce qui concerne la modularité massive. Nous avons tâché de voir si la modularité massive permet de rendre compte des processus mentaux complexes en nous penchant plus particulièrement sur le cas des émotions. Nous explorons d'abord la thèse de Cosmides et Tooby en la distinguant d'avec d'autres conceptions comme l'écologie béhaviorale et en expliquant le rôle particulier que jouent les émotions au sein de la théorie. Nous analysons ensuite la thèse de la modularité massive et les différents arguments théoriques ou empiriques qui l'appuient, et évaluons finalement des critiques de la modularité émises par certains philosophes, dont David Buller. / In this thesis, we enquired about the philosophical and empirical foundations of the psycho-evolutionary model of Cosmides and Tooby, especially with regards their Massive Modularity Thesis (MMT). We wanted to determine whether the MMT can account for complex mental processes such as emotions. The thesis first gives a general explanation of evolutionary psychology (as opposed to behavioral ecology or sociobiology) then evaluates different lines of argument for MMT. We then turn to the philosophical criticism of MMT by David Buller.

Vers la fin du 19ème siècle, le moine et réformateur hindou Swami Vivekananda affirma que la science moderne convergeait vers l'Advaita Vedanta, un important courant philosophique et religieux de l'hindouisme. Au cours des décennies suivantes, suite aux apports scientifiques révolutionnaires de la théorie de la relativité d'Einstein et de la physique quantique, un nombre croissant d'auteurs soutenaient que d'importants "parallèles" pouvaient être tracés entre l'Advaita Vedanta et la physique moderne. Encore aujourd'hui, de tels rapprochements sont faits, particulièrement en relation avec la physique quantique. Cette thèse examine de manière critique ces rapprochements à travers l'étude comparative détaillée de deux concepts: le concept d'akasa dans l'Advaita Vedanta et celui de vide en physique quantique. L'énoncé examiné est celui selon lequel ces deux concepts pointeraient vers une même réalité: un substratum omniprésent et subtil duquel émergent et auquel retournent ultimement les divers constituants de l'univers. Sur la base de cette étude comparative, la thèse argumente que des comparaisons de nature conceptuelle favorisent rarement la mise en place d'un véritable dialogue entre l'Advaita Vedanta et la physique moderne. Une autre voie d'approche serait de prendre en considération les limites épistémologiques respectivement rencontrées par ces disciplines dans leur approche du "réel-en-soi" ou de la "réalité ultime." Une attention particulière sera portée sur l'épistémologie et le problème de la nature de la réalité dans l'Advaita Vedanta, ainsi que sur le réalisme scientifique et les implications philosophiques de la non-séparabilité en physique quantique. / Toward the end of the 19th century, the Hindu monk and reformer Swami Vivekananda claimed that modern science was inevitably converging towards Advaita Vedanta, an important philosophico-religious system in Hinduism. In the decades that followed, in the midst of the revolution occasioned by the emergence of Einstein's relativity and quantum physics, a growing number of authors claimed to discover striking "parallels" between Advaita Vedanta and modern physics. Such claims of convergence have continued to the present day, especially in relation to quantum physics. In this dissertation, an attempt is made to critically examine such claims by engaging a detailed comparative analysis of two concepts: akasa in Advaita Vedanta and vacuum in quantum physics. What is examined is the claim that both concepts would refer to the same reality — an enduring, subtle and all-pervading physical substratum out of which the constituents of the world come into existence and to which they ultimately return. Based on this study, the dissertation argues that comparisons relying on conceptual affinities alone generally fall short of establishing a productive dialogue between Advaita Vedanta and modern physics. Another approach is to bring into focus the epistemological limits respectively encountered by these systems when attempting to define the content of "reality-in-itself" or "ultimate reality." Emphasis is given to epistemology and the problem of reality in Advaita Vedanta, and scientific realism and philosophical implications of nonseparability in quantum physics.

Mémoire numérisé par la Division de la gestion de documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal

Contemporary philosopher of science Nancy Cartwright (b. 1944) has raised many an eyebrow with her books How the Laws of Physics Lie (1983) and The Dappled World (1999), among others. The primary task of this dissertation is to link her philosophy with that of Charles S. Peirce (1839–1914)—a link that includes Duns Scotus. My focus is especially on the criticism Peirce would have of Cartwright, and on the philosophical support he can offer her. The question is this: Given her stated philosophy of science, to what else must Cartwright be philosophically committed? This includes discussions of metaphysics, scholastic realism, laws of nature, and the very possibility of science. There are many striking similarities between Peirce and Cartwright, but I argue that he sees further and deeper into the metaphysical implications of her views on science. / Graduate

This thesis examines philosophical controversies surrounding the evaluation of medical treatments, with a focus on the evidential roles of randomised trials and mechanisms in Evidence-Based Medicine. Current 'best practice' usually involves excluding non-randomised trial evidence from systematic reviews in cases where randomised trials are available for inclusion in the reviews. The first paper challenges this practice and evaluates whether adding of evidence from non-randomised trials might improve the quality and precision of some systematic reviews. The second paper compares the alleged methodological benefits of randomised trials over observational studies for investigating treatment benefits. It suggests that claims about the superiority of well-conducted randomised controlled trials over well-conducted observational studies are justified, especially when results from the two methods are contradictory. The third paper argues that postulating the unpredictability paradox in systematic reviews when no detectable empirical differences can be found requires further justification. The fourth paper examines the problem of absence causation in the context of explaining causal mechanisms and argues that a recent solution (Barros 2013) is incomplete and requires further justification. Solving the problem by describing absences as causes of 'mechanism failure' fails to take into account the effects of absences that lead to vacillating levels of mechanism functionality (i.e. differences in effectiveness or efficiency). The fifth paper criticises literature that has emphasised functioning versus 'broken' or 'non-functioning' mechanisms emphasising that many diseases result from increased or decreased mechanism function, rather than complete loss of function. Mechanistic explanations must account for differences in the effectiveness of performed functions, yet current philosophical mechanistic explanations do not achieve this. The last paper argues that the standard of evidence embodied in the ICE theory of technological function (i.e. testimonial evidence and evidence of mechanisms) is too permissive for evaluating whether the proposed functions of medical technologies have been adequately assessed and correctly ascribed. It argues that high-quality evidence from clinical studies is necessary to justify functional ascriptions to health care technologies. / <p>QC 20150312</p>

Ce travail concerne principalement la notion de modularité hiérarchique et son utilisation pour expliquer la structure et le comportement dynamique des systèmes complexes au moyen de modèles modulaires hiérarchiques, ainsi qu'un concept de ma proposition, l’antimodularité, relié à la possibilité de la détection algorithmique de la modularité hiérarchique. Plus précisément, je mets en évidence la portée pragmatique de la modularité hiérarchique sur la possibilité de l’explication scientifique des systèmes complexes, c’est-à-dire, systèmes qui, selon une description de base choisie par l’observateur, peuvent être considérés comme composés de parties élémentaires discrètes interdépendantes. Je souligne que la modularité hiérarchique est essentielle même au cours de l’expérimentation visée à découvrir la structure de ces systèmes. Mais la détection algorithmique de la modularité hiérarchique se révèle être une tâche affectée par la démontrée intraitabilité computationnelle de la recherche de la meilleure description modulaire hiérarchique, et par l’excessive cherté computationnelle même des méthodes de détection approximatives de la modularité. L’antimodularité consiste en le manque d’une description modulaire appropriée aux exigences de l’observateur, manque dû ou à l’absence de modularité dans la description basique choisie du système, ou à l’impossibilité de produire algorithmiquement une description hiérarchique valide, en raison des dimensions excessives du système à évaluer en relation à la cherté computationnelle des méthodes algorithmiques. Je souligne, de plus, que la modularité et l’antimodularité dépendent du choix pragmatique d’une spécifique description de base du système, choix fait par l’observateur sur la base de ses objectifs explicatifs. Je montre comment l’antimodularité entrave la possibilité d’appliquer au moins trois types bien connus d’explication: mécanique, déductive-nomologique et computationnelle. Un quatrième type, l’explication topologique, reste par contre indemne. Ensuite j’évalue la présence de modularité dans les systèmes biologiques, avec ses possibles conséquences, et l’éventualité d’encourir dans l’antimodularité en biologie et en autres sciences: éventualité assez probable, au moins dans la biologie des systèmes. Je me permet enfin quelques spéculations métaphysiques et historiques plutôt libres. D’un point de vue métaphysique, l’antimodularité semble suggérer une position possible, selon laquelle les espèces naturelles sont modules qui ont été détectés et, en raison de l’intraitabilité computationnelle de la détection de la meilleure description modulaire hiérarchique, il est improbable qu’ils constituent la meilleure façon possible de décrire le monde, parce que la modularité des espèces naturelles assez probablement ne reflète pas la meilleure modularité possible du monde. D’un point de vue historique, l’utilisation croissante des méthodes computationnels pour la détection de la modularité ou pour la simulation de systèmes complexes, en particulier dans certains domaines de la recherche scientifique, suggère la possibilité d’imaginer une multiplicité de disciplines scientifiques émergentes, guidées par une production croissante et auto-alimentante d’explications potentiellement inintelligibles pour les capacités cognitives humaines. Cela, à mon avis, constituerait un changement historique dans la science, qui, s’il n’a pas déjà eu lieu, pourrait bien être sur le point de se produire. / This work is mainly concerned with the notion of hierarchical modularity and its use in explaining structure and dynamical behavior of complex systems by means of hierarchical modular models, as well as with a concept of my proposal, antimodularity, tied to the possibility of the algorithmic detection of hierarchical modularity. Specifically, I highlight the pragmatic bearing of hierarchical modularity on the possibility of scientific explanation of complex systems, that is, systems which, according to a chosen basic description, can be considered as composed of elementary, discrete, interrelated parts. I stress that hierarchical modularity is also required by the experimentation aimed to discover the structure of such systems. Algorithmic detection of hierarchical modularity turns out to be a task plagued by the demonstrated computational intractability of the search for the best hierarchical modular description, and by the high computational expensiveness of even approximated detection methods. Antimodularity consists in the lack of a modular description fitting the needs of the observer, a lack due either to absence of modularity in the system’s chosen basic description, or to the impossibility, due to the excessive size of the system under assessment in relation to the computational cost of algorithmic methods, to algorithmically produce a valid hierarchical description. I stress that modularity and antimodularity depend on the pragmatic choice of a given basic description of the system, a choice made by the observer based on explanatory goals. I show how antimodularity hinders the possibility of applying at least three well-known types of explanation: mechanistic, deductive-nomological and computational. A fourth type, topological explanation, remains unaffected. I then assess the presence of modularity in biological systems, and evaluate the possible consequences, and the likelihood, of incurring in antimodularity in biology and other sciences, concluding that this eventuality is quite likely, at least in systems biology. I finally indulge in some metaphysical and historical speculations: metaphysically, antimodularity seems to suggest a possible position according to which natural kinds are detected modules, and as such, due to the computational hardness of the detection of the best hierarchical modular description, they are unlikely to be the best possible way to describe the world, because the modularity of natural kinds quite probably does not reflect the best possible modularity of the world. From an historical point of view, the growing use of computational methods for modularity detection or simulation of complex systems, especially in certain areas of scientific research, hints at the envisioning of a multiplicity of emerging scientific disciplines guided by a self- sustained, growing production of possibly human-unintelligible explanations. This, I suggest, would constitute an historical change in science, which, if has not already occurred, could well be on the verge of happening. / Questo lavoro riguarda principalmente il concetto di modularità gerarchica e il suo impiego nello spiegare la struttura e il comportamento dinamico di sistemi complessi mediante modelli modulari gerarchici, nonché un concetto di mia proposta, l’antimodularità, legato alla possibilità del rilevamento algoritmico di modularità gerarchica. Nello specifico, evidenzio la portata pragmatica della modularità gerarchica sulla possibilità di spiegazione scientifica dei sistemi complessi, cioè sistemi che, secondo una descrizione di base scelta dall’osservatore, possono essere considerati come composti da parti elementari discrete interrelate. Sottolineo che la modularità gerarchica è essenziale anche nel corso della sperimentazione volta a scoprire la struttura di tali sistemi. Il rilevamento algoritmico della modularità gerarchica si rivela essere un compito affetto dalla dimostrata intrattabilità computazionale della ricerca della migliore descrizione modulare gerarchica, e affetto dal comunque elevato costo computazionale anche dei metodi di rilevamento approssimati della modularità. L’antimodularità consiste nella mancanza di una descrizione modulare adatta alle esigenze dell’osservatore, mancanza dovuta o all’assenza di modularità nella descrizione di base del sistema scelta dall’osservatore, o all’impossibilità di produrre algoritmicamente una sua descrizione gerarchica valida, per le dimensioni eccessive del sistema da valutare in rapporto al costo computazionale dei metodi algoritmici. Sottolineo che modularità e antimodularità dipendono dalla scelta pragmatica di una certa descrizione di base del sistema, scelta fatta dall’osservatore sulla base di obiettivi esplicativi. Mostro poi come l’antimodularità ostacoli la possibilità di applicare almeno tre tipi noti di spiegazione: meccanicistica, deduttivo- nomologica e computazionale. Un quarto tipo di spiegazione, la spiegazione topologica, rimane sostanzialmente immune dalle conseguenze dell’antimodularità. Valuto quindi la presenza di modularità nei sistemi biologici, e le sue possibili conseguenze, nonché l’eventualità di incorrere nell’antimodularità in biologia e in altre scienze, concludendo che questa eventualità è abbastanza probabile, almeno in biologia dei sistemi. Infine, mi permetto alcune speculazioni metafisiche e storiche piuttosto libere. Dal punto di vista metafisico, l’antimodularità sembra suggerire una posizione possibile secondo cui i generi naturali sono moduli che sono stati rilevati, e in quanto tali, a causa dell’intrattabilità computazionale del rilevamento della migliore descrizione modulare gerarchica, è improbabile che essi siano il miglior modo possibile per descrivere il mondo, perché la modularità dei generi naturali molto probabilmente non rispecchia la migliore modularità possibile del mondo. Da un punto di vista storico, il crescente utilizzo di metodi computazionali per il rilevamento della modularità o per la simulazione di sistemi complessi, in particolare in alcuni settori della ricerca scientifica, suggerisce la possibilità di immaginare una molteplicità di discipline scientifiche emergenti, guidate dalla produzione di spiegazioni potenzialmente inintelligibili dal punto di vista cognitivo umano, produzione che potrebbe iniziare ad autoalimentarsi, portando potenzialmente ad una crescita inarrestabile. Suggerisco che questo scenario cos- tituirebbe un cambiamento epocale nel campo della scienza, che, se non è già avvenuto, potrebbe benissimo essere sul punto di realizzarsi.

This thesis deals with philosophical questions, related to modern-day technologies and their impact on the future generations education. It specifically focuses on the paradigmatic transformation of everyday empirical experience (of the world) among people who were born into the digital age. They are called "digital natives", and they feel comfortable in the cyberspace´s infosphere. In terms of the philosophy of education, the "digital dementia" is understood as a principal inability and unwillingness to get out of personalised "bubble universe". The goal of education is (in this thesis) understood as a skill how to perform a personal turn-around and how to actively participate their own "philosophy of life", that means to seek for the meaning of the life and live autonomous and authentic lives.

Terence Hutchison's 1938 essay has been variously interpreted as introducing positivism, ultra-empiricism, and Popperian falsificationism into economics. Given Popper's well known anti-positivist stance, this state of affairs may seem puzzling. It might be presumed either that contradictions of some kind are involved in Hutchison's position, or that Popper's stance is not so far removed from logical positivism after all. In tins thesis the latter option is adopted and Popper and logical positivism is viewed as part of a wider 'logical reconstructionist' pre-Quinean philosophy of science. Yet this move may not, and should not, resolve all disquietude on the part of the reader. For, to the extent that Hutchison adopted those aspects of Popper which clashed with logical positivism, there is an inherent contradiction between the view that Hutchison introduced positivism and the view that he introduced Popper into economics. This provides us with the springboard we need for our thesis. For the contradiction is resolved once these views are recognised as turning Hutchison into a straw man. In the weak version of our thesis we argue that there has been an overemphasis on the positivist and Popperian elements in Hutchison's essay and a neglect of the extent to which it is concerned with economic methodology. In the strong version of our thesis we argue that Hutchison's essay is best viewed as a modern restatement of the inductivist-empirical-historical, as opposed to the deductivist-apriorist-fonnalist, approach in the long-standing methodenstreit in economics. In this restatement Hutchison draws on various elements of positivism and Popper to support a position that arises out of, and is specific to, the concerns of economic methodology, rather than to promote any particular philosophy of science in economics. Survey chapters on the philosophy of science with special emphasis on logical positivism, and on aspects of the history of economic methodology, enable us to evaluate the nature of Hutchison's essay and to substantiate our thesis. Thereafter we highlight the shortcomings of the traditional interpretations of Hutchison's essay pointing to how these have limited Hutchison's influence in economics. / Economics / D. Litt. et Phil. (Economics)